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A RESEARCH NOTE AND A COMMENT
ON THE RESEARCH METHOD AND OBJECTIVE
PREFACE SECTION P.l: THE NATURE OF THE ISSUE TO BE INVESTIGATED:
In the analysis of 'Fxpropriation and the Social Contract, with reference
to the relation between Citizens and their Property', it emerges that there
are (along with certain ancilliary investigations), three principal and
interrelated ideas, to the assessment of which this research has been directed:
1. Expropriation: The State's expropriation power permits it to interfere
significantly with any Citizen's rights to the private property he owns.
(For purposes of this exposition it is noted that the word 'Citizen'
is used in its sense as being correlative to the word 'State', and
not in its strict and more conventional sense of nationality). Since
a liberalist and naturalist stance is adopted by this writer, the
statutory (positivist) interpretation of expropriation is herein
supplanted by the common-law dominium eminens orientation, in an
effort to focus on what expropriation ought to be rather than to
state merely what it is at present. The inquiry is conducted largely
in the public law.
2. The Social Contract: The Social Contract, the foundation upon which
the State's dominium eminens power is based, is the agreement entered
into by all men in terms of which the State is created, and as a result
(ii)
of which the State's power of dominium eminens (in the public law forum),
and the Citizen's rights of property ownership (in the private law
forum), know existence. This Contract defines the nature of the agreed
relation between State and Citizen, and the derivative relation between
Citizens and their Property - a considerable jurisprudential debate
attaches to its parameters and extent •. The effect of the Social Contract
with particular reference to property law has been investigated.
(It is noted that the above is not intended as, nor does it constitute,
a definition of 'Social Contract'- no single definition is possible,
since each contractarian philosopher adopts a different inflexion).
3. The relation between Citizens and their Property: Since, in terms of
contractarianism, the institution of private ownership devolves and
derives from the Social Contract, this relation is best considered
from that standpoint, both in general jurisprudence, and in South
Africa in particular. The assessment in this regard translates the
public law principles into their parallel private law context.
(It is noted that 1 2 and') supra and infra correspond to Chapters 1 2 and 3
of this exposition).
Essential to these considerations (respectively) are:
1. the public law proprietary powers that attach to the State(l) in
consequence of the Social Contract, and specifically, the power
(1) Section 1.3.
(iii)
vesting in the State to expropriate private property. (2) Central here
are the origin, meaning, evolution and effect of the State's power of
dominium eminens(3) as enunciated by Grotius; the jurisprudential
debate that arises in this regard;(4) the definable characteristics(S)
of the power; the questions of nomenclature; (6) and the naturalist
view of the compensation entitlement upon expropriation. (7)
2. The Social Contract(8) foundation is assessed in the writings of
philosophers and jurists through the ages. From its early foun-
dations(9) to the emergence of a theory(10) of a Social Contract
proper(ll) in the seventeenth century, and thereafter to its reassess-
ment under the German school of transcendental idealism(l2) and in the
recent writings of John Rawls(l3) and others, the contractarian movement
(notwithstanding objections(l4) to its validity), yields a valuable
insight regarding the nature and limits of the State's public law power
f d
.. . (IS)o om~n~um em~nens.
3. The analysis of dominium eminens (and the other public law proprietary
power of the State) against the contractarian backdrop, contributes
significantly to the deeper understanding of the changing relation
between Citizens and their Property. (16) The Hegelian and naturalist
(2) Sections 1.1 and 1.4.
(3) Chapter 1. (4) Section 1.2 (S) Section 1.4.
(6) Section 1.S (7) Section 1.6 (8) Chapter 2
(9) Section 2.2 (10) Section 2.3 (11) Section 2.4
(12) Section 2.S (13) Section 2.6 (14) Section 2.1
(IS) Section 2.7 (16) Chapter 3
(iv)
standpoint(17) adopted herein of a synthetic tripartite historical
continuum unfolding in accordance with universalisable maxims, is
utilised to trace the development of private ownership and
° to f °t dOG and Rome,(18) °t 1 toexproprla lon rom l sawn In reece l s evo u lon
in mediaeval(19) and English(20) law, to the modern era with its
new vision of property. (21) Thereafter, the nature of the real
right of private ownership in South African law is considered, along
with its apparently antithetical correlation with the State's power
f d
o 0 ° (22)o omlnlum emlnens.





(22) Sections 3.6 and 3.7
PREFACE SECTION P.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
(v)
The following research objectives underlie this exposition:
(i) to inquire into:
(1) the origin, meaning, evolution and effect of dominium eminens as
the common law foundation for the State's expropriation power;
(2) the writings of contractarian theorists from the earliest times
to the present day, with a view to assessing in the forum of
property law whether the Social Contract affords a rationale
for the State, and for the proprietary rights of its Citizens;
(3) the changing nature of private ownership as a determinant of
the relation between Citizens and their Proeprty, and the
effect thereof upon the nature and exercise of the State's
power of dominium eminens.
(ii) to consider the thought framework presented by the jurists and
philosophers and by the traditions of legal history, and to
formulate a concept of dominium eminens reflecting these
understandings;
(iii) to develop and assess:
(1) the concept of dominium eninens in relation to the jurisprudential
debate attending its rationale, and in relation to the other public
law proprietary powers of the State;
(2) the theory of Social Contract (largely unexplored in prior
writings as a basis for dominium eminens), and to extend
this theory to the relation between State and Citizen, and
between Citizens and their Property in a South African
context;
(3) the nature of private ownership in South African law in
terms of a Hegelian model of history.
(iv) to analyse relevant research material, to assess the significance
of findings, to report on conclusions, to consider possible future
developments, and where appropriate, to make recommendations for
statutory reform.
(vi)
PREFACE SECTION P.3 RESEARCH METHODS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
(vii)
(1)
The examination of the Social Contract in the sphere of the expropriation
of private property, involves principally a jurisprudential inquiry into
the nature of the reciprocal contractarian undertakings between State and
Citizen, the powers thereby conferred upon the State, the limits upon their
exercise, and the nature of the institution of property thereby created.
The writings of inter alia Grotius, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel and Rawls are
accorded a high level of significance.
The inquiry herein conducted is, by its nature, interdisciplinary. 'Expropriation
and the Social Contract, with reference to the relation between Citizens and
their Property', requires not only the consideration of legal thought (within
jurisprudence, property law, legal history and philosophy, and to a degree(l)
within compensation theory), but also its synthesised assessment in relation
to relevant aspects of political theory and sociology. The range of reference
is accordingly considerable. (2)
To do justice to the broad development and yet to distil the essence of its
trend, a selective reading of texts must necessarily be undertaken. The
In regard to the limitation of scope introduced regarding expropriatee
compensability: although the broad questions of the entitlement in
principle (under naturalism) to compensation, and of the question of
expropriation without compensation, remain germane (vide Section 1.6
infra), it is noted that no detailed assessment of (positivist)
compensation provisions in expropriation statutes or enactments, is
brevitatis causa permitted (or even contemplated) in an enquiry of this
nature. Comprehensive positivist analysis in this regard has already
been undertaken in South African law in Gildenhuys Onteienin sre (1976),
Jacobs The Law OT Expropriation in South Africa (1982 , and Joubert
The Law of South Africa (1979).
(2) Cf Bibliography infra.
(viii)
caution has however been exercised not to consider in isolation an extract,
without conditioning the observations made by reference in general to the
body of writing in which it appears. For instance, in respect of Social
.Contract theory, the issue of civil disobedience is excluded from this
exposition, although it is against an awareness of this broad background
that the fundamental focus has been upon the proprietary consequences of
that Contract, since it is to these primarily that this exposition is
directed. Furthermore by way of illustration, naturalist criticism
requires an understanding of the positivist statutory framework - although
the analysis of enacted provisions is not undertaken in detail herein, the
present exposition has been entered upon against the background of the former
expropriatee compensability analysis conducted by this writer in 1981
(referred to in the Bibliography infra).
Where possible, reference has been made to primary texts to overcome
deficiencies in translation and reproduction (cf Section 1.5 supra). In
instances however where the consideration of translations or extracts has
been acceptable (by reason of their accuracy) or necessary (by reason of
the non-availability in South Africa of the original scripts), such reference
to primary texts has not been undertaken. Moreover, where possible, extensive
photostat copies of relevant materials have been made to facilitate research
and to permit annotation and cross-referencing - this technique has proved
to be invaluable to the writer.
The inquiry and research herein has been both theoretically-based and
practically directed. Reference to expropriation in a situational context
permits and enhances both an awareness of the significance of conclusions
(ix)
drawn, and in itself stimulates many of the questions pertinent to the
inquiry. In the University forum, the writer has worked under the
supervision of Professor A S Mathews and Professor L J Boulle of the
Howard College School of Law, University of Natal; in addition, certain
sections have been discussed with Professor R I Wacks, Mr M Robertson,
Mr P Glavovic and Ms R Naidoo - the writer appreciates greatly their
encouragement. The writer records also the substantial assistance and
guidance he has received from Dr A Gildenhuys of Gildenhuys and Liebenberg,
Pretoria, from Advocate MS Jacobs of Cape Town, and from three Senior
Counsel in Durban, with whom he has worked during 1979 to 1983. In his
association with Hattingh and Hattingh, Expropriation Consultants, and
D McCarney of King and Fuller, the writer has received furthermore the
opportunity to consult in expropriation law and some of the practical
experience he has gained in expropriation Matters. In total, the writer
has, through medium of these associations during the past five years, had
the opportunity to research (and recently to present) some forty
expropriation cases with claims in aggregate in the region of ten
million rand.
The writer expresses also his gratitude and appreciation to Mrs E Charnas
(for her tireless efforts in typing this thesis, and for the care and
concern she has shown in its presentation and completion); to certain
students at the University of Natal, who were engaged by the writer to
assist in many of the laborious tasks that attended the preparation of
this thesis (inter alia, P Lavoipierre, MFrantzen, H Woker, J Burns, C Bush
~
D Anderson, and several others); and to the Human Sciences Research Council
and the A. Baker Group of Companies (for the bursary and scholarshtp
assistance received).
(x)
Above all, however, the writer remains deeply indebted to Mr Aboobaker
Ismail, Chairman of the A Baker Group of Companies, who, against a lifetime
of experience in property development, and whose property has been
expropriated on more than twenty occasions, has contributed vastly to the
writer's understanding. In overview it is submitted that the importance
of assessing law in its operation cannot be overstated in its value as a
research medium.
PREFACE SECTION P.4 RESEARCH DIFFICULTY: LIMITED MATERIAL ON
EXPROPRIATION LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA
(xi)
The difficulty that any researcher in expropriation encounters in South
Africa, is that research materials in this field in South African University
libraries are severely limited. (1) "The writer has examined texts at the
Universities of Natal (Durban and Pietermaritzburg), the Witwatersrand and
Cape Town, and has requested some works from other University libraries.
In addition, the writer has obtained material from overseas sources. Were
it not however for the access granted to certain private libraries (inter
alia those of Dr A Gildenhuys and Advocate MS Jacobs, which were collected
by them for purposes of their publications in 1976 and 1982 respectively),
much of the research herein contained, would not have been possible. The
writer records accordingly his sincere gratitude for having been permitted
the use of these facilities.
Without in any-way denying the vast (positivist) merit in Dr Gildenhuys'
treatise Onteieningsreg, in Advocate Jacobs' work The Law of Expropriation
in South Africa, and in the article on expropriation by Dr Gildenhuys and
Advocate G Grobler in Joubert The Law of South Africa, it seems that
further research in South African expropriation law is justified and
necessary, particularly in respect of compensation and recommendations
for statutory reform.
(1) Cf Bibliographical Note infra at Section B.l of Bibliography.
CHAPTER 1
THE STATE'S POWER OF DOMINIUM EMINENS
IN THE WRITINGS OF HUGO GROTIUS
AND ITS PLACE IN MODERN SOUTH AFRICAN JURISPRUDENCE _
1
CHAPTER 1
THE STATE'S POWER OF DOMINIUM EMINENS IN THE WRITINGS
OF HUGO GROTIUS AND ITS PLACE IN MODERN SOUTH AFRICAN
JURISPRUDENCE
1.1 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE JURISPRUDENTIAL DEBATE
The nature and characteristics of the State's power of dominium eminens found
crystallisation and direct expression for the first time in the locus classicus
of the Roman Dutch jurisprudence, Grotius' De lure Belli ac Pacis:(l)
"The property of subjects is under the eminent domain
(dominium eminens) of the State, so that the State, or
he who acts for it, ~ay use and even alienate and destroy
such property, not only in cases of extreme necessity, in
which even private persons have a right over the property
of others, but for ends of public utility, to which ends
those who founded our society must be supposed to have
intended that private ends should give way. But it is
to be observed that when this is done, the state is bound to
make good the loss to those who lose their property, and to
this public purpose, he who has suffered the loss must if
needs be contribute." (2)(3)
In these words, Grotius amplified his statement in an earlier 1iber that
dominium eminens, the common law foundation of expropriation, is fundamentally
a public law power of the State:
(1) De lure Belli ac Pacis (1625): Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). The major
consulted translations of this work are WWhewell (1853), A C Campbell
(1901) and F Kelsey (1925) (tercentenary edition). Vide Section 1.5.3 at
footnote 8.
(2) Ibid, 111.20.7. Vide discussion under Section 1.4 infra. Cf 111.19.7
and 11.14.7-8 (quoted in Section 1.6 infra at footnote 3).
(3) This principle has found judicial recognition in South African law in
Corporation of Pietermaritzburg v Dickinson and McCormick (1897) 18 NLR
233 at 245. Also cf: Puffendprf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium, 1.1.19.
"Directe publica sunt actiones, ••••..... ,
in quibus comprehenditur dominium eminens,




As translated by Whewell (1853)(5)thisextract reads:
"Directly public are public acts ; (6)
among which is comprehended the eminent dominion
(dominium eminens) which the State has, for public uses
over its Citizens and the property of its Citizens."
Although the dominium eminens concept accordingly found its lexical origin
in Grotius' writings, (7) its jurisprudential foundation rests upon and dates
from the institution and the instituting(8) of the State itself.(9) In view
of the paucity of emphasis that has been accorded to the eminent domain enquiry
in modern South African jurisprudence, and in view of the extensive signifi-
cance in practice of the jurisprudential orientation adopted and its effects
on any expropriation legislation promulgated, it becomes essential that a
study of the origin, meaning, evolution and effect of the State's power of
(4) Grotius, op cit, 1.3.6(2).
(5) Ibid, Whewell translation (1853).
(6) Regarding the alternative translation of 'dominium eminens' as 'eminent
domain'(Campbell and Kelsey) and 'eminent dominion'(Whewell), it would
seem that the former is preferable - vide Section 1.5 infra.
(7) In Attorney General v Tamlane, Ch.D. 214 (1878) (England), it was noted
"The phrase itself (domini wn eminens) was not known to the
(early) common law nor was the doctrine itself in any other
application of it than was found in the exercise by the
Sovereign of the prerogative right to enter upon lands
for the defence of the realm."
(8) As is indicated in the last clause of. the first sentence quoted from
111.20.7. Refer footnote (2) supra.
(9) Cf the rationale of the Social Contract theorists discussed in
Chapter 2 infra.
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dominium eminens be undertaken, since such a study in the context of expropria-
tion will yield a greater understanding of the relation between Citizens and
their Property and a perspective into the living law in South Africa in its
operation. Authority and guidance must necessarily be sought inter alia in
the writings of contractarianphilosophers and jurists throughout the centuries,
and in modern times, within the naturalist parameters of the American legal
system, since it is in that country in particular that considerable focus
has been placed upon the study of eminent domain, in antithetical contrast
to the way in which this topic has been almost entirely ignored in South
African law. In American jurisprudence, where the provisions of the
Constitution elevate and almost sanctify property rights and interests,
and where property is a cornerstone of the capitalist ethic we espouse, it
is natural that the "oughts" in property legislation will there be indicated.
A consideration of the historical and natural law background to the controversy
regarding the origins of and authority for the State's dominium eminens permits
a most important insight. Historicity in the context of eminent domain and
the social contract is not prompted by antiquarian fervour nor by the potential
sterility of pure academia - rather, it is the tracing of the strands of legal
history through the millenia that enables a balanced assessment and an aware-
ness of the perpetual and dynamic historical continuum of which our contem-
porary stage represents merely a phase. We stand both at the conclusion of
the past development and at thethreshhold of the unfolding future movement,
and our present South African expropriation legislation evidences this state
of flux which characteristically attends any evolving branch of the law.
An historical/naturalist and comparative jurisprudential approach is accordingly
desirable to avoid the misplaced emphasis and unorientated stance consequent
4
upon a bland positivist(10) acceptance of the law as it is, and to avoid a
denial of the unfolding patterns which have emerged and which are also
presently manifesting themselves in the law.
Although the existence of the State's power of dominium eminens was highlighted
.in Grotius' writings and an attempt was made there to outline its nature and
characteristics, the origins of and authority for this power were not
conclusively nor satisfactorily determined by Grotius, and remain the subjects
of a continuing, albeit gradually resolving, jurisprudential debate. (11) Does
dominium eminens derive its existence and acquire its jurisprudential sub-
stance as a corollary and extension of the State's capacity as original
proprietor of all property; or does this power find its rationale in a theory
of a State expediency manifesting itself as a compulsory purchase~or
alternativelY,in a theory of a State formation based upon a Social Contract
arising in misty antiquity at the conception of any society?
The resolution of these questions is fundamental in natural law in the under-
standing of the concepts involved and in the assessment of the orientation
which our legislature ought to adopt. It is principally towards the
elucidation of the power of dominium eminens, (12) the Social Contract, (13)
and the relation between Citizens and their Property(14) that this exposition
is accordingly directed.
(lO)The positivist standpoint in South African law is severely criticised
herein. Vide eg Section 1.3.8 infra. As instances of positivist
acceptance in expropriation law, vide inter alia Joubert, The Law of
South Africa, Vol X p 8 para 10 first subparagraph thereof· and vide
5 Encyc.Soc.Sciences· p 494: 11 ••• which cOuld be easily reme~ied by
legislation if inconvenience (to the expropriator) should result
therefrom .... "
(ll)Vide Section 1.2 infra.
(12)0' d·' 11 ChIscusse prlnclpa y in apter 1 hereof.
(13) O' d·' 1 Clscusse prlnclpa ly in hapter 2 hereof. Vide also Section 1.2.5.
(14)r\.: __.. -1
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1.2 THE ORIGIN IN JURISPRUDENCE OF DOMINIUM EMINENS -
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS
1.2.1 INTRODUCTION
The jurisprudential origin of the power of eminent domain is a vital
determinant of the" nature of the relation of Citizens to their Property
and of the legislation that governs this relationship. On the one hand"
have existed the proponents of the state-centred theories of proprietary
power, even among whom controversy has arisen as to whether the original
proprietary theory(l) or the sovereignty theory(2) is the correct
jurisprudential interpretation. At the other end of the scale, debate
has taken place among the theorists of an individualistically-based, and
alternatively socialist, conception of property, and the competing Social
Contract theory(3) and the compulsory purchase postulate(4) respectively
emerge. Whereas the sovereignty approach has in modern times been widely
acclaimed as the resolution to this jurisprudential dilemma, it is
submitted herein, without denying the weight of the sovereignty interpre-
tation, that a far greater merit exists in the Social Contract view than
is frequently contemporarily recognised.
(1) Discussed in Section 1.2.2 infra.
(2) Discussed in Section 1.2.3 infra.
(3) Discussed in Section 1.2.5 infra.
(4) Discussed in Section 1.2.4 infra.
1.2.2 THE ORIGINAL PROPRIETARY THEORY
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Under the original proprietary theory, it is postulated that title to all
property vested originally in the State, and that any title passed to private
individuals was transferred only suspensively in that the State retained a
reversionary interest therein. The exercise of dominium eminens accordingly
entailed the invoking by the State of the necessary power to resume its
original proprietary title. Dominium in the private law was therefore
qualified by, subordinate to and co-existent with the State's power of
resumption of its former ownership. This idea is enunciated in Beekman v
Saratoga(l) where the Court held that there is a property right "remaining"
in the State to "resume" private property for public purposes:
"Eminent domain is the highest and most exact idea of
property remaining in the government, or in the aggregate
body of the people .... It gives the right to resume(Z) the
possession of the property in the manner directed by
the laws of the State, whenever the public interest
requires it."
The theory of an original and absolute State-based ownership of all property
is consistent with the naturalism of Grotius in that he saw the right of
private ownership as having been created by and deriving from an original
grant from the State. It was in the words of Puffendorf an "exercise of
transcendental property", (3) and to Huber an "overriding ownership". (4) The
(1) 3 Paige 45, 22 AM Dec 679, USA; (Emphasis added).
(2) In Agg's and Wharton's Law Lexicon (1911) eminent domain is similarly
defined as "the right which a government retains over the estates of
individuals to resume them for public use."
(3) De Jure Naturae et Gentium Lib VIII C.S S3.
(4) Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt (Gane transl.) 2.8.27.
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theory found consistency also with the writings of the early Social Contract
theorists, in that firstly the institution of private property could in their
view have known existence only from the time that the State itself had come
into being; and secondly, as a tacit condition of the original grant of
property by the State to the private sector, the right of State resumption
was agreed upon where public purposes sO predicated. Several of the early
United States decisions gave judicial endorsement to the proposition of a
reserved -right vested in the State:
"The right to take property for public use, or of eminent domain,
is a reserved right attached to every man's land, and paramount
to his right of ownership. He holds his land subject to that 5
right and cannot complain of injustice when it is lawfully exercised."(
Dominium eminens under the original proprietary theory accordingly involved
the reassertion by the State of its postulated original proprietary rights.
It is upon this basis that the power is defined in Black's Law Dictionary(6)
"the right of the State, through its regular organisation,
to reassert, either temporarily or permanently, its
dominium over any portion of the soil of the State on 7
account of public exigency and for the public good." ( )
as:
Against the background of the historical sources that the original proprietary
theory appears to find in both the Roman law and in the system of feudal
tenure in mediaeval Europe, the reliance that Grotius placed upon this
jurisprudential orientation can be understood. In Expropriation in Roman Law, (8
(5) Todd v Austin 34 Conn 78; vide also United States v Jones 109 US 513,
27 L ed 1015, 3 S Ct 346; Walker v Got1in 12 f1a 9; Harding v Good1ett
3 Yerg 40, 24 AM Dec 546.
(6) 4 ed 1951 p 616.
(7) Cf .. ~A h M1 h C 0l'lacveag v u tonoma ounty 126 re 417, 270 P 502 at 507 (1928, USA);
and Costa Water Company v Van Rensselaer 155 F 140.
(8) 1909 LQR 512 at 514 - 515.
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J WaIter Jones considers the ager pUblicus(9~hich "was not allocated to
individuals outright, but so far as it was occupied by them at all, was held
subject to some undefined superior right vested in the people and capable
of being invoked if the need arose". Whereas, as was generally the case in
primitive societies, "the Populus was (then) regarded as existing in, rather
than above, its members", the divergence that arose between private use and
public advantage promoted the idea that "the community as a whole had interests
distinct from the private interests of its individual members". The agrarian
reforms instituted in Rome were accordingly capable of interpretation as
"attempts rather to enforce an implied condition of re-entry attached to
grants made by the Populus, than to effect a compulsory transfer of ownership".
In mediaeval times, the original proprietary theory finds a congruence also
with the feudal structure of land tenure, in that all property was vested in
the Crown; and as pointed out by Blackstone in his Commentaries~lO)its
possession could be resumed by the Crown's exercise of its inherent prerogative.
Foreign judicial recognition exists in New York City Housing Authority v
MUller(ll~here it was held that "eminent domain is a remnant of the ancient
law of feudal tenure".
The original proprietary theory has been criticised in modern times and
several objections to its acceptability arise. Firstly, if the theory is to
have validity, then it must have general application. Since, for instance
(9)Cf: 3uckland Roman Law and Common Law 2 ed pp 83 and 95; ~<unkel An
Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History (transl. by Kelly)
2 ed pp 32, 44 and 46. The agrarian reforms (infra) took place in III BC.
(10)
(11)
2 Al. Comm pp 408 - 409.
155 Misc NY 681, 279 NYS 299.
9
. . (12) .
specificatio (defined by Sohm Institutes of Roman Law as "the working up
" )( 13) .Id' · t thof a thing into a new product wou constltute an exceptlon 0 e
proposition that all property was originally owned by the State, the general
theory loses credence. Secondly, as inter alia Seneca and Heineccius pointed
out, to kings belong the control of things, and to individuals their owner-
ship. (14) Furthermore, the theory tends to promote a social concept of
property that is not consistent with the liberalist and individualist ethic
and spirit of Western ideologies. In the words of Bloodgood v Mohawk:(15)
"Such a doctrine is bringing the social system back to the
slavish theory of Hobbes, which however plausible it may be
in regard to lands once held in absolute ownership by the
sovereignty, and directly granted by it to individuals, it is
inconsistent with the fact that the security of pre-existing
rights to their own property is the great motive and object of
individuals for associating into governments."
Jurisprudence moved accordingly towards an alternative rationale of dominium
eminens, and the competing sovereignty theory emerged. Although the sovereignty
theory is at present generally regarded as providing the principal rationale
for the dominium eminens power, the original proprietary approach retains a
limited relevance in South African law in view of the nature of the title
acquired(16) by the expropriating authority in instances of a divided ownership;
(12)p 324.
(13)
Discussed by Si1berberg and Schoeman The Law of Property 1983 ed
p 226 - 227.
(14)Heineccius, Elementia Juris Naturae- et Gentium Liber 1 Caput 8 Section 168.
(15)18 Wend (NY) 9, 31 AM Dec 314. Cf Section 3.5 infra.
(16)V'd th" . d1 e au orltles clte in Section 1.4 infra at footnotes 26 and 27.
Cf also the 'bundle of sticks' approach discussed in Chapter 3 infra.
and in Australia today, where expropriation is termed 'resumption'. (17)
(17) Cf Brown Some Aspects of the Law of Expropriation in Canada a~d
Australia (1973) (6) Ottawa Law Review 78; McVeagh and Babe Land
Valuation Casebook; O'Keeffe Legal Concept and Principles of-rand
Value; Gildenhuys op cit p 30. Vide also Burland v Metropolitan
Meat Industry Board (1969) 120 C L R 400 (Australia) and
Magennis v The Commonwealth (1949) 80 C L R 382 (Austra1ia)~
discussed in Brown Land Acquisition.
10
1.2.3 THE SOVEREIGNTY THEORY
11
Standing in contrast to the original proprietary view, is the sovereignty theory
under which it is postulated that dominium eminens is a power inherent in
sovereignty that is necessary for the fulfilment of the sovereign function, and
which is superior to all private property rights. (1) The sovereignty approach
is accordingly based upon the premise that the sovereign power is subordinate
to neither person nor property, and the Sovereign's justified exercise of its
power in the social interest knows no restriction. In West River Bridge
Company v Dix(2) it was held:
"In every political sovereign community, there inheres necessarily
the right and the duty of guarding its own existence and of
protecting and promoting the interests and welfare of the community
at large. This power and this duty are to be exerted not only in the
highest acts of sovereignty, and in the external relations of
governments; they reach and comprehend likewise the interior polity
and relations of social life, which should be regulated with reference
to the advantage of the whole society. This power, denominated the
'eminent domain' of the State, is, as its name imparts, paramount to
all private rights vested under the government, and these last are,
by necessary implication, held in subordination to this power and
must yield in every instance t.o its proper exercise. "
The existence of dominium eminens is an aspect of sovereignty that is founded
I , . 1 't d d' (3) It . t . d' t dupon po ltlca neceSSl y an expe lency. s eX1S ence lS pre lca e .
notwithstanding the absence of express legislative (or constitutional) provision,
(l)Cf Corpus Juris Secundum 1965 Vol 29A para 2 at 162.
(2)6 How US 507, 12 L ed 535.
(3)Joiner v City of Dallas 380 F Supp 754, affirmed 95 S Ct 614,419 US 1042,
42 L ed 2d 637, rehearing denied 95 S Ct 818, 419 US 1132, 42 L ed 2d 831:
"The power of eminent domain is an offspring of political necessity and is an
inherent power inseparable from sovereignty unless denied by fundamental la~
(4)Small v Ives 296 F Supp 448: "The right to condemn property is an inherent
aspect of sovereignty which does not depend for its existence on any express
provision of constitutional or statutory law; it is limited only by the
requirement that the State pay just compensation."
Dillon v ~ 230F. Supp 487: "The power of eminent domain is an inherent
essential attribute of sovereignty and is one of the prerogatives of the
sovereign to aid it in performance of its constitutional or organic activitie~
under premise and purpose that no person or group or classification 'of person~
should bear economic losses in operations of government, but that such losses
and expenses should be borne by all of the people equally and equitably."
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Seneca in De Beneficiis(5) adds: "Omnia rex imperio possidet, singuli domino".
Dominium eminens, as an unavoidable sequi tur of sovereignty, would accordingly
and in light of Grotius' writings, appear under common law undeniably to be
a power of the sovereign. (6) This is not however to say that the exercise of
that power by a non-sovereign organ or branch of government (as distinct from
the existence of that power in the political sovereign itself) does not
require statutory authority. In the Appellate Division decision in Joyce and
McGregor v Cape Provincial Administration, (7) it was held accordingly that:
"I entertain no doubt that in South Africa today all ri ghts(8)
of expropriation must rest upon a legislative foundation."
These dicta voice the crucial caveat that expropriation at common law is not
recognised in South Africa - extreme caution must accordingly attend the
application of general common law theoretical principles to South African
expropriation law. The exercise of the dominium eminens power by the admini-
strative branch of government (which is distinct from the legislative sovereign~
(5) 7.5.5.
(6) Cf Fourie v Minister van Lande en 'n Ander 1970 (4) SA 165 (0).
(7) 1946 AD 658 at 671. Per Schreiner JA (with a full bench concurring:
Watermeyer CJ Tindall JA Greenberg JA and Feetham AJA).
(8) Cf Winds of Change and the Law of Expropriation in (1961) 39 Canadian Bar
Review 542 at 543, where Professor Todd describes the State's expropriation
power as "the legal rules, derived from statutes and judicial decisions,
which regulate the rights and liabilities of persons authorised to acquire
property, without the owner's consent, for express statutory purposes."
In English law, Cf: I Blackstone Commentaries 139; 5 Encyc. Soc.Sci. 493.
Similar authority exists in the United States: vide 26 American Juris-
prudence p 643 at footnote 6; 31 West's Federal Practice Digest p 108;
Green Street Association v Daley 373 F 2d 1 (1967): neminent domain is
legislative in character"; Board of Commissioners v Blue Ribbon Ice Cream
and Milk Corporation 123 Ind 436, 109 NE2d 88:
"... the time manner and occasion of the exercise of the
power of eminent domain are wholly in the control and
discretion of the legislature .... ";
Aldridge v Tuscumbia 2 Stew & P (Ala) 199; Cf Section 1.6 infra at
footnote 11.
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and impliedly the expropriatee's compensation entitlement, both require a
prior legislative authorisation (and a delegated Ministerial approval
procedurally) before an expropriation can be lawful and before compensation
(permitted statutorily only) can be justified. The words "all rights of
expropriation" can perhaps also be read as "all rights flowing from
expropriation", in which sense they are an indication of the present
positivist approach in South African expropriation law. It is submitted
however that by these dicta, the Court d~d not purport to nor intend to deny
the existence in itself of the sovereign's eminent domain power nor of the
sovereignty of the legislature - to the contrary, the judgement contains an
implied affirmation of these aspects. Perspective is provided in American
Jurisprudence: (9)
" ... under the customary division of governmental power into
three branches, executive, legislative and judicial, the right
to authorise the exercise of the power (of eminent domain) is
wholly legislative, and there can be no taking of private property
for public use against the will of the owner without direct
authority from the legislature ... it is the province of the
legislature to prescribe how and by whom the power of eminent
domain is to be exercised ... the executive branch of the
government cannot, without the authority of some statute, proceed
to condemn property for its own uses .... Once authority is given,
the matter ceases to be wholly legislative. The executive
authorities may then decide whether the power will be invoked and
to what extent ... and the fixing of compensation is generally a (10)
judicial question?
(9)
Vol 26, SS, pp. 643 - 644.
(10) Precedents supporting these propositions are found in American law in the
following cases.
United States v Rauers DC Ca 70 F 748: "The power of eminent domain residing
in the Government is a legislative power, and no executive officer can law-
fully underta~e to exercise it in the absen6e of ~~press aathority conferred
by a (statutory) act."
Little v Lour River Public Power District 150 Neb 864, 36 NW 2d 261, 7 ALR
2d 255 "It is for the legislature to authorise the exercise of the power
of eminent domain and the mode of its exercise".
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In short, it is not the existence itself at common law but the exercise
(without statutory foundation and justification) of the power of dominium
eminens, that was denied in Joyce and McGregor's case supra. Consistently
with this judgment, it appears that dominium eminens, while being inherent
in the sovereign legislature, lies dormant in the hands of the executive
until called into motion by express legislative authority. (11) It is noted
that a contrary view was adopted in Cape Town Municipality v Abdulla(12) where
Baker J went as far as to suggest that failing a statutory right to compensation
the expropriatee will have a claim to compensation under the common law.
Although Baker J was prompted by naturalist considerations of equity and
fairness, although he was guided by the principle in Belinco v Bellville
Municipality, (13) and although his judgment is consistent with a wealth of
similar persuasive dicta, (14) it is submitted, with respect and great regret,
that the position in South African law appears to remain regulated by the
positivist rigour of Joyce and McGregor:(15)
,,~ .. (t)he passages in the Roman Dutch writers which say that
expropriation can only take place against reasonable
compensation ... appear to me to be ... irrelevant to the
construction of our modern statutes."
Of fundamental significance for purposes of this exposition, is the realisation
that this Appellate Division rejection of the Roman-Dutch authorities is
confined strictly to a denial of their relevance vis-a-vis compensation upon
(11)
Cf Rogers v Toccoa Power Company 161 Ga524, 131 SE 517, 155 p 680;
State by State Hi hway Commission v Stumbo 222 or 62, 352 P 2d 478, 2ALR
3d 1028; Corpus Juris Secundum 1965) Vol 29 A para 2.169.
(12)1974 (4) SA 428 and 1975 (4) SA 375(C); decision a quo reversed on appeal
1976 (2) SA 370(C).
(13)1970 (4) SA 589 (A) at 597(C): " .•. a leqislative intention to authorise
expropriation without compensation will not be imputed in the absence of
express words or plain implication"; discussed in Section 1.6 infra at
footnote 25.
Per Schreiner JA. A similar view was expressed by
Diemont J and Van Heerden J concurring) on appeal
(14)V·d S· .
1 e ectlon 1.6 lnfra at footnote
(15)1946 AD 658 at 671.
Van Winsen AJP (with
26.
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expropriation. Without here commenting upon the 'oughts' in this matter, it
is n.oted that expropriatee compensability in South Africa is regulated by
purely statutory formulae. These dicta do not however dispute or deny the
valuable jurisprudential orientation that the Roman-Dutch treatises provide,
nor do they nor can they question the desirability and value of undertaking
a -naturalist investigation of the nature and origins of the dominium eminens
D GOld h 0 h 0 1 k 0 0 0 (16) t tpower. When r ~ en uys ~n ~s monumenta wor nte~en~ngsreg s a es:
"Dis verkeerd om ... 'n vergoedingsplig uit die gemenereg te probeer haal,
soos gedoen is in Cape Town Municipali ty v Abdulla", he sides clearly in
favour of Joyce and McGregor, and although his interpretation is unquestionably
correct when tested against the prevailing South African law of expropriation,
it is noted with respect that such 'verkeerdheid' is consequent only in the
event of an antecedent positivist standpoint.
Nichols, on the other hand, in The Law of Eminent Domain(17) finds a basis
for the consistency of the sovereignty theory, with the principles of
naturalism. He suggests that dominium eminens as an attribute of sovereignty,
has developed from two schools(18) of legal thought. The first is based upon
the natural law theory that the State, without the need for any constitutional
vesting or limitation thereof, by its very na~ure, has an inherent and superior
right over private property. The second approach focusses on the idea of
sovereignty itself, and deduces that in order that the State may fulfil its
intended functions, the power of eminent domain must necessarily have known
(16)Page 10, footnote 69.
(17) Vol I, S 1.14, P 1 - 21.
(18) D0 d f h 0 fIscusse urt er ~n ra under S 1.2.5.
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existence eo instante with the inception of government. Nichols unfortunately
however does not undertake a reconciliation of these divergent movements.
It would seem that although the distinction between the two schools is fin~
significant differences do however emerge: firstly, in the rationale of
sovereignty adopted (the former infers the power 'prospectively' from the
nature of the State, whereas the latter deduces its existence 'retroactively'
from the functions the State must fulfil); secondly, in the treatment of the
question of compensation (whereas the former would regard compensation as a
reciprocal product and inescapable consequence under natural law, the latter
would require a legislative (or constitutional) positive assertion of the
right to compensation before this would be conceded as a limitation and a
sequitur of the exercise of the power of eminent domain); and thirdly, in
the limits or qualification attached to the extent of this sovereign power
(the former would qualify the exercise of the power with the naturalist
entitlement to compensation, while the latter would hold the power to be
unlimited and absolute). Contemporary South African expropriation law in
°t °to ° (19) Of t 1 1 dh d bOO1 S POSl lVlsm manl es s c ear y an a erence an su scrlptlon to the
second interpretation of the sovereignty theory of eminent domain. The
former is however herein supported as being more consistent with naturalist
and contractarian principles.
In recent times,although no clear guideline for the relative ranking of these
two schools within the sovereignty theory has surfaced, a consensus has
ultimately emerged among modern writers that the power of eminent domain
(19)
Vide inter alia Sections 1.3.8 and 1.6 infra and discussions thereat.
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is principally an attribute of sovereignty and is not a transcending
suspensive property right as was advocated under the original proprietary
theory. In Shoemaker v United States(20) it was held:
"It is now generally considered that the power of
eminent domain is not a property right or an
exercise by the State of an ultimate ownership in
the soil, but that it is based upon the sovereignty
of the State".
(20)
147 US 282, 37 L ed 170, 13 S et 361.
1.2.4 THE COt1PULSORY PURCHASE POSTULATE
18
In English law, the principal jurisprudential rationale for the Stat~'s
acquisition (by expropriation) of private property rests in the compulsory
purchase postulate,(1) which is based upon the following premises. Firstly,
although private ownership is clearly recognised, present English law
imbues it with a 'socialist' flavour; and it is considered subordinate to the
Sovereign's plenary power to compel the private owner to surrender up his
rights over his property (as distinct from surrendering up the object itself
of his right, as under the 'in rem' view in South African law) where the
public need so requires, and against payment of full compensation by the
State in consideration for such surrender. (2) Secondly, although in English
law the proceedings are necessarily deemed participative or derivative, they
are regarded as being involuntary - for this reason a 'sale' under compulsory
purchase is. not equivalent to a sale by traditiQ, yet the former differs
also from the original mode of acquisition that exists in an expropriation
in South African law. Thirdly, compulsory purchase proceedings could be
considered effectively to be in personam (and not in rem), since the right
acquired by the State under compulsory purchase is co-extensive with the
title of the person who was obliged to surrender his ownership - to this
extent, compulsory purchase gives expression to the 'nemo dat qui non habet'
principle of traditio. For this reason, under compulsory purchase, if the
identity of the owner is incorrectly determined, re-expropriation would be
(1) Vast statutory and judicial authority in this regard exists in English
law. Vide inter alia Cripps Compulsory Acguisition of Land and Davies
Law of Compulsory Purchase.
(2) In English law, 'full compensation'in early times extended even to the
recognition of a pretium aff~ctionis, eg in the case of the expropriation
of ancestral homes. South African law by contrast recognises only a
verum pretium - vide Union Government v Jackson ]956(2) SA 398 (A) at
347 D~E; Tongaat Group Limited v Minister of Agriculture 1977(2) SA
961 (A) at 964 D.
(3 )
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necessitated since the true owner would be entitled to oust the expropriator. (3)
(Contra: Kendrick v Community 8evelopment Board and Another 1983 (4)).
The compulsory purchase postulate accordingly would find a greater consistency
with the interpretation of dominium eminens as 'eminent dominion' than with its
Af 1 ,. d·' (
4)more accurate translation in South rican aw as emlnent omaln.
In the early part of this century, several noted non-British jurists (inter
alia McNulty in Eminent Domain in Continental Europe(5) and Lenhoff in
Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain; (6) also Dormatin Les Lois
Civiles dans leur Ordre Naturelle(7))took a stand in favour of the compulsory
purchase postulate, by reason of the consistency that its attendant
obligation to pay reasonable or full compensation, found with principles
of equity and fairness and with the natural law. Blackstone in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England(8) had previously said: "All that
the Legislature does (by compulsory purchase) is to oblige the owner to
alienate his possessions for a reasonable price." Early judicial authority
for this proposition that expropriation is merely a form of 'compulsory'
Contra: South African law, where although notice to the owner is required
under Section 7 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, provision is made
for deemed or constructive notice by publication in the Government
Gazette and local newspapers. Vide also Sections 13(1) and 22 which
provide that all unregistered rights (save as specified in Section 9(l)(d),
terminate upon expropriation. Furthermore, by operation of law under
Section 8, the property is released from all "mortgage bonds (subject
to the mortgagee's preferent claim against compensation awarded).
In Kendrick v Community Development Board and Another 1983(4) 532(W), it
was held that the purchaser of a sectional title unit under Act 66 of
1971 is not entitled to be served with notice of expropriation.
(4) Vide Section 1.5 infra, where this submission is discussed.
(5) (1912) 21 Yale Law Journal 556; Cf: Ibid
Purchase under the Law of England.
at 639: The Power of Compulsory
(6) (1942) 42 Columbia Law Review 596 at 601 et seq.
(7) S 1.2.13.
(8) Vol 1, 139 referred to in Gildenhuys, op cit, p 4.
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purchase or sale, came also in Grimbeek v Colonial Government:(9)
"L think it is clearly proved that the Expropriation of
land, though compulsory, is a sale, and when effected,
the ordinary results of the transference of ownership
follow, as a matter of course, just as in the case of (10)
voluntary sale and purchase."
It is respectfully submitted however that the Court in Grimbeek's case
erred in equating expropriation with sale. The element of compulsion
(9)1900 17 SC 200 at 204; vide also Graaff-Reinet Municipality v Jansen 1916
CPD 486; Durban Corporation v Lewis 1942 NPD 24; and City of Cape Town v
Union Government 1940 CPD 193, where Van Zyl JP held: " ••• (the expropri-
tion) •.. was a voluntary transaction on the part of the (expropriator),
and although it lacked the element of mutual agreement essential to
transactions of purchase and sale, it had so much of the quality of a
purchase that it will not be inept to describe it as a compulsory
purchase."
(lO)Further precedent in this regard can be found in the United States in the
following judgments - they are of interest since the United States like
South Africa, has now moved to a rejection of the compulsory purchase
postulate:
City and County of Honolulu v A S Clarke Incorporated 587 P 2d 294:
"A taking by the government in a condemnation action is
characterised as a ' sale', albeit a forced one".
In Langston v City of Miami Beaeh 242 So 2d 481 at 483 (Fla App 1971)
citing' Geist v State 3 Misc 2d 714 at 719 and 156 NYS 2d 183 at 189
(Ct Cl 1956)
"Moreover a condemnor attains the status of a bona fide
purchaser for value, and stands towards the owner of the
property as buyer towards seller"
City of East Orange v Palmer 47 NJ 307 at 314; 220 A 2d 679 at 683 (1966)
(Hall J)
"Indeed, such a thesis (that acquisition by condemnation should
be treated differently than by voluntary conveyance) could
bring about otherwise needless resort to the 'rugged remedy'
of condemnation, contrary to the universally accepted policy
of encouraging acquisition through voluntary conveyance".
Thompson v Willis 202 Okl 538; 215 P 2d 850:
" ... there is no element of duress in the reasonable
requirement of the government ... ",
In later American law, inter alia in San Antonio v Grandjean 91 Tex 430,
it has been held that "eminent domain is not a compulsory conveyance".
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present in the concept of a 'compulsory sale' defeats the very consensual
. (11)
essence of contract - from the Dlgest:
"nihil consensui tam contrarium est quam vis atque metus".
In Pahad v Director of Food Supplies and Distribution(12) (and in subsequent
decisions), (13)the Court has reaffirmed its rejection of the interpretation
of _expropriation as being a 'compulsory sale':
"The distinctions between the two concepts leap to mind.
Consensus is the foundation of sale .... A party to the
contract may safeguard his interests by seeing to it that
adequate provisions are incorpora~ed in it, for conventio
legem dat contractui. In expropriation that is obviously
not the case. The purchaser pursues his private interests
and is himself to blame if he ineptly neglects them; the
expropriating authority aims at the wellbeing of the State
or community and the conditions governing expropriation are
beyond the control of either party. Consequently, the
analogy of sale is completely false ... "
There are further distinctions between Expropriation and Sale. In the
exercise of its power of Eminent Domain, the State acquires original title(14)
to the land expropriated, whereas sale (by traditio) involves a voluntary and
participative acquisition of a derivative form of ownership. Also, whereas
(ll)Dig. 50.17 116.
(12)1949(3) SA 695 AD at 711.
(13)Simi1ar dicta can be found in Etna Stores v Van Eck NO and Another 1946
NPD 651-652 Ste11enbosch Divisional Council v Shapiro 1953 (3) SA 418 (C)
at 425; John Wilkinson and Partners v Berea Nursing Home 1966 (1) SA 791
(D) at 795 H to 796 C.
(14)In Ste11enbosch Divisional Council v Shapiro 1953 (3) SA 418 C at 423 G,
Van Winsen J held: "The expropriating authority does not derive its title
from the previous owner but obtains its title by reason of the consequences
attached by law to the operation of a valid notice of expropriation." Vide
also Grimbeek v Colonial Government 17 SC 200; Mathiba and Others v Mosche
1920 AD 354 at 364-5 (Juta AJA's judgment); Union Government (Minister of
Justice) v Bolam 1927 AD 467; Robertson v Ci ty of Capetown 1937 CPD 213 at
218; Hulett~Refineries Ltd v SAR&H 1945 NPD 413 at 418; Pahad v Directol
of Food Supplles and Distribution 1949 (3) SA 695 A at 700. Vide also
Section 1.3.7 infra at footnote 26 and Section 1.3.9 infra at footnote 6.
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a derivative acquisition of ownership requires the participation of the former
owner, this is not required in respect of acquisition by an original mode.
Compulsory purchase by contrast, although derivative, is deemed an involuntary
alienation of property.
English law, notwithstanding its adherence to the compulsory purchase postulate,
has too found unison with the Pahad judgement,in Kirkness v John Hudson and
Company(15) where it was held that it is "an illegitimate use of language to
say that because an acquisition under the procedure of the Land Clauses Act
is spoken of as a compulsory sale, therefore this transaction is a sale".
Davies, however, in The Law of Compulsory Purchase and Compensation, although
no longer equating the two concepts, turns the matter virtually full circle
again in the English law in supporting the analogy, notwithstanding the
Kirkness decision. His argument is contested however on the basis that the
"only cause of difference"he distinguishes is of so fundamental and material
a nature in South African law, that the validity there of the comparison must
collapse. Davies states:(16)
"The analogy wi th the common law goes much deeper than the
question of rules evolved by judges, thrown back on their
own resources by statute, when solving compensation disputes.
The entire process of compulsory purchase itself rests on an
analogy with common law. Indeed, virtually the only cause
of difference is the element of compulsion; and so the factors
which distinguish the process of compulsory purchase from that
of a sale of land by agreement at common law, are traceable to
the need for compulsion."
The principal distinction between the compulsory purchase postulate and the
other interpretations of the jurisprudential origin of dominium eminens, and
accordingly the primary basis upon which this postulate has been rejected
(15)1955 AC 696 at 709.
(16) At Chapter 2, para 3.
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outside the British legal system~rest in the final analysis in the nature of
the title that is acquired - a 'compulsory sale' can confer upon the
expropriator only the title (in whatever limited form it may exist) that the
expropriatee ('seller') has at the time of the expropriation ('sale'). Since
expropriation in South African law is clearly a proceeding in rem, and since
the title acquired is independent of the title of the expropriatee, defeat
. accordingly ensues for any attempt to apply the compulsory purchase postulate
in our legal system. (17)
(17)As appears in Lloyd's discussion of Compulsory Purchase in The Idea of
Law (at p 317 f), it is apparent that the distinctIon "(1n ·regard to
expropriation) that exists between South African and English law is
on both a substantive and a procedural level - caution must accordingly
attend the unconsidered extension of modern English principles to a
South African analysis.
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1.2.5 T4E SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY OF THE ORIGIN
IN JURISPRUDENCE OF DOMINIUM EMINENS
Social contract theory provides a valuable, yet seldom considered, (1)
rationale for the origin in jurisprudence of the State's power of dominium
eminens. This theory in one sense stands opposed to the sovereignty approach
in that it contests the proposition that proprietary power is State-centred,
submitting instead an individualistic conception of property. In
another sense, however, the social contract theory finds consistency with
the sovereignty interpretation, since both approaches hold as a common
denominator the view that the de iure sovereign necessarily has the power
to expropriate private property for public purposes where the public interest
so requires. A difference remains however in the fact that the social contract
proponents initiate the logical development from an origin one step antecedent
to that from which the sovereignty view commences - namely from the primary
level of the individuals who contract to aggregate into a collective, rather
than from the evolved level of the State that is thereby formed.
As regards the reconciliation of social contract theory with the other
alternative jurisprudential orientations possible: the social contract theory
would not be inconsistent with the original proprietary approach if the
(1 ) The Social Contract Theory is overlooked in, rejected by, or omitted
from all the major treatises on expropriation law that have been consulted.
In South African law, it is omitted by Gildenhuys Onteieningsreg, by
Jacobs The Law of Expropriation in South Africa, and by Joubert The Law
of South Africa Vol. X. A similar position exists in Cripps, Davies,
Orgel, Todd, et al. Nichols in The Law of Eminent Domain touches very
briefly on the theory, and rejects It.
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jurisprudential deficiencies (recorded supra) in the latter could know
resolution, since the State's reserved right of resumption could be
considered to have been impliedly agreed in the broad Social Contract;
secondly, with reference to the compulsory purchase postulate, reconciliation
with Social Contract theory is here less feasible since a fundamental conflict
arises between their respective socialistic and individualistic visions of
property, and in the nature of the title acquired by the expropriator.
Characteristic of the writings of pure Social Contract theorists (in
particular John Locke - see detailed discussions infra), (2) clothed in the
dictum of the Rationalist School, was an espousal of the individualist
ethic and a subscription to the sanctity of private property. Although
private property was unwaveringly conceded as being subject to the State's
dominium eminens, their jurisprudential conclusion that this proprietary power
stemmed from the -original sovereign - the body of individuals comprising
the society, or in what Rousseau termed the 'Volonte Generale'- is
justified under the thesis that each member of the organised community has
subordinated his personal rights~powers,duties and immunities to the needs
of government, by an implied consent embodied in the Social Contract.
Although the South African case law on expropriation contains no known
direct assessment of the Social Contract theory, fairly extensive debate
has taken place in the United States. No resolution of the arguments for(3)
(2) Vide Chapter 2 infra.
(3 ) United States judgments in support of the social contract theory include
the following - it is noted that authority is founa principally in New York
Secombe v Railroad Company 23 Wall 108, 23 L ed 67;
Embury v Connor 3 Conn 511;
Thatcher v Dartmouth Company 18 Pick 501;
Livingstone v Meyer 8 Wend 85;
Matter of Central Park 16 Abb 566;
Buffalo and New York Railway Company v Brainard 9 NY 100;
People v Smith 21 NY 595;
In re Ely Avenue in City of New York 217 NY 45, III NE 266;
In re Townsend 39 NY 171;
Matter of Fowler 53 NY 60;
In re City of Brooklyn 143 NY 596, 38 NE 983, 26 LRA 270.
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and agalnst( 4 )the theory appears to have emerged, al though it is noted that
certain of the State Courts (notably New York) lean slightly in favour of
an acceptance of this theory. This uncertainty in orientation has arisen
principally perhaps from the fact that si.nce the widely accepted sovereignty
interpretation shares a similar developmental trend to that of the Social
Contract theory (albeit a different starting point and accordingly a different
emphasis), the urgency attending further enquiry has perhaps been considered
to have been defused.
(4) Criticism of the view that Social Contract theory is based upon an implied
contract with the expropriatee (condemnee) is found in the following
judgments:
North Carolina Railroad Company v Lee 260 US 16, 67 L ed 104, 43 S Ct 2;
Omnia Communications Company Incorporated v United States 261 US 502,
67 L ed 773, 43 S Ct 473;
Garrison v New York 21 Wall 196, 22 L ed 612;
Liggett and Myers Tobacco Company v United States 274 US 215 71 L ed
1006, 47 S et 581; .
Park District v Zech 56 NO 431, 218 NW 18;
Dorsett v State 422 SW (2d) 828.
It is noted further that the general support in New York for the Social
Contract theory is not unanimous. It was held In re Public Parking
Place in Village of Hempstead 207 Misc 402, 140 NYS 2d 341:
"It seems clear that acquisition of real property
by condemnation possesses no contractual attributes",
although these dicta may well constitute more a denial of the analog:y
with the 'sale' than a denial of the Social Contract theory itself.
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There is a further important factor motivating the consideration of the
social contract theory as the jurisprudential basis and origin of the
eminent domain power, in preference to the sovereignty interpretation -
namely that dominium eminens is an incident of the grant of governmental
powers whether or not sovereignty is simultaneously conferred upon the
legislature. As Nichols notes in The Law of Eminent Domain:(5)
"A general grant of Governmental power, even wi thout
sovereignty and without any special mention
of eminent domain, carries the power to take or to
authorise the taking of private property for the
public, use."
It appears accordingly in Nichols' view that under common law, dominium
eminens is an inherent attribute of organised government that exists notwith-
standing the absence of sovereignty in that governing body, and underlies and
qualifies the otherwise-apparent indefeasibility and unviolability of private
ownership. In light of Nichols' assessment of the two schools of legal
thought discussed supra(6) regarding the sovereignty theory - the first being
based upon natural law theory and the second upon the idea of sovereignty
itself - it would accordingly appear that the former is jurisprudentially
preferable, notwithstanding the fact that it is the latter which is clearly
embodied in the South African positivist legal approach. The social contract
theory, in its expression of naturalist principles, presents an avenue which
permits the retention of the merit in the sovereignty approach without
requiring a continuing adherence to the positivism that frequently attends
its implementation under the second school - the adoption of Social Contract
theory as a jurisprudential justification for dominium eminens is accordingly
advocated.
(5)
S 1.14.4 p 1 - 32.
(6) Under Section 1.2.3 hereof; relating to Nichols Vol I, S 1.14, P 1 - 21.
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A detailed examination of the tenets of the Social Contract theory, and its
evolution in the writings of philosophers through the ages, is undertaken
infra(7) in order to elucidate its propositions and submissions, and in
order to promote a deeper understanding of the concepts upon which this
alternative rationale of the dominium eminens concept is centred.
(7) Vide Chapter 2 infra.
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1.2. 6 CO~KLUSIOt~ - A~l ASSESSrJ1E~IT OF THE CONFLICTING
J£JRISPRUOEHTIAL THEORIES rH PERSPECTIVE
Within the American legal system, the jurisprudential conflict between the
original proprietary theory and the sovereignty approach, has in modern
times found almost universal resolution in favour of the latter. The British
system has evolved a compulsory purchase postulate, which although suited
to the socialist norms prevailing there, lacks application in a South African
context. Or, Gildenhuys' treatise Onteieningsreg(l) considers these three
interpretations, and concurs impliedly and in advance with the opinion
expressed in Advocate Jacobs' later detailed study The Law of Expropriation(2)
that the right of expropriation is "a necessary incident of sovereign power."
South African law however has not yet contemplated the Social Contract as a
feasible and perhaps optimal rationale for dominium eminens, or if it has
done so indirectly, it appears to have rejected this interpretation and
omitted to furnish its consideration thereof.
Whereas the sovereignty approach has accordingly been widely acclaimed as the
solution to the jurisprudential dilemma, it is submitted in overview, without
denying the weight of the sovereignty interpretation, that a far greater merit
exists in the Social Contract theory as a rationale for the jurisprudential
origin of dominium eminens and as a vital determinant of the relation between
Ci tizens and their Property~ than is frequently contemporarily recognised.
To place dominium eminens and the Social Contract in perspective in the public
law forum in which they operate in South African law, a comparative analytical
assessment of other similar proprietary powers of the State is now undertaken.
(l)Gildenhuys, op cit, pp 2 - 6.
(2)J b . 2aco s, op Clt, at p .
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1.3 A COMPARATIVE ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE POWER OF
DOMINIUM EMINENS IN RELATION TO OTHER PUBLIC LAW
PROPRIETARY POWERS OF THE STATE
1.3.1 INTRODUCTION
The fuller understanding of the nature meaning and characteristics of dominium
eminens is promoted by its comparative consideration and analysis in relation
to the other public law proprietary powers of the State to which it bears a
resemblance.
It is stressed that the analytical assessment herein conducted not only is
confined to the proprietary forum and linked to eminent domain (for this
reason, a consideration of nonproprietary powers of the State, such as the
power to compel the rendition of personal services, (l)is excluded), but is
restricted also to the study of only those powers which have a direct
bearing upon and which elucidate the relationship of Citizens to their
Property (on this basis, no analysis is undertaken for instance of the State's
power to control the public domain, (2) albeit that such has a proprietary
nature). Where analysis is undertaken, it is noted furthermore that non-
proprietary aspects of the particular power in question are not included in
the detailed discussion infra, but are best understood by referral to other
(1 )
Examples under this power include conscripted military service;
attendance in Court as a subpoenaed. witness; and in certain foreign
jurisdictions, jury service; etc.
(2)
This power contemplates the control the State may exercise over the
various forms of res extra commercium, eg: the power to control the
res publicae vide Silberberg and Schoeman, The Law of Property 1983 ed,
17 et seq.
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sources - in respect of the power of destruction by necessity and the war
power, for instance, reference is not made to emergency powers legislation
in the broad (nonproprietary) sense, since a comprehensive and commendable
insight in this regard is available for instance in Mathews Law Order and
Liberty in South Africa. (3) The effect of the delimitation hereby placed
upon the scope of this analysis, is that an in-depth focus on the powers
germane to the theme at hand is permitted, and further that their develop-
ment in relation to dominium eminens is facilitated.
Although there is no numerus clausus of such powers, it appears that the
following are the principal members:
(1 ) D .. . (4)omlnlum emlnens
(2) The Power of Taxation (5 )
(3 ) The Police Power (6)
(4) The War Power(7)
(5) The Power of Destruction by Necessity (8)
(6) The Power of Forfeiture (9)
(7) The Power of Dominium over Bona Vacantia
(or the Power of Escheat)(lO)
(8) The Group Areas Power (sui generis in South Africa) (11) and
(9) The Power to construct public improvements. (12)
(3) Chapter XIII, p 221 et seq.
(4) S 1.4.
(5 ) S 1.3.2. (6) S 1.3.3. (7)S 1.3.4.
(8) S 1.3.5. (9) S 1.3.6. (10)S 1.3.7.
(ll), S 1.3.8 (J.2) S 1.3.9.
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The inquiry regarding the analytical comparison and contrast of dominium
.. . h (13) t . ft·' 1 . temlnens wlth other sue powers, cas s an ln orma lve c arl y upon
dominium eminens itself, (14) and has particular relevance to the relation
between Citizens and their Property. It is undertaken accordingly
(13)Report by the Judicial Council of Michigan on Condemnation Procedure
(January 1932) (quoted by Gildenhuys, op cit, pI): "Among the many
limitations or restrictions which have been placed upon private property,
are the taxing power, the police power, and the power of eminent domain.
These are some of the sledges which have struck away whole sections of
the Gibralter of private property, and made incessant inroads thereon."
In American jurisprudence, the power of escheat is frequently appended
to this list - vide Section 1.3.7 infra at footnote 2.
(14)To illustrate the importance of drawing a distinction between dominium
eminens and the other powers supra, it is appropriate to consider an
example which illustrates the difficulties which may arise. Under the
State's police power for instance (as is more fully elaborated under
Section 1.3.3 infra), the State is permitted to regulate the property of
its Citizens, but an analysis of the case law (particularly in the United
States), reveals that considerable dispute can arise where such "regula-
tion" assumes the features of "taking" of property under dominium eminens.
For this reason, it is vital to delineate the boundaries of each of the
respective powers.
5 Encyc. Soc. Sci. at 495-7 develops this example of the police power
further in the following words: "Difficulties begin when -it is attempted
to draw a sharp distinction between the police power and the power of
eminent domain The Supreme Court (USA) has ruled, for instance,
that property is held subject to a continuing public power to subordinate
it to public uses; eg: that by virtue of its power of regulating commerce,
the federal government may make river and harbour improvements in the
interest of navigation without liability for compensation for the removal
or damage of existing structures.
(Greenleaf Lumber Company v Garrison 237 US 251 (1915)).
In such a case the equitable claim to indemnification is extremely strong;
it is hardly less so if property is destroyed to check the course of a
conflagration, or if exposed herds of livestock are killed to check the
spread of contagious disease; it seems even stronger if cedar trees are
destroyed to protect apple orchards (Miller v Schoene 276 US 272 (1928)).
In all these cases, there is no appropriation, no transfer of title to
the public, and hence no exercise of the power of eminent domain .
..... (In short), what "taking" does the police power justify?"
Cf. Encyclopaedia Britannica Vol 8 p 336.
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infra along with an assessment of the proprietary aspect of each of these
powers. Since precedent for submissions, particularly in certain cases, is
either not available in South African law or is undeveloped, comparative
references are frequently made to persuasive American authority. (15)
(15) . .. ef: Van Zyl, Beglnsels van Regsvergelyklng
(Butterworths Durban 1981), in particular Section 3 (p 17ff),
Section 4 (p 34ff), Section 13 (p 196ff) and Section 25 (p?84 ff)
1.3.2 THE POWER OF TAXATION
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The State's power of taxation, the first of the public law powers considered,
comprises several branches, each of which may have proprietary consequences
and which may accordingly affect the relation between Citizens and their
Property. Incorporated within South Africa's system of taxation are inter
alia income tax, donations tax, immovable property tax (or rates), estate
duty, undistributed profits tax (in the case of companies), various non-
resident taxes (such as non-resident shareholders tax and tax on interest),
and other forms of levy or contribution required by the State from its members.
An extensive body of jurisprudential authority exists which explores the
parameters of the State's taxation power. John Stuart Mill in Political
Economy(l)draws a distinction between direct and indirect taxation, and
observes that the person taxed is not only intended but also expected to pay
the tax levied. Further classical authority can be found in Adam Smith's
celebrated canons of taxation(2)-fairness, certainty, convenience and
(1) Book V, Chapter 3: "Taxes are either direct or indirect. A direct tax
is one which is demanded from the very person who it is intended or
desired should pay it. Indirect taxes are those which are demanded
from one person in the expectation and intention that he shall indemnify
himself at the expense of another; such are the excise or customs. The
producer or importer of a commodity is called upon to pay a tax on it,
not with the intention to levy a peculiar contribution upon him, but to
tax through him the consumers of the commodity, from whom it is supposed
he will recover the amount by means of an advance in price."
This definition has received judicial approval in de Waal N 0 v North Bay
Canning Co Ltd 1921 AD 524-5; Clarke and Co v de Waal N 0 1922 AD 624;
and Bank of Toronto v Lambe 12 App Cas 575. The distinction between
direct and indirect taxes receives consideration also in Bell's SA Legal
Dictionary 3 ed p 803 and in the cases cited thereat.
(2 )
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776)
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inexpensiveness - but in recent times in South Africa as Kaufman(3) and
Livingston(4) have noted in relation to these principles, noncompliance
therewith by the legislature will not remove the citizen from his taxation
liability to the State. Meyerowitz notes this spirit of positivism in Income
Tax in South Africa:(5)
"Like any levy, income tax is essentially a creature of
statute, and whatever policy the Legislature may have
pursued in imposing the tax, it is the statute alone
which must be consulted in order to ascertain the tax
position of a person. "
The broad taxation liability of South Africans is accordingly regulated
today by statutes, provincial ordinances and municipal rates determinations.
In respect of income tax for instance, the position of the taxpayer is
governed by the provisions of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, as amended.(6)
Dominium eminens and the State's power of taxation bear a close resemblance
in certain respects - both powers have a jurisprudential origin in common-
law but are based today in their exercise upon statute; both are proprietary
powers which are invoked in the public interest, which serve a public need,
and which promote the wellbeing of the State and its members; in addition,
both it is submitted originate in or devolve from the Social Contract and
emerge as attributes or powers inherent in the political sovereign. It is
these similarities that have given rise to a measure of confusion, particu-
larly where principl€s applicable to only one of these powers, have been
(3)1954 Taxp 15.
(4)
. '1961 Tax£. 2
(5)Page 1 para 3.
(6)A detailed assessment of the prOV1Slons of this Act is contained in
Silke on South African Income Tax, Silke, Divaris and Stein, (Juta
and Company), Cape Town, 10 ed 1982.
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given an expression extended beyond the confines of that power into the
forum of the other. Grotius' words supra, (7) th~t when property is
expropriated, "the State is bound to make good the loss to those who lose
their property, and to this public purpose, he who has suffered the loss
must if needs be contribute", accordingly, when correctly understood, do
not suggest that the State has the power (under dominium eminens) to levy or
require a noncompensable contribution from its Citizen~fhis Property (as
would be the case under its power of taxation) - rather these words suggest
that the Citizen's expropriation loss (under natural law) is compensable, but
that, since compensation is made from the public revenues, the expropriated
Citizen contributes indirectly and as a constituent of the social collective,
via his taxation liability, to the compensation he as an individual receives
upon expropriation. It is accordingly that it has been held in County of
Mobile v Kimball(8) that:
"The power of eminent domain is clearly distinct from
the power of taxation, and each is goverened by its (9)
own principles."
The distinctions between dominium eminens and taxation emerge principally
in four respects - in whether exemption from the exercise of the power is
possible; in whether the power by its nature is alienable (subject to the
qualification infra); in whether a proportionate or disproportionate liability
accrues to affected individuals; and in whether a compensation claim against the
State results from the exercise of the power.
(7) Vide first extract under Section 1.1.
(8) 102 US 691, 26 L Ed 238.
Cf Section 1.6 infra at footnote 7.
(9)
Similar dicta exist in State v Texas City 303 SW 2d 780 (affirmed in
Winship v City of Corpus Christi 373 SW 2d 844), in which it was held:
"The inhibition against taking private property for public
use (without just compensation) has reference solely to the
exercise of the right of eminent domain and not to taxation
for public use."
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In regard to the first point of distinction - whether exemption from the
exercise of the power is possible - it is noted that under the provisions
of Section 10(1) of the Income Tax Act, (10) certain income is exempt from
taxation. (11) In addition, in accordance with the spirit of the broad
Social Contract in its operation in South Africa, as manifested in the
enactments of the legislature, the State has effectively under the provisions
of Sections 10(1)(c) and 10(1)(t), (12) contracted with certain institutions
and corporations considered beneficial to the public interest, (13) that their
receipts and accruals (and in some instances, their property) shall be exempt
from tax. No such similar provisions exist in expropriation legislation
exempting property from its subjection to the State's dominium eminens.
The second distinction - whether the power by its nature is alienable - appears
closely linked to the first distinction in that an exemption from the exercise
of the power prima facie seems similar in prqctice to an alienation of the
power. However it is noted though that whereas the State in its contract
with an institution (as supra) may contract away by statute its ability
to exercise its power of taxation, and although in the United States in
New Jersey v Wilson (14) it has been held that:
(10)S8 of 1962, as amended.
(ll)Vide discussion in Silke, 10 ed, Chapter 6, p 273 et seq.
(12)Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.
(13)For example, the CSIR, the South African Inventions Development Corporation,
the South African Gas Distribution Corporation Ltd, the South Atlantic
Cable Company (Pty) Ltd, the Armaments Development and Production Corporation
of South Africa Limited. SAFTO, the South African Special Risks Insurance
Association, institutions that " ... conduct scientific technical or
industrial research ... (subject to certain provisions) ... ", and others.
(14)7 Cranch 164, 3 L Ed 303. Vide also Gordon v Appeal Tax Court 3 How 133,
11 L Ed 529; State Bank of Ohio v Knoop, 16 How 369, 14 L Ed 977; Home of
the Friendless v Rouse, 8 Wall 430, 19 L Ed 495; Farrington v Tennessee
95 US 679, 24 L Ed 558; Mobile Railroad Company v Tennessee 153 US 486,
38 L Ed 793, 14 S Ct 968; Wright v Georgia Banking Company 216 US 420
J
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L Ed 544, 30 S Ct 242.
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U(g)enerally recognised in the case of an exemption from
taxation, there is an exception to the rule that each
legislature assumes the legislative power as fully and
completely as its predecessors,(lS) ... the legislature
may~ccordingly) ... bargain away a portion of the Sovereign
power of taxation as it is handed on to succeeding
legislatures .... u ,
it appears in South African law, notwithstanding this precedent, that the
power of taxation, like that of eminent domain, is inalienable; and that a
statutory suspension by the State of its ability to exercise its power of
taxation, does not constitute an irrevocable alienation in principle of
that power itself. As Cockram notes in The Interpretation of Statutes, (16)
U(t)he South African Parliament can make and unmake any
law whatever, with one exception - it cannot bind its
successors, for this would mean that a successor (17)
Parliament would not be sovereign. u
It would appear accordingly, that although both powers are delegable, (18)
neither power (contrary to the American dictum in respect of taxation) is
alienable, (19) and further, that a distinction in South African law between
the two powers on the basis of alienability, is more of appearance than of
(15)Cf F t·l·· C H d P k 97 US 9 2: er 1 lSlng ompany v year 65 4 L Ed 1036.
(16)Page 2, as supported by authorities cited at pp 2 - 3 thereof.
(17)A ··1 .. 1 . d· S D·· 1Slffil ar prlnclp e lS expresse ln teyn, le Ult eg van Wette.
(18) I t f . t d . .d· 1· h . .n respec 0 emlnen omaln, Vl e lnter a la t e provlslons of
Sections 4 and 5 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 (as amended)
regarding delegation.
(19)1 t f d .. . .n respec 0 Offilnlum emlnens, lt was held in Waynesburg Southern
Railroad Company v Lemley that "if there is any attempt to contract




In whether a proportionate or disproportionate loss or liability accrues to
affected individuals, a third distinction exists between the taxation power
and dominium eminens. Whereas under the former, all individuals contribute
in terms of the statutory formulae, under the latter the contribution is
required f~o~ a particular individual. Cooley in Taxation, (21) states:
"Taxation exacts money or services from individuals as and
for their respective shares of contribution to any public
burden. Private property taken for public use by the right
of eminent domain is taken not as the owner's share of
contribution to a public burden, but as so much beyond
his share. Special compensation is therefore to be made
in the latter case because the government is a debtor for
the property so taken; but not in the former because the
payment of taxes is a duty and creates no obligation to
repay, otherwise than in the proper application of the
tax. Taxation operates upon a community or upon a class
of persons in a community and by some rule of apportionment.
The exercise of the right of eminent domain operates upon an
individual and without reference to the amount or value
exacted from any other individual or class of individuals."
The fourth distinction - whether a compensation claim against the State
results from the exercise of the power - is alluded to in the above extract,
and is developed by Cheng in The Rationale of Compensation for Expropriation:(22
(20)The difference in this regard between American and South African law is
to an extent however reconciled in the judgment in Wellington Petitioner
16 Pick (Mass) 87, 26 Am Dec 361:
"All acts of legislation not in terms limited in their
operation to a particular term of time, are in legal
contemplation perpetual or declared to be in force
forever; which means, until duly altered or changed
by competent authority."
(21)Volume 1,3 ed, Sections 1 and 30, citing People v Mayor of Brooklyn 4
NY 419, 55 AM Dec 266.
(22)1958 and 1959 44 Grotius Transactions, 267 and 297
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U (Expropriated) individuals without their being in
any way at fault, are being asked to make a sacrifice
of their private property for the general welfare of
the community, when other members of the community
are not making corresponding sacrifices. The compensation
paid to the owners of the property taken, represents
precisely the corresponding contributions made by the rest
of the community in order to equalise the financial
incidence of this taking of individual property.u
Whereas the benefits of taxation flow from the fact of organised government
and accrue to all members of the State to the extent that they share in the
public works thereby executed, an expropriation without compensation would
prejudice disproportionately the particular expropriatee, and create a
benefit (unjustified in natural law) for the community at large. Just
compensation would accordingly appear a necessary consequence of expropriation
(subject in South African law to the positivist proviso of statutory
recognition), since the individual's disproportionate liability or loss is
determinable. (Compensation is regulated in South Africa under the formulae
in Section 12 of the Expropriation Act). The application of a similar principl
in respect of taxation although perhaps desirable in theory, is as Cooley(23)
observes, not feasible in practice:
UIf it were possible to do so, the taxes levied by any
government ought to be apportioned among the people
according to the benefit which'each receives from the
protection the government affords him, but this is
manifestly impossible. The value of life and liberty and
of the social and family rights and privileges, cannot
be measured by any pecuniary standard. U
In the final analysis, although dominium eminens and the power of taxation
share considerable similarities, the points of distinction that exist
between them are sufficiently substantial (as is the case too with the
(23)T t· Vol I 3 d 24axa lon e p . Cf: Puffendorf, De Officio Hominis et
et Civis 11 15 4 quoted in Section 1.6. infra at footnote 7.
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further powers that follow), (24) to preclude the direct transferability of
principles applicable in the one forum to the other, and to qualify
necessarily any unconsidered reliance upon an analogy between the two,
that may be advanced. Their similarities, and the use of considered
analogy between the two, however justifies the assessment of general
principles of taxation in relation to eminent domain.
(24) V·d . f1 e In ra.
1.3.3 THE POLICE POWER
4Z
The State's police power is far broader in its compass than its name may
suggest. It reaches beyond the 'policing' of the conduct of members of
the State and the enforcement (as an administrative organ) of the directives
of the legislative and judicial branches of government, extending into the
forum of property law in regulating the use to which private property may be
put. In this regard, zoning regulations are a significant example of the
police power. Rent control, licencing regulations, the law of nuisance,
price controls and the requirements relating to the contribution of
endowments(l) by subdividers and township developers, are inter alia
further such illustrations in South Africa in the field of property.
The determination of where the dividing line lies between what constitutes
an expropriation (under the power of dominium eminens), and what is merely
a regulated or controlled use of property (under the police power), remains
the source of a jurisprudential controversy(2) which will assume an
escalating significance as our society evolves socially and economically.
The considerable debate in this regard that has taken place in American
jurisprudence, presages the issues that South Africa will face; and the
attendant question as to whether a compensation entitlement ought to flow
from the deprivation that results, highlights the relevance of this inquiry.
(1) The American equivalent of 'endowment'is a 'dedication'eg in respect
of land made available for parks, roads, schools et al.
(2)
Goldblatt v Hempstead 369 US 590, 82 S Ct 987, 8 LED 2d 130 (1962)
"A determination of where regulation ends and taking begins is not
capable of any set formula or definition ... Each case must turn on
its own set of facts." Vide also Section 1.3.1 supra at footnote 14.
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Dominium eminens and the State's police power share certain common features -
. d t ·b f . t (3) d 1·both are lnherent an necessary at rl utes 0 soverelgn y, evo vlng upon
the State, it is postulated, from the Social Contract, (4) and vitalised in
(5)
their exercise by a prior legislative enactment; both recognise the
superior right of the community against the caprice of private individuals;(6)
(3)
(4)
In Miller v Board of Public Works 195 Cal 477 at 484; 234 P 382 at 383
(1925), it was held: "The police power of the State is an indispensible
prerogative of sovereignty and one that is not to be lightly limited."
People v Byers 153 Cal Reporter 249 "It is clearly established that the
property ownership rights reserved to the.individual ... must be subor-
dinated to the rights of society. It is now a fundamental axiom in the
law that one may not do with his property as he pleases; his use is
subject to reasonable restraints to avoid social detriment."
Vide Sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.5 supra and Chapter 3 infra. Also, Sheppard
v Village 300 NY 115, 89 NE 2d 619 at 620: "Cardinal in regard to the
police power is the principle that what is best for the body politic in
the long run, must prevail over the interests of particular individuals."
It was held further in Cities Service Oil Company v City of New York
5 NY 2d 110, 154 NE 2d 814: " ... we deem it fundamental that, in this
area of governmental action, what is best for the body politic in the
long run, must prevail over the interests of particular parties .... The
interference here complained of, must be shouldered by the plaintiffs
as one of the inconveniences to be borne by the individual for the
larger benefit of the community and the public in general."
(5) Southern Pacific Company v City of Los Angeles 242 Cal App 2s 21, 51 Cal
Reporter 197: " ... (it is a) well settled rule that the determination
of the necessity and form of zoning regulations, as is true with all
exercises of the police power, is primarily a legislative function."
(6) Astra Limited Partnership v City of Palo Alto 401 F Supp 962:
"Care must be taken to distinguish between the power of the
community to zone and the power to condemn. Both powers
have their source in the authority to act in the public
interest, but the nature of the public interest is
considered differently depending upon which of the two
powers the public authority is purporting to exercise."
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both. entail an exercise by the State of a vested right or power of control
over property within its jurisdiction (notwithstanding that the nature and
. (7)
extent of that exercise varies under each of the powers); and both involve
a sacrifice by or detriment to a particular individual contraposed by a
benefit to the community at large. (8)
Notwithstanding these similarities, crucial considerations differentiate
dominium eminens from the police power. Fundamental among these is the
realisation that the former deprives the owner of his title, while the
latter merely inhibits the owner in his exercise thereof, without any
alienation of that title. In the words of Nichols in The Law of Eminent
Domain:(9)
"The distinguishing characteristic between eminent
domain and the police power is that the former
involves the taking of property ... while the
latter involves the regulation of such property ... If (10)
(7) Potomac Sand and Gravel Company v Governor of Maryland
266 Md 358 293 A 2d 241: "The exercise of the police power is legitimate
to regulate and restrain a particular use, that would be inconsistent
with or injurious to the rights of the public, of property within the
control of the State."
(8) Gray v Reclamation District 174 Cal 622 at 642: "the police power of a
state embraces regulations designed to promote the public health morals
or safety ... even when attendant with inconvenience or peculiar loss,
... each member of the community is presumed to be benefited by that
which promotes the general welfare".
(9) 3 ed S 1 - 42 P 1 - 127.
(10) Similar dicta are found in Deputy v City of Waco 396 SW 2d 103 at 107
(!ex Supp) (1965). Vide also: Searles: Eminent Domain - A Kaleidoscope
Vlew, 1 Real Estate Law Journal, 226 at 234; Jahr Law of Eminent
Domain p 8f.
These are further distinctions between the powers. Mercer in Regulation
(under Police Power) v Taking (under Eminent Domain)(ll)considers the aspect
that the exercise of dominium eminens promotes a public purpose (directly),
whereas the police power prohibits a particular use of property in a manner
prejudicial to the public interest (and thereby indirectly serves the general
wellbeing). Alternatively expressed, "the taking of private property for
public use and for the public benefit under the power of eminent domain, is
distinguished from a proper exercise of the police power which is to prevent
a perceived public harm.,,(12) In short, a distinguishing criterion lies in
the motivation for the respective interferences with private property rights
- whether the property in its proposed prospective use is directly beneficial
to public purposes, or whether in its existing use it is injurious to the
general wellbeing. It was held accordingly in Franco-Italian Packing Company
v United States:(13)
"The distinction is that in the exercise of the eminent
dqmain power, a property interest is taken from the owner
and applied to the public use because such use is beneficial
to the public; and in the exercise of the police power, the
owner's property interest is restricted or infringed upon
because his continued use of the property is or would
otherwise be injurious to the public welfare."
In the words "taken" as opposed to "restricted or infringed upon" in the
extract supra, is indicated also another point of contrast(14) - whether or
(11)6 N C Central Law Journal 177 (1975).
(12)Fesjian v Jefferson 399 A 2d 861.
(13)128 F Supp 408.
(14)Cf: East Side Levee and Sanitary District v Mobile 279 III 319, 116 NE 727:
"The distinction between regulations and condemnations is that under the
latter doctrine, private property is appropriated for public use, while
under the former, the use and enjoyment of the property by its owner is
merely regulated by laws enacted to protect the general health and welfare."
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not ownership passes as a result of the exercise of the respective powers.
While under the provisions of Section 8(1) of the Expropriation Act, "(t)he
ownership of property expropriated in terms of the provisions of this Act
shall .•. on the date of expropriation J vest in the State", it has been held
generally that the exercise of the police power "does not take away from the
owner any title, essential dominium or ownership; these elements remain
inviolate.,,(15) It could furthermore be observed that whereas dominium
eminens has operation in the proprietary forum only, the State's police power
has operation over both persons and property, as discussed supra. (16)
Blust in the University of Illinois Law Review(17) formulates as 'rule of
unique attrition' as a basis for differentiating the powers in the context of
contributions or endowments required from subdividers and township developers.
Although it is noted that ownership of the contributed endowment passes to
the municipality, when viewed in the context of the broad township scheme, it
is submitted(18) that this illustration does constitute an exercise of the
police power (and not of eminent domain) notwithstanding the noncompliance
with the general feature of the police power regarding ownership. In
determining whether the developer (or the municipality) is to bear the cost
(lS)State v McKinnan 153 Me 15 133 A 2d 88 S
(16)V'd' d h Sl e lntro uctory paragrap 1.3.3.
(17)318 at 325, 1967.
(18)It is noted that this reasoning conflicts perhaps with the judgment in
Johannesburg City Council v.Victteren Towers (Pty) Ltd 1975 (4) SA 334 (W)
where it was held that a development contribution in essence is a tax.
By reason however of the fact (as discussed supra under 1.3.2) that
taxes are proportionately levied from the whole nation, the writer
respectfully disagrees with this judgment.
'T/
of essential services and new facilities, it was held in Department of
Public Works v Exchange National Bank, (19) that it is necessary to consider
whether the burdens or costs created are "specifically and uniquely attri-
butable to the developer's activity.". Blust' s concluding remarks appear
consistent with the South African approach:
"When the State takes property (under dominium eminens) to
meet the needs of the general public, it should compensate
the owner. When the State makes a person bear the cost of
his own activities, only regulation (under the police power)
occurs."
A final and prominent difference(20)between the exercise of dominium eminens
and that of the police power arises in relation to whether a compensation
entitlement accrues to the prejudicially affected party. Whereas compensation
upon expropriation is statutorily permitted under the provisions of Section 12
of the Expropriation Act, (21) the general rule is that regulatory interference
with private property rights under the police power of the State, is non-
compensable, (22) since any loss or detriment resulting is damnum absque
(19)334 NE 2d 810.
(20)Cf: Todd, The Law of Expropriation and Compensation in Canada p 24 - 5.
Vide also Section 1.6 infra, footnote 20.
(21)Act 63 of 1975.
(22)Lamm v Volpe 449 F 2d 1202: "Police power should not be confused with
eminent domain, in that the former controls the use of property by
the owner for the public good, authorising its regulation without
compensation, whereas the latter takes property for public use and
compensation is given."
~o
injuria,(23) being an incident of, or risk inherent in, the nature of
h· . t If (24)owners lp 1 se .
The fact that the State's police power can be exercised without giving rise
to a compensation entitlement, can be criticised from a standpoint of
equities and the natural law. To the contrary, an attempt is frequently
made to justify such non compensability upon the basis that "each member of a
community is presumed to be benefited by that which promotes the general
welfare.,,(25) This rationale is however subject to certain crucial
(23)East Rutherford Industrial Park v State 119 NJ Super 352, 291 A 2d 588
(and Union v Boldt 481 F 2d 1392):
"The exercise of appropriate regulatory powers has never been
held to constitute a taking which would require compensation
... Injuries resulting from such exercise must be considered
incidents of ownership and are damnum absque injuria".
Lees v Bay Area Air 238 Cal Reporter App 2d 850, 48 CaJ. Reporter
295: " •.. just compensation attached to an exercise of the power
of eminent domain does not extend to the State's exercise of its
police power, and damage resulting from a proper exercise of the
police power is simply damnum ahsque injuria."
Vide also: Independence Savings Bank v 290 Madison Corporation
167 NJ Super 473, 401 A 2d 259; Happy, Damnum Absque Injuria:
When Private Property may be damaged without Compensation 36
Missouri Law Review 453 (1971); Cities Service Oil Corporation
v City of New York 5 NY 2d 110, 154 NE 2d 814.
(24)
In People ex reI. Department of Public Works v Ayon 54 Cal 2d 217 at
224, 5 Cal Reporter 151 at 154, 352 P 2d 519 at 522, it was held:
" ... the exercise of the police power ... is simply a
risk the property owner assumes when he lives in
modern society under modern conditions."
(25)Gray v Reclamation District 174 Cal 622 at 642 (1917); vide also:
CSO-Railway v Drainage Commissioners 200 US 561 at 593 (1906).
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deficiencies - firstly, this reasoning, if endorsed, could apply equally
well to the exclusion of compensation upon expropriation; secondly, the
share of the prejudiced party in the general benefits is so disproportionate
in relation to his contribution, as almost to necessitate the payment of
. (26)compensatl.on.
American jurisprudence has accordingly evolved the principle that where a
regulatory interference with the use of property, although in form falling
short of an exercise of the power of dominium eminens, is in fact and in
substance so extensive an inroad into private ownership as to constitute a
'taking', then the prejudiced owner has available to him the procedural
remedy of 'inverse condemnation', (27) whereby it is he (and not the
(26) In HFH Ltd v Superior Court (116 Cal Reporter 436), it was held:
"the loss to the individual property owner (may be) so great
that he is forced to bear more than his fair share of the
improvement of the public welfare ... individual property
owners should not reasonably be forced to carry the cost
of achieving goals which are to the benefit of the entire
community ... it is to be expected that the public will
bear the costs of public improvements."
also
Lindas, Inverse Condemnation in American Right of Way Association
Journal (1969) Chapter 4;
Wittke v Kusel 215 Kan 403 at 405, 524 p 2d 774 at 776 (1974),
where it was held:
"Inverse condemnation has been characterised as an action
or eminent domain proceeding initiated by the property
owner rather than the condemnor, and has been deemed to
be available where private property has been actually
taken for public use without formal condemnation
proceedings and where it appears that there is no
intention or willingness of the taker to bring such
proceedings. "
In Saunders v State Highway Commission 211 Kan 776 at 781, 508 P 2d 981 (19~
"Inverse condemnation actions are in the nature of a suit on implied
contract. When a public entity appropriates and uses property or
rights therein, without compensating the owner, an implied contractual
obligation arises to pay the owner the reasonable value of the




expropriator) that institutes the expropriation process. When the socio-
economic structure of South African society has advanced to a comparable
level to that of the United States, (or if even the use of such a procedure
is justified in particular circumstances in South Africa at present), the
adoption and implementation of 'inverse condemnation' in our legal system is
advocated, in order that the inequity attendant upon a noncompensable'taking,
might thereby be alleviated or obviated.
The dichotomy that emerges between dominium eminens and the police power
is a "conflict between the public interest manifested through the exercise
of the police power on the one hand, and on the other hand, the property
interest of the landowner which is disclosed through the exercise of eminent
domain.,,(28) The resolution of where the dividing line lies between these
two forces is in short a question of degree. In Just v Marienette it was held:C
(27) continued:
Vide also: Ventures in Property v City of Wichita 594 P 2d 671;
Schaeffer v State, 22 Cal app 3d 1917, 99 Cal Reporter 861.
In relation to endowments and inverse condemnation, it was held in
Selby Realty Company v City of San Buenaventura (104 Cal Reporter 865) that:
under certain circumstances, a governmental body may require
the dedication of property as a condition of its development ...
and it may not be necessary for the county to acquire the land
by eminent domain even if it is ultimately used for a public
purpose. In order to state a cause of action for inverse
condemnaeion, ehere muse be an invasion or an appropriaeion of
some valuable properey right which the landowner possesses, and
the invasion or appropriation must direcely and specially affect
the landowner to his injury."
(28)Bringle, 13 Hastings Law Journal 401; also Wine v Council of City of
Los Angeles 177 Cal App 2d 157, 2 Cal Reporter 94.
(29)56 Wis 2d 7, 201 NW 2d 761; discussed by Haik in Police Power Versus
Condemnation, 7 Natural Resources Law Journal 21 1974 .
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"To state the issue in more meaningful terms, it is a
conflict between the public interest ... and an owner's
asserted right to use his property as he wishes. The
protection of public rights may be accomplished by the
exercise of the police power unless the damage to. the
property owner is too great and amounts to a confiscation.
The securing or taking of a benefit not presently enjoyed
by the public for its use is its power of eminent domain.
The distinction between the exercise of the police power
and condemnation ... (is accordingly) ... a matter of
degree of damage to the property owner. In the valid
exercise of the police power reasonably restricting the
use of property, the damage suffered by the owner is
incidental. However, where the restriction is so great
the landowner ought not to bear such a burden for the public
good, the restriction has been held to be a constructive
taking even though the actual use or forbidden use has not
been transferred to the government so as to be a taking in
the tradi tional sense. Whether a taking has occurred
depends upon whether the restriction practically or
substantially renders the land useless for all reasonable (30)
purposes. "
(30)Vide also: Home Building and Loan Association v B1aisde11
290 US 398, 54 S Ct 231, 78 L Ed 413:
" ... where the restrictions imposed by the socalled
regulations are so broad that the owner of the
property regulated is deprived of most or all of
his interest in the property, for all practical
purposes there has been a 'taking' of that property."
Auto Transit Company v City of Fort Worth 182 SW 685 at 692
(1916):
"... (where) the pecuniary loss that the plaintiffs
will suffer from the enforcement of the ordinance
is not so out of proportion to the benefit that
the public will receive so as to render it invalid,
... (the regulation will be noncompensable) .... "
Wandermere Corporation v State 79 Wash 2d 688, .488 P2d 1088:
" ... where the character of governmental interference
with private property rights is planned deliberate
and substantial, such interference upon proper
factual showing, should be deemed a 'taking'."
State v Johnston 265 A 2d 711:
"... (where) their compensation by sharing in the
benefits which this restriction is intended to
secure, is so disproportionate to their deprivation
of reasonable use, such exercise of the State's
police power is unreasonable."
Bayside Warehouse Company v Memphis 470 SW 2d 375:
"... if regulation goes too far, it will be
recognised as a taking."
(34)
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It emerges that valid governmental action under authority of the State's
police power, requiring private adherence to statutesJordinances and bye-laws
which promote public order~safety~health and general welfare, does not
constitute an exercise of dominium eminens, and consequential loss or
damages thereby suffered will accordingly in general be noncompensable. (31)
It would however appear under principles of natural law that where governmental
interference with the owner's use and enjoyment of the specific property
affected, is so substantia~unreasonable and arbitrary)to the extent that
it effectively and in substance constitutes an expropriation, and provided
that such is factually determinable and proved by the landowner, (32)
compensation ought in such circumstances to be payable. However regard must
be had to, and recognition must not be forgotten of, the purposes for which
h 1 · . t (33)t e po lce power eX1S s:
"The power which the State has of prohibiting a use by
individuals of their property, as will be prejudicial
to the health morals or safety of the public, is
not, and consistently wi th the existence and safety of
organised society, cannot be, burdened with the condition
that the state must compensate such individual owners for
pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not
being"permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to
inflict injury upon the community."
(31)Cf: State v Ensley 160 Ind 472, 164 NE2d 343 (1962); Also: Kucera, Eminent
Domain v Police Power - A Common Misconception in 1959 Institute of Eminent
Domain Yol 1.
(32)Yide Indiana and Michigan Electric Company v Stephenson 363 NE2d 1254 (1977).
(33)Mug1er v Kansas 132 US 688 at 689.
(34)Cf: Carruthers v Board of Adjustment 290 SW2d 340 at 346 (1956):
" ... legislation regulatory of the use of property
pursuant to the police power, is to be sustained
regardless of even severe hardship in particular
cases, whenever the public health safety morals
or general welfare outweigh the equities of the
individual property owner."
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Although itis acknowledged finally that a landowner does not have an absolute
and unlimited right to change the essential character of his property so as
to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state, and
f h Id b b . 11 .. d . d' d (35)by which the rights 0 ot ers wou e su stantla y lnJure or preJu lce ,
the caveat that is here voiced is that a deep awareness of naturalisM must
remain, in order to avoid permitting the positivist trend(36) of noncompensable
exercises of the police power in South African law, to escalate to encompass
excesses, the proportions of which are inconsistent with the naturalist
foundation of compensability.
In overview, the distinction between the police power and dominium eminens
will assume a pressing significance as social~economic,culturaland political
advancement and development take place in South African society. The
(35)As was held in Sibson v State 336 A 2d239; discussed by Waite in
Ransoming the Environment, 23 Maine Law Review 117 (1971).
(36)A similar trend has been evident in American law (although consciousness
there of the need for safeguards against abuse, is much greater).
In Euclid Ohio v Ambler Realty Company 272 US 365, 47 S Ct 114, 71 L Ed
303 it was held:
"Regulations, the wisdom validity and necessity of which, as
applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they
are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a
century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary
and oppressive."
Similar dicta are found in Brown v Tahoe Reaional Planning Agency 385 F
Supp 1128:
"As public welfare and necessity dictate more and more
restrictions upon the uses and abuses of private
exploitation of private property, decisions will have
to be made whether the impact of the regulations
constitutes damnum absque injuria or whether just
compensation should be forthcoming."
"
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relevance of the inquiry and the value that is contained for South Africa
in the assessment of the American experience, is presaged and foreshadowed
. (37)
in the dicta of a United States Court:
"In a changing world ... it is apparent that the polic~ (38)
power is not a circumscribed prerogative, but is elast~c,
and, in keeping with the growth of knowledge and the belief
in the popular mind of the need for its application, capable
of expansion to meet existing conditions of modern life ....
(It) thereby keeps pace with the social economic moral and
intellectual evolution of the human race."
(37)Miller v Board of Public Works 195 Cal 477, 234 P 381 at 387.
(38)Board of Supervisors of James City County v Rowe 216 SE 2d 199:
the police power is elastic but its stretch
is not infinite."
Southern Pacific Company v City of Los Angeles 242 Cal App 2d 21
51 Cal Reporter 197:
" ... (it is) a flexible police power that is necessary."
1.3.4 THE WAR POWER
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Characteristic of Grotius writings in De lure Belli ac Pacis, is that the
distinction he draws between dominium eminens and the other public law
proprietary powers of the State is not as clearly defined as in modern
jurisprudence. In respect of the war power of the State however, its
separation by Grotius from dominium eminens, by virtue of the nature of his
work, is in general far less blurred. War is, as Grotius observes, (1) "the
state of persons contending by force." Although dominium eminens is essentially
a peacetime municipal power of the State, there is some overlap and parallel
with the interrelated war power, that warrants consideration and contrast
d · ·f· 1· I h· . d (2) . .an JUSt1 les ana YS1S. n 1S openlng wor s, Grotius foreshadows this
realisation, and through his commitment to naturalism, displaces the focus
of his enquiry from the positivist dictates of institutions:
"Questions of Rights among Citizens of the same State are
settled by the instituted law of the State; and therefore
do not belong to our subject, which is Rights by Nature,
not Rights by Institution. Between persons who are not
bound by a common instituted Right, as those who have not
yet formed a state; or between those who belong to different
states - whether private persons, or Kings, or those whose
mutual Rights (and Obligations) resemble those of Kings, such
as Rulers of peoples, or free Peoples themselves - questions
of Rights pertain either to time of war or time of peace; on
the other hand, there is no question of Rights which may not
issue in war .... "
(1) De lure Belli ac Pacis Liber 1, Caput 1, Section 2.
(2) Ibid, Liber 1, Caput 1, Section 1, Whewell translation.
S6
Although the war power has in common with dominium eminens, a recognition of
a link with sovereignty, a capacity to take private property, and a focus on
the common good and wellbeing of the Citizens, certain fundamental distinc-
tions emerge. Differentiation is possible on the basis of whether the power
in question is essentially an international wartime power or an intranational
(or municipal) peacetime power; but a significant question which arises (in
the event that it is accepted as detailed infra that dominium eminens originates
in the Social Contract), is whether the war power shares a similar source.
On the one hand, it is noted by both Hobbes and Locke(3) (and impliedly by
Grotius in the extract supra) that although individuals have passed into
societies, nations themselves remain inter se still in a noncontractarian
or 'natural' state (a state of "Warre", to use the Hobbesian dictum). From
this, it might appear that the war power, being a sequitur of the 'natural'
state, existed prior to the Social Contract, and is accordingly not created
by that Contract. On the other hand however, Hobbes,Locke and others(4)
submit that the State itself is formed by the Social Contract, whereby men
transferred to the State those powers they had in their 'natural' condition;
from this it appears that the powers the State has, were conferred originally
by that Contract. Under this alternative latter view, the war power would
be seen as having a direct link to the sovereignty conferred upon the State
under the Social Contract, and would be consistent with the contractarian
principle that a function of the State is the protection of its Citizens;
(3) This is not to say however, that Hobbes and Locke regard the war power
of the State as being unrelated to the Social Contract or as being
caused by any other factor. Vide infra Sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4.
(4 )I t I' th· ,n er a la lS wrlter.
(5)
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furthermore, although it would be conceded that the war power existed in
individuals prior to that Contract, it would be disputed that this proves
that the war power could not have originated in the hands of the State
under that Contract - although not created thereby, it would be conferred
thereby, and to this extent, the war power of the State could validly be
said in theory to originate in the Social Contract. Unfortunately as is
noted infra, South African law in its practice may not display the degree
of adherence to these tenets of theoretical jurisprudence that would be
desirable. (5)
The principal distinction however between dominium eminens and the war power
lies in that a taking under the war power is frequently noncompensable
(although it is noted that modern interpretation in English and American
law has moved in favour of the recognition of a compensation e~titlement if
appropriation by dominium eminens is possible, and further that ex gratia
payments are on occasion made even where urgency justifiably motivated the
noncompensable exercise of the war power). That the war power can in its
valid operation preclude an entitlement to compensation, is based upon two
jurisprudential sources - the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and the
principle salus populi est suprema lex. There has been a fairly substantial
enunciation of the war power in the United States case law, where it has
been held that:(6)
Vide inter alia Didlow v Minister of Defence and Provost Marshal 1915 TPD
549. CF: English law: Kawasaki etc of Kobe v Bantham Steamship Company
(1939) 2 KB 544 at 559; Re Cooper's Estate: Bendall v Cooper and others
(1946) I A E R 28; Ruffy-Arnell Company Limited v The King (1922) 1
KB 599.
(6) United States v Pacific Railroad 120 US 227, 30 LEd 634, 7 SCt 490.
"The destruction or injury of private property in battle,
or in the bombardment of cities and towns, and in many
other ways in war, ... (has) to be borne by the sufferers
alone, as one of its consequences. Whatever would embarrass
or impede the advance of the enemy ... (is) lawfully ordered
by the commanding general. Indeed it (is) his imperative
duty to direct their destruction. The necessities of war
ca11( ) for and justif(y) this. The safety of the state in
such cases overrides all considerations of private loss."
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(7)
American judgments(8) in respect of the war power, in general mark a curious
departure from their customary naturalist lead over the British precedents,
and although still recognising the desirability in general of compensation,
tend to accept wider inroads into private property under the war power than
do their English counterparts. The American writer Nichols, (9) for instance
sets out seven factors which have a bearing upon whether or not compensation
is payable, but in their irreducible form, two dominant factors emerge. The
(7) The same judgement held further:
"The principle that for injuries to or destruction of private
property in necessary military operations during war, the
government is not responsible, is thus considered established.
Compensation has been made in several such cases, it is true;
but it has generally been ... 'a matter of bounty rather than
of strict legal right' ... (T)he government cannot be charged
for injuries to, or destruction of, private property caused by
military operations of armies in the field, or measures taken
for their safety and efficiency .... "
(8) Inter alia: United States v Caltex Incorporated 344 US 149;
Bell v Louisville and Nashville Railway Company 1 Bush 303, 89
AM Dec 632; Ford v Surgent 46 Miss 130; Central Eureka Mining
Company v United States 138 F Supp 281; Jurugna Iron Company v
United States 212 US 297, 53 L Ed 530, 29 S Ct 385.
(9) The Law of Eminent Domain Section 1.44 p 731 - 735.
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first is the nationality (or status) of the prejudiced owner: if enemy
property is affected, its destruction is noncompensable; if neutral property
is affected, then in the absence of an international provision for indemnity,
its appropriation without compensation is permitted under 'the right of
angary,;(lO) if property belonging to Citizens is affected, then although
the State has the right to appropriate such property for defence purposes,
the mere fact that a state of war exists does not justify the failure to
pay compensation where possible. (11) The second factor is the location of
the property: if it is situated in enemy territory, irrespective of the
nationality of the owner, it is subject to appropriation or destruction
without compensation; if situate at "the theatre of the war", (at "the
actual seat of the struggle"), a similar rule applies; if situate within
the territorial jurisdiction of the State in question, the remedy of
compensation under modern usage presents itself to the Citizen owner.
English law, although in broad agreement, has however adopted a different
inflexion, supporting in certain circumstances a presumption of 'no
expropriation without compensation' even in wartime. Founded on the
liberalist ethic and the Lockesian Social Contract theory as recognised in
Entick v Carrington (1765), (12) the property relationship between State and
Citizen came in English law to know the naturalist refinement of the ratio
in Attorney General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel, (13) in which it was held that
(lO)Vide: International Law Situations: Naval War College (1926) 65.
I
Oxford English Dictionary Vol 1 at p 70 defines angary as "(t)he
right of a belligerent to use and destroy neutral property".
(ll)Authority in the last regard may be found in Todd v United States 292 F
2d841 and Mitchell v Harmony 13 How US 115, 14 LEd 75.
(12)Common Pleas (1765) 19 State Trials 1029, discussed infra under Section 2.4.4
(13) .
Attorney General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel 1920 A C 508 (H L); 1920 All
E R 80; 89 L J Ch 417; 122 L T 691; 36 T L R 600; 64 Sol Jo 513; 17
Digest (repl) 437, 91.
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the Sovereign prerogative to expropriate private property without compen-
sation yields to the statutorily conferred power of expropriation subject
to compensation:
"The Crown is not entitled as of right, either by virtue
of its prerogative or under any statute, to take possession
of the land or buildings of a subject for administrative
purposes in connection with the defence of the realm, without
paying compensation for their use and occupation. "
(14)
English authori ty (15 )accordingly reinforces the proposi tion -that the' sovereign
prerogative embodied in the war power, should be exercised (noncompensably)
only in the event that an exercise (compensably), based upon statute and
under the power of dominium eminens, is not possible by reason of the
impelling and cogent nature of the prevailing wartime circumstances. This
view finds consistency also with the naturalist dicta of Grotius: (16)
" ... a right, even when it has been acquired by subjects,
may be taken away by the king .... But to do this ... there
is required in the first place, public utility; and next,
that, if possible, compensation be made to him who has lost
what was his, at the common expense. And as this holds with
regard to other matters, so does it with regard to rights
which are acquired by promise or contract."
(14)lbid, headnote, 1920 A C 508 (H L).
(15)lbid. Vide also: Re Petition of Right 1915 3 KB 649; Universities of
Oxford and Cambridge v Eyre and Spottiswood (1964) Ch 736, (1963) 3 All
E R 289; Minister of Housing and Local Government v Hartnell (1965)
AC 1134; (1965) 1 All E R 490; contra Burmah Oil- Co (Burma Trading) Ltd
v Lord Advocate (1965) AC 75, 1964 2 All E R 348, which last decision
was however in a different context, and in any event was nullified by
the War Damage Act (1965) (England). Vide also discussion under
Section 1.6 infra at footnote 24.
(16)De lure Belli ac Pacis 2.14.7. Vide also Sande Dec.Fris. 7.7.4 and
Van BijnkershoekVerhand. van Staats. 2 15, cited with approval in
Krause v SAR&H 1948 (4) SA 554 (0) at 562 - 563.
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The principles of international law that Grotius first enunciated, have been
developed in modern times by convention between nations. Bouvier notes
(cited by Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain p 1 - 732), that "an indirect
recognition, a fortiori, of the duty of the belligerent to pay indemnity,
may be found in Articles 52 - 53 of the IV Hague Conference 1907(17)which
require the ~ayment of such indemnity when private property is requisitioned",
provided that such personal property was not "hostile property". Oppenheim
(18) . (19)on International Law (similarly to Wheaton on Internatlonal Law)
observes that "Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, which says that private
property may not be confiscated, does not prevent the utilisation of private
buildings temporarily, as hospitals barracks and stables, without compen-
sation". To this extent that there is flux present in international law,
these dicta are not inconsistent with the judgment in the De Keyser's Royal
Hotel case supra, although necessarily, the validity of transgressions of
internationally-recognised Regulations must involve a question of degree
based on the attendant facts and circumstances. In Seery v United States(20)
it was held:
(17)The text of the IV Hague Conference 1907 Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land is reprinted in Roberts and Guelff, Documents
on the Laws of War, Oxford, 1982, p 43 et seq.
(18)Vol 11, Section 140 6 ed (1940).
(19)7 ed (1944) p 248.
(20)127 F Supp 601
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" ... (although) it would seem that departures from the Hague
Regulations are permitted in order to enable a commander
in the field to meet emergency situations relating to his
troops and supplies, they would hardly seem to be applicable
to the taking of a luxurious estate, at a remote location in
a resort area, for use as an officers' club some months after
hostilities had ended."
In final analysis, although this writer supports the desirability of the
view expressed by Or Gildenhuys(2l) that "(d)ie prerogatiewe bevoegdheid
van die Staat om privaateiendom toe to eien, mag vandag slegs in noodtoe-
stande uitgeoefen word", on the other hand since present South African law
characteristically displays a denial of naturalist 'oughts' (as evidenced
by inter alia Joyce and McGregor v Cape Provincial Administration(22» it is
questioned whether Or Gildenhuys' statement will actually receive in the
context of the war power, the practical translation its theoretical foun-
dation would predicate. In consequence of the fact that the war power would~
in our law as practised, appear based more upon direct sovereignty and less
upon the naturalism that a Social Contract grounding would require, South
Africa may here regrettably tend to follow rather the noncompensability
approach that is possible under an extreme positivist interpretation of
the sovereign immunity doctrine and the salus populi principle.
(21)0 . . 1 fntelenlngsreg p ootnote 4.
(22)1946 AO 658.
1.3.5 THE POWER OF DESTRUCTION BY NECESSITY
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The State's power to destroy private property by necessity, although similar
in certain respects to both the war power and to dominium eminens, is distinct
from both, principally in the motivation and in the rationale (respectively)
of its exercise. In Grotius' classification however, this power is, incorrectly
it would seem, subsumed under the broad dominium eminens encapsulation he
advances, in terms of which:
"(t)he property of subjects is under the eminent domain
of the State, so that the State or he who acts for it,
may use and even alienate and destroy such property, not
only in cases of extreme necessity, in which even private
persons have a right over the property of· others, but for
ends of public utility .... "
(1)
The power of destruction by necessity is invoked in circumstances which, by
the impelling necessity and cogency of their nature, warrant the destruction
of private property in order that a greater harm to the public at large may
thereby be averted or avoided - in this it differs from dominium eminens which
promotes public purposes in another manner.
"In the case of fire flood pestilence or other great public
calamity, when immediate action is necessary to save human
life or to avert an overwhelming destruction of property, any
person may lawfully enter another's land and destroy his
property, real or personal, providing he acts with reasonable(2)
judgment."
(1) Vide extract from De lure Belli ac Pacis 3.20.7 referred to under
Section 1.1 supra; emphasis added.
(2 ) Bowditch v Boston 101 US 16, 2S LEd 980; cited in Nichols, The Law of
Eminent Domain S 1.43(1) at p 1 - 722. Vide also Case of the
Prerogative 12 Commonwealth Reporter 13: "For the Commonwealth a man
shall suffer damage, as for saving a city or town, a house shall be
plucked down if the next one be on fire, and a thing for the Common-




Customarily, such destruction is authorised by prior statutory enactment
1 bl · .. (3) b t 1· t Id . din the form of a genera ena lng provlSlon, u wou seem ln mo ern
South African usage, that the powers of destruction by necessity that are
statutorily conferred, are not in our law of an unlimited general nature.
Rather they are qualified by the requirements that principles of natural
justice must where appropriate have expression; that reasonableness attends
their invocation; and that due regard must where possible be had to the
interests of the prejudiced party. This refinement was applied in De Jager
v Farah and Nestadt(4) where although the slum clearance regulations clearly
authorised the demolition of slum buildings, such action by the authorities
without prior notice to the inhabitants and without appropriate ejectment
proceedings, was held to be an unlawful exercise of the power conferred. (5)
This decision critically qualified the opportunties for governmental abuse
that had been presented by the earlier decision in Louvis v Municipality of
Roodepoort-Maraisburg(6) in which a contravention of the building regulations
in itself had been held to justify the demolition of a house.
A common law parallel of the power of destruction by necessity is found in
the destruction of property in situations of emergency. Burchell and Hunt
Vide Silberberg and Schoeman The Law of Property 1983 ed p 200 - 202 and
at p 344: " ..• an owner may be deprived of property if its destruction
has been authorised by statute". The South African case law contains
several precedents, inter alia: English v British South Africa Company
1913 AD 76, in which cattle suspected of carrying African coast fever,
were held to have been justifiably destroyed in Terms of Ordinance 9
of 1904; also Ostrawiak v Pinetown Townboard 1948(3) 584(N).
(4 ) 1947 (4) SA 28 (W).
The position in American law appears similar. In City of Rapid City v
Boland 271 NW 2d 60 (South Dakota) it was held that "(t)he abatement
of a public nuisance does not entitle the owner to compensation; however
he is normally entitled to due process ... a summary abatement is allowed
only where (1) the property constitutes a public nuisance that is an
imminent hazard to the public health safety or welfare; and (2)
destruction is the only adequate method of eliminating the hazard".
(6) 1916 AD 268.
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in South African Criminal Law and Procedure(7) set out the defence of
necessity in the criminal law, in which the prospect of imminent bodily
injury or death can justify what would otherwise have been an unlawful
destruction of property - justified private defence can render an act to
be not 'reus'. Several judgments have elucidated this field of South
African law, but prominent among these is the landmark decision in Ex
parte Minister van Justisie: in re S v Van Wyk, (8) in which a full bench of
the Appellate Division unanimously(9)held that the protection of private
property can extend to include and justify not only the destruction of
other property, but also the wounding or killing (in appropriate circum-
stances) of another person. Van der Merwe and Olivier in Die Onregmatige
Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg(lO) and McKerron in The Law of Delict, (11)
consider those circumstances in delict in which the destruction of the
property of another in situations of emergency may be justified on the basis
(7)
1 ed, Vol 1, p 285 and 1972 Supplement p 18 - 21; or Ibid, 2 ed, Vol 1,
p 328 et seq. Vide also Olmesdahl, Cases on Criminal Law 1978 ed p 770
ff (where inter alia certain Roman Dutch authorities are cited); 1971
Acta Juridica 205 at 211; 1967 T H R H R 110 at 154; 1970 T H R H R 431;
1970 SALJ 467. precedents of interest include S v Goliath 1972 (3) SA 1
(A); ~ v Rabodila 1974 (3) SA 324 (0); ~ v Pretorius 1975 (2) SA 85 (SWA).
(8) 1967 (1 ) SA 488 (A).
(9) It is noted however. that
this principle had valid
affirming the point that
and circumstances.
(10) 4 ed 184 et seq.
(11) 7 ed 74.
it was a 3-2 split majority that held that
operation in the facts of Van Wyk's case,
regard must be had to all relevant facts
. . (12)(13)that 1t 1S not 'wrongful'. . However, detailed analysis of these
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criminal and delictual aspects is not germane to the theme of this exposition,
and is accordingly not undertaken here - reference to the material in the
footnotes herein will suffice, if necessary.
What are however relevant are the points of distinction that exist between the
State's power of destruction by necessity and an individual's right to destroy
property belonging to another in situations of emergency; and for this reason,
care must be taken to differentiate them. In the first place, the former is
a public law power whereas the latter is best viewed from a private law
perspective. A second distinction is found in the respective nature of the
circumstances of necessity and of emergency. Thirdly, under Social Contract
theory, whereas the former power is conferred upon the State under the Social
Contract, the latter represents the justified revival of the individual's(14)
natural instinct for survival (as it had existed in his original condition
prior to that Contract), in circumstances in which the State has failed to
(12)Vide also: Greyvenstein v Hattingh 1911 AD 358, in which a swarm of
locusts was prevented from entering a farmer's land by action detrimental
to his neighbour's property.
(13) .S11berberg and Schoeman The Law of Property 1983 ed pp 200 - 202 explore
the further question of the extent to which an owner may refuse the use
of his property by others in situations of emergency they face, and
conclude that although American authority indicates that the right to
use the property of another in such circumstances, is limited "to those
who are in a financial position to make good any damage they may cause
to it", it appears conceivable in South African law that "situations
may arise in which such a limitation might not be justified".
(14)In City of Rapid City v Boland, 271 NW2d 60 (South Dakota), it was held
that "(t)he right to destroy life or property for selfpreservation
differs from eminent domain ... (and) ... when it is exercised by a
public officer, he must justify his conduct as an individual whose
position makes him a natural leader, rather than as an agent of the
governnment".
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discharge its function of protecting its members. Fourthly, salus populi
est suprema lex links to the latter, whereas the focus of the former is
upon the 'salus' of the individual. Finally, the former is a 'natural'
right, the exercise of which requires no statutory foundation, while the
latter is an attribute of sovereignty (with a contractarian origin), which
requires the sanction of the legislature to warrant its operation.
Destruction by necessity by the State differs also from destruction by mobs
during riots, (15) although both give rise to no common law claim for
compensation against the State. Certain jurisdictions have however by
legislative action recognised such a claim by Citizens. (16) In South Africa
however, vis major and casus fortuitus are frequently excluded from general
insurance policies; and the prevailing uncertainty of domestic stability
has contributed to a widespread use of additional political riot premiums
in property insurance.
Between the power of destruction by necessity and dominium eminens, apart
from the difference in the respective rational~17Jf each, a primary contrast
surfaces in whether there is an entitlement to compensation for the dis-
advantaged owner. When property is taken by the State under circumstances
(15)Vide: Municipal Liability for Riot Damages under Eminent Domain 28
Washington and Lee Law Review 103 (1971).
(16)For example 1855 Laws of New York, c 428.
(17) . .In re Cheesebrough 78 BT 232: " ... the rlghts of prlvate property must
be made subservient to the public welfare; and it is the imminent danger
and the actual necessity which furnish the justification (of the power
of destruction by necessity): salus populi (est) suprema lex".
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of imminent necessity, it incurs no obligation to compensate the owner
'1 t 11 (18) 1 h' t' 1 t d' the e abl1'ngJust y or even a a, un ess suc 1S s 1pU a e 1n n
legislation. It would appear though that for the State to be able to
invoke this power, there must be:
"a necessity, extreme imperative or overwhelming, ...
(so as to) constitute such a justification; put mere
public expediency or public good or utility, will not
answer. "
(19)
In final analysis, the power of destruction by necessity, although conferred
originally upon the State under the Social Contract, in its modern South
African usage, requires in general an authorisation of its exercise by
prior statutory enactment. In this and in the regard that a compensation
entitlement arises in positivist law for the owner only where such is
statutorily provided, this power shares a similarity with dominium eminens.
In regard to whether compensation ought to accrue however, it would seem
(unlike situations of expropriation), that such is not mandatory, in view
of the nature of the public necessity that here attends the destruction
of property.
(18)United States v Caltex Incorporated 344 US 149, 73 S Ct 200, 97 LEd
157 (1952); Annotated 14 A L R 2d 73.
Vide also Decker's note to Van Leeuwen's Commentaries 2.2.1 where it
is stated: " ... in case of need, (a Citizen can be compelled) to give
his property up without payment. But this cannot last longer than the
necessity, for then compensation may justly be claimed".
Cf: Jooste v The Government 4 Off Rep 147.
(19)Hale v Lawrence 21 NJL 714, 47 AM Dec 190 (1848), cited in Boland's
case supra, which judgment continued: "Thus the destruction of sound
and substantial buildings has been allowed without due process and
without compensation where the destruction or damage was, or reasonably
appeared to be, necessary to prevent an impending or imminent public
disaster from fire flood disease or riot. Once the impending disaster
has passed, the government may not rely upon the doctrine of necessity
to .justi fy the subsequent destruction of property".
1.3.6 THE POWER OF FORFEITURE
The State's public law proprietary power to require the noncompensable
forfeiture of private property used in the transgression of public purposes,
is an attribute of sovereignty vested in the State under the Social Contract.
This power flows from the contractarian premise (enunciated principally by
the ph~losophers of the German School of transcendental idealism) (discussed
infra)(l) that property is an object into which men project their personality.
Furthermore, although property ownership is traditionally indefeasible in the
private law, as does the inviolability of the uninhibited freedom of individual
men yield in the public law forum to the general will, so may the property of
those men become subject to public appropriation when its use represents a
gross violation of collective wellbeing. Fichte and Hegel developed this
initially Kantian view in submitting that although the State ought to be
minimally interventionist in disturbing property rights, the freedom that
men find in society, is not unrestrained or unqualified in an absolute sense,
since one man's free activity is necessarily conditioned by the equal free
activity that must rationally be ascribed to others.
The power of forfeiture(2) appears to have had a parallel in early law ih
(l)Vide Section 2.5.
(2 )
It is noted that in South African law, "'forfeited' and 'forfeiture' ...
mean actual forfeiture and not liability to forfeiture ... ": per
Greenberg J in Boberg v Ettlinger and Grimwood 1937 WLD 34. In English
law, the"power of forfeiture is on occasion termed the power of
confiscation.
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the concept of deodand, (3) it having been held in a United States judgment(4)
that forfeiture is an "anachronistic relic" thereof. This historical basis
and the writings of the German transcendental idealists, contributed to the
prominence at the turn of the century of a justification of forfeiture on the
gr.ound that the property itself is 'guilty'. This doctrine(5) of 'in rem guilt
was however unintended by the German philosophers: although they submitted
that the owner projected himself into his property, they did not suggest that
a personality separate or divisible from the owner was imparted thereby to
the inanimate thing. Recent judgments(6) have accordingly discarded the
in rem approach and adopted an alternative rationale of forfeiture,(7) the
fundamental justifications of which are: that the owner is often partially to
blame because, notwithstanding that the illegal use may have been unintentional,
(3) An analysis of the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary definition (Vol I
p 520) provides interesting background: "Deodand (1523) [-law Fr
deodande - AL deodanda - urn ie Deo danda - urn, that is to be given to
God; dative of deus (God), gerundive of dare (give)]. A thing to be
given to God; (specially in English Law), a personal chattel, which
having been the immediate occasion of the death of a person, was forfeited
to the Crown to be applied to pious uses. (Abolished in 1846). (Loosely)
a sum taken in lieu of the deodand (1831)."
(4) United States v One 1969 Plymouth Fury Automobile 476 F 2d 960.
(5) Admiralty Courts applied this doctrine for instance in The Palymyra 12
Wheat 1, 6 LEd 531, in holding that a ship itself was the transgressor.
(6) Inter alia, United States v One 1970 Buick Riviera 463 F2d 1168, and
authorities cited therein; ~lso Calero-Toledo v Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co~pany 416 US 663 94 S Ct 2080 40 LEd 2d 452 (1974).
(7 )
Adapted from the judgments in State ex reI Patterson v Weaver 254 NW2d 68;
Calero-Toledo case supra; and State v One 1968 Volkswagen 251 NW 2d 666.
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such invariably is (alternatively) due to his negligence; that forfeiture
prevents later re-use of the property for a similar criminal purpose; that
the previous criminal use is penalised and made unprofitable by forfeiture
(which on this basis, is a punishment imposed by the society for the use of
private property that violates the spirit of the Social Contract); and that
a deterrent to offenders, and an inducement to owners, to control their
property with greater care, is thereby created.
Consistently with the principles supra, modern American law has evolved the
standpoint that an owner surrenders control of his property at his own risk, (8)
and in the event that it is used by another contra bonos mores or in a manner
that subverts public wellbeing, the owner cannot in theoretical jurisprudence
raise his innocence as a defence against the forfeiture of his property. A
similar approach would appear to prevail in South African law. In United
States v United States Coin and Currency(9) it appears from obiter howeveithat in
the administrative exercise of the power of forfeiture, leniency ought to
attend the treatment of innocent owners, and that forfeiture would seem best
invoked in practice only where the owner "has significantly participated in
the criminal enterprise". Public policy considerations would tend to reinforce
the propositions that " ... this claim ... to deprive totally innocent people
of their property, would otherwise hardly be compelling", and that in reason-
ableness and equity, unless the contrary is clearly indicated in statute,
forfeiture by innocents ought perhaps to be presumed not to have been intended
by the legislature, notwithstanding the principles advanced supra in
justification of the power.
(8) Vide Nich01s op cit S 1 42(14) P 1 - 454, and precedents cited thereat.
(9) 401 US 715 91 SCt 1041, 28 LEd 2d 434 (1971).,
It is relevant to note that several American judgments(lO) subsume the
power of forfeiture within the category of
(11)
the police power. With
respect, it is submitted that such a classification is incorrect, and blurs
the distinction(12) between these powers in a material respect - whereas the
police power is confined to regulating or controlling the use of property
without a transfer of title to the State, the power of forfeiture contemplates
a deprivation of the Citizen's ownership right and a full 'taking' by the
State. This is not to say however that the power of forfeiture corresponds
to dominium eminens - here too differentiation is possible on the basis of
the rationale of each power, and in respect of whether a compensation
entitlement arises under naturalism.
The parameters of the power of forfeiture are broad in South African law,
extending to encompass fines~penalties,forfeitures and confiscations.
Characteristic of the exercise of this power however, is that an empowering
statutory foundation is required to authorise its invocation by the executive
branch of government. Illustrations in South African law of the power of
forfeiture are found inter alia in customs and excise matters, (13) in liquor
(10)Inter alia: United States v One 1962 Ford Thunderbird 232 F Supp 1019
(referred to in West's Federal Practice Digest 2 ed Vol 31 p 122; and
other authorities cited thereat):
"Where Congress ... provides for penalties such as forfeitures,
such action ... represents a federal exercise of police power
to which the constitutional requirement of just compensation
is inapplicable".
(ll)Vide Section 1.3.3 supra.
(12)1 1 A . . d . h b h Id hn severa merlcan JU gments, lt as een e t at the seizure-and-
forfeiture of vehicles used to transport dagga (marijuana) or for
other unlawful purposes, is clearly not an expropriation under dominium
eminens: United States v One 1971 Buick Riviera 463 F2d 1168;
United States v One 1972 Wood 19 Foot Custom Boat 501 F2d 1327;
United States v One 1969 Plymouth Fury 476 F2d 960; McKeehan v United
States 438 F 2d 739.
(13)Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 as amended:Sections 88 and 89.
Appendix to Section 1.3.6.
Vide
legislation, (14) in criminal law, (15) and in contraventions of Group Areas
1 . 1 t· (16) b t f (17).egls a lon, to name u a eWe
Procedurally in South African law (unless ownership passes derivatively in
circumstances in which the owner consents to the forfeiture), it was held in
S v Frost(18) that a rule nisi should first be issued prior to the final
order by a court of competent jurisdiction, in order that the audi alteram
partem principie might have application. (19) This general approach would
however necessarily seem subject to any statutory procedures laid down in
the empowering statute, as was held in S v Khan. (20)
(14)Liquor Act, 87 of 1977, Section 190, as amended. Vide also: S v Ntsimenyane
1980 (4) SA 53 (0); ~ v Tshabalala 1980 (4) SA 179 (T).
(15)Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977.
(16)Group Areas Act 36 of 1966, as amended, Section 41(5). Vide also
discussion under Section 1.3.8 infra.
(17)Vide also:
R v Leatherman 1937 TPO 242; ~ v Christos 1944 TPO 50; R v Claasen 1945
GPO 11;
Fil Investments v Levinson 1949 (4) SA 485 (W);
Master's Compressed Yeast Company Ltd v Commissioner of Customs and Excise
1949 (4) 819 (A);
R v Molibele 1952 (4) SA 7 (T); R v Husband 1959 (4) SA 132 (N);
R v Moloto 1961 (3) SA 496 (T); 5 v Moodley 1962 (1) SA 842 (N):
Ex parte Minister van Justisie 1968 (1) SA 380 (A); S v HelIer 1970 (4) SA
679 (A); S v Ntombela 1973 (3) SA 89 (T).
(18)1974 (3) SA 466 (C).
(19)Vide also inter alia: S v Brandt 1968 (1) SA 644 (SWA) at 652; Scottish
Rhodesian Finance Limited v Provincial Magistrate, Umtali 1971 (3) SA 234
(R) at 235; and ~ v Chandiwana 1971 (3) SA 262 (R), discussed in
Silberberg and Schoeman, The Law of Property, 1983 ed, p 344.
(20)1965 (3) SA 783 (A) at 789.
In final analysis, the power of forfeiture vesting in the State, although
frequently appearing harsh in its noncompensable operation, is based on
sovereignty under the tenets of Social Contract theory.(21) Its frequently
asserted subsumption under the police power emerges as being insubstantial,
and the power remains best viewed separately, where its distinction too
from dominium eminens (and the other public law proprietary powers of the
State) is apparent.
(2l)Cf: Section 1.2.5 supra and Chapter 2 infra.
1.3.7 THE POWER OF DOMINIUM OVER BONA VACANTIA
(OR THE POWER OF ESCHEAT)
''''
The State's power of dominium over bona vacantia (l)in South African law
corresponds closely in its practical operation to what is in American
jurisprudence termed the power of escheat. (2) Black's Law Dictionary(3)
defines escheat as a "reversion of property to the State in consequence of
the want of any individual competent to inherit; ... (it) indicates. the
preferable right of the Stat~ to an estate left vacant, and without there
being anyone in existence able to make claim thereto". In South African




Sodhi and Vasan, in Latin Words and Phrases for Lawyers, (Canada), define
'bona vacantia' as "unclaimed goods ... which belong to the Crown by
virtue of its prerogative". The concept of bona vacantia has been
discussed in South African case law in the following judgments:
Ex parte Sprawson (in re Hebron Diamond Mining Syndicate Limited) 1914
TPD 458 at 460 - 1; Ex parte the Government 1914 TPD 596 at 597;
Ex parte fUnister of Irrigation 1948 (2) SA 779 (C) at 784 - 5;
Ex parte Marchini1964 (1) SA l47(T) at 150. Vide also 1946 T H R H R 3
at 5 - 6.
It is noted that the analysis of the public law powers of the State in
American jurisprudence is traditionally conducted on a fourfold basis.
The powers conventionally distinguished there are eminent domain, the
taxation power, the police power and the power of escheat. It appears
however that this breakdown is incomplete in material respects, as set
out in Section 1.3.1 supra at footnote 13. The American analysis may
be consulted in Rams on Eminent Domain at pp 62, 66, 160, 185, 200,
311, 349; in The American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers' Handbook
at p 13; in Condemnation Appraisal Practice Vol 1 at p 3 and Vol 11 at
pp 263 and 277; in 31 West's Federal Practice Digest at K2; in 26
American Jurisprudence at Sections "4 and 277; in Gildenhuys op cit at p 1;
in Ring, Valuation of Real Estate at p 13; and in Todd, The Law of
Expropriation and Compensation in Canada at pp 21 - 24.
5 ed p 488.
(4) Corbett, Hahlo, Hofmeyr and Kahn, The Law of Succession in South Africa
p 588; Vide also Walker, Oxford Companion to Law, p 430 and Thompson,
Dictionary of Banking p 251.
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to bona vacantia, (5) the effect of which is largely equi.valent to that of
escheat - in short, where a person dies intestate without heirs, the State
acquires dominium in the bona vacantia in his deceased estate.
The words 'dominium over bona vacantia' have been conceived by this writer
in preference to the adoption of the American 'escheat' nomenclature
by reason of the fact that the jurisprudential orientation and emphasis of
these respective terms differs. A survey of dictionary definitions of
'escheat' reveals that its meaning is characterised by a subscription
(5)Sir Edward Coke in The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England,
or a Commentary on Littleton (as translated in Black's Law Dictionary
4 ed p 640) notes also two classical sources in the law, of relevance
to ,the power of escheat or dominium over bona vacantia:
(1) "Escheata derivatur a verbo Ga11ico 'eschoir', quod
est accidere, quia accidit domino ex eventu et ex
insperato: (Co Litt 93)
Escheat is derived from the French word 'eschoir',
which signifies to happen, because it falls to
the lord from an event and an unseen circumstance"
(2) "Escheatae vu1go dieuntur quae decidentibus iis quae
de rege tenent, cum non existit ratione sanguLnLs
haeres, ad fiscum re1abuntur: (Co Litt 13).
Those things are commonly called escheats which
revert to the exchequer from a failure of issue
in those who held of the king, when there does
not exist any heir by consanguinity."
Stroud's Judicial Dictionary 4 ed p 934 notes that these sources have
been recognised judically in Attorney-General of Ontario v Mercer
8 App Cas 767; St Catherine's Company v The Queen 14 App Cas 46;
Attorney-General for Quebec v Attorney-General for Canada (1921) 1
AC 401.
I I
.. 1 ° t th f h' (6)(7) h a th °nflexloonto the orlglna proprle ary eory 0 owners lp, were s e 1
under South African law is in favour of a sovereignty emphasis (as modified,
it is submitted, by a Social Contract foundation)(8) - 'dominium over bona
vacantia' is accordingly more consistent with, and more accurately descriptive
of, the jurisprudential nature of this power in South African law.
(6) Vide Section 1.2.2 supra.
(7) The original proprietary emphasis of the definition of escheat is
illustrated by the underlined extracts from the following dictionaries
and texts:
(a) Black's Law Dictionary (supra): "a reversion of property to the
State .... "
(b) Claasen, Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases, Vol 2 p 26:
"The reversion of lands or moneys to the State; a reversion of
lands to the lord of the fee or original grantor."
(c) Canadian Law Dictionary p 136: "The reversion of property to the
State as the ultimate proprietor of land, by reason of the lack
of anyone to inherit ... (it) escheats to the lord as reverting
to the original grantor ..•. "
(d) Wharton's Law Lexicon Dictionary of Jurisprudence, p 349: "a species
of reversion: it is a sort of caducary inheritance ... the lord of
the fee, from whom or from whose ancestor the estate was originally
derived, taking it as ultimus haeres. upon the failure, natural or
legal, of the intestate tenant's family."
(e) The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary Vol I p 680:
"(1) (Law) An incident of feudal law, whereby a fief reverted to
the lord when the tenant died siesed without heir .... Hence the
lapsing of land to the Crown (in US to the State), or to the lord
of the manor, on the death of the owner intestate without heirs.
(f) 16 Halsbury's Laws of England (3ed) p 427: "Escheat was the right
whereby land of which there was no longer any tenant, returned to
the lord by whom, or by whose predecessors in ti tIe, the tenure
was created".
(g) Attorney General of Ontario v t1ercer (1883) 8. App Cas 767 at 772:
"From the use of the word 'revert' in the writ of escheat, is
manifestly derived the language of some authorities which speak
of escheat as a species of reversion".
(8) Vide Sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.5 supra.
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Escheat (or dominium over bona vacantia) appears to have been a tacit
condition in feudal law attaching to the investiture of rights of tenure
in feudal tenants (9) under the process of enfeoffment, (10) as was
acknowledged judicially in Burgess v Wheate; Attorney General v Wheate
(1759). (11) In his analysis of feudal tenure, Blackstone, in Commentaries
on the Laws of England, (12) notwithstanding his customary opposition to
contractarianism, alluded indirectly further to the Social Contract
foundation of the power of escheat. It is submitted accordingly that
dominium over bona vacantia, like dominium eminens,is based on a contractarian
origin.
(9) Cf: Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History, Chapters
2 and 4.
(10) The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary: Vol I, pp 657, 735 and 746:
"Enfeoffment : the action of enfeoffing"
"Enfeoff: To invest with a fief"
"Fief: See FEE"
"Fee: (Feudal Law) An estate in land (in England always a heritable
estate) held on condition of homage and service to a superior lord;
a fief." (my underlining).
(11) (1759) 1 Eden, 177, in the judgment of Lord Henley and Lord Keeper
at 241 - 243:
"The legal right of escheat arises under the law of enfeoffment,
by which ... the lord gave the land to the tenant and his heirs,
under a tacit condition to revert, if the tenant died siesed
without heirs .... " (my underlining).
(12) 2 Blackstone Commentaries, 72 and 73, where it is stated inter alia:
" ... the tenure was determined by breach of the original
condition, expressed or implied in the feodal donation .... "
/;1
The statutory treatment of the power of escheat provides perspective
regarding its evolution since feudal times. In English law, as is noted
by Walker in Oxford Companion to Law, (13)certain forms of escheat were
abolished by the legislature in 1870, and further in 1925;(14) and the
present position, in the words of Thompson, Dictionary of Banking, (15)
is that "if an estate owner dies intestate ... (and) ... without heirs,
his property goes to the Crown as bona vacantia". 8y contrast, in the
United States, (16) legislative recognition accorded to the doctrine of
escheat has increased, it being provided generally that "this right of
the State (exists) to succeed to property, either real or personal, where
no heir can be found. 1l (17) The trend in Canada approximates to that in
the United States: Todd in The Law of Expropriation and Compensation in
(18) .
Canada, Ilsts eleven escheat statutes enacted after 1960. In South
Africa, a statutory recognition of escheat came in early law inter alia in
(13)p 430.
(14)Vide Administration of Estates Act 23 of 1925 (England), Sections 45
and 46; discussed in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary 4 ed at p 934.
(15)p 251.
(16)As is noted supra in footnote 2.
(17)R dOI.a ln,
(18)p 21.
Law Dictionary, 2 ed p 113.
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the Natal Escheat Laws(19) (No. 11 of 1868 and No.6 of 1869), but in more
recent times, the approach would appear to correspond to that in modern
English law in the bona vacantia orientation. (20)
The power of dominium over bona vacantia is closely allied to, but distinct
f
. (21) . (22)
rom, the State's power of forfelture. Although both permit the
acquisition under an original mode by the State of the property of its
Citizens, it would seem to adopt the feudal dictum, that the former arises
propter defectum sanguinis tenentis whereas the latter comes about propter
. . (23)
cr~men tenent~s.
(19)Claassen, Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases Vol 2 p 26 states in
this regard that "it may be noted that these laws were passed while
Natal was still a Crown Colony. Law No 6 of 1869 (N) declares the
law and practice in cases of escheats, and provides for the holding
of an inquest in all cases of escheat to the Crown."
(20)Vide Corbett, op cit, supra.
(21)It is noted that powers of escheat and forfeiture are frequently
grouped together for purposes of analysis and their distinction is
accordingly blurred by some writers: vide eg Walker Oxford Companion
to Law, p 430.
(22)Vide Section 1.3.6 supra.
(23)Classical authorities are at some variance in their reference to this
terminology. Walker, ibid, uses the words propter delictum tenentis,
as does 32 Halsbury's Laws of England 3ed, 367 - 8. Black's Law
Dictionary, Sed p 488 and 4ed p 640, refers to per defectum sanguinis
and per delictum tenentis.
Wharton, op cit, p 349, employs the phrases ob defectum sanguinis and
pro delicto tenentis, but correctly observes~hat "the following interests
do not escheat, viz ... (inter alia) ... propter delictum tenentis •.•. "
It would appear that although the choice of preposition is not important,
and although the substitution of crimen for delictum is justified on
the basis of modern usage, what is significant is to differentiate
between the powers on this basis.
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Wharton's Law Lexicon Dictionary of Jurisprudence (24) attempts to distinquish
escheat and forfeiture on two bases, one of which is here approved, the
other of which is respectfully rejected. In the first place, it is stated:
"It (escheat) differs from forfeiture ... in that the
latter is a penalty for a crime personal to the offender,
of which the Crown is entitled to take advantage by virtue
of its prerogative, while an escheat results from tenure
only, and arises from an obstruction in the course of
descent ... "
In the second place respectively, it cannot be accepted here that;
"An escheat is partly in the nature of a purchase ... (in)
... so far as it is necessary for the lord to enter on the
reverted property, in order to complete his full ownership
of it ... "
Although Wharton thereafter dilutes this submission by stating that "a mixed
ti tIe" is created under escheat, "being neither a pure purchase nor a pure
descent, but in some measure compounded of both", the analogy with purchase
k (25)is particularly wea . The mere fact that a subsequent taking of
possession (cf: delivery) of the bona vacantia over which dominium is
acquired, is (in the view of Wharton) necessary to perfect the acquisition
of title by escheat, does not justify this comparison with sale, since inter
alia the consensual nature of the latter is conspicuously absent from the
former. It would seem furthermore, by extension from the principles
applicable under dominium eminens, (26)that the effect of the power of
(24)Ibid, p 349.
(25)Cf: the criticisms of the analogy of dominium eminens with a
'compulsory sale', as discussed under Section 1.2.4 supra.
(26)Vide Section 1.3.9 infra at footnote 6, (in particular the judgment of
Juta AJA in Mathiba and Others v Mosche 1920 AD 354 at 364-5, quoted
thereat), and vide Section 1.2.4 supra at footnote 14.
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do~inium over bona vacantia, is that ownership of the subject property
pas?es to the State directly, by operation of law and by the very
nature of this power, notwithstanding that the general common law
requirements of delivery or registration may not'have been fulfilled.
Although, as is apparent supra, the rationale of dominium eminens(27)may have
relevance in the clarification of the nature of the power of dominium over
bona vacantia when displaced to the context of the latter, it is necessary
to retain a cognisance of the differences that exist between these two
powers. The forum of and motivation for their operation, the manner and
procedure of their exercise, the fact that the latter arises only in
relation to dead Citizens, and the question as to whether compensability
is appropriate for consideration, constitute inter alia a significant basis
for their separation.
In overview, although the power of dominium over bona vacantia shares
common features with both forfeiture and dominium eminens, it remains
a sui generis public law proprietary power of the State and is best
analysed as such.
(27)As discussed in greater detail in Section 1.4 infra.
1.3.8 THE GROUP AREAS POWER IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
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South African legal development has since 1948(1) been characterised by a
subscription to apartheid, the manifestations of which have permeated
almost every fibre in the fabric of the law, (2) to the extent that the very
foundations themselves of human rights and the Rule of Law have been eroded.
Contrary to the background of a common law heritage(3) that knew no distinction
on the basis of colour, and in the face of an overwhelming international
(1) The year in which the National Party came to power in South Africa.
(2) Dugard, in Human Rights and the South African Legal Order ~hapter 4
p 53 - 106 traces the parameters of racial discrimination in South
African law, and notes that it operates on both a political and a
personal level. Apartheid extends through the legislative spectrum
from race classification and labour legislation to the Homelands
policy, and from prohibitions on mixed marriages and freedom of
movement and association, to an institutionalised separation of
facilities, of amenities, of education, and of territorial residen-
tial and trading areas. Vide (or on jurisprudential grounds, perhaps
contra) Joubert The Law of South Africa Vol 10 p 329 et seq. Vide
also inter alia Van Reenen, Land - Its Ownership and Occupation in
South Africa. A Treatise on the Group Areas Act and the Community
Development Act; and Robertson, in lecture handouts at the
University of Natal, September 1983, who makes the crisp observa-
tion that "a prevailing theme throughout the history of developments
in land tenure in South Africa (from 1650 onwards) is that of race".
(3) Roman-Dutch authorities display a significant absence of racial
orientation, and in its place, a commitment to natural justice
and fundamental liberties. Voet states:
"A law has various requisites. In the first place indeed,
it ought to be just and reasonable - both in its matter,
for it prescribes what is honourable and forbids what is
base; and in its form, for it preserves equality and binds
the citizens equally".
Commentarius ad Pandectas 1.3.5. Gane translation, The Selective
Voet, being the Commentary on the Pandects Durban Butterworths
1955, Vol 1, p 34.
It is noted that although the above extract is perhaps too general to
prove the absence of a racial colouring in the Roman Dutch law, it does
indicate (indirectly) that the conception of justice that prevailed,
was premised upon something other than a legal recognition of the
separate identity of races.
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authority against, (4) and rejection of, 'separate development', the
governmental regime has chosen to institutionalise in its laws and now
h · . . t· t t· (5) 1· d d des· h· .h eto ens rlne In lts new cons l u lon, a po lCy an gran 19n W lC ar
anathema to fundamental natural human rights and freedoms.
Inter alia: The 1971 Namibia opinion of the majori ty in the International
Court of Justice (Legal Consequences for States· of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I C J Reports 16 at 57); the dis-
senting judgment of Tanaka J in the 1966 South West Africa cases (1966
I C J Reports 248 at 313 - 315); Schreiner, The Contribution of English
Law to South African Law in South Africa p 92; Schwelb, 1972 66 American
Journal of International Law, 337 at 349, in an article entitled "The
International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the
Charter"; Lefcourt, Law against the People Chapters 2 and 3, p 38 - 64.
(5) Pursuant to the affirmative outcome of the referendum held among whites
in South Africa on 2 November 1983, it appears that the practical
operation of the proposed constitution waits upon merely the formality
of executive implementation. With inter alia its division between
"own affairs" and "general affairs" under a presidential system in
which there is no guarantee of powers of judicial review, and with
its 4:2:1 ratio for the tricameral parliamentary representation of
Whites, Coloureds and Indians, to the total exclusion of Blacks, the
new dispensation represents a gross constitutional embodiment of
the tenets of National Party dogma and an indefensible denial
of the liberalist and egalitarian tenets, not only of Social Contract
theory and the natural law, but also of the very Christianity that the Con-
stitution purports to espouse. In this regard it is not insignifi-
cant that the Churches in South Africa have taken a stand against the
proposed constitution (vide inter alia The Natal Mercury of 27 October
1983 at page 18), on grounds inter alia of its entrenched division of
men and its institutionalised departure from the principle that all
men are equal before God.
The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983 in Schedule 2
thereto, details the nature and extent of the repeal and amendment of
certain provisions of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act
32 of 1961. Although the bulk of the earlier statute is repealed,
Part VI thereof is retained (subject to the amendments listed in
paragraph I.A.2 of Schedule 2 of the 1983 Act). The effect of the
1961 Act is accordingly now confined to matters of provincial govern-
ment, as reflected in its new title (S 121: " ••. the Provincial Govern-
ment Act, 1961"), and in its substituted long title ("To provide for
provincial Councils and their powers and the administration of
provincial matters, and for matters connected therewith").
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Proponents of the apartheid philosophy contend that it rests on the premise
that 'separate but equal, is equal',(6) but as Dugard notes, (7) the reality
in South Africa at present is a premise of 'separate but unequal. ,(8)
Although it can be clearly understood why some have a wish that apartheid
be practised, (inter alia, political expediency, self-interest and a desire
to maintain the status quo, motivate its adoption and retention) and not-
withstanding that it is conceded that a political transition to an alternative
and jurisprudentially-superior philosophy will have attendant difficulties,
the fundamental premise supra upon which apartheid rests cannot be and is
not condoned - it is repugnant to the principles of naturalism and the spirit
of naturalist legal heritage, and constitutes an extreme violation of the
Rule of Law. (9)
(6) It was described by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development,
Mr MC de Wet Nel (in Hansard Debates, Vol 1, column 7994, of 14 June
1961), as "differentiation without inferiority". Similarly the South
African Ambassador at the United Nations, Mr. R F Botha said: "Our
policy is not based on any concepts of superiority or inferiority,
but on the historical fact that different peoples differ in their
loyalties cultures outlooks and modes of life and that they wish to retain
them": 1974 11 UN Monthly Chronicle number 10 at p 19 - 23; also
Hansard Debates Vol SS columns 382-3 of 7 February 1975.
(7)
Human Rights and the South African Legal Order p 64-5.
(8) The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, 49 of 1953, for instance
permits the reservation of separate but unequal facilities for
different races, and precludes the possibility of judicial pronounce-
ments on the validity and lawfulness thereof.
(9) Vide A S Mathews, Law Order and Liberty in South Africa, p 302 ff and
references cited thereat.
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While the 'separate but unequal'philosophy clearly revolts the sensibilities,
it is noted that in early American jurisprudence, the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' found acceptance in the infamous decision in Plessy v Ferguso~
(1896). (10) This was however later convincingly overruled and repudiated
in the landmark judgment in Brown v Board of Education of Topeka (1954), (11)
where Warren CJ ruled that separate but equal is not equal, since segregation
represents a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. (12) The rejection of the 'separate but equal' premise, and the
aversion that natural law finds for discrimination based upon race, have
been expressed also by inter alia a former Chief Justice of Australia, (13)
and in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) by Beadle CJ in City of Salisbury v Mehta.(14)
In South Africa too, a judicial reluctance to recognise the reasonableness
of apartheid can be found in several judgments;(15) but the majority
(10)163 US 537 (1896).
(11)347 US 483 (1954).
(12)Furthermore, Ibid, at 494: "To separate (black children) from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race, generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone".
(13)Latham CJ in Lord Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City of Melbourne
v The Commonwealth (1947), 74 Commonwealth Law Reports 31 at 60.
(14)1962 (1) SA 675 (RAD).
(15)eg: Williams and Adendorff v Johannesburg Municipality 1915 TPD 106;
~ v Plaatjes 1910 EDL 63; the dissenting judgment of Gardiner AJA in
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs v Rassool 1934 AD 167 at 191-3.
In R v Carelse (1943 CPD 242 at 253) and R v Abdurahman (1950 (3) SA 136
(AD) at 145) however, the Court insisted that the inequality be substantial
before it would intervene - a similar approach was adopted on the facts in
~ v Lusu 1953 (2) SA 484 (AD). In more recent times, a judicial considera-
tion of the equity of Group Areas legislation has taken place in Minister
of the Interior v Lockhat 1961 (2) 587 (A) at 602 and in S v Adams 1979
(4) SA 793(T) at 794-5 and 805.
Vide also the dicta of Didcott J in In re Duma 1983 (4) SA 469 (N) at 473
G - H~and his earlier judgment in Nxasana v Minister of Justice and
Another 1976 (3) SA 745 (D) at 747H - 748 B.
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decision of the Appellate Division in Minister of Posts and Telegraphs v
Rasool, (16) in upholding the legality of separate but equal post office
counters for whites and non-whites, remains characteristic of the South
(17)
African standpoint, and has paved the way for the later statutory
treatment (particularly post-1948) under the separate but unequal
approach. (18)
The primary instrument for the expression of apartheid in the forum of
property law in South Africa, is the State's Group Areas power, which in
its exercise and operation in practice, contemplates and comprises two
essential phases - firstly proclamation (of a designated group area), and
secondly displacement (of ?ffected persons, by way of expropriation).
(16)1934 AD 167.
(17)The Group Areas power (broadly construed) claimed by the State, is
expressed in a statutory framework which is manifold. The Group
Areas Act, 36 of 1966, and its 'sister' Act, the Community Development
Act, 3 of 1966, regulate the acquisition occupation and use of land
in South Africa on a racial basis. Whereas these acts, although
contemplating the Black group, have reference primarily to the White,
Coloured and Indian Groups, the Black Urban Areas Consolidation Act,
25 of 1945, provides amplification regarding the treatment of urban
blacks; the Black Land Act, 27 of 1913, and the Development Trust
and Land Act, 18 of 1936, inter alia, have relevance here too. In
regard to apartheid legislation broadly, inter alia the Prohibition
of Mixed Marriages Act, 55 of 1949, the Population Registration Act,
30 of 1950, the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, 49 of 1953,
and the Immorality Act, 23 of 1957, Section 16, serve to enact racial
discrimination in South African law. Although any detailed analysis
of the extreme positivist nature and effect of these statutes lies
beyond the confines of this study, suffice it here that these
references thereto are made in order to record the far reaching
scope and range of these enactments.
(18)Vide supra at footnote 2.
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In respect of the first phase supra, under the provision of Section 23(1)
of the Group Areas Act, (19) the State President is empowered to proclaim a
group area for occupation and for ownership by members of a particular race
group. In this regard, the Group Areas power may appear prima facie to share
a conceptual similarity with the police power, and perhaps even to be subsumed
within the category of the latter, in as far as each relates to the regulation
t (20)or controlling of the use to which the property may be pu . In point of
distinction however, whereas the latter relates to the use itself, the former
is focussed principally upon the racial identity of those persons who may
thereafter put the affected property to use, and not upon that use directly,
if at all. Moreover, in further distinction, whereas the latter inhibits and
prohibits a particular use recognised as being prejudicial to the public
(19)Act 36 of 1966.
(20)In the United States, in instances where there has been racial discrimi-
nation in property usage, the Courts have upheld the constitutionality
of statutory prohibitions against such discrimination, and have viewed
this regulatory power as falling within the ambit of the State's police
power (vide cases infra). It is suggested however that although this
would be a convenient classification in the United States where the
Group Areas power is not known or recognised, such is inappropriate in
South Africa (for the reasons recorded in the main text hereafter~.
United States decisions of interest on this point view this question
accordingly from a different perspective (viz: they forbid rather than
entrench discrimination based on race) but contain nevertheless relevance
in their enunciation of naturalist ideals:
In District of Columbia v John R Thompson Company 346 US 100, 73 S Ct
1007, 9? LEd.1480 (1953), and cases cited therein), it was held that
the leglslatlve power delegated to the District of Columbia by Congress
was "as ~road as ~h~ ~olic~ po~e: of a state" and included the power to
enact a law prohlbltlng dlscrlmlnation against Negroes".
In C~m~o~wealth.v Alger 7 Cush 53 (~1ass), the Court upheld legislation
prohlbltlng raclal discrimination in the renting of flats.
In t1assachusetts Commission Against Discrimination v Colangelo 344 ~1ass
387, 182 NE2d ?95, ~he Cou~t held that although the "freedom of the
~wner to exerClse hl: own Judgment in the sale or rental of his property
lS .: .. (~) ... mos~ lmp~rta~t.attributeof ownership", a statutory
prohlbltlon on raclal dlscrlmlnation does not constitute a taking of
property under the power of dominium eminens.
Vide also: Locatelli v City of Medford 287 Mass 560 192 NE 57; and
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate 33; Mass 773 at 777.
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interest, naturalist jurisprudence would contest vehemently that the
exercise of the Group Areas power serves this function, and would
contend instead that the nonrepresentative (but purportedly '~public") interest
advocating this power was unjustly prejudiced (and not that the racially
prohibited use was justifiably prejudicial in itself).
In respect of the second phase of its operation, the Group Areas power
evidences a substantial overlap with dominium eminens in regard to the
practical mechanics by which each power achieves final effect: Section 38
(lB) of the Community Development Act (21) provides that " ... the provisions
of Sections 6 to 23 of the Expropriation Act, 1975, shall mutatis mutandis
apply in respect of the acquisition of immovable property by expropriation
in terms of this section .... ". However a significant distinction arises in
that under dominium eminens, expropriation is empowered "for public purposes,,(22)
under the provisions of Section 2(1) of the Expropriation Act,(23) whereas in
terms of Section 38(1)(a) of the Community Development Act, (24) expropriation
(21)Act 3 of 1966. Section 38 relates to the "(a)cquisition of immovable
property by the (Community Development) Board by agreement or expropria-
tion". Vide also discussion in Section 1.3.9 at footnote 18.
(22)Vide Jacobs The Law of Expropriation in South Africa pp 15-16 and 267.
(23)Act 63 of 1975, Section 2(1): "Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
Minister may, subject to an obligation to pay compensation, expropriate
any property for public purposes or take the right to use temporarily any
property for public purposes".
(24)Act 3 of 1966, Section 38(1)(a) provides:
"The board may with the written approval of the Minister, if
it is satisfied that it is expedient to do so for the attain-
ment of any of its objects, acquire any immovable property
by expropriation .... "
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is empowered, subject to the written approval of the Minister, where such is
. (25)
expedient for the attainment of any of the (statutory) obJects of the
Community Development Board. Expropriation, then, under the Group Areas
power, fulfils merely a "governmental purpose", whereas expropriation by
dominium eminens under the Expropriation Act serves a "public purpose"of a
far broader nature, as contemplated in Fourie v t1inister van Lande~26)
(25)Act.3of 1966, Section 15, sets out the objects and general powers of the
Community Development Board. Section 15(1) states:
"The objects for which the board is established shall be,
subject to the directions of the Minister -
(a) to develop or assist in the development of such
areas ... as may from time to time be designated
by the Minister, to promote community development
in any such area
(b) to assist in and control the disposal of affected
properties. "
(NOTE: 'affected properties'are defined in Section 1 of Act 3 of 1966,
as read with Sections 23 and 24 of Act 36 of 1966).
"(c) to assist persons to acquire or hire immovable property in
the achievement of the objects mentioned in paragraph
(a) or (b)."
(26)A considerable body of case authority exists in South African law
regarding what constitutes a 'public purpose' as contemplated in Section
2(1) of the Expropriation Act, 63 of 1975, (and as contemplated in the
corresponding sections in preceding statutes eg Section 2(1) of the
Expropriation Act 55 of 1965). Since this determination depends largely
on the facts in the particular expropriation at hand, casuistic analysis
is essential. The nature of "public purposes" received detailed judicial
consideration by Steyn AJ in Fourie v Minister van Lande en 'n Ander
1970 (4) SA 165 (0) (discussed by Jacobs The Law of Expropriation in
South Africa at pIS), in which judgment the following test was laid
down at 177E) for the determination of whether an expropriation (under
the 1965 Act, or similarly the 1975 Act) is valid in this regard:
"Eerstens moet vasgestel word wat die subjektiewe doel was
van die instansie wat die betrokke goed onteien het.
Tweedens moet daar objektief geoordeel word of daardie
doel binne die betekenis val van 'openbare doeleiendes'




The ratio decidendi in this judgment centred on the point that the
Legislature clearly intended "public purposes" in Cl broad sense (which
may include the narrower sense of "governmental purposes", but extends
beyond the confines thereof) (Vide 175 D). Accordingly (at 176 B):
"Die instandhouding en uitbreiding van die Republiek se
telekommunikasiestelsel is dus. nie slegs 'n 'regerings
doeleiende' nie, maar ook 'n 'openbare doeleiende' in
die bree sin, omdat dit die hele land raak en tot voordeel
van die publiek as 'n geheel strek".
Although in the earlier South African cases, expropriations for principally
governmental purposes were held justified in inter alia Jooste's case
(1911) infra, the trend in later cases (vide Slabbert's case (1963) infra),
was in favour of the extended meaning of "public purposes". In the
African Townships case (1961) infra, the Court (at p 393) went as far
as to hold that expropriations were conceivable which would be for
"public purposes" but clearly not for "governmental purposes" - similar
dicta are found in Rudolph's case (1940) (at p 131) infra. For analysis
in depth of the nature of "public purposes", vide the following South
African judgments:
Jooste v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1897 (4) OR 147 at 149;
Rondebosch Municipal Council v Trustees of the Western Province Agricul-
tural Society 1911 AD 271 at 279 and 283 - 284; SA Turf Club v Claremont
Municipality 1912 CPD 54 at 59 - 60; Langlaagte Proprietary Company Lid: (In
Liquidation v Union Government 1916 WLD 127; Van Eck NO and Van Rensburg_
NO v Etna Stores 1947 (2) SA 984 (A); Broadway Mansions (Pty) Ltd v
Pretoria City Council 1955 (1) SA 517 (A) at 522; Minister of Defence v
Commercial Properties Ltd and Others 1955 (3) SA 324 (0); White River
Council v H L Hall and Sons Ltd 1958 (2) SA 524 (A); Davis v Caledon
t~unicipality and Others 1960 (4) SA 885 (C); African Farms and Townships
v Cape Town Municipality 1961 (3) SA 392 (C) at 393 and 396-7; Slabbert v
Minister van Lande 1963 (3) SA 620 T at 621 D - F; 01ifantsvlei Township
Ltd v Group Areas Development Board 1964 (3) SA 611 (T); Barclays Bank
o-c 0 and Others v Tarajia Estates 1966 (1) SA 420 (T); Minister of Water
Affairs v Mostert and Others 1966 (4) SA 690 (A); Pretoria City Council v
Modimola 1966 (3) SA 250 (A) at 25 8 - 9; Springs Town Council v
McDonald and Badenhorst 1968 (2) SA 114 (T); Cape Town Municipality v
L F Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd 1969 (2) SA 256 (C); Fourie's case supra;
Minister van Landboukrediet en Grondbesit v Primrose Estates 1974 (4) SA 209
(W); Hardman NO and Others v Administrator, Natal 1975 (1) SA 340 (~~);
Tongaat Group v Minister of Agriculture 1977 (2) SA 961 (A); Sorrel1 v
t1ilnerton Hunicipali ty 1980 (4) SA 660 (C).
Relevant foreign precedents regarding "public purposes" include the
following:
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Cameron and Jones 11 HLC 443 at 481-2,
11 ER 1405 at 1419; Coomber v The Justices of the County of Berkshire
(1883) 9 AC 61 (HL) at 72-3; Hamabal Framjee v Secretary of State for
India 1914 ILR 39 (BOM) 279; Municipal Council of Sydney v Campbell
1924 AC 338 (PC); Lord McMillan in Barras v Aberdeen Steam Trawling
and Fishing Company 1933 AC 402 at 446-7; Minister of Lands v Rudolph
1940 SR 126 at 129 and 131; Minister of Internal Affairs and Banner v
Albertson and Others 1941 SR 240 at 259-60; Bank Voor Handel v Slatford
2 AER 956 (CA) at 965.
(26) continued/ ...
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On balance it emerges that the Group Areas power is distinct from both the
police power and dominium eminens, and is not subsumed by either nor is it
a hybrid of both. Notwithstanding the superficial equivalence it may
appear to share with the former (in its first phase of operation), and with
the latter (in its second phase of operation), the Group Areas power in South
African jurisprudence seems best viewed as being sui generis.
Contractarian and naturalist jurisprudence is strongly at issue with the pro-
ponents of apartheid philosophy on the question of the Group Areas power,
being at variance not only with the purported social validity of the purposes
the Group Areas power seeks to promote, but also with the congruence of this
power to considerations of public interest and wellbeing. It is significant
Footnote 26 continued
In American law, "public purposes" have been liberally construed to embrace
the public interest broadly, apparently without direct regard to the
degree or frequency of the use. There has been an interesting enun-
ciation of the nature of this concept in United States ex reI T WA v
Welch 327 US 546 (1946). In commenting on this case, Encyclopaedia
Britannica Vol 8 p 336 states:
"Although the determination (in the United States) of
whether a use is public or not, is said to be a judicial
question, the courts have moved so far from the idea
that actual use by an appreciable part of the public is
a requisite to public purpose, toward a conclusion that
if any public purpose is served public use is unnecessary,
that is almost correct to say that the question of whether
a taking of land is for a public use is a legislative one
and not a judicial one .... Thus use of the condemnation
power has been upheld where the purpose was to clear slums,
beautify an area, construct low-cost housing, provide off-
street parking, and promote industrialisation."
(It is noted that this judgment was given against the background of the
judicial review power existing in the United States - reliance out of
context on this judgment must therefore be avoided). Vide also United
States v Twin City Power Company 350 US 222 (1956).
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to note that Section 38 (IS) of the Community Development Act (as supra) does
not incorporate an adoption of Section 2(1) of the Expropriation Act - the
South African lawmakers accordingly cleverly sidestep the naturalist trap
in which they would have been caught, . had they attempted to shroud their purely
"governmental purposes" with the cloak of respectability that "public
purposes" (27) would have provided. The grand apartheid design is quite
patently not a "public purpose" under naturalist ideology and the tenets
of contractarianism, although this is not to say that positivist excess
could not attempt to make it so.
A further enquiry relevant here is the jurisprudential source of this power,
as a determinant of its nature. It would appear that South African law
attempts to 'rationalise' the Group Areas power as being an attribute of
sovereignty, based on legislative authority, and represented or expressed in
statutory enactment: if Parliament is considered to have a plenary sovereign
power to legislate (as is the view adopted in South African law), then it
follows that its enactments are unassailable save by a subsequent sovereign
legislature. (28) The Group Areas power would on this basis prima facie
appear inherent inthe sovereign Parliament. Where the defect however lies
in this purported rationale of the power, is not in the apodosis, but in the
protasis - does a nonrepresentative white parliament in fact have the
unlimited sovereignty that it in this regard claims? That the bulk of South
African society has not been consulted about Group Areas (and furthermore
(27) Vl"de 1 d" " f bl"a so lSCUSSlon 0 pu lC purposes under Section 1.3.9.
(28) Vl"de d" " d S "lSCUSSlons un er ectlon 1.2.3 supra.
would not(29)have consented had they been so consulted), suggests that the
necessary contractarian foundation for the transmission of plenary power from
the original sovereign (the people) to the allegedly de iure sovereign (the
White Parliament) does not exist (nor did it exist) in this regard. The
oppression of a subjugated people differs vastly from ruling them lawfully
and de iure.
Social Contract theory becomes invaluable here in elucidating these issues
and in dismissing as ultra vires(30) the supposed legality of the State's
Group Areas power. This power is clearly not basedon abroad Contract of all
the Citizens inter se, guided by and under principles of natural law; (it is
noted in passing that this too provides a further justification for the sui
generis treatment supra of the Group Areas power). If it can be accepted
that South African society embraces all its Citizens regardless of race
(which assumption appears reasonable and would be trite anywhere but in South
Africa), then it would seem that the democratically-spirited vision of a
dynamic and periodically-renewed or continuously-ratified Soci~l Contract
between those Citizens (as enunciated primarily by Rousseau), (31) would
militate crucially against the lawfulness of enactments (by a represented
(29) It is noted that Dworkin, in Taking Rights Seriously (p 152) criticises
contractarian reasoning in this hypothetical manner. In defence of
this rhetorical style here, it is submitted that such is necessary
here to highliqht the absurdity and illogicality of imputing a
pactum subjectionis (vide Section 2.3) by South African Blacks.
(30)
Vide, by extension, although in a different context, the judgment of Lord
Russell in Kruse v Johnson (1898) 2 Q B 91 at 99.
(31) Vide S 2.4.5 infra.
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power-wielding minority) against, and materially prejudicial to, a
disenfranchised majority; alternatively expressed, to borrow Rousseau's
dictum, true sovereignty rests in the Volont~ Generale, and the positivist
dictates of an oppressive regime cannot deny the immutable rights of the
majority nor the lawfulness of the General Will. The Group Areas power of the
State, in its very nature and in the manner it is draconianly implemented in
South Africa, emerges accordingly as being ultra vires the Social Contract
and as having been illegitimately assumed by a Parliament that is questionably
sovereign in this regard.
The contractarianism of John. Rawls(32) contributes significantly also to the
clearer understanding of the logical lacunae in the conventional South African
rationale of the Group Areas power. It is noted however that Rawls' thesis
did not envisage the Social Contract as the direct source of powers conferred
on the government - rather, in his view, that Contract was focussed on
determining the fundamental principles of justice that regulate the structure
and operation of democratic society in a spirit of social co-operation, and
it is from those principles that those powers in turn would indirectly arise.
As is elaborated in greater detail infra in Section 2.6, his concept of
'justice as fairness' can find no concord with the apartheid and Group Areas
practices in South African law, since both of the Rawlsian principles are
violated in a vital regard: it cannot be said that our society is structured
firstly such that each person would have "an equal right to the most extensive
system of equal basic liberties compatible wi th a similar system of liberty for all" (
(32)Vide Section 2.6 infra.
(33)Rawls, A Theory of Justice Section 46 p 302.
and nor can it be said secondly that social and economic inequalities are
ex ante "arranged so that they are both to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged ... and attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.,,(34) Since men in the original
position Rawls postulated, were behind a veil of ignorance (which would
include no acknowledgement of race), and since the principles of justice as
fairness would accordingly be determined objectivelYlrationally and antece-
dently under a process of reflective equi.librium, it would be only authentic
judgments, (unbiased by race and not disproportionately beneficial or pre-
judicial ex ante to any particular individual or class), that would find
expression in the Social Contract - South African law, in regard to apart-
heid and Group Areas, accordingly falls far short of the Rawlsian ideal.
The seriousness of this indictment that Social Contract theory raises, and
the question that is thereby posed regarding the legality of the Group Areas
power, can in a curious way provide a clue to the rationale and motivation of
South Africa's Homelands' policy and its new Constitution. (35) If the South
African government could render its grand design workable, it would perhaps
contend ex post facto that it had convincingly dispensed with the contractarian
objections supra - firstly, the Blacks would become members of another State,
and would accordingly no longer be party to the 'South African Social Contract';
secondly, by virtue of the (nominal) support of the Coloureds and Indians for
(34) Ibid.
(35) The grand apartheid design extends to creating a constellation or
consociation of 'independent' 'selfgoverning' 'Glack' states in the
subcontinent. Vide footnote 5 supra.
"
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the new constitutional dispensation, if its subsequent operation was to their
detriment, it could be countered that they had consented thereto; thirdly, it
would be suggested (although still remaining contrary to Brown v Board of
Education of Topeka supra), that there would be compliance with Rawls' first
principle in that each 'Citizen' (ie excluding Blacks) would now have an equal
(albei t separate) right "to the most extensive system of equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all"; and finally, since the Black
are excluded and other nonwhites are consentinrrpartic~pants,it might be ~uggested
(albeit questionably) that there w~s (deemed) compliance\vith Rawls' second principl
Persuasive though such arguments might be to those who wish to be swayed, it
remains the submission of this writer that even if the grand apartheid design
reaches completion, it can never be justified in this (or any other) manner,
since it ignores the rights of the Blacks in the State of their true
Citizenship and as such critically fails to acknowledge the liberalist and
egalitarian spirit of the Social Contract foundation. In the overt denial
of fundamental human rights and freedoms, and in the rampant positivism that
prevails, South Africa shares much in common with the features of Nazi
Germany that Gustav Radbruch criticised so cogently. Radbruch's words in
Rechtsphilosophie(36) contain great relevance for South Africa today:
(the) conception of law and its application (we call ...
the doctrine of positivism), rendered the lawyers as well as
the people defenceless against the most capricious, the most
cruel, the most criminal laws. In the final resort, this
concept of positivism equates law (Recht) with might: only
where there is might, there is law."
He continued:(37)
(36) 1932 ·ed~ p 335 t 1 t d bl· h d· h Rh·_ as rans a e ; repu IS e In t e eln-Neckar Zeitung
of 12 September 1945
(37) Ibid.
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"What must however be deeply imprinted upon the consciences
of the people and of lawyers particularly, is that there
may be laws incorporating such a degree of injustice and
social destructiveness that they should be denied application,
yes indeed they should be denied even a legal nature.
There are thus certain legal principles which are stronger
than any legal decree, with the result that ?ny law which
contradicts them is devoid of all validity. We call these
principles the law of nature ... "
Guidance is available to South Africa in the warning voice of Radbruch, (38)
in the increasingly incensed demands of the international community, in the
spiritual dictum of the Churches, and in the call of naturalis8 in our
minds and consciences, but will the unanimity that is there presented be
heeded by the White legislature? It seems, however, that to attempt to
reform South Africa's traditional devotion to apartheid may prove" to be a
f . 1 k t d t "1 d'" t t (39) . tru~ t ess tas ,or 0 a op a s~m~ e once use ~n a d~ fferent con ex ~
may be like 'trying to level the Pentagon with a wet noodle' •
In final analysis, the Group Areas power (the proprietary embodiment and
instrument of draconian apartheid) emerges, distinct from dominium eminens
and the police power, as a sui generis power of the State under South African
law. In its modern usage, it is assumed unilaterally and without contractarian
basis by a legislature that is questionably sovereign in this regard; it is given
a practical operation in a manner that is ultra vires the natural functions
of the State; and it is based upon a jurisprudential rationale that contradicts
fundamental tenets of Social Contract theory. The Group Areas power abandons
(38) Cf: Van Niekerk, (1973) 90 SALJ 234 - 261: The Warning Voice from
Heidelberg - the Life and Thought of Gustav Radbruch.
(39) Florynce Kennedy The Whorehouse Theory of Law reprinted in Lefcourt,
Law Against the People p 81 at 89.
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legal tradition, violates the Rule of Law and ignores overwhelming juris-
prudential opposition. It reflects an unreasonable, irrational and
. (40)unnatural sectional prejudice; it institutionalises racial discrimination
as a legal norm; and it elevates private bias to the level of a public duty.
Law is denied its function as an instrument of social change, correction and
evolution, and reduced to a repressive and oppressive positivist instrument
for maintaining the status quo. A tu quoque (41) argument is thrown at the
international community while internally, the law is pitted against the
people instead of serving their interests and wellbeing. Apartheid cannot
be left unchecked, permitted to remain in discord with the tenets of
naturalism, or allowed under a separate and unequal philosophy to continue
to deny the contractarian, co-operative and participative foundations of
any just society. Ultimately, in the submission of this writer, apartheid
and its ramifications are indefensible.
(40)These submissions would perhaps be disputed by supporters of apartheid.
It is submitted however, consistently with the liberalist and egali-
tarian presumptions (vide Section 3.5 infra), that the onus of proving
their falseness rests with the proponents of apartheid, rather than
upon this writer to prove their (almost universally accepted) validity.
(41)Vide Dugard op cit p 104. It is noted however that South Africa differs
in this regard in a material respect from the rest of the world, in that
here, racial discrimination is institutionalised.
1.3.9 THE POWER TO CONSTRUCT PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS
lUU
The State's power to construct public improvements contemplates and encompasses
the broad range of public works the State is empowered to execute, in the
fulfilment of the public purposes for which it was instituted under the
Social Contract, and in the promotion of its Citizens' wellbeing that it
holds as its objective. The number of examples in the exercise of this power
is accordingly vast, but a significant and representative illustration may
be found in the construction of roads by the State or its local authorities.
It is noted further that in the proprietary forum, this power operates on
. 1 1 . (1) . . (2) ( h· hvarlous eve s - on res extra commerc~um, on res ~n commerc~o w lC
have been acquired for public use inter alia by purchase or expropriation),
and even upon res alicuius(3) (without the disruption of private ownership).
Notwithstanding that the distinction between dominium eminens and the power
to construct public improvements may appear fine in that the implementation
of the latter frequently requires the exercise of the former, it is noted
however that these powers are not the same. A difference emerges in that




Vide Gaius Institutes 1.2.1; Justinian Corpus IurisCivi1is 1.2.1;
Thomas Textbook on Roman Law p 127; Sohm Institutes of Roman Law 302
and 304; discussed by Silberberg and Schoeman The Law of Property (1983)
ed at 17.
Ibid.
Vide: Van der Merwe Sakereg p 27; Silberberg and Schoeman, op cit, p 25.
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and does not extend to empowering the acquisition of the property upon which
that 'construction' takes place. It is accordingly that Nichols(4)notes that:
" ... it is well settled that a grant of authority to
construct ... (a public improvement) ... does not,
in the absence of controlling circumstances, authorise
the exercise of the power of eminent domain in order
to acquire a site ... (for that purpose) ... "
(5 )
Further disparity exists in the fact that under the provisions of Section 8(1)
of the Expropriation Act, (6) the invocation of dominium eminens results in
the direct and original acquisition of ownership by the expropriator, whereas
public works by contrast may be constructed even on property still under
private ownership(7) (as in res alicuius supra).




Cf: Canada: Section 449 of the Municipal Act 1933 (Man.)(Canada), and
Section 468 of the 1954 Amending Act; vide Todd, op cit, p 119 et seq
and 173 et seq; Paul v Dauphin (1941) 1 WWR 43 at 45-6, affirmed
(1941) 2 WWR 224. Vide also Todd, op cit, in this regard.
Act 63 of 1975: Section 8(1) provides: "The ownership of property
expropriated in terms of the provisions of this Act shall ..• on the
date of expropriation, vest in the State .... "
It was held similarly (although not under the 1975 Act) by Juta AJA in
Mathiba and Others v Mosche 1920 AD 354 at 364-5: "The effect of
expropriation is to vest the ownership of the land in the Government,
notwithstanding that the land still stands registered in the plaintiff's
name, and has not been transferred to the Government. No doubt, dominium
in land does not as a rule pass without transfer coram lege loci .... But
the principle that such dominium may pass without such transfer by
mere operation of law, is well known to the Common Law And it is
quite in the power of the Legislature to effect such a passing over of
the dominium by operation of law ... (since such) ... is involved in
the very nature of expropriation".
Vide also precedents cited supra under Section 1.2.4 footnote 14, and
vide Section 1.3.7 supra, footnote 26.
Vide Chrysler Realty Corporation v North Carolina State Highway Commission
190 SE2d 677. Also Murphy v Wilmington 6 Houst (Del) 345, 22 AM St Rep
345, where it was held that the construction of channels diverting a
private stream was empowered under a water and drainage statute, whereas
such regulation would not be possible in the exercise of dominium eminens.
Cf: Section 134 of Transvaal Local Government Ordinance 17 of 1939.
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A cognisance on a procedural level of the points of distinction between
these powers is found in The Report of the Select Committee on the Expropria-
tion Bill, (8) where Mr P C van Blommenstein (then Deputy-Secretary, Department
of Agricultural Credit and Land Tenure; now Director General of the Department
of Community Development) said:(9)
"Die onteiening van grond vir paddoeleindes




Record of Proceedings and Original Evidence, S C 6/1974, of 10 October
1974, (ISBN 0 621 01888 0), under the chairmanship of Mr T Langley,
paragraphs 21 - 48, pages 10 - 17, at para 37 p IS, and at para 30 p 12.
This was in reply to a question by Or LAP A Munnik regarding the
reasonableness of the exclusion of expropriation for roads purposes,
from a consolidated all-embracing Expropriation Act. Ibid, paragraph
37 paae IS.
He continued:
" ... want in party gevalle, soos byyoorbeeld in Natal en
in 'n groot mate in die Kaapprovinsie, moet eiendomsreg
verkry word. In Transvaal, skied dit bloot by proklamasie.
Daar is 'n groot verskil. Die (nudum) dominium berus nog
altyd (in die Transvaal) by die geregistreerde eienaar, en
die reg wat (deur sulke proklamasie aan die onteienaar)
verleen word, is slegs die reg om die grond uitsluitlik vir
'n pad ... (te gebruik) ... "
It is noted that reference to extraneous parliamentary material such as
the Select Committee Report is not taken into account in interpreting
the meaning of a statute that is consequent - a long line of decisions
provides authority in South African law in this regard: (Vide inter
alia: Mathiba and others v Mosche 1920 AD 354 at 362; R v Ristow 1926
EDL 168 at 172-3; Mavromati v Union Exploration Imports (Pty) Ltd 1949
(4) SA 917 AD at 919 and 927; Hopkinson v Bloemfontein District Creamery
1966 (1) SA 159 (0) at 166; ~ v Shangase _. 1972 (2) SA 410 at 414).
Nevertheless, in the words of Centlivres CJ in Harris and Others v
Minister of the Interior and Another (1952 (2) SA 428 AD at 457), "in
order to understand the reasons for passing a ... (statute - here the
Statute of Westminister) ... it is permissible to refer to the events
which led up to such an Act being passed". The reference supra to
the Select Committee Report is similarly included here, not to
determine the meaning itself of the Act, but to throw a light on its
motivation and intended effect.
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The 1975 Expropriation Act(ll) gives no direct indication in its long title(12)
to the fact that an important motivation for and effect of its enactment was
the consolidation of the diverse legislation (both as regards procedure, and as
regards the entitlement to and statutory basis for compensation) that had
existed in South Africa prior to 1975. The 1975 Act was, and (although it
has been subject to some subsequent amendment)(13) still is, the "child of
compromise"it was described in the Select Committee Report(14) to be,
endeavouring as it did to reconcile the provisions of Act 55 of 1965 with
h b o ° f of °t d lOd to (15)t e 0 Jectlves 0 unl orml y an conso 1 a lone
(11) Act 63 of 1975.
(12) The long title of Act 63 of 1975 states: "To provide for the expropriation
of land and other property for public and certain other purposes; and to
provide for matters connected therewith." In this regard, its wording
is similar to that of Act 55 of 1965: "To provide for the expropriation
of land and other property for public purposes, to provide for matters
incidental thereto, and to amend ..• (fourteen earlier Acts named) "
A significant difference however is that the 1975 Act provides for
expropriation 'for public and certain other purposes."
(13)
The Expropriation Act, 63 of 1975, has since its commencement on 1 January
1977 been subject to four amendments under Acts 19 of 1977, 3 of 1978, 8
of 1980 and 21 of 1982. These amendments, although short in their texts,
are fairly substantial in their effect. The 1982 Ex ropriation Amend-
ment Act for instance in Section 4 deletes (prospectively Sections 12
(S)(i) and 12 (6) of the principal Act, regarding an expropriatee's
former goodwill entitlement. This amendment, inter alia, evidences
perhaps an even greater movement towards and subscription to positivism;
the exclusion of compensation thereby introduced is indefensible on
naturalist criteria and is accordingly criticised.
(14) Para 21 plO. Vide also p 58.
(IS)
The history of expropriation in South African law reveals that there
have been extensive efforts already to consolidate the mass of legis-
lation that formerly existed. Consideration of the legislative
evolution of a particular statute has considerable relevance to the
proper interpretation of a later Act, one reason being that a




legislative intention. Authority for the importance of statutory history
is found in Steyn Die Uitleg van Wette 4 ed p 159; Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp
Municipality 1920 AD 530 at 554-5; Union Government v Rosenberg (Pty) Ltd
1946 AD 120 at 128-9; Minister of the Interior v Machadodorp Investments
and Another 1957 (2) SA 395 (A) at 404 D; Bassa v The Master and Another
1963 (4) SA 510 (N); Youngleson Investments v South Coast Regional Rent
Board 1971 (1) SA 405 (A) at 413G; Brink v Alfred McAlpine and Son (Pty)
Ltd 1971 (3) SA 741 (A) at 748H.
A full exposition of the statutory history of expropriation is found in
the following references - brevitatis causa, this is not reiterated here,
and may it suffice that the broad themes are summarised. Vide the
submissions of K van Dijkhorst SC in Tongaat Group Ltd v ~1inister of
Agriculture 1977(2) SA 961 (A) at 963H - 969A (where the position up
to and including the Expropriation Act 55 of 1965, as amended, is
considered, with reference to the English law, Canadian and Australian
law, the various provincial proclamations and ordinances prior to
1965, and the general legislation that had application to expropriation
matters). Vide also van Schalkwyk, Onteiening in die Suid'-Afrikaanse
Reg : In Privaatregtelike Ondersoek (unpublished doctoral thesis at
U 0 F S, 1977), at pp 60 - 65 (where schedules are given of twenty four
Acts incorporated into the 1965 Act, and thirty one Acts and Ordinances
not included therein, which had operation co-existently with the 1965
Act) and at pp 77 - 79 and pp 283 - 287 (where that legislation not
consolidated under the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 is discussed). Cf
also Jacobs The Law of Expropriation in South Africa pp 3 - 4 and Gildenhuy~
Onteieningsreg Chapter 2 at pp 22 - 32 (where the development in foreign
systems is considered), and at pp 32 - 36 and 36 - 40 respectively (where
the position in South African law prior to 1910, and subsequently, is
outlined).
In short, whereas the continental systems in general have experienced
the benefits of consolidated legislation (cf Van Schalkwyk, op cit
p 283-4). and whereas English law is to some extent still diverse.'
South African law. althouah it has evidenced a trend towards consolida-
tion and has taken substantial steps forward in this reaard in both
the 1965 and 1975 Acts, still requires further consolidation to
promote uniformity and conformity. The words of t1eyer in an address
Die Noodsaaklikheid van Konsolidasie delivered at a symposium
Onteiening en die Reg in Pretoria in 1971 (prior to the 1975 Act)
remain appropriate:
"(If)ierdie wette (is) uiteenlopend van aard en
wissel van padordonnansies na waterwette na
die Wet op Gemeenskapsbou tot onteiening van
mineraalregte. Hierdie chaos van onteienings-
wetgewing skep verwarring en verwardheid en
veroorsaak geweldige onbillikhede en dit moet
ons doelstelling wees om die on onbillikhede
to voorkom."
Vide also Appendix to Section 3.4 infra regarding the administrative
procedure under Act 63 of 1975, and Appendix to Section 3.7.
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A indirect clue to this motivation is provided however in the long title
in the words "expropriation •.. for public and certain other purposes":
whereas Section 2(1) (16) provides for expropriation for "public purposes",
the "certain other purposes" appear in Sections 2(2) and 2(3) (expropriation
of a remaining portion), Section 3 (juristic persons and bodies), Section 4
(the Railways administration), and Section 5 (local authorities). It
appears unfortunate firstly that the long title does not reflect more
specifically the legislature's intention(17) to consolidate prior
enactments, and secondly that the consolidation that has taken place in
the 1975 Act, is not as extensive as it could have been.
In the latter regard supra, since the commencement of construction of a
public improvement by the State, requires in general as a separate and
antecedent event, the expropriation of property for that purpose under
the power of dominium eminens, it is submitted that expropriations for
roads purposes would be better embodied in the Expropriation Act, either
directly (as for example under Section 4, in the case of railways
expropriations) or indirectly (as under the provisions of Section 38 (18)
(16)Act 63 of 1975.
(17)Vide Stratford JA in Bhyat v Commissioner for Immigration 1932 AD 125 at
129 - 30; and Feetham JA in Perishable Products Export Control Board v
Molteno Brothers 1943 AD 265 at 273-4; S v Bhengu 1968 (3) SA 606 (N)
at 610 (in the judgment of Milne JP). Cockram Interpretation of
Statutes p 35-6 states: "The Courts will examine the long title to
discover the intention of the legislature and the scope of the Act ....
However, the Court will not look at the title so as to modify the
meaning of plain language of the statute .... on the other hand,
where there is an ambiguity in the text of a statute, then the courts
will refer to the title for assistance .... "
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. (18)(19) .of the Communlty Development Act), rather than belng left as they
are at present, to the inconsistent mercy of the various provincial
ordinances.
A comparison, (20)firstly of the compensation provisions and stipulated
(lB)As discussed supra (vide Section 1.3.B), Section 3B(lB) of the Community
Development Act 3 of 1966 adopts Secti6ns 6 to 2~ {incllJsive~ of the -
Expropriation Act, 63 to 1975, to requlate the procedure and compensation
in Group Areas expropriations.
(19)It is noted in passing that it is not recommended that Group Areas
expropriations ought directly to have been included in a consolidated
Expropriation Act. The white South African legislature has in placing
the Group Areas power on a separate statutory basis, perhaps ironically
and unwittingly anticipated the day that this gross power, anathema to
naturalism, will be axed from our lawbooks. The repeal of the Group
Areas Act and its statutory partners in the apartheid stable, will be
facilitated by the retention of the separatist footing. It is submitted
. that contractariari-based reform is necessary if the "extra-constitutional
attempts of the disenfranchised majority t~ participate in the government
of the country" as contemplated by Dugard in Human Rights and the South
African Legal Order (at p 101 - 102) are to be avoided.
(20)(a) Section 12 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 lays down an open
market valuation basis (as discussed in depth in an earlier thesis
by the writer The Expropriation of Leased Business Properties
Chapters 11 and Ill. ) The test is stated in Section 12(1)(a)(i)
"the amount which the property would have realised if sold on
the date of notice in the open market by a willing seller to a
willing buyer". The applicable procedure is set out inter alia
in Sections 6 to 10 of the Act.
(b) In the Cape Province, Section 123(4) of the Municipal Ordinance
20 of 1974 requires the service of a preliminary notice (consis-
tently with the audi alteram partem principle) but no similar
procedure finds expression in Section 7 of the Expropriation Act
(re notice). In addition, the Townships Ordinance 33 of 1934,
sets down a differently phrased test for compensation in Section 51
(2).). It furthermore makes reference to enhancement levies (S35
ter), injurious affection (548), and betterment (S50) - these
concepts originate in English law (vide Davies Law of Compulsory
Purchase and Compensation; Cripps, Compulsory Acquisition of Land)
Continued! ...
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procedure in the Expropriation Act(21) on the one hand, and on the other hand,
the corresponding provisions of the various Provincial Ordinances, and
secondly of those ordinances inter se, yields the realisation that consistency
within the law is here a myth, and that a consolidation promoting uniformity
Footnote (20) continued
and do not appear in South Africa's Expropriation Act. Section 49
stipulates also certain noncompensable regulatory exercises of the
police power).
(c) In the Transvaal, the Local Government Ordinance 17 of 1939, in
Section 79 (24A) permits expropriation "for any purpose within
the powers of the Council", and imparts accordingly a 'governmental'
emphasis in the place of the spirit manifested in Section 2(1) of the
Expropriation Act. The Town Planning and Townships Ordinance 25 of
1965 makes reference also to injurious affection (S 45), to "steps
which may be taken to avoid or reduce payment of compensation"(S 48)
and to a development contribution (S 51).
(d) The Orange Free State's Local Government Ordinance 8 of
1~62 in Section 76, contains a similar characteristically governmental
view of the purposes for which expropriation may take place. "Steps
to avoid or reduce the payment of compensation" are set out in
Section 36 of the Townships Ordinance 9 of 1969.
(e) In Natal, a crucial difference exists between the provisions of
Section 13 of the Provincial and Local Authorities Expropriation
Ordinance, 19 of 1945, and the provisions of Section 12 of the
Expropriation Act, regarding the basis upon which compensation
is to be assessed. Under Section 13, land and buildings are
separately valued at their "fair value"- this defeats the possible
synergistic increment to value that can arise from their joint
valuation "as a unit": Vide Univ. Pitts. Law Review (USA), Vol 29: 322
(1967». It is noted furthermore that the relevant date for purposes
of valuation under the Ordinance is "the date of service of the
notice ... or its first publication"(S 13(a»), and not the (later)
"date of expropriation" under the Act (S 12(1» - since property
values characteristically rise with time and since inflation would
in the interim operate, the Ordinance here too prejudices the
expropriatee. The Roads Ordinance 10 of 1968 provides further
variation - read with proviso to Section 9(2) of Ordinance 19 of 1945.
Vide also: discussions of Roads Ordinances, Joubert, op cit, pp 48 - 65).
(21)Act 63 of 1975 as amended.
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is essential. (22) Although this comparison falls perhaps beyond the scope
of an assessment of the nature of the State's power to construct public
improvement~ it is included here in the interests of perspective, and also
by reason of the fact that the construction of public improvements is
frequently undertaken by provincial and local authorities. Since dominiun
eminens and the public improvements power may appear prima facie to overlap,
an understanding of the Ordinance framework is accordingly necessary.
A particularly cogent further argument supporting consolidatory reform is
the fact that in Natal for example, expropriation as an antecedent to the
instituting of public improvements, is possible in certain instances under
either the Expropriation Act(23) or under the Provincial and Local Authorities
Expropriation Ordinance. (24) Since (as is discussed in footnote 20 supra) an
expropriation under this Ordinance may prejudice the expropriatee substan-
tially (either procedurally but particularly so in relation to his compensation
entitlement), it would not be inconceivable that an authority might elect a
(25)
procedure to its advantage. It is the opinion of this writer that although
(22)It is noted that this was recommended in the Select Committee Report (para
30 p 12 - 13 supra), and that investigations were at that time under way,
but the necessary amendments have not yet been instituted.
(23)Act 63 of 1975.
(24)(Natal): 19 of 1945.
(25)Although it is noted that governmental and municipal authorities are
customarily most fair and co-operative in dealing with the claims of
expropriatees, the writer has personally been advised by a senior
member of a municipal authority in ~Iatal, that where an election as
supra is possible, expropriation is frequently undertaken in Natal
under the Ordinance, by reason of the lesser compensation liability
it creates. Contra: Oosthuizen v SAR&H 1928 WLD 52 at 56.
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the conflict between the superior and subordinate legislation is here not
of a nature that would render the latter ultra vires (by reason of the fact
that there is a difference in the "purpose" for which each conferred power
may be exercised), (26) this positivist realisation does not detract from the
weight of the naturalist contention that an expropriator ought not to be
able on a purely procedural basis, ceteris paribus to give rise to a
. . '1 f . t (27)significantly lesser compensatlon entlt ement or an exproprla ee.
In overview, the assessment of the State's power to construct public improve-
ments, establishes that this power is distinct within the public law proprietary
forum, from the power of dominium eminens; but the assessment gives rise also
to the further and perhaps more vital realisation that the framework of
provincial ordinances under which the former power frequently finds expression,
requires some substiantial legislative revision (guided ideally by naturalist
considerations) in order to promote conformity, to consolidate the diversity
and to eliminate the inequity, apparent in the structure of South African law
in this regard.
(26)In general the subordinate legislation promotes "governmental purposes"
whereas the Expropriation Act refers largely (in Section 2(1))to
"public purposes", as discussed supra.
(27)A further illustration of inequity of this nature, arises in relation to
the provisions of Section 12(2) of the Expropriation Act on the question
of solatium under a combined notice of expropriation, where the aggregate
of the market values of the expropriated properties exceeds RIOO 000,00.
The resolution of what represents the correct (positivist) interpretation
of Section 12 (2) remains open - the 'writer has had occasion to di$cUSS 'this
issue with Or A Gildenhuys (author of Onteieningsreg), who (consistently
with his view in an article in Joubert Law of South Africa Vol X p 114,
para 115), regards solatium in such circumstances as being limited to
RIO 000,00; and to the contrary, the writer has had the benefit of an
outstanding opinion from Advocate K McCall SC, who reasons in favour of a
higher solatium claim based on the separate treatment of each property
under the combined notice. The practical dilemma is set out by the
writer in an earlier thesis The Expropriation of Leased Business Properties
in Appendix D - vide also pp 37 - 39. In final analysis, however, the
presumption of no expropriation without compensation unless the contrary
is manifestly clear in the statute (as is argued, with authorities in
Section 1.5 infra), as read (by extension) with the dicta in Dormehl v
Gemeenskapsontwikkelingsraad 1979 (1) SA 900 (T) at 911 C et seq, the writer
records his support in this regard for the view of Adv. McCal1 SC. It
.::lnnp.::ll"C: hnwpvpl" t-h~t- t-hic iCCllO 't"OM::l;nc. :::> ...""\'t"I"\n ... ;."f-"'" ~,....,... .;.1I~;,.....;-:>1
1.3.10 DOMINIUM EMINENS IN RELATION TO THE OTHER
PUBLIC LAW PROPRIETARY POWERS OF THE STATE -
A CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE
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Since the relation between Citizens and their Property is regulated and even
determined by the powers the State exercises over property within its
jurisdiction, the inquiry conducted supra is justified. The analytical
assessment of ' the public law proprietary powers of the State enables an
amplified awareness of the nature of this relation in South African law -
the comparison of such powers with dominium eminens accords also a
heightened insight into the latter.
It is revealed further that private ownership(l) is not inviolable or
indefeasible in an absolute sense, since not only does this institution
derive its vitality from the prior existence of the State, but also its
operation is qualified by and subject to the State's overriding proprietary
powers as contemplated. When considered from one perspective, dominium
eminens and the other powers appear as inroads into the private proprietary
title of subjects, but alternatively viewed, they represent reservations to
private dominium, that are necessary for the fulfilment of collective purposes,
that are implicit accordingly in the Social Contract foundation, and without
which the existence as intended of the institution of property and of society
itself, would be impaired)frustrated and even defeated.
Notwithstanding the prima facie similarity between certain of the powers and
dominium eminens (a correspondence that appears substantial in some cases),
the points of distinction that exist militate against the naIve and unconsidered
(1)
As is elaborated in greater detail in Chapter 3 infra.
III
transferance of principles applicable to one, into the forum of the other -
this is not to deny the value that can rest in such analogy, but to stress
the caution that must attend such an approach.
A consideration of comparative law (a study of the American experience in
particular) provides further valuable guidance and orientation, but emphasises
that South African law tends to be guided by the sovereignty interpretation
to a greater positivist extent than is evident in the naturalist commitment
in general in United States' jurisprudence. Where South African law expresses
or implies a denial of the fundamental 'oughts' of naturalism, the opposition
and criticism of this writer are recorded; and it is here that naturalisti-
cally-spirited and contractarian-based reform is recommended as being
appropriate or essential. In this regard, it is in respect of the Group
Areas power(2) the South African legislature has taken upon itself, that
the censure of this writer is substantively the most vehement, and in
respect of the consolidation of the host of statutes and ordinances, (3) that
reform,structurally and procedurally, is the most pressing.(4)
It remains now for the nature of dominium eminens itself to be considered
directly in depth. In explanation of the fact that this core concept has
been left for examination to this relatively late stage in this exposition,
it is submitted that this is justified since an evolved definition in light
of the prior jurisprudential debate and the antecedent comparison with the




Cf: Section 1.3.8 supra.
Cf: Section 1.3.9 supra.
Vide Appendix to Section 3.7.
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1.4 DOMINIUM EMINENS - A DEFINITION AND AN
ASSESSMENT OF ITS CHARACTERISTICS
Grotius'encapsulation of the dominium eminens power in the extracts from his
works supra under Section 1.1, although embodying a deficiency in jurispruden-
tial orientation in its advocacy of the original proprietary theory of State-
based ownership, nevertheless presents a clear indication of the nature (in
it operation) of the eminent domain power that is conferred upon or vested in
the State, and thereby provides a guideline as to the definition of this power
and to the assessment of its definable characteristics. It is from Grotius'
writings, from the jurisprudential debate regarding the origins of dominium
eminens, and from the assessment of this power in relation to the other State -
based proprietary powers, that we are led to an elucidated understanding of the
nature of dominium eminens.
In the first place, Grotius' interpretation of the State's dominium eminens,
postulates and gives expression to a supreme power held by the State or its
( 1 )
representatives, which power transcends all private rights to property -, and
which power is exclusively a public law power. Secondly, the exercise of the
power of eminent domain by the State knows little restriction in the scope
and extent of its potential application, extending in Grotius' view not only
to include the exigencies of extreme necessity, (2) (in which circumstances the
sanctity both of the person and of property yields to the public interest)~3)
( 1 )
Cf: Corpus Iuris Secundum (1965) Vol 29A, para 2 at 162.
(2) It is noted that this submission by Grotius can be criticised in important
respects. Vide Section 1.3.5 supra.
(3) Cf: Attorney General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel 1920 AC 508 (HL). Vide
also Section 1.3.4 supra, footnotes 13 and 15, and cases cited thereat.
Cf: Dias, Jurisprudence pp 169 - 170.
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but including also the less extreme equilibrium of conditions within the
municipal activities of the State in its promotion and advancement of the
public wellbeing - the only caveat being that the broad ends of public
utility must be served, (4) (and possibly also that compensation must be
awarded to the expropriatee). (5) Thirdly, to Grotius, the exercise of
dominium eminens appears to constitute a vast inroad into the otherwi.se
apparent sanctity and inviolability of private ownership. (6) Fourthly,
it emerges that private interests are of necessity subject to those of
the State. (7) And finally, it is in the institution of the State itself
that the justification and rationale for this vast power lies - the power
of eminent domain, being an offspring of political necessity, (8) and being
Colonial Government v Stephan Brothers 17SC 515;
Rondebosch Hunicipality v Western Province Agricultural Society
1911 AD 271; SA Turf Club v Claremont Municipality 1912 CPD 59;
Bell's South African Legal Dictionary 3 ed (1951) p 652;
Rams Eminent Domain p 361; Langlaagte Proprietary Limited v Union
Government (Minister of Railways) 1916 WLD 127; White River
Council v H L Hall and Sons Ltd 1958 (2) SA 524 (A); Modimola
case 1966 (3) SA 250 (A); Barclays Bank DCO and others v Tarajia
Estates 1966 (1) SA 420 (T).
(5)Cf: last sentence in extract from Grotius, op cit, III 20 7, quoted
at footnote 2 in Section 1.1 supra.
(6)Cf: Talu Ranching Company v Circle A Ranching Company 1975 (3) SA 905 (D);
Motsuenyane's case; 1968 (2) SA 484 (T); Nel v Bornman 1968 (1)
SA 498 (T).
(7)Cf: Evans v Schoeman 1949 (1) SA 571 (A); applied in Stellenbosch
Divisional Council v Shapiro 1953 (3) SA 418 (C); Sachs v Donges
1950 (2) SA 265 (A); Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) 380 (A);
De Bruin case 1975 (3) SA 56 (T).
(8)That the power of eminent domain is an offspring of political necessity
has clearly been established in the United States. Joiner v City of
Dallas 380 F Supp 754, affirmed 95 S Ct 614, 419 US 1042, 42 L ed 2d
637, rehearing denied 95 S Ct 818, 419 US 1132, 42 L ed 2d 831.
Seneca Constitution Rights Organisation v George 348 F Supp 51 Vatt Ch 20,
34; Bynk, lib 2 ch 15; Kent, Comm, 338 - 340; Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations 584 et seq.
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inherent in the State unless denied by fundamental law, (9) in its operation
justifiably subverts or subordinates the interests of an individual
constituent of the broad social collective, (10) in order that the wellbeing
of the State at large may be advanced. (11)
Grotius' assessment of dominium eminens contains however a significant weak-
ness in that it blurs the distinction between dominium eminens and the
, f d 0 bOt (12 ) I th t 1 0 fState s power 0 estructlon y neceSSl y. n e accura e ana YSlS 0
the nature of dominium eminens, it is essential, as pointed out supra, (13)
to differentiate it from the other powers of the State to which it may bear
a resemblance. In failing to contrast the power of dominium eminens and
the State's police power (or power to regulate the use of property), Bouvier
d Bl k ' L DOt 0 (14) dOl 0 01 k (15) 0 d f' 0an ac s aw lC lonary lSP ay a Slml ar wea ness In e lnlng
( 9)Cf: Kohl v United States 1876 (91) US 449 at 452.
(10)In the words of Huber, . Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt 2.8.27 Gane
translation: "The property of private persons is subject to the common
good: so that the Sovereign has power, for reasons of general necessity
or for the benefit of the citizens, to take away from persons the free
control of their property."
(ll)Cf: Blanton v Fagerstrom 249 Ala 485, 31 So 2d 330, 172 ALR 128;
Northeastern Gas Transmission Company v Col1ins 138 Conn 582,
87 A 2d 139.
(12)Vlo de S . 1 3 5ectlon . . supra.
(13)Vide 1.3.
(14)4 ed 1951 Eminent domain. (emphasis added).
(15) 0
The same weakness lS apparent in Cooley's definition in Constitutional
Limitations, where he defines eminent domain as:
"the rightful authority, which exists in every sovereignty,
to control and regulate those rights of a public nature
which pertain to its Citizens in common, and to appropriate
and control individual property for the public benefit, as




"The superior right of property s.ubsisting in a sovereignty
by which private property may in certain cases be taken ££
its use controlled for the public benefit without regard to (16)
the wishes of the owner."
Although South African common law heritage embraces Grotius' analysis of
dominium eminens, contemporaty South African jurisprudence remains relatively
in a stage of fledgling infancy in its development and enunciation of this
concept. (17) By contrast, vast authority and synthesis in this regard has
found expression in the United States. (18)(19) In obiter in Kohl v United
(20)States, a rationale for the State's dominium eminens is found:
"The power of eminent domain is ... distinct from and
paramount to the right of ultimate ownership. It grows
out of the necessities of lands being held, not out of
the tenure by which lands are held eminent
domain - using this term not as being synonymous with
the ultimate dominion or title to property, but as
indicating the right to take private property for public
(16)Cf: cases cited at 31 West's Federal Practice Digest at III - 112
inter alia: Lamm v Volpe 449 F' 2d 1202 ~1971): "The police power
should not be confused with eminent domain .... "
(17)Sparse reference is made to dominium eminens in South African case
law. Vide inter alia Corporation of Pietermaritzburg v Dickinson and
McCormick 1897 NLR 233 at 245; Jooste v Government or the South AfrIcan
RepublIc 4 Off. Rep 147 at 149; Pretoria City Council v Modimola 1966 (3)
SA 250 (A) at 258 G; Fourie v Minister van Lande en 'n Ander 1970 (4)
SA 165 (0) at 169G.
(18)A vast body of legal writing, under the head of Eminent Domain, exists in
the United States, by writers such as Nichols, Orgel and Rams. In respect
of American case law, vide inter alia 31 West's Federal Practice Digest,
sections 1 and 2 et al; 26 American Jurisprudence 2d, sections 1 and 2
et al; Corpus Iuris Secundum Volume 29 para 2 et al.
(19)It is noted for purposes of South African law that care must be exercised
in relying on United States precedents where the ratio for the decision
rests upon a constitutional provISIon. Where however the ratio relates
to the common law, the United States jurisprudence provides valuable
guidance for the South African system.
(20)1~76 (91) US 449 at 451 (majority judgment).
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uses - belong to state government ... and any other
doctrine would subordinate, in important particulars,
the national authority to the caprice of individuals .
It is essential that the State should hold the power .
to appropriate lands or other property for its own uses
and enable it to perform its proper functions. Such an
authority is essential to its independent existence and
perpetuity. These cannot be preserved if the obstinacy
of a private person, or if any other authority, can
prevent the acquisition of the means or instruments bY(21)
which alone governmental functions can be performed."
A host of definitions of dominium eminens has been suggested but each of
the definitions consulted appears to labour under certain defects. (22)
Nichols in his twenty volume magnum opus on Eminent Domain(23) submits
that "eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take property for
public use without the owner's consent", but he later(24) appends an additional
requirement that such exercise must be "upon making just compensation."
The irreducible definitional characteristics in Nichols are accordingly
the following - that dominium eminens:
(21)Vide extracts from West River Bridge Company. v Dix, 6 How US 507,
quoted under Section 1.2.3 supra at footnote 2, for an alternative
rationale for dominium eminens.
(22)One of the sound definitions consulted is that in Corpus Iuris Secundum
(1965) Vol 29 A para 1 at 161:
"Eminent Domain is the right or power to take private property
for public use; the right of the sovereign, or of those to
whom the power has been delegated, to condemn private property
for public use, and to appropriate the ownership and possession
thereof for .such use upon paying the owner a due compensation."
This encapsulation labours however under the deficiency, elaborated
in the main text infra, that appears in the last seven words thereof.
(23)Vol 1, S 1.11, page 1 - 7.
(24) .Ibld, Vol 1, S 1.11, P 1 - 10.
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(a) is a power or attribute of sovereignty; and
(b) empowers the 'taking' of (private) property:
(i) for the public use
(ii) without the owner's consent
( ") k"" t" (25)iil upon ma lng Just compensa lon.
Nichols' definition can be criticised in two principal respects. Firstly,
since not all expropriations take place without the owner's consent, this
aspect cannot be conceded as a definitional element. Expropriation of a
remainder after a portion of a property has been expropriated, (or'excess
condemnation' as it is termed in the United States), is frequently at the
request of the owner and thereby with his consent. If Nichols' proposition
were to be accepted, then the 'expropriation' of the remainder would in
fact not be an exercise of dominium eminens at all but rather a sale by
traditio, or perhaps a "compulsory purchase" as it would be interpreted in
the English law. It would seem that Bouvier's words supra "without regard
to the wishes of the owner" are accordingly preferable to Nichols' phrase
"without the owner's consent", since the former highlight the important
aspect that dominium eminens is an original mode of acquisition of owner-
ship. The consent or otherwise of the owner would assume significance only
in a derivative acquisition. In the words of Joubert in Law of South Africa:(2c
(25)Cf: Mid-American Pipeline Company v Missouri Pacific Railroad Company
298 F Supp 1112 : "For the valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain, three things are required: (1) provision must be made for
the payment of just compensation.; (2) the property must be devoted
to a public use; and (3) there must be a public need for such use. J1
discussed in 31 West's Federal Practice Digest at p 139 - 140. -
(26)Page 3 footnote 1.
118
"It is clear from section 8 of the Expropriation Act 63
of 1975 that expropriation under this Act embraces the
element of acquisition .... Expropriation is an original
mode of acquiring ownership and the title acquired by
the expropriator is independent of the title of the (27)
expropriatee."
A second criticism (in the context of South African law) relates to Nichols'
final element, which finds its origin in American jurisprudence in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments(28) to the United States Constitution, and
which would (even in United States law) appear accordingly to have been
inaccurately (or redundantly) included in his amplified definition. The
making of just compensation upon expropriation is not an essential feature
of the definition of the dominium eminens power, but is rather a corollary to
or consequence of the definition itself; and, in naturalist thought (as
embodied in the constitutional provisions supra), is an unavoidable sequitur
in necessary limitation of dominium eminens when this power finds a practical
exercise. In addition, Thayer, in his Cases on Constitutional Law(29) although
(27) Cf: Van der Merwe Sakereg p 159 and 194;
Silberberg and Schoeman: The Law of Property 1983 ed, p 299.
Sackman, Condemnation Appraisal Practice Volume 11, p 592
Camillo, Restrictive Covenants, Pittsburgh Law Review 31 : 128, 1969,
relying on Board of County Commissioners v Thormyer 169 Ohio St 291,
199 NE 2d 612 (1959);
Cf: Section 1.2.2 supra at footnote 16. Vide also Beckenstrater v Sand
River Irrigation Board 1964 (4) SA 510 (T) at 515A~'
(28)
Vide: American Jurisprudence 2d Desk Book: Document 1 and vide Section
1.6 infra at footnotes 7 and 9 :
Fifth Amendment: .... "nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation".
Fourteenth Amendment: Section 1: " ... nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law .... "
(29)
Vol I, P 593. Cf: Encyclopaedia Britannica Vol 8 p 335, defines eminent
domain as "the power of the government-to· take private property for
public use"without the owner's 'consent",-stressing ·thereafter that the
dutv to pav comoensation to the orooertv owner is a conseauence in the
United States of constitutional pro~isions (and not of the nature of
the power itself) ..
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not supporting the Social Contract postulate, makes the important point that
the State's right to take private property and the individual's right to
receive compensation upon expropriation, are of a different jurisprudential
nature - the former flows from "a necessity of government" whereas the latter
stands upon "the natural rights of the individual." ~t is accordingly that
it has been held in American law in Griffith v Southern Railway Company(30)
that whereas "the payment of compensation is not an essential element of the
meaning of eminent domain, it is an essential element of the valid exercise
of such power".
If the thesis of dominium eminens asa sovereign attribute is accepted (as
under Nichols' first element), then it emerges that dominium eminens in its
primary appearance was an unlimited public law power of the politically
sovereign St~te. The function of constitutional or legislative enactments
has been to place limitations upon that power in its operation, in order
that the motivation that prompted the aggregation of individuals into
communities might not be defeated - in order that, in other words, the
State's interruption of the relation between Citizens and their Property
might not assume draconian proportions not intended under the Social
Contract. The provisions of Section 2(1) of the Expropriation Act(31) -
that expropriations for public purposes are lawful - represent a legislative
affirmation in South Africa of the necessary limitation that Nichols voices
in his point that dominium eminens permits a 'taking' "for the public use"
only. It is submitted that the limitation thereby imposed upon the otherwise
(30)191 NC 84, 131 SE 413 (North Carolina, USA); affirmed in Wissler v Yadkin
River Power Company 158 NC 465; 74 SE 460;
(31)Act 63 of 1975; South Africa.
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(and generally) unfettered nature of sovereignty, indicates also support
for the Social Contract postulate. That private property cannot lawfully
(under naturalism) be disturbed unless a recognised public purpose justifies
any such action by the State, suggests that it must have been impliedly in
terms of a prior Social Contract that this naturalist limitation upon
Sovereignty was introduced; and contemporaneously with the creation of
dominium eminens that this limitation found social acceptance.
In final analysis it emerges that dominium eminens is a public law power(32)
vested in the State and, as an offspring of political necessity, is an
inherent attribute of sovereignty created and conferred by the Social Contract.
To the extent that the public interest and wellbeing so require,(33)
dominium eminens permits the State to expropriate private property for
public purposes without regard to the wishes of the owner, and through the
exercise of such power through proceedings in rem, to acquire in an original
mode an ownership and title therein that is independent of the title (or
sum of diversified titles) of the expropriatees.
(32) Pretoria City Council v ~10dimola 1966 3 SA 250 A at 258 - 259: "Die
reg van onteiening is 'n publieke reg want dit kom die Staat alleen
toe."
(33)Cf: Footnote 22 supra, and Section 1.2.3 at footnote 8.
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1.5 THE QUESTION OF NOMENCLATURE - , DOMINIUM EMINENS'
AND 'EMINENT DOMAIN'
1.5.1 INTRODUCTION
Allied to the definition(l) of dominium eminens, is the question of the
appropriate English nomenclature. By reason of the criticisms that have
been raised in this regard, it is necessary, although this remains perhaps
merely an exercise in semantics, to consider the appropriateness of the
words 'dominium eminens' as used by Grotius, and their English translation
as 'eminent domain', in order that the accuracy of the description of the
power contemplated t may be assessed.
1.5.2 CRITICISM OF THE 'DOMINIUM EMINENS' NOMENCLATURE BY
THE ROMAN DUTCH JURISTS - THE ALTERNATIVES OF
'IMPERIUM EMINENS' AND 'POTESTAS'
The 'dominium eminens' terminology conveived by Grotius became the subject of
some criticism in Holland, by reason of the fact that certain of the Roman
Dutch jurists considered its reference to 'dominium' to be suggestive of
something' other than the power of the State it was intended to encapsulate.
Puffendorf, in De Jure Naturae et Gentium(2) drew a distinction between the
control over property exercised in the private law by a proprietor owner or
rightholder, and the control over property vested in the sovereign or state
under the public law. To the former, he ascribed the term 'dominium',
whereas in his view the latter was best incorporated in the word 'imperium'.
(l)Vide Section 1.4,supra.
(2)Liber 1, Caput 1, 519. Cf also: Puffendorf De Officio Hominis et Civis
11 15 4.
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He contended accordingly (as supported by Van Bij nkershoek in Quaestiones
Juris Publici)(3) that 'imperium eminens' was more accurately descriptive
of the nature of the power that existed.
In Elementia Juris Naturae et Gentium(4) Heineccius argued:
"We confess that this use of the word (eminent domain)
is not quite apt, for the conception of dominium an~
that of imperium are different things : it is the
latter and not the former which belongs to rulers."
He continues:
"••• (the right) of applying to the use of the state the
property (of- its Citizens) when necessity requires it -
a ~ight which is usually called the right of eminent
domain ••• (is) what Grotius first styled dominium
eminens, (but what) Seneca more accurately called
potestas o To kings; he said, belong the control of
things, to individuals the ownership of them."
Criticism of Grotius was not however unanimous. Huber in Heedendaegse
Rechtsgeleertheyt(S) supported the Grotian dicta and expressed the view that:
"••• the property of private persons is subject to the
common good: so that the Sovereign has the power, for
reasons of general necessity or for the benefit of the
Citizens, to take away from persons the free control of
their property."
It emerges that although there may have been some substance in the criticism
of Puffendorf et aI, the phrase 'imperium eminens' was not necessarily
preferable, in the implied presumption therein that the jurisprudential
origin of the power lay directly in the sovereignty of the state. Further-
more, if 'imperium eminens' were to be advocated as a more correct nomen-
clature, this would narrow the opportunity to develop the submission that
(3)Liber 11 Caput 15.
( !.l. ) --
\ Liber 1 -Caput e Section 168.
(5)2.8.27. Cane translation.
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the power finds its origin in the Social Contract. Finally, as Heineccius
himself conceded,(6) (and in view of the vast recognition accorded to
'eminent domain' especially in American jurisprudence) wide modern usage
and acceptance of this terminology would render fruitless any proposal for
its abandonment. (7)
1.5.3 THE EQUIVALENT IN ENGLISH OF 'DOMINIUM EMINENS' -
EMINENT DOMAIN VS EMINENT DOMINION
The preciseness and accuracy of the major translations of Grotius l writings
has also been called into question, in view of the substitution by
Campbell (1901) (and Kelsey (1925» of the words "eminent domain" for
Grotius' "dominium eminens", in place of the more literal and direct I
translation thereof by Whewell (1853) as "eminent dominion". (8)
Randolph in The Eminent Domain(9) points out that the Latin word "dominium"
is capable of two interpretations - in the broadest sense, it suggests a
general attribute of sovereignty, and in its more limited sense, a trans-
cending public power over private property.
"(T)hough it has been suggested that 'dominium'
be taken in its broadest meaning, with intent to
identify the doctrine with general sovereignty,
the preponderance of authority and common practice
are in favour of its interpretation in its sense of
power over property."
(6 )
L~ber 1 Caput 8, Section ].68.
(7) This view is supported inter alia by Nichols, op cit Vol I.
(8) Discussed supra under Section 1.1 at footnote 1.
(9) 1887 LQR 314.
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Although Randolph contributes to the understanding of dominium eminens by
highlighting its two indicia, and although he may be correct in impliedly
according to sovereignty a slightly lesser recognition than is almost
universally accepted at present, it is submitted that he errs in his
assessment of the jurisprudential authorities, which, even at the time he
wrote, tended to accept both aspects (or perhaps even to favour the
former), and saw dominium eminens as a general attribute of sovereignty
which gave rise to the State's transcending public power over private
property. It remains necessary inter alia to resolve which of the English
translations of dominium eminens reflects this understanding and captures
the idea that Grotius postulated.
It is submitted that it is preferable to adopt the words "eminent. domain"
(as used by Campbell and Kelsey) rather than the words "eminent dominion"
(as used by Whewell) in the English translation of Grotius. This is
appropriate in the first place in order that the incumbent jurisprudential
debate (regarding whether dominium eminens is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty), is not defused and precluded (wrongly so) by semantics -
the word "dominion", with its implicit connotations of sovereignty, would
lessen the cogency of any alternative submission. Secondly, "eminent
domain" appears more accurately to reflect Grotius' intention - in view
of the inflexion he adopts of the State as original proprietor of all
property, "domain" is more consistent with his standpoint. Thirdly,
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etymological analysis(IO) reinforces the adoption of the word "domain",
since although both the English words "domain" and "dominion"share a similar
origin in Latin, a material distintion emerges in their precise meaning -
whereas "domain" emphasises the property i tsel f which is subject to "dominion'~
(lO)In The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, 3 ed





... the power or right of governing and controlling;
sovereign authority; sovereignty; ... "
1. = Demesne
2. A heritable property; estate or territory held
in possession; lands •..
Phrase: Eminent Domain: ultimate or supreme lordship;
the superiority of the sovereign power over
all property in the state, whereby it is
entitled to appropriate any part required for
the public advantage, compensation being made
to the owner."
1. Possession (Law) : possession of real estate
as one's own ...
2. An estate possessed; an estate held in demense;
land possessed and held ...
3. The territory or dominion of a sovereiQn or
state •.. "
1. High; towering above other things ... "
In addition, the linguistic sources are stated as:
"Dominion: M.E. (-OFr dominion - med L dominio, f dominion
property, f dominus, lord, master.)"
"Domain M.E. (-OFr domaine, alt., by association with
L dominus (See DOMINION), of OFr. demaine.
demeine, DEMESNE.)
"Demesne M.E. (-A.Fr, O.Fr. ci~meine, later A.Fr. del"1~nse, ...
L dominicus.).
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the word "dominion"refers to the power or right that exists over the
subject thing. Since the expropriation of private property by the State
f d .. .. d. . (11 ). th tunder the power 0 om1n1um em1nens 1S a procee 1ng~n rem 1n a
the power acts upon the property itself and not upon the title or 'rights
to that property (nor upon the sum of such titles if there are diversified
interests), the nature of the power is most accurately expressed in English
in the word "domain". Finally, as voiced supra, (12) and although such in
isolation would not constitute a valid basis for its perpetuation, the
contemporary jurisprudential tradition, particularly in the United States ~
favours the continued usage of the "eminent domain" nomenclature.
1.5.4 CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, it appears that Campbell's and Kelsey's translation
of 'dominion eminens' as 'eminent domain'is preferable to Whewell's
translation as 'eminent dominion'. It emerges also however that a
cautious .circumspectionmustnecessarily attend the use of the English
translations of Grotius' texts, in that reliance on the primary Latin
source is preferable in instances of controversy. That Latin source too has
been the subject of criticism, but the words 'dominium eminens' appear to
remain a sufficiently accurate description of the power of the State
that is contemplated, to justify their continued use.
(11) .Cf: Sect10n 1.4 supra at footnotes 26 and 27, and at concluding
paragraph thereof. Vide also Chapter 3 infra.
(12)Vide Section 1.5.2 supra at footnotes 6 and 7.
(1)
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1.6 GROTIUS' NATURALIST VIEW OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE QUESTIONS OF COMPENSATION UPON EXPROPRIATION
AND EXPROPRIATION WITHOUT COMPENSATION
Grotius clothed his conceptions of private property and dominium eminens
with the protection of the cloak of a natural law that was based upon the
reason of man, and not, as was formerly the view> upon the inspiration of
Divinity:
"The law of nature is a dictate of right reason, indicating
that moral guilt or rectitude is inherent in any action
according to its agreement or disagreement with our rational-
and-social nature .... This natural law does not only respect
such things as depend not upon human will, but also many
things which are consequent to some act of that will. Thus,
property, as now in use, was introduced by man's will, and
being once admitted, this law of nature informs us that it
is a wicked thing to take away from any man what is properly
his own."
Grotius' displacement and transfer of the naturalist emphasis from the
spiritual to the temporal did not constitute a rejection of or an alienation
from a subscription to and belief in the tenets of a Divine Providence - it
was instead a reconciliation of facts and relationships "consequent to some
act of (human) will", (perhaps, inter alia, the Social Contract), with the
"dictates of right reason" that had in the temporal forum(2) motivated their
expression; and it was an attempt upon the basis of reason (rather than
Providence), firstly to rationalise "the law of nature"and "the moral guilt
or rectitude ... inherent in any action," and secondly to resolve certain
(1 )
Grotius, De lure Belli ac Pacis, 1.1.10 (Gane translation).
(2) An interesting Biblical correlative to Grotius' interpretation is
contained in a footnote in The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,
Volume 2, at page 2259 : 2 Corinthians 4 : 18:
"For the things which are seene, are temporall,
but the things which are not seene, are eternall ll •
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issues relating to "our rational-and-social nature" without having recourse
to an abstract Divinity, which Grotius saw as being separate and distinct
from the secular affairs of men. (3) Property, as he stresses, was
"introduced by man's will", and in so stating, Grotius presages and hints
at the Social Contract theme that was to dominate jurisprudence for more
than a century to follow. (4)
Central to Grotius' naturalist vision of eminent domain, are his words supra
that "it is a wicked thing to take away from any man (without compensation)
what is properly his own". His subscription to naturalism is not however
an extreme idealism, but is tempered by a deep awareness of the need for a
certain degree of expediency in the State's activities. It is for this
reason that he qualifies his words with his proviso that "when this is
done, the State is bound to make good the loss" from its public revenues.
Under the Social Contract he impliedly envisages (as is discussed in greater
detail infra), (5) the civil rights of Citizens acquired in terms of that
Contract are not entirely inviolable or absolute:(6)
"This is also to be noted, that a right, even when it
has been acquired by subjects, may be taken away by
the king in two modes: either as a Penalty or by the
force of dominium eminens. But to do this by the
force of dominium eminens, there is required in the
first place, public utility; and next, that, if possible,
compensation be made, to' him who has lost what was his, at
the common expense. And as this holds with regard to other
matters, so does it with regard to rights which are acquired
by promise or contract."
(3) Cf: 12 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, p 534.
(4) Vide Section 2.4 infra.
11.14.7, Whewell translation, p 179. (Emphasis added).
the two elements Grotius here stipulated (public utility,
compensation), were reiterated in the French Declaration
5 Encyc.Soc.Sci. 493.
(5) Vide Section 2.4.2 infra.
(6) Grotius, op cit,
It is noted that
and if possible,
of Rights : vide
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Accordingly, although Grotius' naturalist jurisprudence predicates broadly
and "if possible" the desirability of compensating an expropriatee, his
dicta do not elevate that compensability to the level of an absolute right,(7)
and relegate rather the issues of the sufficiency of that compensation and
of the possibility of expropriation without compensation to a level of lesser
significance in his broad scheme. Clearly he envisaged a strong presumption
against expropriation without compensation, but he omitted to pronounce the
features of the circumstances in which compensation would be so denied. What
emerge in the context of eminent domain as significant lacunae in Grotius'
writings, are the definition of these circumstances, and the resolution of
the questions as to what in his view would constitute the expropriatee's
justifiable quantum of compensation where the State has exercised its
powers of dominium eminens, and as to when the Citizen must "if needs be
contribute" to the promotion of State wellbeing in a manner disproportionate
to his station, instead of compensation being paid from the public revenues
"at the common expense". Whereas in the Unites States, the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, afford a guarantee of just
compensation, no such protection exists in South African law. Grotius
appears to have held the view that the practical mechanics and determination
of the appropriate quantum entitlement, lay largely beyond the confines of
his jurisprudential enquiry, and' accordingly by implication deferred and
referred that assessment to the practitioners and theorists within a given
society and era,. to determine in relation to the prevailing social circum-
stances and structures of their age.
(7)Cf: Puffendorf, De O~ficio Hominis et Civis 11 15 4 (emphasis added)
" ... Eminent Domain ... consists in this, that when public
necessity demands it, the goods of any subject which are very
urgently needed at that time, may be seized and used for public
purposes, although they may be more valuable than the allotted
share which he is supposed to give for the welfare of the republic.
On this account, the excess value should insofar as possible, be
refunded to the Citizen in question either from the public funds,
or from a contribution of the other Citizens".
The foundations of the natural law accordingly stand in favour of the
interpretation that compensation ought to be the necessary consequence to
disentitlement, dispossession or deprivation through expropriation, notwith-
standing the fact that the jurisprudential origin of the compensation
entitlement differs from that of dominium eminens. In the words of Thayer(S)
"There is a right to take and attached to it as an incident,
an obligation to make compensation; this latter, morally
speaking, follows the other, indeed like a shadow, but it(9)
is yet distinct from it, and flows from another source."
The viewpoint of equity is enunciated in early South African law in In re
John Freeman v Colonial Secretary of Natal, (10) where Connor LJ held:
"On ordinary principles of justice, if an owner of land has,
under compulsion of law, to allow of an interest of his in
the land being taken from him or injuriously affected, he
should be compensated fully, unless legislation clearly
provides otherwise. And there cannot, I think, be any
doubt, that unless legislation has so otherwise provided,
the tendency should be rather in favour of compensation
than otherwise, in consequence of there being such compulsion."
In modern South African law (although there is a measure of conflict
resulting from the contrary proposition that compensation must have
,(S)Cases on Constitutional Law Vol 1 p 953.
(9)Th . .. t' b d' d' h F. fIS sp1r1 1S em 0 le 1n t e 1 th Amendment to the United States'
Constitution in the words: "No person shall be ... deprived of life
liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation".
(Cf: Section 1.4 supra at footnote 28). In regard to the basis for
the differentiation between these sources, vide Section 1.4 supra
at footnotes 29 and 30, and discussion in main text thereat.
(10)
(1889) 10 NLR 71 at 73; Cf Lochner v Afdelingsraad, Stellenbosch 1976
(4? SA 737 (~) at 746, and Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of
EmInent DomaIn (1942) 42 Columbia Law Review 596 at 615.
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statutory authorisation if the Sovereign is to be bound),,(ll) it would
appear nevertheless that there is a presumption generally against expropria-
tion without compensation. (12) Numerous authorities are cited in this regard
in Hinister van Waterwese v Mostert. (13) Statutory law has not however in
all cases given direct expression to this naturalist and common law ideal,
. .. b d· t t t· ht (14)Slnce sovere1gnty 1S not su or 1na e 0 proper y r1g s. As discussed
supra, (15) it was held in Joyce arid McGregor Ltd v Cape Provincial
Admjnistration(16)(contra Cape Town Municipality v Abdulla)(17)that the
expropriated party has no right to compensation in South African law unless
he can show that such is specifically permitted in terms of the empowering
statute, arid even where compensation is payable, the expropriated party is
not necessarily entitled to the full extent of his loss. (18) In regard to
unregistered rights, for instance, S 22 (read with S 13(1)) of the Expropria-
tion Act(19)provides that unregistered rights are terminated on expropriation,
(ll)Vide inter alia Section 1.2.3 supra at footnotes 7 and 8. Cf: Pretoria
City Council v Blom 1966 (2) SA 139 (T)
(12 )A . .1 .. d . 1· . k f h . . ThSlm1 ar V1ew 1S expresse 1n an ear 1er wor 0 t 1S wr1ter, e
Expropriation of Leased Business Properties (1981), in Chapter r-thereof.
(13)1964 (2) SA 656 at 660E.
(14)\/1·de S .v ect10ns 1.2.2. and 1.2.3 infra.
(15) .V1de Section 1 2.3 supra.
(16)1946 AD 658 at 671.
(17)Contra 1974(4) SA 428(C) and 1975(5) SA 375(C); but cf 1976(2) SA 370
(C) at 375 A - F and 376 A - C
(18)Cf: Johannesburg t~arket Concession and Building Company v The Rand Plaaue
Committee 1905 TS 406 at 412. Contra: Puffendorf, be lure Naturae ~t
Gentium 8.5.7; Van Bijnkershoek Verhandelingen van Staatzaken 2.15; and
Kersteman, Aanhangzel tot het Rechtsgeleert Woorden-Boek p 285. Vide
also: Jones v Stanstead Railroad Company 1872 LR 4 PC 98 at 115; East
Freemantle v Annois 1902 AC 213 at 217; Reddy v Durban Corporation 1939
AD 293 at 299; Pretoria City Council v Slom 1966 (2) SA 139 (T) at 143 (H)·
Moller v SAR&H 1969 (3) SA 374 (N) at 3~ ,
(19)Act 63 of 1975.
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and further that such do not qualify for compensation, unless they are
protected in terms of S 9(1)(d)(i)-(iv). (20)
Under the doctrine of positivism, the plenary power of the legislator to
1 . 1· ·1 bl (21) d h t t t . t f theg1s ate 1S unassa1 a e; an were s a u ory 1ns ances occur 0 e
authorisation of expropriation without compensation, the South African
judiciary does not have the power to alter the harsh effects of such
enactments. (22) Furthermore, as noted in the Canadian case Queen v Super-
test Petroleum Corporation, (23)
"(t)here is no element of tort or delict in an expropriation
under the Expropriation Act (Canada). It (expropriation) is
the lawful exercise by the Crown ... of its right of eminent
domain under the authority of an enactment of Parliament:
(20)There are several further instances of deprivation without compensation
in South African law - eg: as in respect of loss or damage caused by the
exercise of powers conferred by the Environment Planning Act 88 of 1967.
(Cf: English law: The Town Planning Act (1925), Section 11; Town and
Country Planning Act, 1959; discussed in Davies, op cit.). As is noted
supra however (in S 1.3.3 and at footnotes 14 15 and 16), caution must
be exercised to distinguish dominium eminens from plenary police powers
(and the other public law powers of the State discussed under Section
1.3 supra). Vide also: Cape Provincial Administration v Honiball 1942
AD 1; Simmer and Jack Proprietary Mines v Union Government 1915 AD 368;
O'Leary v Salisbury City Council 1975 (3) SA 859 (R); Tongaat Group Ltd
v Minister of Agriculture 1977 (2) SA 961 (A) at 962; Administrator,
Transvaal v Kildrummy Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1978 (2) SA 124 (T) at 131-2.
Vide inter alia also: Town Planning and Townships Ordinance (Transvaal),
No 25 of 1965, Section 45; Section 4 of the t~ountain Catchment Areas
Act 63 of 1970; Van der Spuy; 1977 T H R H R 52 et seq; Joubert, op cit,
P 4. Cf Section 1.3.3 infra at footnote 20 and main text thereat.
(21)Collins v Minister of the Interior 1957 (1) SA 552 (A) at 565.
(22)Vide Joubert Law of South Africa, Vol X, p 8 at footnote 4.
(23)(1954) Ex eR 105 (Canada) at 146; 71 C R T C 169; (1954) 3 D L R 245;
per Thorson J; discussed by Todd, The Law of Expropriation and Compen-
sation in Canada, at 244, footnote 148. Vide also Horn v Sunderland
Corporation (1941) 2 K B 26 at 46 (C A), (1941) 1 AER 480, per Scott LJ,
discussed by Jacobs, The Law of Expropriation in South Africa, at 93 ff.
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Notwithstanding the positivist conviction in South African law, the combined
pressure of the naturalis~the contractarian and the capitalist commitment
to the sanctity of property, has however given rise to a presumption that
wherever expropriation subject to compensation is possible in terms of
existing legislation, there should be no deprivation without compensation -
the standpoint in English law is similar. (24) It is noted further that the
proposition in South African law that "a legislative intention to authorise
expropriation without compensation, will not be imputed in the absence of
express words or plain implication,,,(25) is supported by a wealth of
precedent and authority. (26)
(24)It is noted in this regard that the English law of property is a curious
hybrid - on the one hand, a socialist norm prevails, and on the other
hand, private property rights are reverently respected. In Attorney
General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel 1920 A C 508, (discussed supra in
Section 1.3.4 at footnote 13 and in the main text thereat), the House of
Lords held that the Sovereign's prerogative power to expropriate private
property without compensation, gives way to its statutory power of
expropriation subject to compensation.
(25)Belinco v Bellville Municipality 1970 (4) SA 539 (A) at 597C.
(26)For example, inter alia:
Van Niekerk v Bethlehem Municipality 1970 (2) SA 269 (0) at 271 E et seq;
Cape Town Municipality v Abdulla 1975 (4) SA 375 (C), 1976 (2) 370 (C)
(criticised by Gildenhuys op cit, at p 10 footnote 69); Krause v South
African Railways and Harbours 1948 (4) SA 554 (0) at 562 - 563 ;
Blackmore v Moodies Gold Mining and Exploration Company 1917 AD 402 at 416;
Central Control Board v Cannon Brewery 1919 AC 744; Colonial Sugar Company
v Melbourne 1927 AC 343 at 359; Attorney-General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel
1920 AC 508 at 542; Inglewood Pulp and Paper Company v New Brunswick
Electric Power Commission 1928 AC 492 at 499, where for example it was held:
" ... the rule has long been accepted in the interpretation of statutes that
they are not to be held to deprive individuals of property without compen·
sation unless the intention to do so is made quite clear"; Rex v Stronach
1928 (3) DLR 216 at 219. Vide also: Town Council of Cape To;;-v The
Commissioner of Crown Lands and Public Works Foord 21 25; Jooste v-The
Government of the South African Republic 1897 (4) OR 147 at 148; Lenz
Township Company v Lorentz and Stapylton - Atkins 1959 (4) SA 159 ~at
165 - 166; Malherbe v Van Rensburg 1970 (4) SA 78 (C) at 82.
134
From this, what becomes apparent is that the South African Courts, in their
interpretation of expropriation statutes, will construe the enacted provisions
restrictively, (27) and will not give effect to measures depriving Citizens
of their property without compensation, unless the legislature's intention
to do so is made quite clear. In this regard, the words of Holmes JA in
Belinco v Bellville Municipality(28) are of value, where (in answering the
question left open in Administrator, Cape Province v Ruyteplaats Estates
(Pty) Ltd(29))he held: "I do not consider that an implication can be plain
if it has to be astutely winkled from contextual crevices."
It is regrettable that in spite of these interpretative efforts by the
judiciary, the constraints imposed by statute have given rise to instances
of harsh operation. Not only has the legislature seen fit to ignore largely
our naturalist heritage, to overlook the contractarian insight and to reject
the Grotian guidelines, but it has also determined the parameters upon which
the compensation entitlement is based, to the exclusion of certain parties
prejudicially affected by expropriation. If the recognition accorded by
(27)Broadway Mansions (Pty) Ltd v Pretoria City Council 1955 (1) SA 517 (A) at
522; Slabbert v Minister van Lande 1963 (3) SA 620 (T) at 621 D;
Fourie v Minister van Lande en 'n Ander 1970 (4) SA 165 (0) at 170 B;
Jacobs, op cit, p 5 "As an e~propriation constitutes a drastic interference
with the rights of the individual, the Act is to be restrictively construed.
Vide also: ~ v SAR&H 1958 (4) SA 339 (A) at 349; Wellworths Bazaars
. Limited v Chandlers Limited 1947 (2) SA 37 (A) at 43; Dadoo Limited v
Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 552; Krause v SAR&H 1948
(4) SA 554 (0) 562 - 3; Africa v Boothan 1958 (2) SA 459 (A) at 462;
Oosthuizen v SAR&H 1928 WLD 52 at 62; Halsbury's Laws of England Vol 36
p 413 para 627; Newcastle Breweries v The King (1920) 1 KB 354 at 866.
(28)1970 (4) SA 589 (A) at 597 D; cf Brebner v Seaton 1947 (3) SA 629 (E)
at 640.
(29)1952 (1) SA 541 at 551 A-B.
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Friedman J in Interland Bemarkings Edms (Bpk) v Suid Afrikaanse Spoorwee
en Hawens en Andere 1981 (1), (30) to the extended right of compensation
conferred under the 1975 Act on parties formerly excluded, is indicative
of the future trend, or if his words represent a judicial recommendation
or anticipation of the movement to come, then the possibility remains that
equity may find expression in the South African law of expropriation.(3~) The
bald fact however at present remains that the compensability of expropriated
interests is not an unavoidable sequitur of expropriation.
(30)1981 (1) SA 1199 0 at 1200 H: per Friedman J:
"Whereas under 5 13 of the old Expropriation Act 55 of 1965,
no compensation whatever was to be paid to the holders of
'unregistered rights,' the 1975 Act permits of certain
exceptions ... as demonstrated by 5 13(1)."
(31)Vide Appendix to Section 3.7.
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1.7 DE lURE BELLI AC PACIS IN HISTORY AND IN MODERN LAW:
A CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE REGARDING THE ROLE OF DOMINIUM
EMINENS IN SOUTH AFRICAN JURISPRUDENCE AT PRESENT:
De lure Belli ac Pacis is an epic treatise in international law and the
reservations that have been voiced herein, do not constitute an indictment
of the vast merit of Grotius' writings, inas much as they voice the
realisation that it was not exclusively or even principally towards an
enunciation of dominium eminens that Grotius' work was primarily directed.
Accordingly, although Grotius does not assess this power encyclopaedically,
his contribution remains rooted in his encapsulation of it and his exposure
of certain matters of fundamental significance in regard to its understanding.
Grotius did not (and nor did he purport to) resolve all the questions that
his inquiry generated. It is in elucidation or in answer to certain of the
issues he raised that this exposition has been directed, principal among
these issues being the origin in jurisprudence of the State's dominium
eminens (and in particular the Social Contract (and other) interpretations
thereof that have been advanced), and the relationship that Citizens bear
to their (immovable) property under South African law.
The conflict that exists between Grotius' rationalist and naturalist
"dictates of right reason" and the statutory dictates of the South African
legislature, evidences that our present legislation falls substantially
short of the Grotian ideal, and as will subsequently emerge in the discussion
of Social Contract theory that follows, similarly short of the fundamental
contractarian principles. For these reasons, and in order to be true to
the foundations of our legal heritage, a critical reassessment of the
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statutory provisions is recommended. The themes of our legal and historical
tradition and our rightful evolution should not and must not be permitted
to be subordinated to the positivist dictum.
Dominium eminens emerges in final analysis as an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, created conferred and limited by the Social Contract, and
rationalised as an offspring of political necessity. Its effect is that
the State, in the promotion and advancement of public wellbeing, is
permitted to expropriate private property for public purposes without
regard to the wishes of the owner, and to acquire in an original mode, title
th~reto. The jurisprudential orientation of sovereignty founded on .
contractarian principles, and the comparative assessment of dominium eminens
in relation to the other public law proprietary powers of the State, permits
an elucidating clarity regarding the originJmeaning,evolution and effect of
this power in South African law. Cognisance must remain however of its
distinction from other such State-based powers, and an awareness and
realisation of the aberrated nature of certain draconian abuses in South
African law under guise of dominium eminens, will afford the opportunity
for South African law to move itself towards greater conformity with the
naturalist ethic which Grotius then advocated, and which we now ought to
espouse cherish and nurture.
* * * * *
CHAPTER 2
THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTRACT AS A
FOUNDATION FOR DOMINIUM EMINENS
CHAPTER 2 THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTRACT AS A
FOUNDATION FOR-DOMINIUMEMINENS
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2.1 AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY AND
AN OUTLINE OF OBJECTIONS TO ITS VALIDITY
As the hands of history turned through the last pages of the mediaeval Church-
based era, the rays of a rising enlightenment permeated the minds of men and
heralded the dawn of a new epoch of culturalism and reason. The Renaissance,
the Reformation and the growth of the national state manifested Man's
cultural spiritual and political rejuvenation, and as was evidenced by the
consequent unfolding of political thought, the mediaeval backdrop and
Church-based dogma were no longer able to quench the thirst for knowledge
or appease the hunger for political power. No more a mere segment of the
mediaeval universal theocratic or cosmological collective, Man's emergence
as a central protagonist in the mortal interplay gave rise to a conflict
between the State or Sovereign's burning claim to supremacy and the flame
that had been kindled for individualistic self-assertion, and, consistently
with the increasingly rationalist tradition, to the need to legitimise these
competing forces. The Doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings, (1) enunciated
inter alia by Sir Robert Filmer in Patriarcha, came in the seventeenth
century to have as an opponent the theory of an Original Social Contract,
(1) The Doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings was both the political precursor
and the substantive antithesis to Social Contract theory (Vide Section
2.4.4 infra at footnote 15, and Section 2.4.5 infra at footnote 7.).
Based on the scriptural authority of St Paul in the thirteenth chapter




in Six livres de la republique (1576)(a) to justify the centralising of
absolute authority in the monarch Louis XIV). James 1 of England himself
in the Trew Law of the Free Monarchies (1598)(b) wrote that:
"The state of monarchy is the supremest thing upon
earth:for kings are not only God's lieutenants
upon earth, and set upon God's throne, but even by (c)
God himself they are called Gods."
He stated further:
"And so it follows of necessity, that kings were
the authors and makers of the laws, and not the (d)
laws of the kings."
The magnum opus came in 1600 in William Barclay's elaborate De regno et regali
potestate, which was followed later by Sir Robert Filmer's Patriarcha:
Or the Natural Power of Kings (1680). It is interesting to note that
Patriarcha was published posthumously, twenty seven years after Filmer's
death, (e) by Royalists anxious to restore monarchial legitimacy in the
face of the growing popularist spirit. His argument, in short, extended
the traditional ius divinum rationale and submitted that the king's
power is "natural" , since he is the heir by primogeniture descended from
Adam. He was bitterly attacked by Sidney Discourses Concerning
Government, (f) (who was executed in 1683 for his 'seditious'efforts) , and
by John Locke in The First Treatise of Government (1690) (entitled:"In the
(First Treatise), the Falfe Principles of Sir Robert Filmer and His
Followers, are detected and overthrown tl ). (g)
Sub-Footnotes:
(a)
Later enlarged and republished in Latin in 1586 and in English in 1606.
(b)Reprinted in The Political Works of James· I, with an Introduction by




(f)Written between 1680 and 1683, and published posthumously in 1698.
(g)Vide Section 2.4.4 infra.
/Text continued on page
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either between Ruler and Ruled, or between the Ruled inter se. (2)
The theme common to the writings of the pure Social Contract theorists (the
early 'contractarians') is their view that society arose by tacit agreement
from an original Contract or Compact, the effect of which was that the
individual was removed from the state of nature and placed within the civil
society created. Government under laws, impartial justice, the inviolability
of the person, and the institution of property, were thereby vitalised and
infused with a living existence.
The essence of the challenge the contractarians faced, may be distilled into
a fivefold structure: firstly, to present a plausible vision of natural
pre-social man; secondly, to show that such a man, rationally committed to
his self-preservation, would have chosen to enter into a state of Society
in preference to remaining in his natural condition; thirdly, to prove that
the instrument of Social Contract would have been adopted to effect this
intention; fourthly, to account for the binding nature of the obligations
consequent thereupon; and fifthly, to show how those obligations would
devolve from the original participants to bind subsequent generations. (3)
Modern scholarship, in line with the nineteenth and twentieth century juris-
prudential vogue, has in general regarded the Social Contract proponents
(2}Vide Section 2.3 infra.
(3)Certain of these objectives are adapted from Wilmoore Kendall, 14 Internat.
Encyc.Soc.Sci. (1968) 376 at377.The structure as framed by Kendall labours
however under the crucial omission that it could find consistency with a
non-contractarian rationale of the origin of society. For this reason it
has been materially modified herein.
(5)
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as having failed in these tasks, and has tendea to relegate the significance
of theories of an Original Compact. Dias, (4) for instance, refers to "the
mythical Social Contract theory," and Laski notes:
"We have no evidence of an original Social Contract such
as the theory demands; the state has not been made but
has grown. Nor could its operations be conducted on
the basis of consent alone. There is not only the fact
that, at some point, a dissenting minority must be made
to give way; there is also the fact that ... the problem
of size makes representative government, in some shape,
the only form through which it is practicable for the
will of the State to find expression. . .. Something
more positive (than tacit consent) is required ...
(since) ... it is impossible to think of a modern
community, the ends of which can be obtained without
the exercise of force over some, at least, of its
citizens."
Although several responses are available to each of the objections Laski
raises (Rousseau's 'Volonte Generale' concept for one (as discussed infra)
dispenses with much of the criticism, and appears accordingly to have been in-
correctly interpreted by Laski), suffice it here to observe that the
contractarian doctrine of tacit consent was in part a naturalist statement
of the basis upon which a just and legitimate society ought to be founded.
This realisation became particularly apparent as the theory evolved from an
interpretation grounded on historical fact to its view as a postulate of reason.
Sir Henry Maine in Ancient Law(6) directed a further vehement attack against
Social Contract theory, disputing the alleged historicity of its foundation:
(4)Jurisprudence (1970) p 575.
(5)Introduction to Politics (6ed) 1971.
(6)At pp 308 - 10 and 345 - 7. Vide also Section 2.3 infra at footnote 4.
"The State of Nature had been talked about till
it had ceased to be regarded as paradoxical and
hence it seemed easy to give a fallacious reality
and definiteness to the contractual origin of Law
by insisting on the Social Compact as an historical
fact .... But the antiquity to which was referred, was




Maine accused the contractarians of adopting both "juridical and popular
errors", (8) and of being "ignorant or careless of historical jurisprudence", (9)
and contended that:
"The doctrine of an Original Compact can never be put
higher than this though unsound, 'it may
be a convenient form for the expression of moral (10)
truths' ... "
His final analysis was that Social Contract theory, although based upon
"poli tical serviceabl~ness,~( 11) was a mythical creation "grati fying the
speculative tastes of lawyers,~(12) centering his conclusion squa~ely upon
his observation that:
"The point which before all others has to be apprehended
in the constitution of primitive societies, is that the
individual creates for himself few or no rights, and few (13)
or no duties".
Si~ce it is postulated in this exposition that the Social Contract is the
jurisprudential foundation for dominium eminens, Maine's objections must be
considered in some depth; in the interests of perspective too, they must to
an extent be viewed against the background of the positivist rejection of
the natural law that prevailed during the nineteenth century. His criticism
is based upon an inductive and deductive reasoning process under which he
drew inferences from a voluminous and weighty compilation of antiquities, but
~7)Ibid, P 310. (8) Ibid, p 308. (9) Ibid, P 309. (10) Ibid, p 347.
(ll)Ibid, p 309. (12) Ibid, p 309. (13) Ibid, p 311.
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this empirically anthropological method may in itself cast light upon what
may constitute a critical flaw and defect in Maine's hypothesis regarding
the Social Contract. That private law rights and duties were in general rare
in primitive tribal communities~does not, it is submitted, disprove that the
State itself originated in a contractarian manner, nor does it prove that
the State's public law power of dominium eminens did not or could not flow
from an implied Original Social Contract or Compact - the general does not
disprove the specific. (14) What is conceded though is that if it is argued
that a private law contractual relationship as historical fact is the one
that existed at the inception of primitive societies and that gave rise to
dominium eminens, then this evidence adduced by Maine would labour the
proponent of such view with the task of overcoming the fact that the existence
of such relationship would accordingly appear improbable. Dominium eminens
however is not postulated as having a private law source, (15) and nor in the
ultimate analysis is the Social Contract postulated as historical actuality
- rather, contractarianism is directed principally at explaining the nature
of society and not purely its origin. (16)
Consistently with the Roman law and particularly with the dicta of Grotius,
dominium eminens is ex hypothesi a public law power vesting in the State,
without the realisation of which, the private law indefeasibility and
inviolability of the real right of ownership(17) could not exist. In a
curious irony, it may well be Maine himself who is guilty of the "juridical
and popular errors" he alleges in his opponents. Empiricism, and particu-
larly empiricism grounded upon facts acknowledged even by Maine in this
(14) Cf .. (lth h 1a oug not re ating to the same context) the logic that underlies
the 'generalia specialibus non derogant' principle of interpretation (as
set out in Steyn Die Uitleg van Wette p 193-4).
(15) Vide Section 1.4 supra at footnote 32.
(16) Cf: Kendall, op cit, p 376.
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regard to be inadequate (albeit drawn from a vast source), and grounded upon
logically questionable induction, must not be permitted to ravage the
possibility of considering alternative indicia. Although Social Contract
theories in the context of their time, may in some respects have afforded the
"political serviceableness" M~ine alleges, it would be illogical to conclude
that such effect represents in all cases the primary or exclusive theoretical
motivation or justification.
What emerges is that although the onslaught of Maine and his successors has
confirmed the existence during the greater part of this century until a
decade ago and earlier, of a broad jurisprudential presumption against the
validity of Social Contract theory, their attack has by no means pronounced
a final valediction - at most, it has shifted the onus in this debate to the
advocates of its correctness. Following the publication by John Rawls of
his Theory of Justice(lS)in 1972, (19) we stand perhaps at the commencement
of a new era of contractarianism; and the teachings of the Old Masters -
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and others - accordingly revive to relevance in the
background and insight they provide. As revealed by Rawls, it is submitted
by this writer that a far greater importance attaches to the Social Contract
theory than is contemporarily recognised, both in general law and in expro-
priation law in specific, and both in regard to the origins of social
institutions broadly and in regard to the institution of property in particular.
(18)Discussed at Section 2.6 infra.
(19)It " h . ·f" t t t h 11 " ..lS per aps slgnl lcan 0 no e t at a crltlclsms of pure Social
Contract theory consulted, predate Rawls' publication eg: compare
publication dates cited in footnotes supra. On the one hand this
confirms the general jurisprudential vogue prior to that time, and
on the other hand, signifies the innovative and even revolutionary
nature of Rawls' insight.
145
For dominium eminens then, a crucial light is cast by Social Contract theory
upon its jurisprudential origin and nature. In delimitation of scope however,
it is noted that whereas this theory is frequently used as a rationale for
civil disobedience (and this was largely the forum in which its early
expression took place), the principal concern herein is not this issue, but
rather the proprietary inflexion and orientation. It is accordingly that
the analysis infra of Social Contract theory is undertaken.(20)
(20)
, The assessment conducted herein focusses on the principal contractarian
works - lesser writers are excluded.
(2)
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2.2 THE ORIGINS OF SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY
Although frequently ascribed to Hobbes,Locke and Rousseau, the historical
origins of Social Contract theory date back long before the seventeenth century.
Contemporary legal historians have however been unable to agree upon the
starting point of the Social Contract movement. It is relevant to trace its
development to afford historical perspective and to permit a deeper understanding.
Perhaps the first expression(l)of the Social Contract idea is set out by Plato
in his Republic (353 BC):
"Therefore when men act unjustly towards one another,
and thus experience both the doing and the suffering,
those amongst them who are unable to compass the one
and escape the other, come to this opinion:
that it is more profitable that they should mutually
agree neither to inflict injustice nor to suffer it.
Hence, men began to establish laws and covenants
with one another, and they called what the law
prescribed lawful and just."
These words give expression to Plato's belief that the aggregation of individuals
into societies was impelled by the wish to avoid the pain suffering and injustice
that attended the absence of an ordered community - "that it is more profitable
that they should mutually agree neither to inflict injustice nor to suffer it".
(1 ) Gough's critical study The Social Contract (1936, Oxford, Clarendon) makes
reference to the Old Testament covenants between God and particular
individuals (eg Abraham), and between God and the people of Israel.
However as 14 Internat.Encyc.Soc.Sci. 376 at 378 notes, the Biblical
covenants "may be dismissed out of hand as sources for the modern
contractarians. They were, in the nature of the case, agreements
between Jehovah and an already existing society; the 'law' to which
they subjected the people of that society, pre-existed it and was
allegedly not of human origin".
(2)
Book 2, 358, Lindsay translation, (emphasis added): Glaucon's statement.
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To Plato, Nature was a State of Might, not Right, and Man in the pre-social
pre-legal and pre-moral condition was dominated by egoism and the pursuit of
self-interest - this was in Plato's view the primary motivation of political
behaviour. Hobbes and certain of the philosophers of his era were later to
revive much of the Greek abstract, and to transfuse into it the prevalent
waves of individualism and rationalism.
In A History of Political Theory, (3) Sabine refers to the contribution of the
Epicurean School (circa 300 BC) to the development of the Social Contract
approach. Epicurus and his followers reasoned that men are innately selfish
and as an exercise in expediency, tacitly contracted mutually to establish
the State, in order to obtain protection against the depredations of other men,
and to promote and to enable co-existence.
From the time of the Greeks, (4) Social Contract theory proper regained a
recognition only in the later mediaeval times, when the emphasis in juris-
prudence and theology returned" to regarding man as an individual. Manegold
of Lautenbach in the eleventh century (as referred to in Carlyle A History
of Mediaeval Political Theory in the Westf5) evolved a theory of Social
Contract based upon a pactum between the King and the People, in order to
justify censure of sovereign abuses and excesses. In his words as translated:
(3)3ed p 133-4.
(4)Laski in 14 Encyc.Soc.Sciences 127 notes however that in Roman law the
theory found "an un precise form ... in Cicero and in the lex regia".
Kunkel, Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History (Kelly
translation) 2ed at p 150 amplifies this by reference to the'Lex Dei quam
praecipit Dominus ad Moysen' which attempted to "justify the law of the
pagan jurists and emperors by the standards of the Christian state religion".
(5 )
Vol Ill, P 164, note 1.
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"No man can make himself emperor or king; a people sets a
man over it to the end that he may rule justly, giving
to every man his own, aiding good men and coercing bad,
in short, that he may give justice to all men. If then
he violates the agreement according to which he was
chosen, disturbing or confounding the very things he was
meant to put in order, reason dictates that he absolves
the people from their obedience".
In The Mediaeval Idea of Law as represented by Lucas de Penna~6)Ullman voiced
certain essentials of the Social Contract in stating de Penna's view that
since the Ruler was seen as dominus mundi, he acted at the same time as Trustee
Guardian and Protector to all his subjects:
"It is by virtue of this trusteeship that he is permitted
to expropriate possessions for the common good, but on
the other hand is obliged to compensate the owner".
In these extracts, it emerges that there was in the mediaeval conception,
a change in emphasis - whereas the Greeks saw self-interest and egoism as
having motivated the Social Contract, Manegold and de Penna idealised this
as a quest for justice. Common though to both interpretations and to all
the early forms of Social Contract, extending even to Hobbes' time, was an
acceptance of Social Contract as an historical fact.
Friedman in Legal Theory, (7) traces. the origin of the Social Contract to
the Italian jurist, Marsilius of Padua (1270 - 1343) who, in his rebellion
against the supremacy of the Church in secular affairs, developed the
distinction between the de iure and the de facto sovereign. In his view the




is legitimate, by the mandate of the people and with their consent (Social
Contract), de iure authority is revocably transferred thereby or conferred
upon the political sovereign; where however a legitimate sovereign is
usurped, or the sovereign imposes its will upon the people without their
consent, de facto sovereignty exists. (8) The naturalist and Aristotelian
standpoint that Marsilius adopts in Defensor Pacis (1324) is that the sovereign
accordingly has obligations to the Citizens or subjects, and it would appear
that this obligation would extend in his view to the Citizen's entitlement
to compensation in the event of the expropriation of his property.
(8) Edward McChesney Sait, in Political Institutions - A Preface (1938;
pp 156-7) considers the nature of the distinction between these
sovereigns - it is noted that for purposes of reference thereto in
this exposition (in the absence of indication to the contrary), the
word 'sovereign' connotes the de iure political meaning thereof:
"We recognize, first, a legal sovereign, which has de jure
- that is, from the standpoint of law - the final word of
command. There may be no other sovereign. With the
establishment of the representative system, however, a
second sovereign makes its appearance - the electoral
sovereign. It may acquire a share in the legal sovereignty,
ratifying constitutional amendments that the legislature
has proposed; or even all the legal sovereignty, so that
it acts without the legislature by means of the initiative.
In most cases, however, constitutional amendments are made,
under special rule and procedure, by the legislature.
Then the electoral sovereign is both superior and inferior
to the legal: superior in the fact that it creates and
des~roys the legisla~ors; inferior in the fact that the
representatives, in their sovereign capacity, may modify
or even abolish the electorate. In a period of political
transition, some person or group in the community may become
the centre of real, effective power - the actual or de facto
sovereign. This sovereign may either (illegally) destroy the
other sovereigns or else, preserving them, bind them to its
will. If it demonstrates its stability over a considerable
length of time, its de facto supremacy will be merged in
de jure supremacy."
This distinction was significantly blurred or omitted from consideration
by the great analytical positivist, John Austin, who in his lectures
The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (p 221) stated:
"If a determinate human superior, not in the habit of obedience
to a like superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk of
a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that
society, and the society (including the superior) is a society
political and independent."
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The individualistic emphasis in the natural law in the writings of St Thomas
Aquinas(9) found its parallel in the evolution of Social Contract theory in
the De Concordantia Catholica (1433) of Nicholas of Cusa:(lO)
"Since by nature all men are free, any authority by which
subjects are restrained ... comes solely from harmony and
consent of the subjects, whether the authority reside in
written law or in the living law which is the ruler. For
if by nature men are equally strong and equally free, the
true and settled power of one over the others, the ruler
having equal natural power, could be set up only by the
choice and consent of the others, just as a law also is
set up by consent."
The essential propositions Nicholas makes are: that man in his natural state
is free; that the power of the sovereign (king) is derivative and by mandate
from the people; and that government derives from the consent (Social Contract)
of the Citizens and not by delegation from a Divinely-appointed Monarch.
Nicholas' writings reflected then the popular spirit of individualism that
characterised European political theory and jurisprudence from the
Renaissance to the seventeenth century; and to a considerable extent, his
themes contribute significantly to the later writings of John Locke.
The Vindiciae contra Tyrannos (1579) was one of the leading post-Renaissance
treatises(ll) - although primarily focussing upon the relationship between
Church and State, (12) its substance. linked directly to the unfolding and
(9)Vide Chapter 3 infra.
(10)11, xiv.
(ll)There is debate as to the true author of the Vindiciae - Sabine, op cit,
p 377 - 384 regards it as being Languet, while Laski, 14 Encyc.Soc.Sci.
127 at 128 says it was probably Duplessis-Mornay.
(12)Th V· d· . . h 1 fe 1n 1C1ae was wr1tten sort y a ter the Massacre of St Bartholomew in
1572, with the object of considering whether it is the duty of a Citizen
to obey the monarch if his commands are contrary to divine and natural law.
The author's conclusion, based on a contractarian structure, was that
obedience to the State (or to a monarch who persecutes religious truth)
was justified only to the extent that there was compliance with the Will
of God - in this, the Vindiciae presented a doctrinal counterbalance to
the Divine Right of Kings (Cf: Laski, ibid).
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development of Social Contract theory. The broad Contract involved two pacta -
the first was a religious covenant between God and the king-and-people jointly
(which reflected the Reformist mood), and the second a political covenant
between the King and the People, involving' mutual and reciprocal obligations.
The Vindiciae incorporated however a curious contradiction - in that the king
was a "vassal of the King of Kings" under the first covenant, (13) his obli-
gations seemed to be to God alone; and yet, in that he derived his political
authority from the people, it seemed that it was to them that he must answer.
Although on the surface, the second covenant may have appeared to lend support
to the liberal cause and to justify popular resistance to despotic or
absolute government, the contradiction in the broad formulation permitted the
Vindiciae to find some consistency also with the doctrine of the Divine Right
of Kings. It was perhaps an attempt to reconcile in the ecclesiastical forum
a conflict that was assuming a growing secular significance - that conflict
between the Divinely-ordained hereditary Monarch and the popularly-inflamed
spirit of individualism. It was from this point that the proponents of the
Divine Right of Kings on the one hand and the Social Contract theorists on
the other, were to know significant divergence. (14)
In The Sociology of Law, (15) Berman (in an article entitled The Influence of
Christianity on Western Law) points out that the seventeenth century prominence
of the Social Contract theory was anticipated a century earlier in the works
of Calvin, who reconciled to an extent the contradiction the Vindiciae embodied
(13)
\ Cf: A Defence of Liberty against Tyrants (Laski translation) London
1924 p 70.
(14)Cf: Section 2.1 stlpra at footnote 1.
(15)Ed: Evans, Ch 30 P 424 at p 434 footnote 10.
(18)
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by advocating passive obedience on the part of the Citizen. McNeill's
History and Character of Calvinism(16) confirms that Calvin himself on
one occasion had asked each person in Geneva to accept the doctrine of
justification by faith, to swear their obedience to the Ten Commandments,
and to take an oath of loyalty to the city. In Property and Prophets: The
. I .. d Id 1 . (17) H t t f th th tEvolution of Economlc nstltutlons an eo ogles, un no es ur er a:
"Protestantism not only freed (the new middle-class capitalists)
from the religious condemnation the Catholic Church had heaped
upon their motives and activities, but eventually made virtues
of the selfish, egoistic and acquisitive motives the mediaeval
church had so despised."
In the political writings in general in the sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries, much of the interpretation of the later Social Contract theorists
. f h d d M h· 11· (19) h· ., . (. 1· .lS ores a owe. ac lave 1, t e ..;esul ts lnter a la
(16)New York 1957 p 142.
(17)New York 1981 at p 31.
(18)The relationship between Protestanism and Capitalism is explored in depth
in Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York.
Scribner 1958) and Tawney Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (~lew York
Mentor Books 1954).
(19)Machiavelli's central works, The Prince and Discourses on the First Ten
Books of Titus Livius, both completed in 1513, (Detmold translations in
The Historical Political and Diplomatic writings of Niccolo Machiavelli,
Boston 1891), are iconoclastic as far as absolute monarchy and papal
supremacy are concerned, viewing politics as an end in itself. "The
principles (of religion) seem to me to have made men feeble, and caused them
to become an easy prey to evil-minded men, who can control them more securely,
seeing that the great body of men. for the sake of gaining paradise, are more
disposed to endure injuries than to suffer them" (Discourses IT 4). In their
emphasis on universal egoism, his writings anticipate contractarianism, and
in his treatment of the omnipotence of the legislator, find substantial
accordance with the sovereignty theory in property law (vide Section 1.2.3)
and the writings of Rousseau (et al). Moreover, in his views that man and
society are not coeval, that man is not social or political by nature, and
that natural or divine law imposes no perfect duties upon men towards one
another and towards society itself (of which their rights are derivative),
Machiavelli's writings provide a common bond uniting Hobbes Locke and
Rousseau. In this latter regard, cf Kendall in 14 Internat.Encyc.Soc.Sci.
at 376.
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de t'1ariana(20) and Suarez)(21) and the German Protestant Althusius, (22)
contributed significantly to the later contractarian standpoint.
Cole, in his Introduction to the Social Contract of Rousseau(23) records
reference to the theory of Social Contract existing in Hooker's Ecclesiastical
Polity (1632) and Milton's Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (1649), but submits
that the best known instances of its use at the time was by the Pilgrim
Fathers in their declaration on the Mayflower in 1620:
"We do solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God
and of one another, covenant and combine ourselves
together into a civil body politic."
No exhaustive record of the early origins of Social Contract theory is
possible within the limits of an exposition of this nature - Bellarmine,
Boucher, Buchanan, Knox, Lilburne, Parker, Parsons, Prynne, Selden, Tyndale
and a host ofother~ participated also in the unfolding of contractarianism,
(20)Juan de Mariana, in De rege et regis institutione (1599), gave the
principles of the Vindiciae a non-theological translation. He conceived
of a state of nature(similar to that of-Hobbes) and of a natural process
of transfer· by men to a state of civil society grounded upon the
institution of property. Cf Savine op cit p 389.
(21)In Tractatus de legibus ac deo legislatore (1612), Francisco Suarez
defended the spiritual power of ' the pope, and regarded the Social
Contract as justifying tyrannicide or the resistance of political
oppression where the pope called upon the people to act in that way.
14 Encyc.Soc.Sci 127 at 128-9 observes: " ... with remarkable ingenuit~
contract and popular sovereignty combine (in Suarez's writings) to make
the Roman pontiff, as in the Middle Ages, the master of secular power".
(22)Althusius, a law professor in Holland, postulated a form of Social Contract
in Politica methodice digesta (1603), which characterised sovereignty with
the requirement that certain fundamental conditions or limitations thereby
imposed are not to be violated - in this regard, his emphasis corresponds
to that of Locke.
(23) P ... .
Xlll - XlV.
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although it is noted that their works were largely of a lesser stature and
to a considerable extent subsumed by the writings of the principal theorists.
The references that have been made and those which remain, serve however to
prove that the Social Contract was not merely an ephemeral innovation of
seventeenth century political thought - rather it was against this historical
backdrop, spanning two millenia, that the Contract theory proper was to
emerge formally, powerfully and in depth in the seventeenth century in the
writings of Hobbes) Locke and Rousseau, and the social philosophers that
followed. (24)
(24) An t f h ..assessmen 0 t e wrltlngs of the principal. contractarian theorists
is undertaken infra.
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2.3 THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY PROPER:
THE PACTUM UNIONIS AND THE PACTUM SUBJECTIONIS :
From the jurisprudential foundations expounded by Grotius) Hobbes,Locke
Rousseau et aI, (1) and drawing from the cornerstones of the legal heritage, (2)
a Social Contract philosophy emerged in the seventeenth and early eighteenth
. b d . . 1 t t (3)centurles, ase upon two prlnClpa ene s:
(i) firstly, the pactum unionis; and
(ii) secondly, the pactum subjectionis;
which either alternatively or in conjunction constituted the Social Contract
theory envisioned by jurists at that time. Since the relative emphasis and
acknowledgement of these pacta varied significantly in the writings of the
theorists, a considerable jurisprudential debate arose, not as to whether the
Social Contract itself existed (since this was generally accepted at the
time), but as to what its constituents were.
• J.
The former, thepactumun~on~s , was postulated as an agreement of unification
between all men inter se, in terms of which a notional collective or State
(the Civitas) was created. It presupposed that at the inception of societies
(1) Vide Section 2.4 infra.
(2) Vide Section 2.2 supra.
(3)
Pollock, Essays on the Law p 80 - 112 (vide also History of the Science of
Politics (1911»), (repeated by Friedman Legal Theory p 68)sets out and
discusses these two pacta.
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.. h t t . t ·t· (4) (fin a ti~e of misty antlqulty, men c ose 0 aggrega e ln 0 communl les or
reasons of their own self-advancement) in terms of this agreement of union
collectivisation or socialisation as contemplated. The unionis hypothesis
accordingly gave expression to the broad naturalist conception that men
yearned for an ordered society, and provided a rationale feasible within the
age, regarding the basis of societal formation. Mutual respect and fore-
bearance, the promotion of peace stability and growth, and the securing of
private rights to person and property, constituted the primary motivations
for union. The effect of union on the one hand was that the State as a body
came into existence, and on the other hand that individuals found the
opportunity for their protection and advancement in the ordered forum the
State presented.
The pactum subjectionis was the device which imbued the State with sovereignty
(de iure), since it was here that the individuals comprising the society,
agreed to submit to the State's powers. Whether this pactum took place
between the Sovereign"and the Citizens collectively as a body.(in consequence
of a 'prior' pactum unionis) , or between the Sovereign and the Citizens indi-
vidually and severally (in the thesis of tho'se contractarians who rejected
the existence of the unionis postulate), or further still, between the
Citizens individually inter se without the participation of the Sovereign
(4) Insofar as this proposition is concerned, it is not dissimilar to Maine's
celebrated pronouncement:
"The movement of progressive societies has bitherto
been a movement from Status to Contract"
(Ancient Law p 182; contra discussion under Section 2.1 supra. Vide also
Graveson The Movement from Status to Contract)
in that men are in uniting, moving from what Hobbes described as a "brutish"
state of "Warre", into ordered (yet subjected) societies. The primary
difference however (and the basis for Maine's objection to Social Contract
theory) is that Maine's vision of contract remains rooted in the Romanist
conception of contract as confined by the limits of the private law.
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(under which last view the Sovereign could (perhaps) not be considered to have
incurred any 'contractual' obligation), depends on which particular genre of
the Social Contract is adopted. Notwithstanding this diversity, where sub-
jectionis was conceded, the rationale impelling this subjection of the indivi-
dual was considered to rest in the fact that a State without plenary sovereign
powers, would not be able in all circumstances to enforce observance of, and
to sanction transgressions of, the ideals that had motivated men to move into
societies. The pactum subjectionis in its effect, on the one hand conferred
the relative status of Sovereign and Subject, of Ruler and Ruled, of State and
Citizen, and gave rise to the broad duty of the members to obey and to be
subject to the sovereign they had chosen and to whose existence they had
consented; and on the other hand, in the proprietary forum, this pactum
entrenched the existence of the powers the State has over the property of its
Citizens to require their subjection and obedience in this regard. (5) In its
extreme effect however, subjectionis placed an absolute power in the hands
of the State, as the embodiment of the will of the people, and it was in
aversion to the excesses that this could connote)that certain later demo-
cratically-spirited theorists were to attempt to place constraints and
qualifications upon the subjectionis postulate.
Where it was accepted that the Social Contract embraced both pacta, the
question necessarily arose: did the pacta occur contemporaneously, or did
the pactum subjectionis occur subsequently displaced in time?
suggesting:(6)
"To this contract (the pactum unionis), is added
simultaneously or subsequently a second pact
(the pactum subjectionis),"
(s)Vide Section 1.3 supra.
(6)Op cit p 68 (emphasis added).
Friedman in
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surprisingly sidesteps the need to assess the temporal relationship of the
two pacta inter se. Although he impliedly provides the guidance that the
former could not have preceded the latter (since intuitively the universal
or corporate 'union' as a collective could not have agreed to subject itself
to the State or Sovereign before that 'union' had come into being), and
although he (perhaps correctly) suggests that both pacta conjunctively and
inseparably constituted the Original Social Contract, the word "added" in
its context, if not being prima facie antithetical or negatory to the word
"simultaneously", is at least to be questioned. Friedman's words then do not
resolve the temporal issue unambiguously.
The power of dominium eminens (being one of the instruments of subjection to
which the contracting participants - the prospective Citizens - are
collectively consenting), provides a valuable indication firstly of the
nature and composition of the Social Contract, and secondly of the relative
ranking in time of the two pacta.
As regards the first aspect supra, since the intention of the individuals in
so aggregating into societies must necessarily have been that it contemplated
the knowing of some restraint and limitation upon the former unrestricted
exercise of individual expression (for in the absence of such limitation, the
sovereign would be unable to fulfil its function of protection), it appears
on the one hand that a pactum unionis in isolation could not have given
fulfilment to these objectives that motivated the societalisation that took
place, and on the other hand that a pactum subjectionis of a qualified
character at least) was part of the Social Contract created. From the fact
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that unreserved subjection would have conflicted with the dominant goal of
promoting selfadvancement, it is evident also that the pactum subjectionis
notionally .and rationally was not absolute. It appears moreover that al though
this qualified pactum subjectioni~ as postulated, need not necessarily in
logic have stemmed from the prior existence of a unified collective-~
capable of consenting (since that consent could have been given~QQ an
individual basis), it-would seem however that a universal contemporaneous and
congruent common purpose among all individuals regarding consent, would in
probability appear highly unlikely without some form of preceding pactum
unionis - accordingly it emerges that pragmatic probability here operates
to modify pure logic and to suggest that it was a collective body (unified,
not necessarily upon a formal basis, but in likelihood tacitly, via medium
of the common purpose shared) that gave the requisite consent. In outline
then, the Social Contract appears to be composed of both pacta.
As regards the second aspect supra - the relative time ranking of these two
pacta - it appears, alternatively yet consistently viewed, that the creation
or formation of the devices of subjection (inter alia dominium eminens) must
necessarily have been contemplated at the time of union, for without them,
that union would have been unableto justify its inception. It appears
accordingly that unionis must necessarily have taken place either prior to
or contemporaneously with the agreement of subjection - however since that
union could not have had its intended operation and nor could it have been
effective until the instruments of subjection had a practical reality, it
appears that the entering into of a pact of subjection was a suspensive
condition attached to the agreement of union. Accordingly, it is submitted
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that the pactum unionis ranked earlier in time than the pactum subjectionis,
although both were interconnected organs of the Social Contract organism.
From the analysis of dominium eminens in relation to the Social Contract,
it emerges then in overview in the submission of this writer that:
(i) the two constituent pacta were interdependent;
(ii) they were entered upon collaterally;
(iii) the pactum unionis was made prior to the pactum subjectionis,
but was subject to the suspensive condition that the latter
pact came into existence;
(iv) the pactum subjectionis was made thereafter in order that
the intention underlying the former pact might not be
frustrated (alternatively expressed j in order that the
suspensive condition might be fulfilled);
Cv) in the South African jurisprudence, by virtue of the fulfilment
of that suspensive condition, the pactum unionis would be
considered to have originated retrospectively, (7) ie from the time
(7)A suspensive condition is one which suspends the operation or effect of one,
or some, or all, of the obligations under a contract until the condition is
fulfilled. If the condition is fulfilled the contract,' or that part of it
which was suspended, is deemed to have been in force from the date of
agreement, not from the date of the fulfilment of the condition~ Vide
inter alia:
(a) A J Kerr - The Principles of the Law of Contract (Second Edition 1975)
(Butterworths) p 230.
(b) Pothier - Obligations : A Treatise on the Law of Obligations, or
Contracts by R J Pothier, translated from the French by Wi11iam
David Evans}Barrister-at-Law, Butterworths Dublin 1806 reprinted by
S Pagunatt & Co, Jaffra Ceylon 1907, at paragraph 220.
(c) Sir J WWessels, The Law of Contract in South Africa 2nd ed edited by
A A Roberts assisted by E L Jansen and J J Trengrove, Butterworth & Co
(Africa) Ltd 1951 at paras 1352 and 1380.
(d) Peri-Urban Areas Health Board v Tomaselli and Another 1962 (3) SA 346
AD at 351 H.
(e) Provident Land Trust Limited v Union Government 1911 AD 615.
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of it having been entered upon and concluded and not from the
(later) time of the said fulfilment;
(vi) it accordingly appears that if the existence of both pacta is
accepted, although they are interdependent and collateral, the
pactum unionis predates the pactum subjectionis.
It is noted that although a principle of private contractual law has been
employed in the determination of the relative time ranking of the two pacta,
(viz: the retrospective validation of contracts that are subject to a
suspensive condition), this is not to suggest that the two pacta separately,
or collectively in the Social Contract in which they are comprised, constitute
contracts within the private law. The Social Contract is perhaps best viewed
as a contract sui generis since inter alia it operates in a public law forum;
furthermore, it is from this Contract broadly that the State itself knows
existence, and without which the divisions of public and private law can know
no substance. The use of a predominantly private law principle to rationalise
the relative time rankings of these constituents, does not, it is submitted,
represent a departure from logic in using a conclusion to validate a
conclusion. That principle used (and labelled as a private contractual law
principle) is justified in its operation in the public law by considerations
which have equivalent application in the context in which that principle is
employed in the private law.
If the existence of the pactum unionis is accepted, then the method by which
the Civitas was formed, is rationalised. If the existence of the pactum
subjectionis is accepted, then the question is resolved as to how it was that
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the original contracting parties incurred civil obligations under the Social
Contract. Conceptual difficulty attaches however to the issues, firstly of
how it is that those who did not consent are bound, and secondly of how it
is that this Social Contract is transmitted from generation to generation
it is frequently upon these bases that Social Contract theory is rejected by
critics. (8)
In regard to the first aspect, consensus ad idem rears its head in an attempted
denial of the view that those who have not consented are still bound. Were it
not for the fact (as reasoned supra) that subjectionis is preceded by unionis,
and were it submitted instead that the consent was given individually (and
not as a body), then it would seem credible that nonconsenting participants
would be free to reject the allegation that they had civil obligations. The
submission that consent emanated from the 'Volonte Generale' following a
pactum unionis, indicates then that the nonconsenting minority was still
bound, notwithstanding the possible absence of their consent on an individual
level. In the words of Hobbes in Leviathan:(9)
"( B )ecause the major part hath by consenting voices
declared a Soveraigne, he that dissented must now
consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow
all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed
by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the
Congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently
declared thereby his will, (and therefore taci tel y covenanted)
to stand to what the major part should ordayne; and therefore
if he refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation against
any of their Decrees, he does so contrary to his Covenant;
and therefore unjustly; And Whether he be of the Congregation,
or not; and whether his consent be asked, or not; he must either
submit to their Decrees, or be left in the condition of Warre he
was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by
any man whatsoever". (10)
(8)Cf: Section 2.1 supra.
(9)Part 2 Chapter 18 p 92.
(lO)It . d h H1S note t at obbes' reasoning, although similar to that of the writer
herein, differs in degree. The subjection that Hobbes envisages is
unconditional, whereas that postulated by this writer is qualified.
Hobbes' words however elucidate the proposition of tacit consent to the
will of the "Congregation".
16)
In regard to the second aspect - the devolution of the Contract (and its
. .. f t t (11) d thobligations) upon subsequent generat10ns - pr1v1ty 0 con rac, an e
f . b' d . t (12) (fdoctrine that the acts 0 one sovere1gn cannot 1n 1 s successors or
to be able to do so would be to imply that the successor lacked sovereignty),
are here too raised by some in attempted refutation of the postulate of
transmissibility. The argument is, so it goes, that within any modern
society, since (consistently with the jurisprudence of t~arsilius(13) and
some that followed) the people are the original de iure sovereign, and since
the authority of government is accordingly derivate and revocable, the people
(11)
It would here perhaps not be appropriate to note that privity (as it exists
in English law) does not constitute part of the South African law of
contract, since that observation would be germane only in a private law
debate, and not necessarily in respect of the sui generis public law
Contract here hypothesised. If this aspect accordingly remains relevant,
then it could be contended on this basis that since the subsequent
generation is not one of the original participants, it cannot be regarded
as being bound. That view can however be rejected, either by regarding
the Original Contract as a stipulatio alteri (in terms of Roman Dutch Law)
(although this is weakened by the co-existence of both burdens and
benefits), or can be more convincingly rejected on the basis of implied
consent, as reasoned infra.
(12)Vide inter alia Section 59(1) of the Republic of South Africa Consti-
tution Act 32 of 1961 :
"Parliament shall be the sovereign legislative authority
in and over the Republic, and shall have full power to
make laws for the peace order and good government of
the Republic."
This is effectively readopted in the corresponding provision (S30)of the
1983 Consti tution Act, 110 of 1983, al though the President is now vested wi th
greater powers. Vide also Section 37(3) of the Transkei Constitution Act
48 of 1963.
Cf: Maugham LJ in Ellen Street Estates v Minister of Health (1934) 1 KB
590; contra Blackburn v Attorney General (1971) 2 AER 1380 at 1381-2
(per Lord Denning MR) (regarding the EEC and the Treaty of Rome). Vide
also Ogilvie-Thompson CJ in (1972) 89 SALJ 30 at 33-4; discussed in
Cochram The Interpretation of Statutes at p 2 - 3.
(13)Vide Section 2.2 supra in main text at footnote 7 et seq.
can displace(14) the legislative sovereign in the event that the latter
violates its obligations to the former - it is on this basis that it is
contended by some that a subsequent sovereign people cannot be bound by a
former consent to subjection. Although not rejecting in any way the
correctness of this broad principle, the interpretation that is attached
to it however is disputed - alternatively expressed, although it is not
denied that the original de iure sovereign has the power to withdraw (as a
collective) from the Social Contract, the central point that would appear
is that it is able as a body to withdraw only by an overt and external act
of a continuing nature that manifests such withdrawal, and further, perhaps
also only in circumst~nces of severe sovereign abuse or excess which under
naturalism would justify such withdrawal. In the absence of such manifested
intention and such excesses, the presumption under the doctrine of implied
consent will be that the subsequent body of Citizens has impliedly and
retrospectively validated and adopted the Social Contract relationship that
(14)An example that would be available in support of such a thesis would be
found in America at the time of the Declaration of Independence or more
recently perhaps, in the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Rhodesia, although the latter example would seem more an instance of
a de facto exercise of sovereignty.
In Munn v Illinois (94 US 113 at 124 24 L Ed 77) it was held:
"When the people of the United Colonies separated from
Great Britain, they changed the form but not the substance
of their government. They retained for the purposes of
government all the powers of the British Parliament and
through their state constitutions or other forms of social
compact undertook to give practical effect to such as they
deemed necessary for the common good and the security of
life and property."
.1.0J
. (15) (16)the former Congregatlon entered upon and concluded. It is accordingly
by the conduct of implied acceptance and ratification, that subsequent
generations may be bound under the Original Social Contract, and that social
obligations under this Contract will devolve upon those persons.
From this broad outl~ne of the pactum unionis and the pactum subjectionis,
and the interpretation thereof advocated by this writer, it remains to
consider the primary texts to analyse in greater detail the views that have
been expressed by the Social Contract jurists. An assessment of the writings
of the contractarians from Hobbes and Grotius to Rawls is accordingly
undertaken in the sections that follow.
(15)Cf: Sir Robert Atkyns in The Trial of Sir Edward Hales, 1686, 11 How St
Trials 1204 (cited by Norton-Kyshe in Dictionary of Legal Quotations,
Sweet and t~axwell, London 1904 republished 1968 at p 225) (emphasis added):
"'A people whom Providence hath cast together into one
island or country are in effect one great body politic,
consisting of head and members, in imitation of the body
natural, as is excellently set forth in the statute of
appeals, ... which stiles the King the supreme head, and
the people a body politic (these are the very words),
compact of all sorts.and degrees of men, divided into
spirituality and temporality. And this body never dies."
---'-:- --
(16)Grotius, op cit 11 9 3 Whewell translation, observes in this regard:
"Thus a People ... is reckoned the same now as it was a
hundred years ago, though none of those who lived then
is alive now - As long as that communion which makes a
People and binds it together with mutual bonds preserves
its unity ... the (mere) change of the component parts
does not make a people cease to be what it was, even for
above a thousand years .... "
2.4
2.4.1
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY PROPER IN THE WRITINGS
OF GROTIUS HOBBES LOCKE ROUSSEAU AND MONTESQUIEU
INTRODUCTION
In the philosophical and political discourses that took place on the Social
Contract in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the balances shifted
and vacillated along the jurisprudential spectrum. Although the origins of
Social Contract theory were clearly rooted in naturalism, the swelling tides
of the Age of Reason and positivism at the close of this period, undermined
and eroded the natural law bastions, and in a curious inversion, brought the
theory proper to a conclusion in an age characterised by an absence of
naturalist commitment or conviction.
The core of the rationalist school(l) of natural law is centred in its
fundamental postulates - that legitimate authority rests directly and
originally in the people and not in the ius divinum or in the monarch
(via medium of the Divine Right of Kings); that naturalist principles
and law itself flow from the nature of Man and his yearning for a rational
peaceful and ordered existence (and are deduced either a priori or
a posteriori); that transgressions of naturalist principles are invalid;
and that contrary to the organic mediaeval conception, society and the
State (as the creations of individual will) are to be conceived in an
atomistic manner.
(1) Cf: Friedman, op cit p 64.
The particular interpretation of the Social Contract by each of the jurists
varied, both in respect of whether social aggregation was hypothesised on
the basis of historical actuality or on the basis of reasoned inference,
and in respect of whether it was the pactum unionis or the pactum subjectionis
or both that represented the essence of the Social Contract - the transition
from one standpoint to another was gradual. What was evident however was
firstly a common and unqualified subscription to the individualistic nature
of property ownership; secondly, an interpretation of naturalism which
placed an original de iure sovereignty in the Citizens (as a body) without
reference to a 'Higher Law' emanating from God (as had been the case in the
mediaeval backdrop to contractarianism); thirdly, an interpretation of the
State as holding a derivative de iure political sovereignty in consequence
of its formation through and by way of the exercise of individualistic
intention that manifested itself in the Original Compact; and fourthly, in
accordance with the spirit of individualistic assertion that was prevalent,
an atomistic flavour was attached to the society that was consequent.
Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Montesquieu each made significant
contributions to the development of the Social Contract theory proper -
an analysis of their writings is accordingly undertaken herein.(2)
(2) V"d " 1 S "
1 e respectlve y ectlons 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, 2.4.5, and 2.4.6 infra.
2.4.2 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT UNDER GROTIUS 1583 - 1645
16ts
(3)
In De lure Belli ac Pacis, (l)Grotius' assessment of Social Contract Theory
ini tiates in his acceptance of an Original Compact as historical actuali ty or
fact. In this, his jurisprudence differs significantly from the later
d l ·d 1· (2). G t th 1 f th . ht th ttranscen enta 1 ea 1sm 1n ermany a e c ose 0 e e1g een cen ury,
where the Contract was viewed exclusively as a postulate of pure reason. On
this contractarian basis, he accounted for the existence of the State and the
inception of private property as an institution:
"And thus we learn how things became Property; not by an
act of mind alone: for one party could not know what
another party wished to have for its own, so as to
abstain from that; and several parties might wish for
the same thing; but by a certain pact, either express,
as by division, or implied, as by occupation: for as
soon as community was given up, and while division was
not instituted, it must be supposed to have been a matter
of agreement among all, that what each had occupied, he
should have as his own .... "
Reasoning from this primary historical premise, Grotius considered on the
international level the relation between Sovereigns (whom he regarded as
being still within the natural phase that individuals were in prior to the
Original Compact), and concluded that it was the absence of restraints that
(1) Cf Section 1.1, footnote 1. It is noted that the full title of Grotius'
work is "Hugonis Grotii De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, in quibus Jus
Naturae et Gentium, item Juris Publici, Praecipua explicantur".
(2)Vide Section 2.5 infra.
(3)1125 (Whewell)translation (emphasis added); Cf 11 2 1.
" " "1 b 11" (4 )gave rlse to lnternatlona e 1gerence. His advocacy of an international
reconciliation (guided by contractarian principles and extended from the
natural law) has led to his being styled the "Father of International Law".
More significant however to the theme of this exposition, is Grotius'
reasoning on the intranational or internal level. Here he considered that
" 1 d ( ... 1 )(5) d d" "tman was lnnate y goo a "Deo car~ss~mum an~ma " an was rlven ln 0
"b " 1" -1 - ( . . t t' .,\( b ) h" h b d1soclety y a SOCla unpu se an "appet~ tus soc~e a ~s I , W lC roa y was
the basis of all Jus, the cause of societalisation, and the font from which
the institution of private property sp~Jng. (7) It appears then, notwith-
standing the rationalist devotion to individualism that Grotius cherished,
that his individual was to be considered as a social creature and not purely
in isolation. In the words of Hartenstein in Darstellung der Rechtsphilosophie
des Hugo Grotius:(8)
"Grotius does not ... seek the ground and basis of Rights in the
insulated existence of the individual (alone), but in the social
relations of men. "
(4) Grotius in Article 28 of his Prolegomena described the bellicose attitude
that he saw prevailing among nations, and which in part was responsible
for motivating the writing of De lure Belli ac ~acis:
"I saw prevailing throughout the Christian world a licence
in making war, of which even barbarous nations would have
been ashamed; recourse was had to arms for slight reasons,
or for no reason; and when arms were once ~aken up, all
reverence for divine and human law was thrown away; just
as if all men were thenceforth authorised to commit all
crimes without restraint."
(Whewell translation; discussed in Whewell's Introduction at p x).
Cf also: Section 2.4.4 infra at footnote 29.
(5) 111.25.8, being his final words in De lure Belli ac Pacis; as translated
by Whewell: "a creature most dear to God".
(6)Cf Whewell's Introduction at p vii and p xiii .
. (7)Vide Prolegomena Articles 8 and 16; cf 11.2.5 supra.
(8)
Darstellung der Rechtsphilosophie des Hugo Grotius, (Whewell transl.),in
The Transactions of the Royal Society of Saxony 1850.
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The particular genre of contractarianism that Grotius articulated, recognised
a multilateral contract of interaction between the Citizens inter se without
the participation of the sovereign, (9) in terms of which the sovereign
. , l' bl' t' (10) b h' h b' t t t .Incurred no contractua 0 19a Ions; y w IC man was su Jec 0 cer aln
civil subjection; (11) and under which his place in society was created and
regulated. 14 Encyc.Soc.Sciences(12) submits in this regard that:
"With Grotius, (the Social) Contract is the basis at once
of the right to private property and of the sovereign
power of the ruler. The latter for him rests upon a
pactum subjectionis and becomes accordingly the basis of
absolutism... "
It is important however to note that in Grotius' writings, this subjection,
although perhaps appearing absolute, was in substance constrained however by
the sovereign's obligation to uphold the inviolable and irrevocable tenets
of the natural law, in observance of which all (including the State) were bound:
(9)
To Grotius, the Sovereign was not a party to the pactum subjectionis he
contemplated. He accordingly notes in 1.3.9(1) (Whewell translation)
that although "(s)ome assert that there is a mutual subjection, so that
the whole people ought to obey the king when he rules rightly, but when
a king rules ill, he is subject to the people", he in 1.3.10(1) rejects
this "opinion... (as being)... false".
"
(10)Cf: 1.3.14(2) (Whewell translation):
it is not universally true that all government is for
the sake of the governed .... So some kingly governments
may be established for the good of kings, as those which
are won by victory .... But I do not deny that in most
governments, the good of the governed is the object .... "
He added in 1.3.15:
"... the vices of Princes are to be tolerated like bad
seasons ... (since) ... magistrates judge private men;
Princes, the magistrates; God, Princes".
(ll)Cf: 1.3.8(1):
"And here we must first reject their op~n~on who say that
Sovereignty everywhere belongs to the people; so that it
has the power of controlling kings, and of punishing them
if they abuse their power. What evil this opinion has caused
and may cause, any wise man may see. We refute it .... "
(12)127 at 129.
.1/.1
"(Although) it is the general pact of human society to obey
kings ... by natural law, all have the right of repelling
wrongs. But civil society being instituted to secure
public tranquillity, the State acquires a Superior Right
over us and ours ... (only) ... as far as is necessary for
that end." (13)
The Grotian rationale on the one hand was that it was the Citizen's
unreserved duty and obedience to his freely-chosen Sovereign that was the
factor permitting and enabling the attainment of order and municipal stability
(objectives that each Citizen sought), and on the other hand, it was the
existence of binding naturalist principles that prevented sovereign abuse.
There was accordingly in Grotius' writings only a quasi-pactum subjectionis
that was not of the pure and absolute form later postulated by Hobbes; but
it brought nevertheless with it the far-reaching effect that the original
sovereign's surrender or submission to his freely chosen de iure political
sovereign, implied the loss by the former of the power to punish the latter
for transgressions - in short, in terms of Hohfeld's analysis, (14) sovereiQn
immunity was born.
As regards the composition of the Social Contract he envisaged, Grotius does
not appear then to have gone as far as adopting a direct division between
the pactum unionis and the pactum .subjectionis. His emphasis is on the
latter, although both pacta consolidate to an extent under his naturalist stress
on the importance of promises and undertakings, (15) and as a dictate of right
(13)1.4.2(1) and (2) (Whewell translation); (emphasis added). Cf: Locke's
view, discussed in Section 2.4.4 infra at footnote 21.
(14)Vide Chapter 3 infra.
(lS)Vide 11. 11 at p 146 et seq (Whewell translation). The importance of
promises is embodied in the 'pacta sunt servanda'principle discussed
by Friedman Legal Theory p 65.
reason JI. Subsequent writers however have criticised Grotius in the consis-
. (16) .tency of that reasonlng, but what emerges is that Grotius has attempted
to reconcile the natural law and the principle of consent expressed in the
Social Contract, with the rising spirit of individualism and the consequent
need for limitations upon sovereign excess, in a way that afforded a
rationale inter alia for his enunciation of the State's powers. His reasoning
on the intranational level, .although perhaps in a modern context not without
(17)some weakness, appears however to have been accurate and appropriate
within the era in which he wrote.
The effect of the Social Contract that Grotius contemplated was that the State
was imbued with certain transcending powers, in accordance with which, private
ends gave way to public utility, and the private right of revolt remained
only in the most limited of circumstances. Dominium eminens emerged in
Grotius' works as a corollary to the form of pactum subjectionis he postulated.
He manifested also however his naturalist and individualistic interpretation
(16)Vide Dias Jurisprudence p 575 argues that he derives "ought" from "is";
Friedman, op cit, p 69, suggests that he is "strangely vacallating";
Mann Outlines of a History of Expropriation p 192 submits that "his
remarks are not always free from ambiguity"; Gierke Natural Law and
Theory of Society p 55 et seq argues that he moves from an expounding
of the State as individualistic or atomistic to an organic view thereof.
(17)Weakness attaches to an extreme interpretation of the internal purpose
Grotius contemplated. If the power to punish a ruler is forfeited, then
his authority cannot subsequently be usurped. By reason of the initial
support of his people and notwithstanding their later opposition,
Gadaffi (for instance in modern times) wOljld under Grotius' view, have
been unjustly deposed. A fur~her weakness perhaps in Grotius' theory
is that modern governments are not permanent to the extent he postulated -
they must stand for re-election (in a democracy) and the people accordingly
have a right to replace their Ruler. It is noted however that Grotius did
not take a stand in favour of any particular political form of government,
and for this reason his writings have a wide application: " ... as there
are many ways of living, one better than another, and each man is free to
choose which of them he pleases; so each nation may choose what form of
government it will: and its right in this matter is not to be measured
by the excellence of this or that form, concerning which opinions may be
various, but by its choice". (1.3.8(2)) (Whewell translation).
of society in stipulating in his celebrated dicta(18) that "the State is
bound to make good the loss" suffered by those over whom dominium eminens
is exercised. The expropriatee's compensation entitlement is accordingly
an unspoken naturalist obligation to which the State (in recognition both
of the natural law and of its contractarian origin) is "bound", but which
in view of sovereign immunity, accordingly falls short of being a directly
enforceable positivist right of the Citizen. Although fair compensation
ought to be awarded (wherever possible) since in Grotius' words "it is a
wicked thing to take away from a man (without compensation) a thing that is
rightfully his own", this is not to suggest that Grotius stated that this
was what the state of the law is. In reconciliation, it seems that in spite
of the paradox between sovereign immunity and the entitlement under naturalism
to compensation, Grotius confirmed his adherence to the principle that the
State remains subject to a fundamental law, either notwithstanding, or in
terms of, the Social Contract.
It emerges then that, as with the concept of dominium eminens, (19) Grotius
did not develop the Social Contract theory to any deep level, although he
pre-supposed the contractarian foundation. The first detailed exposition in
this regard was to come in the later writings of Hobbes.
(18)V'd t d S .1 e ex racts un er ectlon 1.1 supra.
(19) .Cf Sectlon 1.7 supra.
2.4.3 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT UNDER THOMAS HOBBES (1588 - 1679)
Whereas Grotius' focus was more upon the effects of the Original Compact, and
the operation of the relationships between the Sovereigns formed, Thomas
Hobbes directed himself primarily at what motivated men to aggregate into
Societies, and at the consequent consideration of the nature of the Sovereignty
and sovereign power created. When Dias(l) and Friedman(2) assert respectively
that Hobbes'''passionate preoccupation" and "definite political purpose" was
the relevance of his works to the political conflict of his time between the
Long Parliament and Charles I, they lose sight perhaps of the valuable
point that Minogue raises in his Introduction to Leviathan(3) - that Hobbes'
conclusions are the product of an incisive logical development, and although
they relate significantly to the prevailing parliamentary questions, they
were not caused or motivated by that struggle - similar themes are in fact
found in Hobbes' first thesis Elements of Law (1640) which predates that
conflict.
In his principal treatises De Cive (1642) and Leviathan (1651), Hobbes
postulates the formation of an absolute sovereign power vesting in a
Leviathan State, (a notional creation - "an Artificiall Man" - "a ~~ortall
God") which arises from an original Social Contract "by the Art of man", and
in which creation "Soveraignty" vests as an "Artificiall Soul".
"The Pacts and Covenants, by which the parts of this Body Publique
were at first made, set together and united, resemble that Fiat,
or the 'Let us make man', pronounced by God in his Creation". (4)
(1) Jurisprudence p 573.
(2) Legal Theory p 71.
(3) P xxiii.
(4) Leviathan p 1.
To Hobbes then the State was a creation of individual will in terms of
which, as he later amplifies, the Citizens each subject themselves uncondi-
tionally to the power of the State:
"The only way to erect such a Common Power ... is (for men)
to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or
upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills
unto one Will .... This is more than (mere) Consent or Concord;
it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person,
made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner
as if every man should say to every man:
"'I authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe,
to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition
that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his
Actions in like Manner. ,,, (5)
Relevant also is Hobbes' view of the omnicompetent Sovereign, which he
defines as:
"One Person, of whose acts a great Multitude, by Mutuall
Covenants one with another, have made themselves every
one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and
means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their
Peace and Common Defence." (6)
It is here that Hobbes places the crucial imprint and the hallmark of his
interpretation of the Social Contract. He stresses that in his view the
only way in which Sovereign power can be created, is by men conferring all
their power upon one Sovereign. This pactum is formed:
firstly, not with the"'Sovereion itself but in favour of a third party(7)
(de iure) Soverei9n; "'VP
secondly, not by the individual alone, but by the individual acting mutually
and t0gether with the other individuals in that society.
(5) Ibid, p 89.
(6) Ibid, p 90.
(7) In this respect it is not dissimilar in structure to the stipulatio
alteri in Roman law.
The effect of that pactum is that:
firstly, a de iure Sovereign is created, being a notional or "Artificiall"
creation, a product of the exercise of individual will in the
pactum, and a logical extension of that pactum;
secondly, the individual surrenders his right of self-determination and
the unrestricted exercise of his will, in favour of an adopted
subjection to the State or Sovereign;
thirdly, the Sovereign acquires an absolute power over its Citizens; (8)
fourthly, "there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the
(9)
Soveraigne;"\ and
finally, that it is in the conceiving of a sovereign, that the individuals
receive a "reall Unitie of them all".
It was in Hobbes' deduction that the Sovereign enjoyed absolute power, and
by extension, immunity from the suit of its Citizens, that the Royalist
cause found support in his writings; (10) that critics were able to accuse
him of structuring his philosophy to suit his era; and that later writers
were to find the need to explore limitations on Sovereign powers in view of
the abuses thereof that were in theory facilitated(ll)and that in practice
ensued.
It was the inference that the Social Contract could not have arisen without
(or alternatively, only by way of) a pactum subjectionis, that led Friedman
to observe that in Hobbes' writings, "there is only one' kind of pact,
~
(8) Cf: Leviathan p 97.
(9) Ibid, pp 91 and 96.
(10) Cf: Ibid p 98.
(11) Vide ibid p 96.
.. 1 b' t' '" (12)an uncond~t~ona pactum su ]ec ~on~s .
.L I I
Where Friedman may however (with
respect) have erred in this regard, is in that the act of subjection in
itself required, and was conditional upon, a "reall Unitie of them all", a
condition that "thou (shall also) give up thy Right to him (the Sovereign)".
In these thoughts then, Friedman's word "uncondi tional" is perhaps inappropriate,
or a~ least, it is ambiguous, since as far as the Citizen was concerned, the
pactum subjectionis by any individual was conditional upon other such indi-
vidual pacta. In fairness to the learned Or Friedman however, the pactum
was unconditional in Hobbesian writings inasfar the Sovereign itself was
concerned when the pactum was viewed from its standpoint. Objection is still
however called for in respect of Friedman's conclusion that since no
obligations accordingly attached to the sovereign, "his 'social contract' is
therefore no true contract but a logical fiction".( 13) Although such an
assessment could find substance within a private contractual law based upon
a doctrine of valuable consideration or upon privity of contract(l4) (as in
England for instance), it certainly is not an acceptable observation within
the South African jurisprudence.
What was it in Hobbes' view that motivated men to surrender their "Rights"
to that "Artificiall Soveraigne"? 'Essentially it was man' 5 fear, his
selfishness, his desire for self-preservation, and his yearning (in terms
of the rationalist school) for order, security and stability - these were
all externalised and embodied in the Social Contract as an exercise by man in his
(l2)L 1 Thega eory p 68.
(13)Ibid.
(14) .As dlscussed supra.
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rational self-interest. In Hobbes' view it was necessary for men to escape
from the state of nature or "Warre" into which he was born, and which
rendered his life "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short" - the Social
Contract provided· the necessary instrument for this:
" ... during the time men live without a common Power to keep
them in awe, they are in that condition which is called
Warre; and such a Warre is of every man against every man.
For Warre consisteth not in Battell onely, or in the act of
fighting ... but in the known disposition thereto, during
all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All
other time is Peace.
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre,
where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent
to the time, wherein men live without other security, than
what their own strength, and their own invention shall
furnish them withall ... there is ... consequently no Culture
... no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare,
and danger of violent death; And the life of man, is solitary,
poore, nasty, brutish, and short." (15)
In Hobbes' rationalism and individualism, his absolutism and his quasi-
utilitarianism, it was the existence of an Original Social Contract that
imbued the Sovereign or State with transcending powers over its subjects, (16)
inter alia, that of Eminent Domain:
"From this institution of a Commonwealth are derived all the
Rights or Facultyes of him or them on whom the Soveraigne
Power is conferred by the consent of the People assembled.
(inter alia) ... it is annexed to the Soveraigntie,
the whole power of prescriping the Rules; whereby every
man may know what Goods he may enjoy ... and this is it
men call Propriety (or Meum and Tuum)." (17)
(15)Leviathan p 65.
(16)Ibid, P 90.
(17)Ibid, p 93 - 94.
The Social Contract in its interpretation by Hobbes, accordingly emphasised
the subjection of the subject and the absolute power of the Sovereign.
Although he notes (18)
"(t)he Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraigne, is understood
to last as long, and no longer than, the power lastest by which
he is able to protect them",
it is evident that during the currency of the de iure political Sovereign's
rule, his powers (inter alia of dominium eminens) knew little if any
restriction in the Hobbesian vision, and the entitlement (if any) to
compensation by an expropriatee, would flow from a moral claim, rather than
from any direct legal guarantee or right. The question of restraints on
sovereign excess, condoned and accepted by Hobbes, came to know later
restatement in crucial respects in the writings of John Locke.
(18) Gp cit, Part 21 Chapter 21.
2.4.4 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT UNDER JOHN LOCKE 1632 - 1704
LOV
If Hobbes' theories are celebrated for their incisive logic, John Locke's
theories are noted for their popular appeal. His liberalism provided in the
political and jurisprudential field an avenue for the translation and
expression of those principles that were foreshadowed in the religious works
of.Calvin. (1) Locke became spokesman for the interests of the middle class
and provided a rationale for their mercantilist ethic. He presented the
counterpoise to the early mediaeval notions that the institutions of private
property and of the State were innately sinful (being God's retribution
heaped upon a Man bearing Original Sin), and achieved in his writings the
restoration of naturalist individualism to its latter-day mediaeval heights.
He imbued private property with a spirit of inalienability and justified
the conduct of acquisitiveness that attended its appropriation. In that his
conclusions were eminently suited to the popular cause, by contrast to the
Royalist and monarchial flavour of the writings of Hobbes, Locke's works
contributed significantly to the revolutions of liberation and democracy
to come, and showed how it was that Social Contract theory was capable of
serving a whole spectrum of divergent political philosophies.
Although Locke and Hobbes shared sentiments of and a subscription to
rationalism and individualistic naturalism, they separated widely on the
absolutism or otherwise of the Sovereign power as viewed against the
individual's claim to liberty. Thus it has frequently been said (but as
(1) Vide Section 2.2 supra, at footnotes 15 to 18, and in main text thereat.
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quallOfl"ed lOnfra)(Z) that I~obbes and L k t t ° th °I oc e were grea opponen s 1n e1r
respective views of Social Contract theory" By way of illustration, in his
Second Treatise, Locke refutes the postulate upon which Hobbes' view is
centred:
"OOO(one cannot) give just occasion to think that all
Government in the World is the product only of Force
and Violence, and that Men live together by (no
other cause than by having been) 0" ° Beasts"" (3)
To Locke, man's natural state prior to the formation of societies, commands
an image of "a State of Perfect Freedom(4) a State also of Equality". (5)
Al though he says "( b)ut though this be a State of Liberty, yet it is not a
State of Licence", (6) what is clear is that is not the state of "Warre"
that Hobbes postulated. Peace and the self and mutual preservation of the
human race as instruments of God's Creation and as equal beings in His Image,
were the cornerstones of Locke's vision - a "state of Peace, Good Will,
Mutual Assistance and Preservation •.. is properly the State of Nature". (7)
The question which naturally springs to the mind of the reader of Locke is
what then was it that motivated man to move from this apparently idyllic
(2)Vide main text at footnote 18 infra.
(3) Second Treatise 1689 S 1. It is noted that the first Chapter of the
Second Treatise attempts to encapsulate the broad themes of his some-
what fragmentary First Treatise. The full title was The Second Treatise
of Government: an Essay concerning the True Original, Extent and End of
Civil Government.
(4) Cf: Milton Paradise Lost where the image "He for God alone, she for God
in him" finds some consistency with Locke's view of Adam and Eve in the
First Treatise.
(5 ) Ibid, Section 4.
(6) Ibid, Section 6.
(7) Ibid, Section 19.
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natural state to a state of subjection in Society? Locke's interpretation
as he himself described it is indeed a "Strange Doctrine,,(8):
"If Man in the State of Nature be so free, ... if he be
absolute Lord of his Own Person and Possessions, equal
to the greatest and subject to no Body, why will he
part with his Freedom? Why will he give up this Empire
and Subject himself to the Dominion and Controul of any
Other Power? " (9)
He later answers this in the words:
" ... 'tis obvious ... that although in the State of Nature,
man hath a (natural) Right, yet the enjoyment of it is
very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the Invasions
of others. For all being Kings as much as he, every man
his equal, the Enjoyment of the Property he has is very
unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to quit
this condition, which however free, is full of Fears, and
continuall Dangers; and 'tis not without Reason that he
seeks out ... others ... to unite, for the mutual preser-
vation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates, (10) which
I call by the general Name, Property". (11)
(8)1bid, Sections 9, 13, 180.
(9)1bid, Section 9 at 123.
(lO)1t is noted however (vide Second Treatise, sections 25-29, 31-33, 40, 46-47)
that Locke observes:
"The chief matter of Property ... (is) ... now not the
Fruits of the Earth, and the Beasts that subsist on
it,but the Earth it Self; ... As much Land as a Man
tills, plants improves, cultivates, and can use the
Product of, so much is his Property. He by his
Labour does, as it were, inclose it from the Common".
It appears accordingly that Locke's notion" of property in land is pre-
capitalist, and the value thereof is based upon personal labour. (cf
Second Treatise. Sections 43, 48,50). It has been observed in modern
times that while Locke's comments here are valid while the supply of
land is unrestricted, they are of a lesser application when supply is
limited. Vide also Grotius, op cit, 111.6.24.
(ll)Ibid, Section 9 at 124.
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Locke had earlier laid the foundations for his Two Treatises on Government
in his definition of the State or 'respublica' in Epistola de Tolerantia
(1689), and had suggested there also the motive of men for aggregating into
civil communities:
"The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men
constituted only for procuring and preserving their
own civil interests (bona civilia) ... therefore is
the magistrate armed with the force and strength of
all his subjects in order to the punishment of those
that violate any other man' s rights". (12)
It is important to note, as Laslett does in his Introduction to Two Treatises
of Government, (13) that Locke's writings were primarily an attack on Sir
Robert Filmer's Patriarcha (1680), (14)which contended strongly that the
monarch held a Divine Original (or "Natural") Right of Sovereignty. If
such was the case, as Locke realised, then man would have lacked the capacity
to contract freely (having been born subordinate to a Divinely-ordained .Monarch),
and would therefore have been unable to form a Social Contract. Locke
was cognisant of the need to disprove the Divine Right doctrine and his First
Treatise(15) is accordingly directed to this purpose. As Laslett notes~
(12)Epistola p 5 (as translated by Popple (1765) at pp 35-6). It is noted
that the words "bona civilia'l have been expressed as "civil interests"
in order to capture Locke's view that Property broadly embraces "Life,
Liberty and Estate"(see supra). They accordingly imbue the text with
a greater 'correctness', and are thus more accurate than their literal
form "civil goods". Interesting also is his reference to the magistrate
as symbol of the people, in direct contrast to what Hobbes here would
have used - the Sovereign - which, in his absolutism, was the anti thesis
of the liberal ethic. -
(13)Chapter IV: "Locke and Hobbes"(1960).
-'
(14)Vide Section 2.1 supra at footnote 1.
(lS)The full title of his First Treatise is : The First Treatise of Government:
in (which) The Falfe Principles and Foundations of Sir Robert Filmer and
His Followers are Detected and Overthrown.
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notwithstanding the points of distinction(16) between Locke and
Hobbes:
"If Locke wrote his book as a refutation of Sir Robert Filmer,
then he cannot have written it as a refutation of Thomas Hobbes."
(17)
Against this background, it is submitted that Locke's and Hobbes' conceptions
of why it was that men formed societies, although divergent, are not as
dissimilar as some have supposed.(18) Firstly, both agree that a Social
Contract took place. Furthermore, there are common themes in the writings
of both - man's egoism and individualism in his natural state; the "Fears
and Continuall Dangers"to which he is exposed in this original condition;
and his rational propensity to move towards the promotion of his self-
interest - these are shared as a rationale for the Social Contract, and in
these respects, their views are clearly not antithetical.
Where however their standpoints found a wider disparity, was in their res-
pective views of the nature of men and of their natural state, and accordingly
of what it was that motivc,ted Man's Original Compact. The distinctions here
between them are revealed in the following submissions. Firstly, the hallmark
of Locke's interpretation is that man (who is innately good)contracts out of
his natural state by tacit consent; whereas the inflexion adopted by Hobbes
is that "brutish" men are impelled by the "Force" of their circumstances to
leave the condition of "Warre" in which they had first found themselves.
(16)Vide infra.
(17)Laslett, op cit, Chapter IV.
(~8)Vide main text at footnote 2 supra.
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Secondly, whereas Hobbes contends that men were actuated primarily by "Feare",
Locke concedes that this was present, but emphasises that the main motivation
for societalisation lay elsewhere in the desire for the "Preservation of
their Property" - he submits accordingly that the Citizens created and
instituted a political sovereign under the Original Social Contract to make
laws and to uphold this property ideal. Finally, whereas Hobbes argued in
support of an absolute and almost irrevocable Sovereign power, Locke
(although confining his express words to those instances in which the
Sovereign has acted ultra vires its mandate from the people), clearly stressed
that the pr~servation of private property was the central function and duty of
the State, and contended accordingly that its sanctity could be violated if
and only if a recognised public interest was thereby served:
"Whensoever therefore the Legislative shall transgress this
fundamental Rule of Society (the protection and preservation
of private property) and endeavour ... to grasp the Properties
of the members themselves, ... for quite contrary Ends, ...
(the Sovereign) forfeit(s) the Power, ... and it devolves to
the People, who have a Right to resume their original Liberty
and to provide for their own Safety and Security, which is
the End for which they are in Society". (19)
Locke's Sovereign then is considerably displaced from the absolutism of the
Hobbesian vision, and possesses only those powers necessary for the promotion
of the "Publick Good", holding them "in Trust,,(20) or in a fiduciary capacity.
Man in Locke's view is a moral animal who creates a moral state, which not
only should, but "ought" to, promote his wellbeing. Upon the Sovereign, are
(19)Second Treatise, Section 19 at pp 219 - 222.
(20)Ibid, Section 13 at 149. Locke's vision of moral natural man is almost
one of the 'noble savage'.
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conferred only those powers necessary for the fulfilment of this Original
Intention. Where the de iure Sovereign violates and acts ultra vires what
Locke clearly interprets to be a natural and fundamental obligation to
protect its Citizens' property (broadly), its laws and actions begin to lose
their derivative validity and bindingness - here then Locke's interpretation
has a similarity to that of Grotius. (21)
In regard to his view of the constituents of the Social Contract, Locke
confirms his subscription to the existence of both a pactum unionis and a
pactum subjectionis:
"Whosoever therefore out of a State of Nature unite into a
Community, must be understood to give up all the power _.-
necessary to the ends for which they unite in Society, to
the majority in the Community .... And this is done by barely
agreeing to unite into one Political Society, which is all the
Compact that is, or needs be, between the Individuals that enter
into, or make up, a Commonwealth. And thus that which begins
and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but
the consent of any number of Freemen capable of a majority ....
And this is th2t, and that only, which did, or could give beginning
to any lawful Government in the World." (22)
The interpreter must exercise caution not to accord to these words in the
isolation in which they here appear, an emphasis not intended by Locke.
Although he states that it is "that (pactum unionis) only", that act of
_~'barely agreeing", which is "all the Compact" is, he does not intend to
stipulate that there is no pactum subjectionis, for in the same breath he
says that the Citizens "must be understood to give up all the power
necessary to the ends for which they unite".
(21)Vide Section 2.4.2 supra at footnote 13, regarding Grotius, op cit
11.4.2.
(22)Second Treatise, Section 99.
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. . '. d· 1 t· 1 t· t t (23) t .The pactum subJect~on~s 1S accor 1ng y an essen la cons 1 uen 00 1n
the Social Contract Locke envisages, but in point of distinction with
Hobbes, it is clearly limited to that subjection "necessary" for the
Sovereign to fulfil its mandate of protection. On this basis, inter alia,
Locke rejects Filmer's Divine Right of Kings. In the context of the
Sovereign's dominium eminens in property law, Locke by extension contends
on this basis further that although the Citizen has surrendered in a partial
degree his original absolute title over his possessions in order to confer
upon the majority Sovereign the necessary powers to fulfil its functions, he
has not conferred upon that Sovereign more powers than are necessary to that
end. (24)
A final point central to the, understanding of Locke's vision of the Social
Contract, relates to·the realisation that Locke was a humanist with a
philosophy rooted deeply in the natural law. His interpretation of man's
natural state is not a positivist assertion of how men were, but a
naturalist conviction of how men ought to be if they uphold the fundamental
law that justifies and guides their existence. (25) Paradoxically then(26)
(23)Cf: Ibid, Section 96, where this submission is amplified.
(24)Friedman, op cit, p 74ff, critises the weaknesses in Locke's reasoning
here, but concedes that his influence on subsequent political develop-
ment was nevertheless extensive.
(25)In his Second Treatise in Section 7 at 90 - 93, Locke distinguishes
between "rights" (being moral claims) and "liberties" (being the
condition which permits the expression of those rights) - his writings
afforded much substance accordingly for later writings by Hohfeld et al.
(Vide Chapter 3 infra).
(26) .Although Locke's work lS of a lesser logical extreme than that of
Hobbes, he here does not fall into the trap in which Hobbes is accused
of being ensnared - that of reasoning (on the rare occasion) the "ought"
from the "is".
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his concept of man's natural state as being one of freedom is not as much an
assertion that all men were or could have been in that condition inasmuch as it
is a guideline as to the condition in which it behoved men to be, being
creatures of God. (27) Indeed, Locke(28) goes so far as making the same point
as Hobbes(29~viz: that political sovereigns themselves are still within a
state of nature. Locke however points out that although their relationships
inter se do not find the cpncord that would ex hypothesi supposedly attend
upon his view of the natural condition, such concord is undoubtedly what
'ought' to be the characteristic thereof. In this regard then, many of his
sentiments are coloured with the Grotian dialect. (30)
For the reasons that Man's natural state, although free, lacked firstly
"an establish' d settled known Law, received and allow' d by common Consent";
secondly "a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all
Differences" r and thirdly "the Power to give the Sentence due Execution";
Locke concluded:(31)
"The great and chief End there.fore of Men's uni ting into
Commonwealths and putting themselves under Governments,
is the Preservation of their Property."
(27)Cf: Second Treatise, Section 7 at 77.
(28)Ibid, Section 14.
(29)Cf: Leviathan part I, Ch 13. Vide also: Grotius in Section 2.4.2 supra
at footnote 4.
(30)Cf: the Internationalist principles of Grotius in De lure Belli ac Pacis
discussed in Section 2.4.2 supra.
(31)Second Treatise, Section 9 at 125.
"
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This spirit was to dominate the liberalist cause in English law, and the
doctrine of the inalienability of propety in American law in years to come.
C · (32) 1" th E l' h 1 d . d d .In Entick v arrlngton, a locus c ass~cus ln e ng lS aw eCl e ln
1765, Pratt CJ reiterated Locke's famous words:
"The great end for which men entered into society was to secure
their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable
in all instances where it has not been abridged by some public
law for the good of the whole." (33)
Enunciating then the core of the Social Contract theory under Locke prevailing
at that time, the learned Chief Justice established clearly the sanctity
and inviolability of private ownership, not as an end dominant in itself,
but as a general principle governing and explaining the aggregation of
individuals into a community. The spirit of Locke's writings kindled the
popular revolutionary cause, and with its reception into American juris-
prudence in the writings of Madison and The Federalist Papers, (34) it
(32)Common Pleas, (1765) 19 State Trials 1029; vide also discussion under
Section 1.3.4 supra.
(33)Vide: Dias Jurisprudence, commentary on this case at p 168 footnote 3.
(34)Vide: The Federalist Papers (with introduction by C Rossiter' (New York,
t~entor, 1961) p 325ff; and Lees, The Political System of the United States
(Faber, London, 1969) pp 32 33 38 73-4 and 134. Madison for instance in
Federalist 51 in defending the American Constitution of 1787, reiterates
the Lockesian concept of majority ~eveloped by Rousseau)and anticipates
even the principle of 'justice as fairness' enunciated later in depth by
Rawls (discussed in Section 2.6 infra):
in the extended republic of the United States,
and among the great variety of interests parties
and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a
majority of the whole society could seldom take
place on any other good principles than those of
justice and the general good ... the larger the
society, provided it lie within a practicable
sphere, the more duly capable it will be of
government. And happily ... the practicable sphere
may be carried to a very great extent by a judicious
modification and mixture of the federal system."
l:1U
constituted a cornerstone of the American ethic that remains still
today. (35)
(35)The contractarian spirit is manifested in the American Constitution
itself. In the words of the Preamble thereto:
"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a
more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic
tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote
the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty
to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish
this Consti tution for the Uni ted States of America!'.
In South Africa the Preamble to the Republic of South Africa Constitution
Act 32 of 1961 articulates similar ideals:
"IN HUMBLE SUBMISSION to Almighty God, Who controls the
destinies of nations and the history of peoples;
Who gathered our forebears together from many lands and
gave them this their own;
Who has guided them from generation to generation;
Who has wondrously delivered them from the dangers that
beset them;
WE, who are here in Parliament assembled, DECLARE that
whereas we
ARE CONSCIOUS of our responsibility towards God and man;
ARE CONVINCED OF THE NECESSITY TO STAND UNITED
To safeguard the integrity and freedom of our country;
To secure the maintenance of law and order;
To further the contentment and spiritual and material
welfare of all in our midst;
ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT our duty to seek world peace in
association with all peace-loving nations; and
ARE CHARGED WITH THE TASK of founding the Republic of South
Africa and giving it a constitution best suited to the
traditions and history of our land~
The Preamble to the Republic of. South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983,
signifies a significant departure from the liberalism and egalitarianism
of the Social Contract ethic in institutionalising a division among
Citizens based on race, to the exclusion even of the Blacks (Cf Section




"IN HUMBLE SUMBISSION to Almighty God, Who controls the
destinies of peoples and nations r
Who gathered our forebears together from many lands and
gave them this their own r
Who has guided them from generation to generation,
Who has wondrously delivered them from the dangers that
beset them.
WE DECLARE tha t we
ARE CONSCIOUS of our responsibility towards God and man;
ARE CONVINCED of the necessity of standing united and of
pursuing the following national goals:
To uphold Christian values and r-ivilized norms, with
recognition and protection of freedom and faith and
worship,
To safeguard the integrity and freedom of our country,
To uphold the independence of the judiciary and the
equality of all under the law,
To secure the maintenance of law and order,
To further the contentment and the spiritual and
material welfare of all,
To respect and to protect the human dignity, life
liberty and property of all in our midst,
To respect, to further and to protect the self-
determination of population groups and peoples,
To further private initiative and effective
competition;
ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT our duty to seek world peace in
association with all peace-loving peoples and nations; and
ARE DESIROUS OF GIVING THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA A
CONSTITUTION which provides for elected and responsible
forms of government and which is best suited to the
traditions, history and circumstances of our land."-__
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2.4.5 THE CONTRAT SOCIAL UNDER ROUSSEAU 1712 - 1788
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Although there may still have been a superficial voicing of principles of
natural law in the eighteenth century, in substance, the bastions of its
former Golden Age were rapidly crumbling in this Age of Reason under the
f 0 1 0 0 1 k to 0 d 0 0 0 (1)collective onslaughts 0 natlona lsm, ratlona s ep lClsm an emplrlclsm.
The writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in particular Du Contrat Social (1762),
although revising former conclusions, continued Locke's Social Contract
theme of expounding the evils of uncontrolled Sovereign absolutism, and paved
the way to, if not necessitating, the popular~evolutionsthat followed.
Rousseau's works reflect also the trend that had been hinted at in the Social
Contract under Locke - a less philosophic and more popularly-emotive rhetoric
than Hobbes, set out with not as dogmatic and logic; a movement away from the
Social Contract as an historical fact, to its view more as a rational
postulate in legal history; a concept of a non-absolute de iure Monarch
against an absolute inalienable and indivisible sovereignty of the General
Will;(2) and a view of independent individualistic men forming a moral state
or collective in their own rational self-interest. But Rousseau expounds
his interpretations to a far greater democratic extent than does Locke - not
only is Rousseau's democratically-spirited sovereignty of the "General Will"
('volonte generale' )(3) of the people of so far-reaching a nature that the
(1) The writings inter alia of David Hume (1711-1776)
Nature 1748 and Inquiry Concerning the Principles
contributed significantly also to this movement.
2.5 infra at footnote 2.




(3 ) As Cole remarks in his Introduction to the Social Contract (1955 p 37)
this will is "General" in two respects - it has a universal object of
promoting freedom, and is shared by the majority. In that this will
furthermore is rational, the cue is given to Kant: as Rousseau himself
stated - in obeying the Gener.al Will. man obevs himself.
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de iure Sovereign can know restriction(4)even in those respects that Locke
saw as being "necessary" for the State's continued existence, but also he
substitutes for Locke's concept of a tacit Original Compact, the far more
active and dynamic concept of a periodically-renewed or continuously-
ratified Social Contract. (5)
The paradox of Man's political existence is enunciated by Rousseau in his
famous opening words: "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains.,,(6)
Against this introduction, Rousseau proceeds to analyse the legitimacy of man's
passage from the state of nature, into his aggregation in societies, and to
inquire into the essential features of his 'Contrat Social '.
To Rousseau, true freedom is not the unfettered licence of individual egoistic
man - instead it is a condition which knows the limitations imposed by the
democratic majority - realising as he did that it was the excesses of an
unrestrained and illegitimately de iure Sovereign (Monarch) that constrain
the freedom man should, yet seldom does, enjoy. "Since no man has a natural
(4)Cf: Du Contrat Social III 13, 14,18.
(5) Cf: Jones Masters of Political Thought p 280, footnote 3 and p 281;
Vide also Cole; Introduction p 16.
(6)
Du Contrat Social 1,1 (Cole Translation 1955). Vaughan (1915)
translates these words as "Man is born free; however he is everywhere
in chains", and Lloyd, in the Idea of Law (p 138), as "Man is born
free; yet he is everywhere in chains". In their context however, the
meanings of these translations are substantially the same. Lloyd
appends the interesting interpretation (p 138):
"... (these words) may have derived from the romantic
notion that the savage lives a life of primitive
freedom and simplicity, but in practice - as Rousseau
realised - man is never isolated and free in this sense
but always part of a community, and the degree of
freedom he enjoys or the extent of the social restraints
imposed upon him will depend upon the social organisation
of which he is a member".
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authority over other men, (7) and since might never makes right, it follows
that agreements are the basis for all legitimate authority among men.,,(8)
He continues:(9)
"But how can a man pledge his strength and his liberty of
action, together the chief instruments of his own preser-
vation, without harming himself and without neglecting
those duties which he owes to himself? This difficul ty
can be formulated as follows:
'To find a form of association capable of
defending and protecting with the total
common force, the person and the property
of each associate, and by means of which,
each one, uniting himself with all the
others, nevertheless obeys only himself
and remains as free as ever before. '
Such is the fundamental problem of which the Social
Contract gives the solution".
Rousseau accordingly interpreted the Social Contract primarily (some may even
say exclusively) as a pactum unionis made by "the Whole Body with each of its
members,,(lO) - this pactum reconciled on the one hand the wish for aggregation,
and on the other hand the inalienability of certain fundamental human freedoms;
but such stated inalienability is not to say that this freedom could not know
qualification or displaced embodiment in the "General Will,,:(ll)
(7) Thus was ended Filmer's'Divine Right of Kings' Doctrine in Patriarcha.
Vide Section 2.1 supra at foo~note 1.
(8) Du Contrat Social, I 4.
(9) 1bid, I 6.
(10) 1bid, 11 4
(ll)1bid, I 7.
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"Let us reduce the items lost and gained in this transaction
to terms easily compared. What man loses by the Social
Contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to
whatever he can get and hold on to. What he gains is civil
liberty and the ownership of all that he possesses ... We
might, over and above all this, add to what man acquires in
the civil state, moral liberty, which alone truly makes him
master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is slavery,
while obedience to a law we prescribe to ourselves, is liberty".
To Rousseau, there was accordingly a distinction, firstly, between natural
liberty (determined only by individual will) and civil liberty (limited by
the General Will); and secondly, between natural possession (which is only
the right of "force" or of first title), and ownership (which is founded
. t· ··1 t· tl ) (12) Th d· t· t· f thupon a POSl lve C1Vl . 1 e. ere was a lS lnc lon ur ermore
between the "General Will" (of a democratic majority Sovereign) and the
"Will of All" (in the broades t sense). (13) In what W T Jones in ~1asters of
(14)Political Thought 'regards to be a "strange mixture of utopian idealism
and plain common sense", Rousseau determines that:
"However one looks at the principle of Social Contract,
we reach the same conclusion, viz, that the Social
Contract establishes a real equality among the citizens,
all of who~ have the same duties under it and ... enjoy (15)
the same r1.ghts ... "
Central to Rousseau's Social Contract, is his postulate that the General Will
shares some considerable community of purpose and identity with the private
(12)1bid, 11 3
(13)1bid, 1 7.
(14)Vol 11 at p 271.
(15)Du Contrat Social 11 4.
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will. Although the Citizen may attempt to distinguish his own private
interest from the common good when he views his affairs from his personal
perspective:
" he cannot separate his (own private) interest
completely from the common interest ... therefore
he wills the general good for the sake of his own (16)
private interests, just as strongly as anyone else".
Since social order is in Rousseau's view a "sacred right which is the basis
of all other rights ... (and) ... does not come from nature, ... (it)
must therefore be founded on conventions.,,(17) Since there is "a great
difference between subduing a multitude and ruling a society", (18) this
convention cannot have sprung from the compulsion of Hobbes' "Warre", each
man realising that "in giving himself to all, (he) gives himself to
nobody". (19) In this then, the pactum subjectionis, as it exists in this
very limited form in Rousseau's thought, is so rooted in the correlation
and equivalence of private will with the "General Will", that this pactum
does not constitute a consent to an abuse by the general collective.
The essence of Rousseau's philosophy is contained in his words:(20)
"Each of us puts his person and all his power in common
under the supreme direction of the General Will, and
in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as
an indivisible part of the whole".
In short, his formula indicates that unity through a political association
involving the surrender of their former licence and unlawfulness,
(20)Ibid, I 6 (Cole translation at p 13).
(16)Ibid, IV 1.
(19)Ibid, I 6.
(17)Ibid, I 1. (18)Ibid, I 5.
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is the basis enabling men to achieve political liberty. The 'Contrat Social'
creates a moral corporate collective to which the promotion of the well-
being of that collective is entrusted; and it emerges that in this act of
association, mutual and reciprocal undertakings are made and given. Each
. d' .dId' I (21) . b d' d bl . t b of1n 1V1 ua accor 1ng y 1S oun 1n a ou e capac1 y - as a mem er
the Sovereign, he is bound to the individuals, and as an individual he is
bound to the Sovereign. Accordingly it is that his former independent
(22)
individualistic natural condition, is substantially changed:
"The passage from the state of nature to the civil state
produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting
justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions
the morality they formerly lacked".
The atomistic Social Contract upon which Rousseau based this notion of the
State afforded man the rational avenue to guarantee and permit, through
social aggregation, the freedom and equality primitive man had lost in his
transition into the collective modern society, and which enabled that
individual to become "an intelligent being and a man". (23)
Rousseau, (24) like Grotius, (25) accordingly comes close to enunciating a
theory of the State as original proprietor of all property. In postulating:
firstly th~t the real property that individuals possessed (as distinct from
'owned') prior to their Social Contract, was given in that Contract, along
with their person, into the hands of the general collective they created;
secondly that the rights of private ownership could arise only once the
(21)As amplified in : Ibid, I 7.
(22)Ibid, I 8. (23) Ibid, I 7. (24)Ibid, I 9.
(25)Vide Section 1.2.2 supra.
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institution of private property had been established (which in turn was
dependent upon the prior existence of the State); and thirdly that "the
. (26)
Social Contract ... is the basis of all rIghts";' . he postulates (perhaps)
accordingly that the State was the first proprietor of all property (by
way of convention) as a result of the transfer to it of t~e rights of first
occupation (possession) that man had prior to the Social Contract (by way
of the exercise of "force" (or detentio) over physical things). It is noted
that the reason for which it is necessary to qualify the preceding state-
ment with the inclusion of the word "perhaps", is that Rousseau in the
same breath says: "this act (of giving the goods he possesses, to the State)
does not make possession, in changing hands, change its nature, and become
property in the hands of the Sovereign". Although many writers(27) have
suggested that Rousseau's work abounds in contradictions, (but that "it is
seldom logical consistency that has decided the success of theories and
movements")J it appears that what Rousseau may have intended in this latter
extract was that it was not this act alone (of giving) which founded private
ownership - its conjunction inter alia with the exerci$e of the "General Will"
would too be a necessary sequitur for the institution of private property
to have been created.
Rousseau makes reference also(28) to the distinction between "the rights
which the sovereign and the (private) proprietor have over the same estate",
(26)Du Contrat Social I 9.
(27) .Cf: FrIedman, Legal Theory p 75; Jones Masters of Political Thought 11,
p 256; Laski Introduction to Politics p 22.
(28)Du Contrat Social I 9.
"
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and hints accordingly at a concept of private ownership (or dominium plenum.)
which knows some latent State participation - in this he accordingly gives
d 1 h d .. . (29) t 1 t th t G t' h dhis implie approva to t e omlnlum emlnens pos u a e a ro lUS a
earlier enunciated, and perhaps foreshadows the 'bundle of sticks' or --
rights(30)image that was later to be adopted.
In his chapter on "The Limits of the Sovereign Power,,(31) Rousseau stipulates
that the State, having derived its authority and powers (inter alia, impliedly,
dominium eminens) from the Social Contract by convention, must know accordingly
restraint in its exercise thereof; and presumably, in such exercise for the
promotion of the general well-being, is obliged to compensate in full any
private member in the event of his expropriation (or disentitlement) in
order that no more "charges" may be placed upon him than are proportionately
equitable:
the sovereign power (vesting in the General Will ),
absolute, sacred, and inviolable as it is, does not and
cannot exceed the limits of general conventions ... so
that the Sovereign never has a right to lay more charges (32)
on one subject than on another .... "
In final analysis, when Sabine in A History of Political Theory(33) contends
that Rousseau's Social Contract was "so vague that it can hardly be said to
(29)Vide Section 1.1 supra.
(30)Vide Chapter 3 infra.




to point in any specific direction", he does Rousseau a gross injustice.
Du Contrat Social has as dominant themes human freedom, and the fiduciary
responsibility of the real and popular Sovereign (as instrument and
manifestation of the 'volonte generale') to honour and uphold the noble
purposes for which it was instituted under the Social Contract - despotic
violation and abuse of individual freedom and property rights are
inconsistent with the equal participancy in Sovereignty that Rousseau
postulated. Although Rousseau may have failed to solve many of the issues
he uncovered, his work does point in a specific direction - in the words
of Cole in Introduction to the Social Contract:(34)
"His approach rested on a consistent belief in three
things - the inalienability of human liberty, the
natural propensity of man to goodness, and the
necessity of basing political institutions on
democratic sovereignty as the means of expression
of the General Will".
Perhaps the final indictment of Sabine's criticism lies in that it was to
the subsequent unfolding of history that Jean-Jacques Rousseau pointed.
In the cause of political freedom, his deification of the collective will
was to contribute to the Battlecry of the popular cause in France and the
United States; in the forum of philosophy, his equation of a direct
Sovereignty in the Volonte Gener~le, with noble ideals based upon reason,
was to orchestrate the melodies of German transcendental idealism; and, as
. th L k (35) h· 1· k· f . t . . . .W1 oc e, 1S 1n 1ng 0 propr1e ary acquls1t1veness w1th the lofti-
ness of legal heritage, conducted the anthem to come in Western property
law (with its principles of just compensation upon expropriation).
(34)At p 38.
(35)Vide Section 2.4.4 supra at footnotes 34 and 35.
2.4.6 THE ESPRIT DES LOIS OF MONTESQUIEU (1689-1755)
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The writings in Esprit des Lois (17~8) et al of Montesquieu announced a
significantly new perspective in jurisprudence - major innovation came in
his sociological theory of climate and environment, and in his celebrated
(1)Doctrine of the Separation of Powers. His departure from naturalism
was still not yet however in the form of an extreme positivism - rather
it was a transitory movement that gave momentum for the nineteenth century
jurisprudence that followed. Although Montesquieu's focus lay elsewhere,
he incorporated(2) in his voluminous writings still a brief but succinct
affirmation of the Social Contract and a recognition of rights to property
(similarly to Locke) as being of a singularly high order:(3)
11[1] As men have given up their natural independence to live
under political laws, they have given up the natural
participation of property to live under civil laws.
[2J~ By the first they acquired liberty; by the second, property.
We ought not to decide by the laws of liberty, which as we
have already said, is only the government of the community,
what ought to be decided by the laws concerning property.
'Tis a paralogism to say that the good of the individual
ought to give way to that of the public: this can never
take place, but when the government of the community, or
in other words the liberty of the subject, is concerned.
This does not affect those cases which relate to private
property, because the public good consists in everyone's
having that property, which was given him by the civil
laws, invariabl y preserved 11 •
(1) Cf Lees, The Political System of the United States, p 33.
(2) Esprit des Lois (transl. by Carrithers) Book XXVI Chapter 15. It is noted
that whereas Montesquieu's writings precede those of Rousseau chrono-
logically, they bear a greater similarity in substance to those in the
period that followed - for this reason, Rousseau's contribution is con-
sidered herein before that of Montesquieu.
(3) Ibid XXVI 15. It is noted however, on the political level, that
Montesquieu was not as committed to majority rule as were Locke and
particularly Rousseau.
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To Montesquieu then, Social Contract was again an historical fact, in which
natural independence was exchanged for political liberty, and the institu-
tion of property was established in terms of the civil laws created. It was
however of paramount importance in Montesquieu's formulation (as stressed by
his heading to Chapter 15), "that we should not regulate by the principles
of political law those things which depend on the principles of civil law".
Although he acknowledges indirectly that the State holds the power (of
dominium eminens) entitling it to dispossess private persons of their
property, he argues strongly that the public good requires the preservation
and sanctity wherever possible of the institution of private property, and
that if expropriation is necessary, then such expropriation must take place
under the civil law (with a concomitant indemnity for the expropriatee) and
not as an exercise of political might in which private interests are abused
without compensation. (4)
"~41 Let us therefore lay down as a certain maxim, that
whenever the public good happens to be the matter
in question, it is never for the advantage of the
public to deprive an individual of his property ...
by a law or political regulation. (Rather) we should
follow the rigour of the civil law, which is the
Palladium of property.
~J Thus when the public has occasion for the estate of
an individual, it ought never to act by the rigour
of political law; it js here that civil law ought to
triumph, who with the eyes of a mother regards every
individual as the whole community. (5)
£6J If the political magistrate would erect a public
edifice, he must indemnify those who are injured
(4) Ibid XXVI 15 (continued)
(5) Much of this viewpoint under subparagraph [5J corresponds with the
standpoint of Dworkin in Taking Rights Seriously, Chapter 7.
l:U.J
by it. The public is in this respect like an individual,
who treats with an individual. It is full enough that it
can oblige a Citizen to sell his inheritance, and that it
can strip him of this great privilege which he holds from
the civ~l law, the not being forced to alienate his (6)
possess~ons."
Although Montesquieu's works may broadly have undermined the naturalist
ideology, he stressed the need for the state to exercise its fiduciary
mandate and powers in accordance with the intention of the Citizens that had
instituted its formation. That expropriation can take place, is in his view
already sufficiently vast an inroad upon the sanctity of private ownership,
without this disruption of private rights being compounded through its use
in a political forum as an exercise of political might against the Citizen.
For Montesquieu, a partial naturalist adherence remained in as far as that
the State ought to use its dominium eminens temperately and only within the
framework of the civil laws; it ought to observe the implied Social Contract
and preserve the wish for security of property ownership that motivated that
Contract and that gave expression to that intention; and above all, the State
("the political magistrate") must "indemnify" Citizens who are prejudiced in
their individual capacities by the State's exercise of its dominium eminens.
"With the eyes of a mother", the State must nurse and soothe the individual
aggrievement, never permitting inequity to enter the surrender of private
property for public purposes.
(6)
These dicta contribute significantly to the Compulsory Purchase postulate
(vide Section 1.2.4 supra) which emerqed in English Law. Blackstone in
his Commentaries, writing shortly thereafter, followed the principles
enunciated by 110ntesquieu and incorporated them into the foundation
which underlie the present English law.
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From the belltower of Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws, rings out a message
of justness in expropriation compensation that should not go unheeded in
South Africa. His voice chimes out a deep criticism of expropriations
manifesting political might(7) - expropriations for purposes of Group Areas
consolidations (if that is not an intention and public purpose of a Social
Contract by all Citizens) and expropriations disentitling persons without
compensation (as is the case in South Africa where unregistered rights are
noncompensable, subject to certain exceptions)) are for Montesquieu unjust
exercises of political force. Whereas the United States Constitution, (8) in
its Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, upholds exemplarily the spirit that
Montesquieu advocated, South Africa's Expropriation Act(9) (read in the
context of the Group Areas Act(lO) and Community Development Act), (11)
displays a positivist timbre that denies the expression of Montesquieu's
principles.
(7) Cf Plato, lOn malon t t ° S to 2 2 t f t 2 d h fex In ec lon . supra a 00 note an t erea ter.
(8) Cf: Section 2.4.4 supra at footnote 35.
(9) Act 63 of 1975, as amended.
(10) Act 36 of 1966, as amended.
(11) Act 3 of 1966, as amended.
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2.5 SOCIAL CONTRACT UNDER THE GERMAN SCHOOL OF
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM
2.5.1 INTRODUCTION
The prominence that had formerly been ascribed to individualism, and the
heights that naturalism had known in its Golden Age, came in the late
eighteenth century and in the nineteenth century to find rejection in the
prevailing legal philosophies. At the hands of Austin(l) (1790 - 1859)
and others, positivism surged as a dominant standpoint in jurisprudence.
The Social Contract theme that had preoccupied the jurists from Hobbes to
Rousseau, declined in its broad recognition as societies, consistently with
the emergent forces of nationalism, came to be interpreted in a social and
collective sense. The empiricism and scientific pragmatism that characterised
legal methodology; the scepticism with which David Hume(2) had attacked
metaphysical notions of the State; the 'felicific calculus' of pain - avoidance
or the utilitarian 'greatest happiness' principle that Jeremy Bentham(3)
(1) Cf: latter section of footnote 8 in Section 2.2 supra.
(2) Hume (1711 - 1776) Treatise of 'Human Nature (1739); Inquiry concerning
the Principles of Morals (1751). Vide also Section 2.4.5 supra at
footnote 1.
(3) Jeremy Bentham (1748 - 1832) Fragment on Government (1776) (Ed: ~1ontague,
Oxford 1931); and Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
in Ch 1 Section 1 of which Bentham states:
"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two Sovereign
masters, Pain and Pleasure. It is for them alone to point out
what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.
On the one hand, the standard of right and wrong, on the other
the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne".
He adds in his Theory of Legislation (p 1)
"The end aim of a legislator should be the Happiness of the People.
In matters of legislation, General Utility should be his guiding
principle".
£:.uo
d h 0 1 0 1 0d to (
4) h t tt d d 01 0introduced; an t e SOC10 oglca conSl era lons t a a en e preval lng
legal approach; contributed significantly also to this decline of the
Social Contract and the natural law.
Social Contract theory, notwithstanding the decline of naturalism, retained
however an adherence in the German School of transcendental idealism,
principal among the members of which were Kant, Fichte and Hegel. These
philosophers returned to the Social Contract postulate and developed it in
a way t~at was characterised by an insistent emphasis upon true individual
freedom as being possible only within the parameters of the State, and upon
the Social Contract, not as historical actuality, but as .a postulate of pure
reason alone. Their philosophic idealism imprinted the State with a corporate
supremacy, and their "korperschaft~likeGesamtakt:" interpretation of Social
Contract led the way to the dangerous later climaxes of Fascism and National
Socialism. History revealed again the chameleon - like adaptability of Social
Contract theory in suiting a range of circumstances within the political
spectrum.
(4) Such as in Montesquieu's writings - vide Section 2.4.6 supra.
2.5.2 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT UNDER IMMANUEL KANT (1724 - 1804)
LVI
Whereas Rousseau had tempered his writings with a degree of political
expediency, Immanuel Kant conducted his analysis largely, even exclusively,
within the forum of pure philosophy, although from his conclusions, definite
legal parallels exist. In attempting in his transcendental philosophy to
synthesise pure rationalism and pure empiricism,and to reconcile these
extremes, Kant adopted a midway critical stance. In his humanist view,
man was, as Aristotle had held, a rational willing being to whom freedom
was fundamental. Man however in Kant's view participates in two levels of
experience - the sensory (governed by the senses) and the rational (governed
. by reason). Since Man's ultimate fulfilment arises through his opportunity
to exercise his free will, but since action based purely upon selfinterest
is not moral (unless fortuitously coinciding with a universalisable maxim),
Man's true freedom arises within a society characterised and constituted by
reason. Although some restraint on the uninhibited exercise of individual
will must of necessity be known for all men to be free, social organisation
must however not impose undue or unnecessary constraints upon the individual.
Kant postulated accordingly a "Kingdom of Ends"- which is a systematised
political union notionally created by rational and willing men (who are ends
in themselves) acting in accordance with universalisable maxims to create a
societal structure - an intelligible world: in which, man's dignity and
autonomy are protected; within which, freedom has an absolute quality
transcending individual conceptions of freedom; and through which, man by
his rational exercise of freedom,transcends the imperatives of the natural
world. Freedom of human will accordingly arises for men in the intelligible
world of their rational and willing creation; it is a society under
universalisable laws of which men are the authors - a collectivism reconciled
with individualism and based squarely upon reason.
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The Kantian ideal is formulated in terms of two fundamental principles.
The first, the Categorical Imperative, has meaning in an objective sense,
being rationally derived and being a principle of what is good for every
rational being - in short it is a statement that the individual ought not
to act unless the maxim of his individual action is universalisable as a
maxim for general action. The second, the Principle of Right, establishes
that the morality (goodness) or otherwise of an action is determined upon the
basis of the ability of that action to co-exist with the rationally-construed
freedom of others. Morals and good conduct therefore are not based upon
emotions or the sensory, but must be "adjusted to universal ends" by a
process or reason; and accordingly the only action which is good is one
which gives expression to what reason dictates in its operation in a civil
intelligible society of "balanced harmony". To Kant then law is deducible
from the Categorical Imperative as:
"the aggregate of the conditions under which the
arbitrary will of one individual may be combined
with that of another under a general inclusive
law of freedom".
Society, for Kant, has the function of permitting and maintaining the freedom
of the rational individual. Political power is as extensive as is necessary
to uphold individual freedom and as constrained as is necessary not to
violate this end. The Social Contract as a postulate of reason, and as the
consequence of the exercise of the autonomous (as opposed to heteronomous)
will of men, is the medium which Kant envisaged as having permitted the
transfer of such power to the instrument of the universal collective
(embodied in the State). The reconciliation of the spirit of freedom with
the need for obedience and loyalty to the State, is the political objective
and ideal to which the State, as corpus and embodiment of the collective will,
should direct itself.
LU7
From his fundamental premise,of human freedom, Kant deduces property
ownership as a derivative right, and property itself as an object into
which men project their personality. Since human freedom has inviolability
as its parallel, the property of man derivatively acquires this character
too. This is not to say though that the inviolability of property knows
no restraint - as is the uninhibited freedom of men restrained by reason in
consequence of the act of collective aggregation, so is property ownership
restrained accordingly. In terms of the Categorical Imperative by extension,
the individual would appear to have no right to withhold his property if it
is required for the collective good, because such conduct is not universalisable
as the maxim of a general action. In the same way that any rational man
would require others to surrender their property if collective well-being
so required, so accordingly must that man surrender up his property where
this serves the public good. Furthermore though, in the same way that stlchman
would require the collective will to take cognisance of his individual loss
and require just compensation and indemnity, so must that rational man
acknowledge the universalisable right of any expropriatee to receive due
compensation. In short, whereas the right to refuse to surrender up
expropriated property is not universalisable and is accordingly not lawful,
the individual's right to require compensation is a universalisable maxim
for general action under natural law. Just compensation upon expropriation
is therefore a necessary and essential condition "under which the arbitrary
will of one individual was combined with that of another" in the creation of
a "general law of freedom", and without which the substance of rational
intelligible society and the intention of the postulated underlying Social
Contract, are defeated.
2.5.3 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT UNDER FICHTE (1762 - 1814)
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As was true also with Kant and Hegel, Fichte envisaged man too in terms of
the Greek conception - as a free willing and rational being who adopted
and created by the rational postulate of Social Contract, the institution
of the State, in order that laws might be made to preserve and uphold his
person and his property and to regulate the interrelationships of men with
a view to their protection. Fichte accepted and extended Kant's doctrine
that the freedom that men create through the Social Contract and the institu-
tion of the State, is not uninhibited in an absolute sense, since one man's
free activity is necessarily conditioned by the equal free activity that
rationally must be ascribed to others. Aggregation into a collective
society has then the effect that man's rights and his freedom are at the
same time both ensured as regards fundamentals and limited as regards
infringements of the rights of others. A mutual and reciprocative
recognition must be accorded by each Citizen to his fellow Citizens, and
true and rational liberty arises accordingly only within the framework of
the State.
The Social Contract that Fichte postulated was twofold. On the one hand
there was a property pactum - in creating the State, the institution of
private property arose; and from the ownership of private property, from
the acknowledgement of civic duties~and from the undertaking to forebear
in the infringment of the private property of others, men assumed the mantle
of citizenship - but this Citizenship status was not an unconditional
subjection, since beyond his civic obligations, man retained as full an
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individual liberty as the system permitted. On the other hand, there was
a second pactum - one of protection. The State undertook to uphold and
protect the interests and wellbeing of those who aggregated under the
Social Contract into the State created, and for purposes of fulfilling this
objective, the State was vested with the necessary powers to regulate the
inhibited exercise of individual freedom.
Fichte extended his Social Contract interpretation in a sociological fashion
to include the protection by the State of the individual's right to work,
and in doing so, introduced an economic aspect requiring State participation
in labour and trade. His writings influenced accordingly the later
politico-economic theories of Karl Marx; but the aspect of Marxian thought
falls beyond the scope of this exposition since Marxian politics have had
little (if any) influence in South African jurisprudence. To a large extent
Fichte's works displayed a deeper reflection upon civic freedom and liberty
than had those of Kant, and bridged the gulf to the vastness of Hegel's
dialectic.
2.5.4 SOCIAL CONTRACT UNDER THE DIALECTICISM OF HEGEL 1770 - 1831
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Subsequent legal historians and jurisprudents are in unison that the writings
of Hegel inter alia in Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts ~182l)(1)
represent one of the vastest,deepest and most abstract attempts to analyse
not only history, but the universe itself. (2) Any attempt to summarize here
the diversity and power of Hegel's thought would accordingly be' an undertaking
of impossibility laboured with fruitlessness and inadequacy - suffice it
accordingly that those portions of his work relevant to the themes at hand
be considered.
Hegel adopted a dialectic and historical method based on logic rather than empiricisn
in postulating an Absolute World Spirit (manifested in each nation's Volksgeist)
which regulated the continuous and synthetic unfolding of History progres-
sively revealed, (3) an unfolding' (based upon reason) in which every phase
was interconnected and interdependent. Reason and Spirit were accordingly
embraced in Hegel's central proposition, the Idea of Reason or History. To
Hegel, the Social Contract, as a postulate of reason, becomes a reality for
men because "what is reasonable is real, and what is real is reasonable": (4)
(1) English translation by T M Knox, Oxford,1942.
(2) For exampl~ Friedman, Legal Theory, p 164; Sabine A History of Political
Theory p 620.
(3)"Each particular national genius (spirit) is to be treated as only one
individual in the process of universal history". Philosophy of History,
Introduction, Section 3, as translated by Sibree, Sohn Library, 1955.
(4) Rechtsphilosophie 40.
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"What matters is to perceive in the appearance of the
temporal and transitory, the Substance which is immanent,
and the eternal, which is actual. For the reasonable,
which is synonymous with the Idea in that it assumes
external existence in its actuality, appears in an
infinite variety of forms and phenomena, and surrounds
its kernel, with the shell in which consciousness dwells
first, and which the Notion then penetrates to find its
pulse and to feel its manifold appearance".
Hegel's interpretation of history dismissed the paramountcy of individualism
that the Rationalist school had advocated, suggesting instead that political
power was embodied in the national state - to the extent that the national
state constituted a core element in Hegel's philosophy. Accordingly,
Rousseau's 'volonte generale' postulate was elevated and supplanted by
Hegel's conception that:(S)
"The state is the divine will, in the sense that it is
mind present on earth, unfolding itself to be the actual
shape and organisation of the world".
It is in the understanding of the Idea of History that an understanding of
the state as an institution arises, since(6)
"By listing attributes, no progress can be made in assessing
the nature of the state; it must be apprehended as an organism.
One might as well try to understand the nature of God by listing
His attributes".
Although he refers to the State as "the divine will", his philosophy was a
rationalisation not based upon mysticism. To Hegel, the State has grown and
evolved consistently with Reason and the Spirit, and in terms of the Idea,
under a universal and idealistic tripartite pattern of history - thesis,
(S)Ibid, Section 270, Knox translation.
(6)Ibid Section 269.
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antithesis and synthesis - phases that Sabine in A History of Political
(7)Theory describes respectively as:
"a period of natural, happy, youthful, but largely unconscious,
spontaneity; a period of painful frustration in which the
Spirit is turned inward and loses its spontaneous creativeness;
and a period in which it returns to itself at a higher level,
embodying the insights gained from frustration in a new era
which unites freedom with authority and self-discipline"_
The Kantian doctrine(8) that true freedom for any individual is found only
within the structure of the state, finds accordingly a considerable support
in the writings of Hegel. The state, as the temporal expression of
political power, offers to the Citizen collective protection of person
and property, and permits within its framework the ethical fulfilment and
actualisation of the individual in the three dialectic stages - the family,
which is characterised by "particular altruism"; civil society, which
displays "particular egoism", and the State itself, which is "universal
egoism". (9) In his distinction between the State and Civil Society, one
of Hegel's most notable philosophical innovations lies - the principal
distinction being that the former expresses ethical values and moral purposes
and is superior and absolute~whereas the latter is merely "the resultant of
the irrational forces of individual desires". It is the State which in
Hegel's view permits the highest level of ethical actualisation, and is
the embodiment of freedom and reason - and it is in the State that these
earlier stages are not only preserved but also dialectically transcended.
(7) At p 630. Cf: Section 3.1 infra at footnote 15.
(8) Cf: Section 2.5.2 supra.
(9)
Lowenberg: Hegel's conception of the relation between the State and
Civil Society: unpublished Politlcal SClence essay at the University
of Natal, 1977.
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The State, although supreme, ought to be minimally interventionist,
interfering with the Citizen's private rights to person and property only
where necessity so predicates; but where a conflict between the State and
C. . (10)ltlzen emerges:
"The particular is for the most part of too trifling a value
as compared with the general: individuals are sacrificed
and abandoned".
Freedom of the Citizen, to Hegel then,differed from the Rationalist inter-
pretation of Locke for instance in that the State was made supreme, but
shared a similarity with Locke, as emerges in Die Verfassung Deutschlands
(1802), (11) in that Hegel here defines the state "as existing for the
collective protection of property, and in that its powers are limited to
those necessary to this end. To Hegel, property acquires derivative sub-
stance as an extension and embodiment of the personality of men, but as
such, although its existence is independent of and perhaps even prior to
the State, its enforcement and recognition requires a State sanction - his
view here then shared features present in the writings of both Locke and
Kant. The movement of individuals into social collectives, by aggregation
under a Social Contract, as a consequence of synthesis and as a postulate
of reason in the minds of rationa~ and willing men, was a movement brought
about by a realisation, as expressed in Uber die neuesten innern
Verhaltnisse Wurttembergs (1798), that:
"The silent acquiescence in things as they are, the
hopelessness, the patient endurance of a vast
overmastering fate, has turned to hope, to
expectation, to the will for something different.
(lO)Philosophy of History, Introduction, Bohn Library p 34.
(ll)The Constitution of Germany translated and edited by Lasson, Werke,
Vol VII, P 17.
The vision of a better and juster time has entered
alive into the souls of men, and a desire, a longing,
for a purer freer condition has moved every heart ... "
(12)
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The Social Contract, postulated as a creation of rational men acting in
terms of and enacting the Idea of History, was accordingly to Hegel the
foundation from which the State had emerged as embodiment of the national
Geist, and was the ultimate historical synthesis in which its thetical and
antithetical precursors in history were incorporated, reconciled and
sublimated ("aufgehoben"). His conclusions dissented however from
consistency with the French popular liberalism and revolutionary fervour -
individualism in Hegelian thought connoted an extremism of egoistic
caprice, and yielded to and could even be sacrificed in the attainment of
the collective national fulfilment and expression. In the unfolding of
History, in the opposition between the negatives of thesis and antithesis,
and in the advancing affirmative instrument of synthesis, an eternally
shifting equilibrium regulated the affairs of men through the institutions
of its political expression, and any maR in isolation or even in a civil
collective, lacked the capacity to counter or even oppose these historical
forces, remaining instead duty-bound to the sanctified national state in
consequence of his membership and rationally-postulated co-authorship
thereof. But important to realise is that the individual was author and
creator of the State not on the basis of individual consent, but by means
of a Social Contract in which the individual was perhaps merely a partici-
pant in or an agent or instrument of the dynamically progressively-advancing
and synthetically-unfolding Idea of History.
( 12) Ub d· t· .. W b ( )er le neues en lnnern Verha1tnisse urttem ergs 1798 translated
and edited by Lasson, Werke, Vol VII p 150.
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The Hegelian 'individual' had accordingly lost the glorification he found
in Locke and the 'justified' revolutionary fervour with which he was
imbued by Rousseau. Instead of the individual being enchained (as seen by
Rousseau) by forces which were in opposition to the 'volonte generale', he
became instead incarcerated by Hegel within the confines the Volksgeist
itself, although Hegel contended that this did not constitute a subjugation
of men, since the individual acquires true freedom and personality as a
social being in the forum that only the national state can provide. (13)
To Hegel, the individual bore only an indirect relationship to the State -
his personal life was regulated by the State's socio-economic institutions,
and those institutions in turn were conditioned and determined by the
Volksgeist elevatedly manifested in the national state.
In many respects then it emerged that the Social Contract under Hegel had
turned full circle back to the sovereign absolutism of Hobbes, (14) the
central difference however being that Hobbes' interpretation left absolute
authority rooted in the monarch, whereas Hegel's considered that power as
transferring from the (Prussian) monarch to a (German) national state.
During the nineteenth century twilight of naturalism, Social Contract
theory lay dormant with many of its questions unresolved, and it was only
recently in the late twentieth century that it was to rise again to
prominence in the writings of Rawls in his postulate of the Original Position.
(13)To borrow from the verses of William Wordsworth, the national State to
the Hegelian individual was "the nurse, the guide, the guardian of (his)
heart and soul of all (his) moral being"
Tintern Abbey (1798) - Wordsworth in context was actually here referring
to Nature - it is merely the phraseology and not the substance that is
here borrowed.
(14)Cf: Section 2.4.3 supra.
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2. 6 CO~ITRACTARIANISM AND THE 'ORIGINAL POSITION'
IN JOHN RAWLS' 'A THEORY OF JUSTICE' (1972)
Contractarianism found its revival in the twentieth century in John Rawls'
A Theory of Justice (1972), hailed widely(l) as a singular treatise notable
not only for its departures from the traditions of the analytical positivism
and the utilitarianism(2) that had for over a hundred years since Austin
and Bentham, dominated the prevailing Anglo-American politico-legal
philosophies, but also for its advocacy and its providing of a viable and
working liberalist alternative(3) to the challenge presented by the stepping
(1) Daniels, Reading Rawls, Introduction pp xi - xvi cites a host of sources
acclaiming the stature and relevance of Rawls' writings; inter alia,
Bedau, Nation, 11 September 1972 p 180: "As a work of original scholar-
ship in the services of the dominant moral and political ideology of
our civilization, Rawls'treatise is simply without a rival". Cf: also
Section 2.1 supra.
(2) Cohen, Social Contract Explained, New York Times Book Review, p 1:
"For too long now, the main tradition of moral philosophy
has been utilitarian in its broad assumptions ... But the
utilitarian attitudes are incompatible with our moral
judgments and with the principles upon which our Constitution
rests. It is therefore a crucial task of moral and political
philosophy to make clear the inadequacy of utilitarian concepts,
and, more important, t~ provide a persuasive alternative to them."
This was the task that Rawls both undertook and more significantly,
fulfilled. The comparison of Rawls with the utilitarians, although
an important inquiry in jurisprudence, is not undertaken herein however,
by reason of the alternative theme that this exposition develops.
(3 )
~lotwithstanding his critique that Rawls' theory (although of exceptional
value) is not workable, Barry, in The Liberal Theory of Justice: A
crItical examination of the principal doctrines in 'A Theory of Justice'
by John Rawls, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973) p 4, acknowledges that
Rawls' theory is "a comprehensive and systematic statement of a thorough-
going liberal position ... (which) ... it might be added, appear(s) at a
time when liberalism is becoming unfashionable, dismissed in smart circles
as shallow compared with the deep (not to say unfathomable) truths of
Hegel or a Hegelianised Marx".
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(4)
stones on the route from Hegel to Marx.
Rawls in his chapter'The t~ain Idea of the Theory of Justice' sets his writings
h · 1 ., t t' (5)in their philosop lca perspectlve ln s a lng:
"My aim is to present a conception of justice which
generalises and carries to a higher level of abstraction (6)
the familiar theory of the Social Contract as found say in
Locke Rousseau and Kant".
To Rawls, the Social Contract was not, as the classical writers had
suggested, a contract for purposes of entering society or of establishing
government or of conferring powers upon government - instead, the original
agreement he envisaged directed itself at determining the fundamental
principles of justice that regulate the structure and operation of society
in a spirit of social co-operation. His conception of justice was
accordingly one of "justice as fairness". He framed his vision of the
Social Contract, in conformity with the Kantian approach, as a postulate of
reason:(7)
(4) As Crick notes in On Justice in the New Statesman, 5 May 1972,p 602:
"Truly (Rawls) forces us to see that theories of socialism without
a critical moral philosophy are as undesirable as they are impossible.
Who can answer him fully and go beyond?".
(5) A Theory of Justice 53 p 11.
(6) As Dworkin notes in Taking Rights Seriously (Chapter 6), there are
deeper themes also in Rawls but these are beyond the scope of this
exposition on Social Contract.
(7) A Theory of Justice Section 3 pp 11 - 12.
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"Thus we are to imagine that those who engage in social
co-operation choose together, in one joint act, the
principles which are to assign basic rights and duties
and to determine the division of social benefits. Men
are to decide in advance how they are to regulate their
claims against one another and what is to be the foundation
charter of their society. Just as each person must decide
by rational reflection what constitutes his good, that is
the system of ends which it is rational for him to pursue,
so a group of persons must decide once and for all what is
to count among them as just and unjust. The choice which
rational men would make in this hypothetical situation of
equal liberty ... determines the principles of justice as
fairness" .
Central to Rawls' thesis, is his postulate of the 'Original Position', (8)
which corresponds closely to the initial state of freedom that Locke
suggested, but supplements Locke's interpretation in significant respects.
Men in the state of nature are free rational and moral beings and a
symmetrical equality attends their interrelationships, but they are
postulated further by Rawls as being behind a 'veil of ignorance' in
that they do not have knowledge (in advance of contracting) of what their
particular circumstances and status will be under the social institutions
that derive from the principles upon which they (in the Social Contract) agree.
On the one hand this ensures their objectivity and rationality in their
exercise of choice regarding the principles upon which their society is to
be founded, no individual being a'dvantaged or disadvantaged in principle
disproportionately relative to others; and on the other hand, this ensures
(8) He devotes the whole of Chapter Ill, SS 20 - 30,to the examination and
assessment of this idea.
In regard to the analysis of Rawls' writings herein undertaken, the
writer is grateful to acknowledge the considerable guidance he has
received from lecture material presented by Professor R Wacks at
the University of Natal in 1983.
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that the principles so determined will manifest justice as fairness. This
proposition then finds considerable consistency with Kant's Categorical
Imperative, (9) in that the individual's rationally-based determination of
the foundations of social justice, permits a congruence of the maxim of
individual action with the maxim of general action, and in that rational
individual choice is accordingly universalisable in a broad Social Contract
as a postulate of reason.
Rawls develops Rousseau's theme that the Social Contract was a progressively
and continuously shifting and ratified contract and not an historical actuality,
but his writings afford a far more cohesive rationale than Rousseau's for
the succession of this Contract from generation to generation. (10) He
notes that since each person finds himself at birth in a specific society
and at a particular station, that person cannot subjectively be considered
in a direct sense to have entered voluntarily or to have adopted the scheme
of social co-operation that prevails in that society - however, provided
that the society in question manifests and gives expression to the principles
of justice as fairness, then as a postulate of reason, that person objectively
would have chosen to enter that society if notionally he had exercised that
choice. That his circumstances m~ght subsequently emerge to him as being
unfortunate, would in the first place not be a basis for concluding that
he would have exercised his choice in any other (non-rational) manner; and
in the second place, would in an objective sense be acceptable rationally
since not only are those circumstances consistent wi th justice as fairness,
(9)Discussed in Section 2.5.2 supra.
(lO)Cf Section 2.4.5 supra at footnote 5.
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but also it was the exclusion of the specific individual pre-knowledge
thereof that rendered the rational determination of those very principles
of fairness possible. As Rawls states:(ll)
" ... a society satisfying the principles of justice as
fairness comes as close as a society can to being a
voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which
free and equal persons would assent to under circum-
stances which are fair. In this sense, its members
are autonomous and the obligations they recognise
self-imposed 11 •
The original position becomes clear when it is considered in the context
of the "reflective equilibrium" by which it is reached. The rational man
in the original position, guided overwhelmingly by rational self-interest,
will draw a distinction in his judgments regarding what constitutes justice
and fairness, between what is authentic and what would be motivated by
subjective prior knowledge of how those principles would affect him in
the social position he is to occupy. Since the veil of ignorance as
postulated, precludes his bias under the latter possibility, it is only
the authentic judgments that will lead to the principles resolved, once
these have been measured by the individual against his own judgments about
justice. Any disparities that emerge between these assessments, are
reconciled by the individuals under a rationally guided 'cobweb theorem,(12)
of "reflective equilibrium" in which any conflicting standpoints are brought
into balance by spiralling inwards towards the final and authentic expressions
of justice as fairness. Since the veil of ignorance shrouds his societal
(ll)A Theory of Justice p 13.
(12)These words (cobweb theorem) are not used by Rawls, but are drawn from
Economics by way of analogy as being an illustrative image of the
nature of the reasoning process employed.
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future and conceals from. his awareness in the original position, what
life plan lies before him, the individual will accordingly agree to those
principles which afford him the best probability of securing the fruition
and fulfilment of his life plan, subsequently and within the society to
be revealed to him.
Rawls postulates that two principles(l3) regulate or govern the choice that
men in the original position would exercise. The first is that "each
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all".
His second principle is that "social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are both (firstly) to the greatest benefit of the
least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, (14) and
(secondly) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions
of fair equality of opportunity".
It is upon the framework of these two principles that the core of the
Rawlsian postulate rests. On a procedural level, he suggests that these
principles find acceptability to men in the original condition in that
they comply with certain necessary formal conditions - they are general;
they are publicly known and acce~ted; and they represent a final choice.
In addition, he imbues them with a substantive acceptability in that they
are compatible with the rational self-interest of men in the original
position (or in Kantian dicta, they share coherence with the autonomous -
(l3)A Theory of Justice Section 46 p 302.
(14)By the "Just savings principle", Rawls (at p 284 - 293) refers to the
problem of justice between generations. Social assets are conserved
and not wasted because men in the original position have a regard for
future generations, or at least, for the next generation, their
children.
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as opposed to heteronomous - will of such men). Furthermore they are
substantively adopted in that they afford to any individual in the original
position the best opportunity of acquiring the "primary social goods" he
desires - liberty, opportunity, wealth, income, powers, authority and self-
respect - as well as permitting the freedom for him to follow to as great
an extent as possible, the life pattern he wishes for himself.
Rawls ranks his two principles in sequence and contends that the first
(that of liberty) has lexical priority over the second (that of equality),
his rationale for this submission being that men in the original condition,
in anticipation of the lifting of the veil of ignorance, would be more
concerned to safeguard the social primary goods than to uphold or entrench
equality between themselves. Rawls does qualify this proposition to an
extent however by stipulating that such would be the choice of such
individuals only if the society that would arise, was capable of guaranteeing
and protecting that liberty.
As Dworkin correctly observes in Taking Rights Seriously(IS) however, this
adherence to these principles and to this ranking flows not from the actual
interest of individuals in relation to the social position they subsequently
assume, but from their antecedent interest (objectively) while they remain
in the original position.
Perhaps the most innovative and controversial aspect of Rawls' theory
(15) T .,. R
a~lng ights Seriously Ch 6:Justice and Rights p 153.
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is the "difference principle" he embodies in his second proposition, in
suggesting that social and economic inequalities are contemplated and even
ratified by the Social Contract. Far from constituting bland support for
the status quo, (16) Rawls' submission in this regard is actually that men in
the ortginal position would weigh the competing risks attendant upon their
choice, against the reassuring realisation that if they emerged worse off,
the inequalities would be arranged "to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged" (ie his 'maximin concept').
Although Rawls'work has not been without substantial subsequent criticism,
the brilliance and insight of his treatise have earned the respect of even
his most ardent opponents - Crick for instance in New Statesman(l7) contends
"Rawls is profoundly wrong but almost perfectly relevant". Although that
criticism is not adopted here, there are however many issues in Rawls'
writing which remain unanswered. What exactly are the "equal basic liberties"
he postulates in his first principle and how "extensive" are they to be?
Presumably they correspond to a system of the Rule of Law, but should a
lacuna of so central a nature find a place in a work of the stature of
A Theory of Justice? Furthermore, does the psychology of men correspond
to the model that Rawls constructs, that liberty and the primary social goods
are valued so highly above equality? Although it is submitted that Rawls'
interpretation is correct here, it is conceded that if this cornerstone is
incorrect, so commensurately and even to an amplified degree will the structure
that rests upon this foundation be shaky. Moreover, it has been questioned
whether men in the original position would actually choose Rawls' two principles,
(l6)Cf the writings of Nozick et aI, discussed in Appendix A.2 hereto.
(17)Vide Daniels op cit p xvi. Cf: Footnote 4 supra.
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or whether instead they might elect an average utilitarianism - in this
regard however the balance of support lies in favour of Rawls by reason of
the fact that his principles are a logical postulate of reason based upon
what appears to be a correct view of the psychology of men. Provided that
it can be assumed that men would act rationally (which assumption appears
both reasonable and necessary), it seems that Rawls' conclusions are valid.
Marxian critics (inter alia Miller)(18) have suggested that Rawl~ postulates,
and in particular the "difference principle", apply only in a non-egalitarian
society practising a capitalist ideology - whether they may be correct is not
an essential consideration for purposes of this exposition under a South African
jurisprudential enquiry, since it is assumed herein that the contracting parti-
cipants in any Western society would have adopted the capitalist norms r Lloyd (19)
directs two principal criticisms against Rawls: firstly that his underlying
hypothesis is wholly artificial and unrealistic; and secondly, that neither
reason nor experience compels us to accept the risk profile that Rawls paints
for men in the original position. In doing so, Lloyd perhaps loses sight of
the fact that Rawls' treati~e is not a theorem but a theory - neither the
absence of final and conclusive proof nor the presence of assumptions detracts
from its unquestionable merit as a rationale for the nature of (Western) society.
Perhaps the most significant criticism is voiced however by Dworkin who submits
that the mere fact that a person would have consented to certain principles
if asked, doesn't prove that he is bound by those principles if he hasn't
been asked:(lO)
(18)Cf: Miller Social Justice (1976) Ch 8.
(19)Cf: Lloyd Introduction to Jurisprudence (1979) p 98.
(20)Dworkin op cit p 151.
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"If for example I am playing a game, it may be that I
would have agreed to any number of ground rules if I
had been asked in advance of play. It does not follow
that these rules may be enforced against me if I have
not, in fact, agreed to them".
Rawls' answer would be that it remains fundamentally important to consider
the original position (albeit a hypothetical or postulated state) because
the conditions it embodies are (2)
"ones that we do in fact accept. Or if we do not, then
perhaps we can be persuaded to do so by philosophical
reflection. Each aspect of the contractual situation
can be given supporting grounds ... we collect into
one conception a number of conditions or principles
that we are ready upon due consideration to recognise
as reasonable. These constraints express what we are
prepared to regard as limits on fair terms of social
co-operation. One way to look at the idea of the original
position, therefore is to see it as an expository device
which sums up the meaning of these conditions and helps
us to extract their consequences. On the other hand,
this conception is also an intuitive notion that suggests
its own elaboration, so that led on by it, we are drawn
to define more clearly the standpoint from which we can
best interpret moral relationships. We need a conception
that enables us to envision our objective from afar: the
intuitive notion of the original position is to do this
for us".
Rawls' interpretation of the Social Contract in terms of his postulate of
the Original Position, remains the leading modern treatise in the juris-
prudence of the Social Contract - in the words of The New York Review of
Books, (22) his Theory is lauded as being "the most substantial and interesting
contribution to moral philosophy since the war", being "a critical and liberal
philosophy ... argued with an assurance and breadth of mind that puts the
(21)Rawls op cit p 21-2.
(22)Referred to in jacket of Rawls' A Theory of Justice.
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book in the tradition of Adam Smith and Mill and Sidgwick". The two considera-
tions that necessarily arise accordingly are:
(i) Firstly, what is the relevance of A Theory of Justice to South African
society in general?
(ii) Secondly, what is its relevance to South African expropriation law?
As regards the first aspect, if it is true (as Rawls contends and as is
supported here), that men in the original position would have agreed to the
two fundamental principles that are to regulate their social co-operation,
then it is submitted that South African society is structured on or from a
basis that does not comply with the Rawlsian hypothesis (viz:that men in the
original position were shrouded by a veil of ignorance from an awareness of
what the future position is that they would occupy in the society that would
be regulated by these agreed foundation principles). Although it seems that
the deviation that South Africa displays from Rawls' two principles may
legitimately be criticised on this ground (in that South Africa is not (as
Rawls would call it) 'a just or nearly just society'- rather, by his standards
it is palpably unjust), it appears however that a logical difficulty is perhaps
presented in directing criticism at the South African society itself, if such
is based purely upon its failure to conform to the hypothesis of the Original
Position. Until this hypothesis is conclusively confirmed, objection upon this
latter regard cannot in logic be final.
Given accordingly then that certain reservations are capable of being voiced
only provisionally or tentatively (being contingent upon the validity of the
Original Position postulate), it is noted that they are nevertheless not
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irrelevant. It seems in the South African 'society, if Rawls' hypothesis
applies, that the only men that are postulated as being in the original
position are those men that know (or assume) that they are white. If this
is so, then they are excluded from having purely authentic judgments as
inputs into the process of reflective equilibrium, since their prior know-
ledge (or assumption) that they are white, and their contract (or contractual
clause)inter se that a greater share of the social primary goods will be
accorded to whites, will have as its effect, that their pursuit of rational
self-interest will fall short of "the most extensive total system of equal
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all", as Rawls
advocates in his first principle. That the "social and economic inequalities"
that Rawls anticipates in his second principle, do in fact arise in South African
society, and that equality is subordinated in South Africa under a spurious
"separate but equal" (which is really an unequal and non-liberal) doctrine, (23)
certainly do not indicate that there is partial compliance with Rawls' theory.
In fact, they serve rather to affirm that Rawls' two fundamental principles are
largely (perhaps totally) ignored by the South African legislature, primarily
since those postulated inequalities are not "arranged so that they are both
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged ... and attached to offices
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality and opportunity".
As regards the second aspect supra (the relevance of Rawls' A Theory of Justice
to South African expropriation law), it is submitted that it is both significant
and tragic that the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, enacted three short years
after the publication of Rawls' work, contains virtually no adherence to the
(23) .
ef Sectlon 1.3.8 supra. Vide also main text in Section 2.7 infra at (8).
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guidelines that Rawls set out, and that 'justice as fairness' finds little
(if any) expression in South Africa. The statutory formulae, for instance,
for compensation laid down in Section 12 of the Expropriation Act (read inter
alia with Sections 9(1), 13 and 22), promulgate a framework for compensability
that has no sight of Rawls' "equal right" nor of his "equal basic liberties
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all". The expropriatee's
right (if it exists) to compensation rests upon the whim of the legislature
and all the attendant deficiencies in the questionable formulation and expression
of its intention - some classes of expropriated unregistered rightholders are
compensated, others are not; some real rightholders are expropriated separately,
others are not; sometimes compensation is awarded, and sometimes it is not
considered necessary, and worse still~not even considered desirable. (Cf
Appendix to Section 3.7).
Expropriations under the Community Development Act(24) read with the Group
Areas Act(2S) contain a critical fatality for any proponent of a view that
Rawlsian justice as fairness operates in South African society in the forum
inter alia of expropriation. It would seem illegitimate that expropriation
for the establishment and/or consolidation of Homelands and Group Areas,
could be held to be a lawful purpos~ justifying public action and being in
accordance with the fundamental principles of justice under the Social
Contract: where firstly, many (most) of the prejudiced expropriatees are
members of racial groups that were not parties to the aberrated 'Social Contract'
postulated in South Africa and embodied in the legislation; where secondly,
the absence of a meaningful veil of ignorance on the question of race has
(24)Act 3 of 1966.
(2S)Act 36 of 1966.
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precluded the authentic judgment of those who might be postulated to be in
the original position; where thirdly, both of Rawls' principles are
fundamentally violated; and where finally, social and economic inequalities
are arranged, not to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, but
actually to the greatest benefit of the most advantaged.
The 1975 Expropriation Act (as is much of South Africa's legislation) is
an extreme exercise in positivism, and given the political continuity of a
party-based government and the de facto sovereignty of the White Parliament,
as prevail in South Africa, the opportunity and likelihood for the success
of the necessary remedial changes, is often so remote that the advocate of
their implementation is frequently disheartened at the prospect of undertaking
such an exercise. If a system based on the American principles of 'just
compensation' had application in South African law, or if the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution had a statutory
parallel in South Africa, the likelihood that the Rawlsian principles
would not only be recognised, but above all practised, in our legal system,
would be promoted.
That there is not an adherence to Rawls' Theory, that the traditions of
naturalism and historicity have been abandoned, and that reliance upon
Roman Dutch insight and guidance in expropriation matters has been blighted
by Joyce and McGregor v Cape Provincial Administration, (26) does not deny
the merit or necessity of remaining aware of the principles to which we
ought to adhere. Ultimately, John Rawls has been to the Social Contract
what Gustav Radbruch(27) was to naturalism - a revival and a rejuvenation,
(26)1946 AD 658. Vide discussion supra at Sections 1.2.3 and 1.6.
(27) .Cf Sect10n 1.3.8 supra.
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a clarion voice against the sterile positivist acceptance of law and justice
as it is enacted, and a herald call to recognise justice as the fairness it
ought to be. His principles are accordingly a powerful reminder of the form
. (28)
and structure that our legal and soclal systems ought to assume.
(28) . .Vlde Appendlx to 3.7 Recommendations for Statutory Reform.
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2.7 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IN ITS OPERATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN
LAW AT PRESENT - A CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE WITH
REFERENCE TO DOMINIUM EMINENS
The Social Contract theory is too powerful a movement in the natural law,
both as regards its tradition and evolution, and as regards its substance
and expression, to be ignored or rejected by South African society.
Contractarianism motivates and actuates an understanding of the nature
of the State and the origin of its powers (in particular that of dominium
eminens), and articulates a recurrent consistent and cogent theme that is
not only a statement of legal history but is also a guideline which ought
to be of considerable value and force. in legislative and social planning at
present and in the future.
The reconciliation of the different emphases and inflexions within the develop-
ment of Social Contract theory, is not without attendant difficulty, but in
overview four distinct phases broadly emerge. As a prelude, the first
contractarian melodies came intermittently over two millenia, (1) from the
time of the Greeks to the sixteenth century, during which period natural law
and divine law were enjoined. In the second phase, (2) the rationalist school
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, orchestrated the emergence of
Social Contract theory proper - although retaining a deep Scriptural commit-
ment on a personal level, they postulated law and society as man-made and as
being without direct metaphysical origin - tenets of natural law remained
however superior and binding upon State and Citizen alike. The third phase(3)
(1 ) Vide Section 2.2 supra.
(2 ) Vide Section 2.4 supra.
(3) Vide Section 2.5 supra.
of the movement - transcendental idealism - introduced a fundamentally
philosophic perspective and postulated the unfolding of world history as
being in accordance with a cohesive continuum regulated by a dominating
'Idea'. In the final phase(4) in modern times, refinement and culmination
came to the historical symphony in the theory of justice as fairness, as
expressed by Rawls, and gave the cue to the prominent position that
contractarianism must and will assume in jurisprudence and political
philosophy in the future.
What however is the application that Social Contract theory has in South
African society? In the first place, it voices the warning that South
African law (in regard to expropriation and also other matters), is assuming
the features of a positivist frenzy by a questionably sovereign white
legislature, to the extent that fundamental naturalist and contractarian
principles are ravaged violated or abandoned. In the second place, it
suggests that the draconian excesses of an apartheid-centred system (in
Group Areas expropriations), and the positivist heyday (in the statutory
denials or exclusions of compensation under the Expropriation Act), (5) ought
to be eliminated from our legal framework. Finally, it is noted with deep
regret and censure, that in South African law as it exists (or in the mind
of the legislature as it exists), contractarian tenets have nowhere near the
degree of prominence their theoretical foundation and substance demand -
rather it would seem that South African society has been framed by the White
Parliament of this and preceding generations, in a way almost devoid of
recognition of contractarian theory.
(4) Vide Section 2.6 supra.
(5 )
Act 63 of 1975, as amended)eg: Section 9(1), 13 and 22.
When the application in South Africa of contractarianism is viewed from the
perspective of Social Contract theory proper, (6) it would seem in the first
place that there has been no pactum unionis of all the Citizens into one
body - to the contrary, our new Constitution purports (illegitimately it is
submitted) to validate racial separation by a 'pact' of disunity unilaterally
imposed on the non-represented (Black) Citizens. In the second place, it
would seem that although there has undeniably been a subjection of the
people by the State (in some instances of a gross degree), there has been
no antecedent or subsequent pactum in this regard by all the Citizens
legitimising this~and nor is there a legislative recognition of the
naturalist limitations imposed on subjection by Locke and Rousseau. Not
only is such a pactum subjectionis absent on the level of historical fact,
but also as a postulate of reason in the sense that not all the people,
nor a majority thereof, would have consented had they been so consulted -
to the contrary, the Volonte Generale stands strongly opposed, it would seem,
to the machinations of our present government.
When viewed further from the Rawlsian perspective, (7) these conclusions
extended from the writings of the Social Contract theorists proper, are
confirmed and compounded. Not only does Rawls' first principle (of liberty)
lack expression in our country but so does his second principle (of equality).
The first ideal of an "equal right to the most extensive total system of
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all",
is in South Africa aberrated to become a separate but unequal 'right' (denied
on occasion) under a positivist system in which liberty exists only to the
(6) Vide Section 2.4 supra.
(7) Vide Section 2.6 supra.
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extent that it is statutorily recognised. The warp imposed on Rawls' second
principle is that although "social and economic inequalities" of an extreme
form exist, these are not legitimised by being arranged firstly "to the
greatest benefit of the least advantaged", and secondly by operating "under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity"- in contrast, the separate but
unequal dogma in practice confers the greatest prejudice upon the least
advantaged, and denies them their rightful access to lawful instruments for
poli tical and social change. (8) We are led by Rawls by extension
accordingly to the conclusion that 'justice as fairness' does not exist in
South Africa at present (by reason inter alia of our social structure and
our political oppression of the Blacks), and further to the ultimate
realisation that under contractarian theory, our society is not just.
In final analysis, it seems that a political sovereign is legitimate
if it has a mandate from the People - and this would mean all the
people or a majority thereof. If a people is united by pactum,
and agrees further by compact to submit to the State (subject to the
qualification that their best interests as a body be upheld and promoted),
and if Rawlsian Liberty and Equality are manifested, then it would seem
that the relation between State and Citizen, and the derivative relation
between Citizens and their Property, is just from a liberal standpoint -
if not, it would seem that the authority and legitimacy of the de facto
oppressor sovereign is severely to be questioned. Finally, it would seem that
if such a sovereign (as in the latter case) exercised its powers, inter alia
(8) Vide Section 1.3.8 supra.
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dominium eminens,in compliance with naturalist principles, such exercise
could be condoned in that there is a correspondence with the Volonte Generale;
but if naturalism is thereby transgressed, the consequent positivist abuses
are indefensible.
The relation between Citizens and their Property in South African law
remains of fundamental importance and worthy of further consideration. (9)
* * * * *
(9) Vide Chapter 3 infra.
CHAPTER 3
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANGING NATURE OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP,
THE RELATED DEVELOPMENT OF DOMINIUM EMINENS,
AND THE POSITION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AT PRESENT
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CHAPTER 3
THE RE LATI 0 ~l BET WEE N Cl TI ZEN S A~I 0 THE I R PRO PER TY
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANGING NATURE OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP, THE RELATED DEVELOP~1ENT OF DOMINIUM
EMINENS, AND THE POSITION IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
AT PRESE~~T
3.1 I~ITRODUCTION : AN HEGELIAN LIBERTARIAN AND NATURALIST PERSPECTIVE
In the continuum of history, the relation between Citizens and their Property
has not been static or fixed - rather history has revealed it as being evolving
and shifting. The prevailing conception of the state, a host of political
economic and sociological factors, and the degree of recognition of private
rights within the society in question, inter alia, have a bearing upon it.
In the property law forum howeve~this relation is assessed on two levels. In
the first place, the public law proprietary powers of the State, being superior
to private dominium, have a significant influence - this aspect is discussed
in Section 1.3 supra. In the second place, on the private law level, the
changing nature of private ownership and the related development of dominium
eminens, reveal themselves as the central determinants of this relation. It
is the second field of enquiry that is undertaken herein, and the elucidation
it affords, is directed towards an assessment of the relation between Citizens
and their Property in South African law at present.
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The standpoint presented herein is Hegelian, libertarian and naturalist.
On one level, it is submitted that the vision of ownership, like history
itself, is experiencing the synthesis that Hegel postulated. (1) On another
level, the writer has not addressed this exposition to a positivist analysis
of expropriation legislation asit stands - instead, the naturalist tenor has
been adopted, in that the emphasis is upon wh~t ought to regulate our
expropriation law and our conception of private ownership; and inter alia
in the advocacy'that it is the Rule of Law that should be upheld, the liberal
orientation is apparent.
True to the Hegelian visions of a dominating World Spirit and of the Idea of
History, a subscription to a cohesive historical evolution supplants the
alternative view of "a confused whirl of senseless deeds", and substitutes
the realisation that "the history of mankind ... (is) ... the process of
development of humanity itself". (2) Current events and historical backdrop
weld together to form present practice, which, it is submitted, ought to
reflect a recognition of the continuous historical unfolding in which we are
witnessing participants. The words of Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper are noted
as a basis for the expository method adopted:
(1) Vide Section 2.5.4 supra.
(2 ) ef: Engels and Marx: eg in commenting on the Hegelian philosophy which
they developed, they stated in Herrn Eugen Ouhrings Umwalzung der
Wissenschaft (1878) (transl. by Burns New York 1935 at p 30):
"From this standpoint (of Hegel's philosophy) the
history of mankind no longer appeared as a confused
whirl of senseless deeds of violence, all equally
condemnable before the judgment seat of the now
matured philosophic reason ... but as the process
of development of humani ty itself".
"The great questions of histor(y) .....
admit no simple and perhaps no single
solution. Historical change is indivisible,
and its processes cannot usefully be studied
in isolation All we can do is study
the facts in relation to each other, keeping
a sense of proportion by making comparisons
... both in time and space as we go
along. Universal history obliges us to omit
much. It can never give a complete picture.
It squeezes out some of the drama, some of
the richness of ... history. It forces us
to compress, sometimes to desiccate. On the
other hand if it is (carefully)
presented, we need not lose the drama,
the richness, after all ... (We thereby)
can restore to history that colour, that
sense of pace, that extra dimension of
social life .... "
(3)
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It was in man's transition from his natural condition into the societal
collective, that the Social Contract theorists postulated that the institution
of private ownership came into being. (4) Dominium in the private law
originated accordingly at the time of the inception and formation of the State,
and co-existed from then with the State's public law power of dominium eminens. (5)
Prior to that time, although property was capable of possession by individuals
in the natural state, it was suggested that dominium plenum was not then
conceivable, since the universal recognition of the real right of private
ownership and the coercive collective reaction against any infringement thereof,
required the prior existence of the State itself.
It is submitted that the presocial phase, with on the one hand its sovereignty of
each individual and on the other its "Continuall Fears", constitutes an
(3)
Professor H Trevor-Roper: ForewDrd to Larousse Encyclopaedia of Modern History
from 1500 to the Present Day 3 ed Hamlyn Middlesex (1973).
(4)Vide Section 2.4 supra.
(5)As discussed in Chapter 1 supra.
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- (6)
embodiment of the first two Hegelian phrases. Societalisation under the
Social Contract and the inception of the State would accordingly represent
(consistently with Hegel's thought) the synthesised consequence of the
opposing forces dominating man in the natural condition - in turn they
illustrate perhaps the first instance of the operation of the model of
sublimation Hegel contemplated.
Locke(7) and the theorists that adopted his property-based emphasis, submitted
that the State was conceived for the function and purpose of preserving private
property, (8) and recognised that the violation of the sanctity of private
ownership was to exist only in the most extreme of circumstances - the exercise
of dominium eminens (as Grotius noted)(9) was such a caveat to this general
principle. The theory that the jurisprudents evolved, was not only the
consequence of the unfolding of social history and of the changing nature of
property ownership that had preceded its statement, but also the catalyst
that was to accelerate further changes in the interpretation of the relation-
ship between Citizens and their Property, it emerging that the competing
antithetical precursors of private interest and public need, found a synthetic
culmination and sublimation in the State's power of expropriation. The prevailing
nature of private own~rship has a substantial effect upon the nature and exercise
of the State's power of dominium eminens, and on the amplified (synthesised)
view(lO) thereof that has emerged.
(6) Cf Sabine op cit quoted in Section 2.5.4 at footnote 7.
(7) Vide Section 2.4.4 supra.
(8)
Cf: Entick v Carrington Common Pleas(1765)19 State Trials 1029; in
Section 2.4.4 supra at footnote 32.
(9)
Cf Section 1.1 supra at footnotes 2 and 3.
(10) Vide Section 3.5.2 infra.
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The historical and natural law background to the jurisprudential enquiry
concerning the origins of private ownership, assumes significance and
relevance in the context of expropriation, as do the modern jurisprudential
contributions~(ll)in that they together assist in portraying the way in
which the relationship between State and Citizen has developed. Not only
is the nature of the real right of private ownership delineated by that
relationship, but clarity arises also thereby regarding the circumstances
in which State interference with this private right (by dominium eminens)
is justified in the pursuit of public purposes.
Central to the vision of law under the naturalist school (in its classic
formulation), is the relationship t~an bears to the rationally-regulated (or
alternatively Divinely-inspired)(I2) cosmos and universal order that surrounds
him, without regard to the tenets of the actual or positivist law that
dominates his secular existence. Although the relative emphasis in the
naturalist development has vacillated through the centuries, the broad
movement that has been evidenced this millenium has been twofold. Firstly
it has been from a mediaeval metaphysical view of Man's universal inter-
relationship, based upon a Higher and Divinely-ordained law from which no
positivist excursion was to be permitted, to a less deistic and more tangible
conception based upon reason and the rationality of men, which latter conception
(11) .
Natura1~sm has found a significant restatement in John Finnis 1 Natural
Law and Natural Rights (1980) discussed infra. It is considered expedient
however for expository purposes to defer the analysis of his writing to a
later stage herein.
(I2)Th . d" h·· . 1e ~us ~v~num emp as~s IS art~cu ated in the earlier conceptions as
discussed in Section 2.2 supra.
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required that the movements of positive law ought to be directed towards the
expressions that naturalism rationally predicated. Secondly, as regards
property, the movement commenced this millenium with the theocratic dogma
that private property ownership was innately sinful; moderated in the
Thomist and Reformist acceptance and even glorification of private property
as an institution; and emerged in the modern era in the opposing individualis-
tically-based Western and socially-based Marxian philosophies of property
ownership. It is noted however that since Marx's dialectic(l3) has
exercised little direct influence on the South African property law develop-
ment, it lies beyond the perimeters of an assessment of expropriation in
South African jurisprudence - for this reason, the writings of Marx(l4) are
mentioned herein only in passing.
The broad movement in any millenium is however capable of a more detailed
analysis in terms of the Hegelian model of history. (15) The overview of
(l3)It is noted that this exclusion stands in contrast to the relevance the
dialecticism of Hegel contains for South African jurisprudence. Whereas
Hegel remained largely within the philosophic forum, Marx's views had
definite political economic and proprietary overtones. As Sabine notes
in A History of Political Theory (3 ed at p 779):
"Hegel's metaphysical logic, therefore was an assumed major
premise in the whole Marxian argument, (but) with this
difference ... that Marx and Enqels substituted a material-
istic for an idealistic metaphysics".
(l4)A wealth of literature abounds in which the writings of Marx are assessed,
and it is to such further sources that the reader is referred. Vide inter
alia the select bibliography included in Sabine A History of Political
Theory 3 ed p 804.
(lS)Cf: Section 2.5.4 supra at footnote (4) in the main text thereat, where
Hegel's words are recorded:
"What matters is to perceive in the appearance of the temporal
and the transitory, the substance which is immanent, and the
eternal, which is actual ... ".
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the evolution of private ownership, indicates that the phases of thesis
antithesis and synthesis do exist, and are appropriately analysed
accordingly. The contractarian perspective reveals that this tripartite
pattern has manifested itself in the prevailing conception of property
1 0 0 (16) 0 1 1 0 1 0 01
0
ownership since the ear lest tlmes; presocla man, c asslca CIVl 1-
sations and the Dark Ages, perhaps represent respectively also an early
.such unfolding. (17) Subsequently, as is elaborated infra, a similar
development has been repeated cyclically - it is noted however that the
instances of synthesis recorded herein are merely illustrative and are not
exhaustive.
Whereas the naturalist-positivist debate has alternated, possibly with an
emphasis on the former school, the property debate today would appear to
be experiencing periodically (or-yet to experience finally) the synthesis(18)
that Hegel advocated. This assessmentjthe consideration of the evolving
institution of private ownership, and the analysis of the roles that
expropriation has played, will play and ought to play in the relation between
Citizens and their Property, are best determined (in accordance with Hegelian
thought) by tracing the property debate from its font.
(16)As discussed in main text supra at footnote (6).
(17)It is submitted further that although the above example does not
correspond exactly to the description of the three phases as expressed
by Sabine (in Section 2.5.4 supra at footnote 7 in the main text thereat)
it.would seem that this illustration (and the subsequent examples infra) ,
correspond nevertheless with the model Hegel postulated. Thesis and
antithesis appear more to connote a situation of contraposition or
op~osing interpretation~than the 'happy' and 'painful' qualities with
WhlCh they are imbued by Sabine.
(18)Vide Section 3.6 infra.
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3.2 GREECE AND ROME - THE DAWN OF THE PROPERTY DEBATE
It is in Greece and Rome that the dawn of the property (and expropriation)
debates came, (1) since on the one hand it is there that the first developed
concepts of private ownership arose, and on the other hand, it is from these
foundations that the modern Western conceptions are derivative.
Characteristically, the interpretation placed by the ancient Greeks upon ~~an
and upon the ins ti tu tion of property was philosophical, and al though, in
Aristotle, a transition took place from the Sophist's separation of an
ordered nature and an individualistic Man, to their fusion under the Stoics
with Man being embraced within the totality of nature, property remained
consistently a servient instrument to be directed in its enjoyment~justification
and limitation towards those higher naturalist principles, to which it was
subordinate, but through which Man's fulfilment was permitted. (2) The
dominant distinction then between men and things lay in Man's capacity of
and facility for reason, although both men and things were acknowledged as
creations of a (pagan) divinity. The ownership right that was accorded by
the Greeks to men over their subject property was inalienable to the extent
recorded by J WaIter Jones in his treatise The Law and Legal Theory of the
Greeks, (3)when he stated that expropriation without compensation "was
(1 ) It has been submitted by some (inter alia, the French jurist Merlin de
Douai, circa 1800, and more recently by Davies Law of Compulsory
Purchase and Compensation (3 ed (1978) at title page) that one of the
earliest recorded references to expropriation came in the Bible in 1
Kings XXI regarding King Ahab's acquisition of Naboth's vineyard.
Expropriation would seem accordingly to have found-an exercise earlier,
but it is from the time of the Greeks that its development is sound
and traceable.
(2) Cf 12 E 'S . 53ncyc . ...,oc. Cl. atp 3.
(3) 1956; at p 198.
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regarded as inconsistent with the nature of the institution of property". (4)
Whereas the contribution of the Greeks in the evolving concept of property lay
in the philosophy of their abstract assessment, Rome endowed the broad
development with an empiricism and with a practical and operating reality,
but fell short perhaps of the quality of the Greek thought and principles.
Although Roman law included a possibly uncompromising and unwavering absolutism
in its early unfolding in the XII Tables, Justinian's codification released it
from the austerity of its earlier rigid formulation, and brought into the
law in general and into that of property in particular, an admirable clarity
and directness. Roman property law however retained (even in a theoretical
sense), as Jolowicz points out in Historical Introduction to Roman Law, (5)
a marked division between the jus gentium and the jus naturale, slavery being
a material point for distinction. Gierke in Deutsches Privatrecht(6) criticised
the fact that Roman law conferred 'limitless' rights upon the owner, but this
latter submission has been disputed and convincingly refuted by inter alia
Mann Outlines of a History of Expropriation(7) and by Schulz in his Principles
of Roman Law. (8)
(4 ) Cf: t'1cNul ty op ci t p 555 at 556;· Gildenhuys op ci t P 22. Vide also
11 Encyclopaedia Britannica (1952)(Caput: Aristotle):
"If any of the seceding party (ie discontented Athenians)
wished to take a house in Eleusis, the people would help
them obtain the consent of the owner; but if they could
not come to terms, they should appoint three valuers on
either side, and the owner should receive whatever price
they should appoint."
(5) P 103 et seq
(6) Vol 11 (1905) at p 348 and at footnote 2 p 360.
(7) 1959 (75) LQR 188 at 189.
(8) 1936; at p 151.
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Although Gierke's interpretation may have been too extreme, private owner-
ship did possess certain qualities in Roman law that caused Schulz later
to retract the severity of his former renunciation and to conclude (perhaps
now in overstatement in Classical Roman Law(9) that Roman ownership was
"sancrosanct". What is clear however is that Roman law, although not
manifesting the elevatedness of the Greek schools, was inspired with
individualism in its conception of ownership, to the extent that a vested
right (jus quaesita) was accorded a more substantial protection and respect
than exists in South African law.
The legal writers and historians, (10) although at pains to furnish any
(9) 1951; p 355.
(10) In this regard, vide inter alia: Kaser, Das Romische Privatrecht I (1955)
343; Schulz Principles of Roman Law (1936) p 161; Gildenhuys op cit p 23
at footnote 15; Mann Outlines of a History of Expropriation 1959 (75) LQR
p 188 at p 193; Bruns Fontes Iuris Romani 7 ed p 193; J WJones Expropriation
in Roman Law 1929 (45)LOR p 512 at 525; Buckland and McNair Roman Law and
Common Law (2 ed) (Revised by Lawson) (1965') at p 95-6 where (for instance)
it is stated:
"There has been much discussion in recent times of the question
whether Roman law allowed expropriation for public utilities.
Here it is important to draw a distinction which has been
somewhat disregarded. In historical times, there was no
restriction on the powers of the supreme legislature. It
could expropriate for any purpose. But in fact, so far as
utilities are concerned, there is little sign of any such
thing in classical law. Indeed even such evidence as there
is may be deceptive, for it seems that the cases recorded
are of lands which were technically the property of the
State, though in the hands of possessores holding, in
practice permanently, but technically at the will of the
State. Augustus hesitated to expropriate ... (and) ...
(e)ven the later Emperors expropriated sparingly. Moreover
there is a difference between the Supreme legislature and an
executive department, and it does not appear that any magistrate
or official had the compulsory powers which are vested in so many
subordinate authorities in our law. On the other hand, necessity
and utility are different things, and there is no doubt that
officials of various classes had large powers of destruction of
property for religious military or police purposes .... But these
and similar cases are all of overriding necessity".
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considerable classical authority, appear in unison that expropriation, while
being extremely rare in Rome, did take place(ll) (and indicate further that
there was an acknowledgement of the distinctions that exist between the
various public law proprietary powers of the State, (12) although this analysis
there was not extensive and was not upon a formal(13) basis).
Notwithstanding the paucity of its appearance, frequently cited. examples
in substantiation of the existence of dominium eminens in Roman law, include
(14) .the roads and aqueducts . extendlng across the breadth of the Empire, the
straightness of which presupposes that expropriations occurred where they
d h h . d . d . t h· (15) Pt·passe t roug reglons un er a recognlse prlva e owners lp. erspec lve
is provided in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences in the words:(16)
"Nor was a sancrosanct control over lands and chattels immune
to the conspiracy of circumstance and logomachy. As early 17
as the Twelve Tables, a public interest in private possessions( )
was recognised; the city owner could not build to the line;
the pathway across the field was to be kept open; access to
water from private wells was not to be denied. The growth
of commerce brought in contract, introduced usages of trade
and transformed (property from) a customary into a pecuniary
institution. As time passed, a most pretentious absolute
was resolved into separate rights".
(ll)Vide eg Annals of Tacitus Book I p 75; cited.in North Little Rock v Pulaski
County Circuit Co~rt, Arkansas 393 SW 2d 268.
(12)As is set out in detail in Section 1.3 supra.
(13)As is illustrated in the last portion of the extract supra at footnote (10)
from Buckland and McNair op cit.
(14)B ·t 193 ... d h b 8 1 druns op Cl p ; crltlclse owever y uck an and McNair op cit at p 96.
(15)Cf: Bijnkershoek Quaestiones Juris Publici 11 regarding Marcus Licinius
Crassus' objection to the construction of an aqueduct through his farm.
(16)12 Encyc.Soc.Sci p 533.
(17) .Emphasls added.
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While the confines of this exposition preclude any further detailed synopsis
of the jurisprudential and historical evolution of property and its owner-
ship in the Roman law, suffice it here to consider a single remaining issue
pertinent to the deeper understanding of dominium eminens. In the words of
t~ann: (18)
"(a)lthough drawing a clear distinction between public and
private law, and not concerning themselves with the former,
classical lawyers did not include in the discussion of
dominium such limitations as public law imposed".
It was in their endorsement and adoption of this Romanist stance, that the
subsequent critics of contractarianism (such as Sir HenrYMain~,(19) were
to find substance for their rejection of the Social Contract - this accounts
too in part for the common failure to consider this theory(20)as a juris-
prudential foundation for dominium eminens, and for the frequently overlooked
or omitted restrictions and limitations the State's public law powers(2l)
place upon private dominium.
The Roman institution of property (and its ownership) was highly individua-
listic and accordingly was largely confined to and considered within the
parameters of the private law framework. It was for this reason that the
conflict between the private real right of ownership and the State's public
law dominium eminens did not find the soil for its fruition in depth in the
(l8)Outlines of a History of Expropriation 1959 (75) LQR 188 at 190.
(l9)Cf discussion under Section 2.1 supra.
(20)Cf Section 1.2.5 supra at footnote (1).
(21)Cf Section 1.3 supra.
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Roman law. To a large extent, the Roman conceptions of property generally
were transmitted into the South African law by the Roman Dutch jurists,
and today correspond to some considerable degree with their South African
counterparts. In the context of eminent domain, the Roman law affords
sparse authority, the reason for this perhaps being that it has been as a
result of the progressive acceleration and growth of our modern societies
that a concomitant present frequency of expropriations has arisen, and that
the inviolability or otherwise of private ownership now assumes a vital
. t . d .. d (22). S th Af . d 1 hImpor ance In mo ern JurIspru ence In ou rIca an e sew ere.
remains however a formative stage in the Hegelian model.
(22) .ef SectIon 1.2 supra.
Rome
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3.3 THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF PROPERTY IN MEDIAEVAL EUROPE-
THE TRANSITION FROt1 DARKNESS TO THEOLOGICAL
ENLIGHTENMENT, AND FROM A THEOCRATIC TO A
NATURALIST IDEOLOGY
3.3.1 THE DARK AGES AND THE EARLY MEDIAEVAL PERIOD
Relief crept in during the philosophical spiritual and cultural darkness
following the fall of Rome (476 AD), in the form of an emergent Church-dominated
mediaeval order, in which the earlier pinnacles of individualistic assertion
permitted under the natural law were at the outset immersed in the Eucharistic
chalice, and the former prominence of the secular respublica was enyoked
under the hegemony ecclesiastical.
True however to the traditions of the continuum of histor~ it was that the
foundations of the mediaeval philosophies were laid in Rome's twilight years.
Inter alia, St. Augustine's (354-430 AD) outline of eternal law in Reply to
Faustus the Manichean(l)as:
" the divine order or will of God which requires the
preservation of natural order, and forbids the breach of it ... ",
was in the centuries the followed interpreted (inter alia in the Decretum
Gratianum c 1140) in such a way that:identified the law of nature with the
law of God; founded a metaphysical subordination of the State under the
paramountcy of the Church; stressed that it was the Fall of Man from Grace
through the doctrine of Original Sin that gave rise to the need for institu-
tions such as the State; posited Man in the Divinely-inspired cosmos as being
(1) XXII 27.
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without significant independent or individualistic aspect and as being merely
an expression within the Divine Creation; and property, as expressed by
Carlyle in Mediaeval Political Theory in theWest(2) came to be seen as the
"resul t of the vicious desires and impulses of men", and its regulation was
"the means by which these vicious impulses might be restrained or limited".
In the view of the Christian Fathers, property was accordingly both a result
of sin and a Divine remedy for sin - a metaphysical dilemma, resolved for
mortal sinning man through his unqualified devotion to the tenets of Church
dogma, and rationalised for such man (as for example in respect of slavery)
(in the words of Dias Jurisprudence)(3) as "a form of collective retribution
for original sin".
The individualistic conception of property ownership as had existed in the
Roman law, came accordingly in the early Middle Ages to know a crucial
restatement in theocracy. When Rudolf van Ihering later attacked the Romanist
view in his Der Zweck im Recht(4) as expressing "the insatiability, the greed
of egoism", the early mediaeval interpretative transformation (or antithesis)
was not what he would have proposed. His emphasis was upon the 'social idea'
of property, to which expropriation afforded a consistent solution to
"the task to reconcile the interests of society with those of
the owner; it (expropriation) renders property a practically




(4)2 ed (1884) Vol I p 527 - 34; as translated by Husik Law as Means to
an End New York (1924) p 391 - 397.
3.3.2 THE FEUDAL AND THE ALLODIAL FORMS OF OWNERSHIP
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Instead of the movement Von Ihering would have directed had he held the
power to orchestrate the historical unfolding, in its place and as an
accompaniment to the ecclesiastically-based mediaeval philosophies, the
nature of immovable property ownership underwent a significant change from
an allodial form to that form prevailing during the feudal period in Europe.
In modern times, history has turned full circle again to the allodial form
of property ownership in which the private rights of dominium plenum are
inviolable and indefeasible (save for the overriding public powers (inter
alia of dominium eminens) vesting in the State and exercisable in the public
interest). In the words of Ring in Valuation of Real Estate, modern land
ownership is allodial:
"(the) rights to the control and enjoyment of property under
allodial ownership are inviolate and exclusive, except for
superior and sovereign rights of government exercised for
the mutual welfare of the community, state or nation".
(5)
In Dissertations on Early Law and Custom, (6) Sir Henry Maine, having first
considered the nature of tribal ownership in ancient societies, analysed in
depth the distinction between allodial and feudal land. The allod in his
view was "equivalent to or directly. descended from the share which each man
took in the appropriated portion of the domain of the group to which he
belonged ... this share was not at first a definite area but what we should
now call a fraction or aliquot share of the divisible land ... and each share
(5) Ring, Valuation of Real Estate p 330.
(6) (1891) P 338 et seq.
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very slowly became appropriated to particular families". Since, on the
other hand, feudal tenure was tenure in the strict sense - that of holding
land rather than owning it, with a dominium directum vesting in the Sovereign
and merely a dominium utile vesting in the feudal land grantee(7) - Maine was
led to the conclusion that:
"(n)othing can be more singularly unlike than ...
the Roman (which is the developed allodial) view
of land as essentially divisible, ... (and) the . (8)
feudal view of land as essentially impartible .... "
What Maine had in mind was that under allodial ownership, there is (in his
words) a "long succession of partial ownerships, making up together one
complete ownership" - in these references to the I divisibili ty I of Roman
ownership, he impliedly lends his support to the 'bundle of sticks' analogy
later enunciated. (9) On the other hand, under feudal tenure, all land
vested in the Sovereign or Crown, and private persons acquired the right to
hold (as opposed to own) only such land as had been the subject of a grant
to them from .the Crown. Accordingly it would appear that under an allodial
system of ownership, expropriation would entail an exercise by the State of
its power of dominium eminens, whereas under the feudal form, since the
private right was less than full ownership, the State's interference therewith
would be of a lesser degree also - .assuming the form more of a revocation of
the original grant(lO) than of the inroad upon the sanctity and inviolability
of private ownership that expropriation in its modern context may appear to
constitute.
(7) Cf Mann 1959 LQR 188 at 191.
(8) Maine op cit p 340.
(9) Vide Section 3.6 infra.
(10) ef original proprietary theory discussed at S 1.2.2 supra.
3.3.3 THE LATER MEDIAEVAL PERIOD AND THOMAS AQUINAS
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A significant departure from the traditions of the early Christian Fathers -
a transi tion from theocratic harshness to cosmological benevolence, fr"om
darkness to theological enlightenment, and from Scriptural authority to
naturalist ideology - emerged in the writings of St Thomas Aquinas (1225 -
1274) in his view of private property and the State.
Aquinas envisaged an interactive and hierarchial system(ll)comprising eternal
law, natural law, divine law (Biblically revealed), and human law. In Summa
Theologica(12) all four branches of the Thomist system were embraced in his
statement that law is:
"nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common
good, made by him who has the care of the community, and
promulgated" °
In so stating, Aquinas afforded a cue for both the major trends that were to
arise in the centuries that followed - firstly the transformation of the
formerly exclusively higher law basis of the natural law, into a less deistic
system based upon the reason and rationality of individualistic men; and
secondly, in his words "by him who has the care of the community", he presaged
the custodianship or trusteeship aspect (vesting in the State) that was
explored by the Social Contract theorists. (13) In respect of property law,
the writings of Friedman(14) afford a perspective:
(ll)As Dias comments in Jurisprudence p 569.
(12)1 2 Q 90 Art 4.
(13)Cf lOnter alloa Lucas de Penna t 1 dO d Se a lscusse supra at ection 2.2
(14)Legal Theory p 59 and 60.
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"On the right of property, St Thomas' teaching stands
between the unconditional rejection of private property
by the Fathers of the Church and the later elevation of (15)
private property into a natural God-given right".
In the proprietary rejuvenation under Aquinas, came a synthesised incor-
poration of the former Roman and early mediaeval visions of property. No
longer were these institutions seen as being innately sinful (as in the
early mediaeval period) and their reconciliation with and acceptance within
the Christian philosophy constituted a core upon which extensive embellish-
ment has subsequently(16) and to the present day(17) been made within the
Western societies.
(ls)Furthermore, as Laski notes in Introduction to Politics p 19:
"For Thomas Aquinas, law is a mirror wherein is
reflected the divine reason which planned and
governs the universe. In obeying it, as men
ought to obey it, they are clearly bringing
their conduct into accord with the plan upon
which the good order of the world depends".
(16)Cf: inter alia, the writings of John Calvin, discussed under Section 2.2
supra in main text at footnotes 15 to 18.
(17)Cf: the writings of John Finnis, discussed infra at Section 3.3.4.
3.3.4 THE SUBSEQUENT INFLUENCE OF THOMAS AQUINAS
AND THE NATURALIST WRITINGS OF JOHN FINNIS
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St Thomas Aquinas' writings have exercised a profound influence upon
naturalist thinking in the West this millenium. In recent times, Finnis'
Natural Law and Natural Rights(l8)owes a great deal to the Thomist texts
as a foundation, although as Finnis states:(l9)
"... my prior concern is to give my own response to (the)
problems (of human good and practical reasonableness) ...
in this book, nothing is asserted or defended by appeal
to the authority of any person or body. I do quite
frequently refer to Thomas Aquinas, because on any view
he occupies a uniquely strategic place in the history of
naturai law.... But, while there is place for appeal to,
and deference to, authority ... (m)y arguments ...
stand or fall by their own reasonableness or otherwise".
Finnis' contribution to modern naturalist thinking parallels that of
Aquinas in his time. As Wacks notes in Judges and Injustice .(20)
"(n)o account of the natural law tradition can now afford
to ignore John Finnis". (21)
(18) OXford- Clarendon 1980.
(19)Ibid Preface pp v - vi.
(20)
Inaugural lecture University of Natal 1983 p 20 footnote 8.
(21) It' f h' h hlS or t lS reason t at t e naturalist stance adopted herein, is
not taken to the extreme of denying of the lawfulness of the decision
in Joyce and McGregor v Cape Provincial Administration 1946 AD 658,
discussed in Sections 1.2.3 and 1.6 supra. Finnis observes in this
regard (op cit p 357):
"It is not conducive to clear thought or to any good
practical purpose, to smudge the positivity of law by
denying the legal obligatoriness in the legal or intra-
systemic sense of a rule recently affirmed as legally
·valid and obligatory by the highest institution of the
legal system".
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Finnis analyses on two levels his central proposition that the conflict
between positivism and naturalism is more apparent than real, in that
d · . ) (22)f- . tnatural law provides a support (rather than a contra lctlon' . or 1 s
... t t t (23)POSltlV1S coun erpar .'
In the first place, although he concedes that the naturalists (inter alia
(24) .
of the Catholic school) may have fallen into the trap that Hume hlgh-
lighted (that of deriving an 'ought' from an 'is', by way of a defective
syllogism), he contends (as is supported herein), that this error was not
committed by Aquinas or Aristotle. Aquinas for instance held the view that
(22)Contra Sir John Wessels in History of the Roman Dutch Law:
" ... the whole theory of the Law of Nature is now so
thoroughly exploded that it is difficult for the
modern student to imagine how the jurists of former
years ever came to attach such importance to the
abstraction - Natural law".
(23)It is noted that Finnis' writings have a bearing upon the themes developed
by Lon Fuller in The Morality of Law (especially Chapter 3 and pp 96 and
181) and by Professor H L A Hart in The Concept of Law (in particular
Chapter 9: 'Law and Morals'). Fuller's submission is that the validity
or otherwise of a law is to be assessed in accordance with its 'internal'
or 'inner' morality, regardless apparently of the justness or otherwise
of the system that created it. In terms of his eight principles of the
inner morality of law (viz: generality, promulgation, prospectiveness,
clarity, consistency, possibility, stability and congruence), a 'partial'
lawfulness is possible. Hart, on the other hand, sets forward a theory
of the 'minimum content' of natural law. The Hart-Fuller debate lies
however beyond the confines of this exposition, and is accordingly not
assessed herein - it appears however that Finnis makes a valuable extension
and complement thereto. Vide: Hart Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals 71 (1958-59) Harvard Law Review 593; contra Fuller Positivism
and Fidelity to the Law: A Reply to Professor Hart Ibid 630 (inter alia at
659'. Vide also: Dyzenhaus Positivism and Validity (1983)(Part 3) 100 SALJ
454.
(24)Vide Sections 2.4.5 at footnote 1 and 2.5.1 at footnote 2.
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fundamental forms of good and evil are self-evident, and are accordingly
never derived. Hume's noncognitivist observation (that no rational process
in philosophy permits objectively the knowing of right from wrong, or the
derivation of 'ought' from 'is'), loses weight accordingly as a ground for
the relegation of naturalist thinking.(25)
In the second place, Finnis submits that the principle 'lex injusta non est
lex',(26) (notwithstanding frequent criticism by positivists on this basis),
is not a principle of natural law in its accurate conception. The
distinguishing criterion between just and unjust laws lies in whether they
have power morally, ie whether they bind the conscience. In Finnis' view,
if the system itself on the whole is just, then the Citizen would have a
moral duty (in the interests of peace, order, stability and security), to
observe even an unjust law, since non-observance thereof would undermine
the State. In short, his submission seems that whereas the unjust laws
of an unjust regime remain unjust, the unjust laws of a just government
may be just (in the sense that they may still be morally binding). (27)
(25')Cf F· .lnnlS op cit at inter alia Sections 11.4 and II.S.
(26~f Finnis op cit Chapter XII ('Unjust Laws') in particular XII.4
(entitled 'Lex Injusta Non Est Lex').
(27)Cf Finnis op cit p 352 where he states:
"... since authority is derived solely from the needs of the
common good, a ruler's use of authority is radically defective
if he exploits his opportunities by making stipulations intended
by him not for the common good, but for his own or his friends'
or party's or faction's advantage, or out of malice against some
person or group .... On the other hand, it is quite possible that
an improperly motivated law may happen to be in its contents
compatible with justice and even promote the common good".
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In overview of the relationship between State and Citizen, Finnis submits:
"All my analyses of authority and obligation can be summed up
in the following theorem: the ruler has, very strictly speaking,
no right to be obeyed; but he has the authority to give directions
and make laws that are morally obligatory and that he has the
responsibility of enforcing. He has this authority for the sake
of the common good .... Therefore if he uses his authority to make
stipulations against the common good, or against any of the basic
principles of practical reasonableness, those stipulations
altogether lack the authority they would otherwise have by virtue
of being his. More precisely, stipulations made for partisan
advantage, or (without emergency justification) in excess of
legally defined authority, or imposing inequitable burdens on
their subjects, or directing the doing of things that should
never be done, simply fail, of themselves, to create any moral
obligation whatever.
This conclusion should (however) be read with precision .... ,,(28)
This 'theorem' contains considerable relevance for South Africa at present.
Under his view, our Parliament would have "the authority to ... make laws
for the sake of the common good", but no authori ty (by virtue merel y of
having enacted legislation) (29)"to make stipulations .against the common good".
It appears accordingly that the statutory basis for apartheid and Group Areas'
expropriations for instance, does not in itself justify or rationalise moral
adherence thereto, since firstly South Africa lacks a just liberalist and
contractarian foundation, and since secondly, our system is from that
perspective accordingly unjust. Alternatively expressed, (provided that
the contractarian argument is approved), even if it is accepted that lex
injusta may nevertheless be lex (even under a naturalist orientation), then
still it would seem that no moral validity or bindingness will flow from
South Africa's apartheid laws, unless the system itself is justly based.
(28)Fo ° • 9lnnlS op Clt p 35 -60. Cf: the discussion of "public purposes"in
Section 1.3.8 supra at footnote 26.
(29)Cf emphasised section supra in extract from Finnis pp 359-60.
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This writer records however that he cannot concede without some reservation,
Finnis' submission that naturalist and positivist law are not necessarily in
conflict. Admittedly, the derivation of 'ought' from 'is' is contrary to
logic, and it appears true that this was not undertaken by Aquinas and certain
other great naturalists. However, a vast chasm remains yawning between 'is'
and 'ought', and between just and unjust laws; and it is submitted that they
appear incapable of the degree of reconciliation that Finnis attempts.
Although the stance of this writer is accordingly of a greater naturalist
extreme than that of Finnis, it is relevant to note that even Finnis' more
moderate naturalism does not extend to clothing the unjust dictates of an
unjust system with a cloak of 'lawfulness'.
In the final analysis, it appears that Finnis' view represents the synthesised
culmination of the opposing strands that Aquinas and Hume respectively wove
into the tapestry of jurisprudence, and in turn will prove to be the commence-
ment of jurisprudential movements to come. Hegel's model(30) accordingly
finds an expression even in the naturalist-positivist interplay.
(30) .Cf Sectlons 2.5.4 and 3.1 supra.
3.3.5 THE MEDIAEVAL PERIOD IN OVERVIEW WITHIN HISTORY'S CONTINUUM
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From "the comfortable dialectic which had diluted the communism of the early
church into a doctrine of stewardship and the very imminence of the mediaeval
deity which had enabled responsibility for inequalities in wealth to be
placed upon divine shoulders",(31) a proprietary order symbolised in the
emergent middle class had been born. The former curious and convoluted
theocratic rationalisations of the status quo, of Man as a component of a
universal macrocosm, yielded synthetically now both in the spiritual and
in the political field, to the Individualism and Reason that were in the
making. The conflict between Man's private rights to property and his
public law subjection to the Sovereign power, along with his liability to
render up his property for the public good, were to come to know the
scrutiny of contractarian philosophers to come - Grotius, Hobbes, Locke,
Rousseau and others(32) - and their attempts to justify the conflict
between individual rights and duties to the State. As was later to be seen~
it was by the very growth of states and more recently by the industrialisation
of the State's municipal activities, that the prominence of expropriation was
to be accelerated.
(31)12 Encyc.Soc.Sci. p 534.
(32)Th "1 tt' 't' 'd d' S ' 2e prlnClpa con rac arlan wrl lngs are conSl ere ln ectlon .4 supra.
Regarding the early formative period, vide inter alia the writings of
Machiavelli (Prince and Discourses) (1513), discussed in Section 2.2
supra at footnote (19). Cf also Dias Jurisprudence p 572,
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3.4 THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONCEPTS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
AND DOMINIUM EMINENS IN ENGLISH LAW, AND THE INFLUENCE
THEREBY EXERCISED ON THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA
No tracing of the Hegelian historical synthesis(l) in respect of property
ownership and expropriation in South Africa, would be satisfactory without
a consideration of the antecedent development of that institution and that
instrument in English law; since, notwithstanding that the South African
interpretation of private ownership itself is linked to Roman and Roman-
Dutch foundations, (2) and notwithstanding that it is the compulsory purchase
postulate(3) that is adopted in England, much of our expropriation legis-
lation nevertheless derives in a modified and jurisprudentially re-oriented
form from its statutory precursors in the English system(4)- in particular,
the 1845 Lands Clauses Consolidation Act. (5) In this regard, Or Gildenhuys
observes:(6)
"Die bepalings van die 1845 'Land Clauses Act' het as
model gedien vir die onteieningswetgewing in meeste
gemenebeslande en ook in Suid Afrika".
It is significant to observe that this Act was introduced in a century
impregnated with positivism, and following upon a century flavoured with
(1) Cf Sections 2.5.4 and 3.1 supra.
(2 ) Cf Section 3.2 supra.
(3) Cf Section 1.2.4 supra.
(4) Gi1denhuys op cit p 4 states: "Die onteieningswette in Suid Afrika stam
uit Britse wetgewing".
(5) 6 Statutes 9:Vide Davies Law of Compulsory Purchase and Compensation
I p xx~. Cf footnote 31 infra and ma~n text thereat et seq.
(6) G~ldenhuys Ib~d p 26. Th' b" . d• • lS su m~SSlon ~s eveloped herein, infra.
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utilitarianism. (7) The 1845 Act however, in its extensive recognition of
the expropriatee's compensation entitlement, (8) finds a concord with the
naturalist principle expressed by Grotius, (9) that compensation is
"wherever possible" to be paid. Although in its wide reach and influence,
its structure and broad provisions have been transmitted to the Western
world, what has not survived (even in English law, as evidenced by the
ACquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act (1919», is the in-
depth embodiment of naturalist principles of compensation. The supplanting
positivist stance in South Africa (and elsewhere) at present has eroded much
of the naturalist merit the 1845 Act contained.
It was centuries earlier however that the proprietary relations and rights
of Citizens on the one hand, and on the other the State's expropriation power
and the limits thereupon, had found their first major expression in English
law in the Magna Carta of 1215. Chapter 29 thereof foreshadowed the liberal
(7) The works of Austin Hume and Bentham (Cf: Sections 2.5.1 and 2.4.5 at (1»
tended to reduce the significance attached in England at the time
to the earlier writings of John Locke (Section 2.4.4 supra). Recent
philosophers such as Rawls (Section 2.6 supra) and Finnis (Natural Law
and Natural Rights - discussed infra) have taken issue respectively
with the utilitarian and positivist standpoints. Their incisive (and
in the submission of this writer, their convincing) attacks have
lessened substantially the anti-naturalist and anti-contractarian
stance of former eras, and have contributed accordingly to the
anticipation of a return to equity in expropriations.
(8) ef Section 68 of the 1845 Act.
(9) Vide Sections 1.1 (at footnote 10) and 1.6 supra.
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spirit of Locke(lO) in providing:(ll)
" ... no freeman shall be ... disseized of his freeholds
or liberties or free customs ... but ... by the law of (12)
the land".
The origin in English law of the State's 'compulsory purchase' (or expropria-
tion) power, casts a light upon the contribution English law has made to the
development of dominium eminens. In early times, since the distinction
between the various public law powers of the State was blurred (having not
yet experienced the refinement and delineation that modern analysis has
introduced), (13) and further since the agrarian economy that prevailed,
generally required expropriations only for purposes of the defence of the
realm(14) or for averting natural disasters, (15) the acquisition of private
property by the State was then conducted largely by way of the exercise of
(lO)Cf Section 2.4.4 supra.
(ll)Cf Gildenhuys op cit p 25; Mann Outlines of a History of Expropriation
(1959) 75 LQR 188.
(12)Relevant also in this regard are Chapters 19 21 and 28. Vide also:
Erasmus~ text of Lectures on Expropriation at the Uni~ersity of Natal
1983.
(13)Vide Section 1.3 supra.
(14)In Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpetre (1606) 12 Co Rep 12, it
was held:
"And therefore by the common law, every man may come upon my
land for the defence of the realm ... for this is for the
public, and everyone hath benefit by it; but after the danger
is over, the trenches and bulwarks ought to be removed, so that
the owner shall not have prejudice in his inheritance ...
Princeps et respublica ex justa causa possunt rem meam auferre."
Davies op cit p 10 at footnote 2 comments succinctly on this case that:
"Nowadays, of course, the danger is never over".
(15)Vide Case of the Isle of Ely 10 Co Rep 141; and Attorney-General v Tomline
12 Ch D 214.
266
the Sovereign's prerogative powers:16 )and if thereby, frequently without
. (17)compensatlon.
On a procedural level, Nichols notes that eminent domain originated in English
law in the 'inquest of office', (18)an ancient proceeding(19) requiring as a
precursor to expropriation, "an inquiry by jurors concerning any matter that
entitled the king to the possession of lands, tenements, goods and chattels". (20)
The procedure adopted in respect of the determination of compensation required
(16)The Sovereign's prerogative extended beyond the defence of the realm, to
include,as Nichols notes (op cit p 1 - 68)~the power of purveyance and
pre-emption:
" ... (AJ ... prerogative of the crown which strongly resembled
the power of eminent domain as it is now understood, was that
of purveyance and pre-emption, by which the king had the right
to seize provisions for the use of the royal household, without
the consent of the owner, and to pay for them at a fair valuation
made by appraisers. This ancient prerogative was recognised and
regulated by Section 28 of the Magna Carta and was finally abolished
by statute in the time of Charles II".
The resemblance of these powers has been discussed in Little Rock Junction
Railroad Company v Woodruff 49 Ark 381 5 SW 792. Vide also Chitty
Prerogatives of the Crown 213.
(17)Cf 1 Blackstone Commentaries 265 and 287. Contra however in modern
English law Attorney-General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel 1920 AC 508 (HL),
discussed in Section 1.3.4 supra at footnote (13) and in main text thereat
et seq.
(18)Op cit S 1.2.1(1).
(l9)Cf: 2 Blackstone Commentaries 259
"It is part of the liberties of England, and greatly for the
safety of the subject, that the king may not enter upon and
seize any man's possession upon bare surmises, and without




the issue of a writ ad quod damnum(21) .- a fairly extensive use of this writ
. d . . . . 1 E 1· h d A . 1 (22 )1S foun 1n expropr1atlon cases 1n ear y ng 1S an mer1can aWe
By the late eighteenth century however, the writ ad quod damnum had fallen
into disuse, since the alternative statutory procedure of 'inclosure,(23) was
available. It is accordingly that it was held in Davison v Gill:(24)
(the) mode of proceeding chalked out in the 19th section
(of 13 Geo II c 78), .was substi tuted in lieu of the old writ
of ad quod damnum, which had become inconvenient from the
expense and difficulty with which it was attended. A more
compendious and easy method was thereby given; but still the
substance of the old proceeding was to be preserved in all
essential points".
(21)A writ ad quod damnum was issued by the chancery, and directed the sheriff
of the area in which the property was situate, to "... inquire by a jury
what damage it would be to the king, or to any other person, to grant a
liberty, fair, market, highway or the like •.• " (Vide Nichols op cit S 1 - 21
and references cited thereat). It is noted further that the proceeding was
ex parte and that the audi a1teram partem principle did not have application.
(22)Vide eg: King v Warde Cro Car 226 (1663); Ex parte Armitage Ambler 293
(1756); Sir Edward Coke in Case of the Isle of Elf 10 Co Rep 141; Robert
Calli~ Reading upon the Statute of Sewers (1622) 23 Henry VIII cS);
2 Kent's Commentaries 340; Chesapeake Canal Company v Union Bank
4 Cranch CC 75, Fed Case No 2653.
(23)Davies in the Law of Compulsory Purchase and Compensation sets out the
nature of 'inclosures' (at pp 10 - 13; 1978 ed):,
"Perhaps the best established form of compulsory purchase in
the days of B1ackstone, (leaving aside the prerogative right,
and indeed duty, of the Crown to take land for the defence of
the realm in an emergency, was the inc10sure movement. The
essence of inclosures was the extinction of various rights in
land, under compulsory powers, in order to make possible the
reallocation of that land with a view to applying more efficient
methods of farming. The rights to be extinguished included
separate holdings and rights of common; in other words, not
only the full possession of land, but lesser rights super-
imposed on such possession .... "
Cf: Gildenhuys op cit p 26 referring to Davies op cit p 8.
(24)1 East 64 (USA).
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Characteristic of the early period(25) in English law, was a vision of
expropriation that was co-existent with and complementary to the prevailing
naturalist (and later contractarian, or more precisely, Lockesian) (26)
subscription to the inviolability (wherever possible) of private ownership.
Blackstone's celebrated dicta (in the eighteenth century) are indicative of
this spirit, which under the compulsory purchase postulate, has extended in
English law even to the present day - as evidenced inter alia in Attorney-
(27 )General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel. Blackstone stated:
"So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property
that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not
even for the general good of the whole community. If a new
road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a
private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to
the public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this
without the consent of the owner of the land. In vain may it be
urged, that the good of the individual ought to yield to that·
of the community; for it would be dangerous to allow any private
man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this common
good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no. Besides, the
public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in~e
protection of every individual's private rights, as modelled by the
municipal law. In this and similar cases the legislature alone
can, and indeed frequently does, interpose, and compel the in-
dividual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel?
Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an
arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification
and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The public is
now conside~ed as an individual, treating with an individual.
for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the
owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and
even this is an exertion of a power, which the legislature in-










(25)Cf: Gough Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History Chapter 4
at 48 - 65, in particular his discussion of M A Judson's views on the
rights of property. Vide also Judson The Crisis of the Constitution
Rutgers (1949).
(26)Vl.·de S . 2 4 4ectl.on . . supra.
(27)1920 AC 508, discussed in Section 1.3.4 supra. It was held here that the
exercise of the sovereign prerogative to expropriate without compensation,
although still existing, yields to the Sovereign's power to expropriate
subject to compensation, where the latter is statutorily stipulated.
(28)1 Blackstone Commentaries 139. The Roman numerals in the margin of the
extract above, have been inserted to link the text with the observations
that follow.
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d h d· . . h· (29). . t f th 1Blackstone's words recor t e Istlnguls Ing Imprln s 0 e ear y
English interpretation - the essential propositions he makes are that:
(i) the sanctity of private ownership is reverently
to be respected;
(ii) the transgression of private ownership rights is to
be undertaken only with the consent of the owner
(albeit deemed);
(iii) public wellbeing and the law itself are promoted by a
focus upon and paramountcy of private rights;
(iv) true to naturalist principles, full compensation is to
attend any expropriation;
(v) deprivation or dispossession under dominium eminens
is necessarily to be accompanied by a "full indemnification
and equivalent", an. alienation that is necessarily "for
a reasonable price";
(vi) expropriation is not to be exercised "absolutely" or in an
"arbitrary manner"; and impliedly, sovereign excess or
abuse is to be avoided "with caution"; and
(vii) finally, the State's power to expropriate is to be construed
in a way that "(t)he public is now considered as an individual"
and is "treating with an individual for an exchange". Herein
lies the determinative feature of English expropriation law -
the compulsory purchase postulate(30) - and it is upon this
final basis principally, that a divergence from the Continental
and American systems at the time, was apparent.
(29)The word 'distinguishing' is here used in a dual sense - firstly to suggest
that these features are identifiably attributable to and indicative of English
expropriation law, and secondly to connote that they in a measure imbue
English law inthis regard with a significant merit under naturalist criteria.
(30)Cf Section 1.2.4 supra.
"
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The 1845 Land Clauses Consolidation Act(31) was the synthetic culmination of
the movement from the Magna Carta to the time of Blackstone, but at the
same time, it heralded the mass of expropriation legislation that was to
come. It streamlined the English common law in regulating a standard
procedure and basis for compensation, although as Gildenhuys notes, (32)
"(h)ierdie wet het nie weggedoen met die noodsaaklikheid
van 'n privaat wet vir elke skema nie ... ", (33)
and further that "(d)it was nie verpligtend dat alle prosedures volgens die
1845 'Land Clauses Act' moes plaasvind nie •.•. ,,(34)
The procedures embodied in the 1845 Act (England) foreshadow closely those
in later South African (and other)(35) law. (36) Firstly, in Section 18 for
instance, the notice to treat anticipates the notice of expropriation in
Section 7 of the Expropriation Act(37) (South Africa), although a substantial
(3l)(England). Vide footnote 5 supra.
(32)Op cit p 26.
(33)Gildenhuys, ibid, observes further in this regard:
So 'n privaat wet was nog steeds nodig
vir die magtiging van die skema self, en
vir die bepaling van watter grond onteien
moes word .... "
(34)It seems however that alternative procedures were uncommon.
(35)Al· f S th Af . . . .n ana YS1S 0 non- ou rlcan exproprlatlon procedure lles however
beyond the confines of this thesis - for this reason it is not under-
taken herein. Cf however footnote (42) infra.
(36)Cf footnote 6 supra.
(37)Act 63 of 1975 (SA).
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difference is contained in the effect thereof - under the former, ownership
remained vested in the private owner, whereas under the latter, ownership
. 1 t d' th t' (38) S dlpasses by operation of law on the date stlPU a e ln e no lce. econ y,
in Section 22 of the 1845 Act, jurisdiction was determined on the basis of
the qu~ntum of the claim (whether it was less than £50 or not) - a similar
provision exists in Section 14 of the South African Act (although here,
the 'cutoff point'is RlOO 000,00). Thirdly, the English statute in Section
68 distinguished between land claims and financial loss claims(39) - this
distinction is carried over into South African law in Sections l2(1)(a)(i)
and l2(1)(a)(ii) of the 1975 Act. Although differences(40) exist between
the two Acts, inter alia the comparisons supra indicate the strong formative
. fl h 1845 A h . d' . t' 1 (41) . d thln uence t e ct as exerClse ln our exproprla lon aw, an e
extent to which the present South African statute is modelled on its English
antecedents. (42)
(38)Cf Act 63 of 1975, Section 8.
(39)Cf Gildenhuys op cit p 27.
(40)There are certain significant distinctions between the 1845 Act and South
Africa's Act 63 of 1975, inter alia: firstly, the former recognised a
'pretium affectionis' while the latter is based on the 'verum pretium'
(under a market value test: cf Section 12(1»; secondly, the latter
substitutes a solatium entitlement for this shortfall (cf Section 12(2»:'
thirdly, the former in Section·68 recognises directly 'severance damages'
and 'injurious affection', while the latter includes no reference thereto
(and perhaps excludes such claims under Section 12(5».
(4l)A detailed discussion of the present administrative procedure under Act
63 of 1975 (as amended), is contained in the Appendix following this subsectio
(42)It is noted that there have been subsequent legislative developments in
English law, inter alia: the Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation;
Act (1919) (which attempted to constrain the extensive compensation awards
permissible under the 1845 Act); the Acguisition of Land (Authorisation
Procedure) Act (1946) (6 Statutes 154); the Land Compensation Act (1961)
(6 Statutes 238); the Compulsory Purchase Act (1965) (6 Statutes 281);
the Town and Country Planning Act (1971) (41 Statutes 1571); the Community
Land Act (1975) (45 Statutes 2134); and the Development Land Tax Act (1976).
From the Hegelian and historical standpoint, and in the evolution of our
present legislation, it remains however the 1845 Land Clauses Consolidation
Act that has had the most significant influence on the South African
development.
South African property and expropriation law is not by any means however
a consequence only of the English interpretation. In adopting the Western
capitalist spirit and the ethic of individualism, the relation between
Citizens and their Property in South Africa has been influenced to a
considerable extent also by the developments in France and America at
the time. It is to this assessment that the focus now turns. (43) ·
(43)V"d S "1 e ectlon 3.5 hereafter.
3.5
3.5.1
BRIDGING THE GULF TO THE MODERN ERA
AND A NEW VISION OF PROPERTY
INDIVIDUALISM AND THE INDEFEASIBILITY
OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
It was within the legal heritage, and in the teachings of Thomas Aquinas(l)
in particular, that the foundations of a new vision of property were laid.
In the period that followed, the Social Contract movement(2) took place
under Grotius~HobbesJLocke and Rousseau, and culminated in the French
Revolution(3) and in the Bills of Rights, (4) and in the American Declaration
(1) Vide Section 3.3 supra.
(2) Vide Section 2.4 supra.
(3) 1789.
(4) In France~ liberalism~ contractarianism and egalitarianism were manifested
in the Declaration des Droits de l'homme et da Citoyen of 26 August 1789,
which guaranteed the following rights (set out herein in outline) in order
that " ... (the) demands of the citizens, by being founded henceforward on
simple and incontestable principles, may always redound to the maintenance
of the constitution and the general welfare" (ex Preamble).
The following extract is adapted from an Appendix in G Lefebvre The Coming
of the French Revolution 1789 (Transl. by R R Palmer) Vintage Books New
York 1960:
" ... The Assembly consequently recognises and declares, in
the presence and under the auspices of the Supreme Being,
the following rights of man and the citizen.
1. Men are born and remain free and equal in rights ....
2. The aim of all political association is to preserve
the natural and (inalienable) rights of man. These
rights are liberty, property, security and resistance
to oppression.
3•••• all sovereignty rests essentially in the nation
(people) ....
4. Liberty consists in the ability to do whatever does not
harm another; hence the exercise of the natural rights
of each man has no limits except those which assure to
other members of society the enjoyment of the same rights.




5. Law may rightfully prohibit only those actions which
are injurious to society ....
6. Law is the expression of the general will; all citizens
have the right to take part ... in its formation. It
must be the same for all whether it protects or penalises.
All citizens being equal in its eyes are equally admissible
to all public dignities offices and employments, according
to their capacity, with no other distinction than that of
their virtues and talents.
7. (arrest and detention)
8. (punishments) ....
9. (presumption of innocence)
10. (freedom of opinion and reiigion)
11. (freedom of thought speech and expression)
12. Preservation of the rights of man and the citizen requires
the existence of public forces. These forces are therefore
instituted for the advantage of all, not for the private
benefit of those to whom they are entrusted. .
13. For maintenance of public forces and for expenses of
administration, common taxation is necessary ....
14 . .... (the right to have demonstrated the necessity of
public taxes) ....
15 . .... (accountability of public officials) ....
16. Any society in which the guarantee of rights is not
assured or the separation of powers not determined,
has no constitution.
17. Property being an inviolable and sacred right, no-one
may be deprived of it except for an obvious requirement
of public necessity, certified by law, and then on
condition of a just compensation in advance".
From these texts, it is apparent that the French Bill of Rights embodies
and expresses certain fundamental principles of contractarianism -
Rousseau's influence is significant (cf articles 1 3 6 and 12), as is
that of Locke (cf articles 2 4 5 17), and to a lesser extent Montesquieu
(article 16). The Declaration foreshadows also the writings of Kant
(cf article 4) and Rawls (his first principle in article 4 and his
second principle in article 6). In addition, by extension, apartheid
contradicts these fundamental rights of man (cf articles 1 2 3 4 and 5),
and particularly articles 6 and 16.




of Independence(S) and in the United States Constitution. (6) Liberalism
(5) The Preamble to the American Declaration of Independence (1776) states:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident:
THAT all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among
these are life liberty and the pursuit of happiness;
THAT to· secure these rights, givernments are instituted among
men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed;
THAT whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these
ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it,
and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such
principles and organising its powers in such form, as to them
shall seem most likely to affect their safety and happiness".
Although the proprietary emphasis is here less than that contained in the
French Bill of Rights or in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States' Constitution, the contractarian spirit and emphasis are
still apparent, particularly in the second declaration supra.
It is noted further that:
firstly, although "life liberty and the pursuit of happiness"are
endowed by God, the institution of private ownership by contrast
is created by men (cf: first declaration supra);
secondly, that it is the ancilliary Social Contract issue of
civil disobedience (not considered in depth in this exposition)
that is contemplated in the third declaration supra; and
thirdly, that common to all three declarations supra, is the
liberalist egalitarian and contractarian ethic of Locke,Rousseau
and t~adison.
Vide also: Marshall CJ in Ogden y Saunders 12 Wheat (US) 213,6 LEd 606
and Shaw C J in Wellington Petitioner 16 Pick (Hass) 87 at 102,27 An
Dec 631.
(6)
The Anlerican Bill of Rights of 15 December 1791 is embodied in the first.
ten amendments to the United States' Constitution. In total, twenty-five
Amendments have been made (the most recent being on 23 February 1967),
but those of primary proprietary significance are the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments (the latter being dated 28 July 1868).
Cf: Section 1.4 at footnote (28).
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(Text Continued)
and contractarianism, individualism and egalitarianism, became there
enshrined and in property jurisprudence at the time, a similar spirit
·f t d (7)was manl es e .
The complexity of the Hegelian synthesis, and the dominating 'World Spirit'
that regulates the unfolding of secular affairs, are perhaps the most
acutely prominent and apparent in the late eighteenth century. (8) At a
(7)The prevalent liberalist/contractarian/individualistic and egalitarian
approach was apparent in Article 17 of the French Declaration of 1789
(cf footnote 4 supra):
"Property being an unviolable and sacred right, no-one
may be deprived of it except for an obvious requirement
of public necessity, certified by law, and then on
condition of a just compensation in advance".
It is apparent then that although expropriation was recognised, it
was acknowledged to be subject to the requirements of public need, of
due process (to borrow the American nomenclature), and of just
compensation in advance. Regarding the condition that advance payment
of compensation be made: this has fallen away in modern usage in many
jurisdictions, and has been substituted by the requirement that an
interest entitlement on arrear amounts arises (cf Section. 12(3) of
the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975). There are still however current
instances of the retention of this requirement (eg Louisiana USA) (in
consequence of the French influence) (Vide Nichols op cit P I - 68).
This principle has been embodied in various modern Continental consti-
tutions also - eg: French Code Civile Art 545:
" ... no-one is obliged to. transfer his property, unless it
be for public utility, and in consideration of a just and
previous indemni ty".
Vide also: Constitution of Belguim, Art 2; German Grundrechte Articles
14 and 15;Fundamental Law of Holland, Art 147. Cf: Peaslee Constitutions
of Nations (1956).
(8)In this regard it is significant to note that Hegel's writings came in
the wake of the popular revolutionary movement. His works then are
doubly significant - both on a deep philosophical level, and historically
as a justified consequence of, and an expression prompted by, his times.
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rate of change that left its participants possibly breathless, Western
history, jurisprudence and politics were channelled, propelled and accelerated
by the overmastering 'Idea', through the narrow pass that the popular
revolutions presented in the historical divide between past and future.
The diversity of the multi-dimensional strands from preceding eras found
all at once a culmination in the triumph of individualism: inter alia, the
conflict between the enlightenment and innovation of Aquinas, and the
mediaeval yearning of the feudal period, (9) was resolved; the antithetical
standpoints of the Social Contract theorists proper, and of the proponents
. (10) (11)of the Divine Right of Klngs, found a sublimation also; and recon-
ciliation came too for the contradictions between the classical conceptions(12)
of ownership and the opposing feudal interpretations. Man's liberation from
the shackles of absolutism constituted accordingly a focal point of historical
synthesis, but at the same time, marked the commencement of the movement to
come, since it was here that the preparatory foundations of much of modern
Western social structure, culture, belief and proprietary views, were laid.
In that the relation between Sovereign and Subject found a crucial restatement,
so accordingly did the derivative relation between Citizens and their Property
know modification.
The effect of the new movement was principally that the Western conception
of private property and its ownership, came accordingly to be regulated
(9)Vide Section 3.3.2 supra.
(lO)Cf: Section 2.1 supra at footnote 1.
(ll)Cf: Section 2.4.5 supra at footnote 7.
(12)Cf·. S· 2ectlon 3. supra.
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and governed by a subscription to individualism, and by the tenets of the
inalienability of private property and the indefeasibility and inviolability
of the real right of ownership within the private law forum. True to the
Grotian foundation however, private property remained nevertheless an
institution subject to the State's overriding public law power of dominium
eminens.
In the context of expropriation, modern societies were faced with the dilemma
of reconciling the apparently antithetical private law real right of ownership,
and the inroad thereupon which seemed to be presented by dominium eminens. (13)
Alternatively stated, the indefeasibility and inviolability of private
ownership may prima facie appear violated and ravaged by the State's power
to divest the Citizen of his property where the public need so required.
Wh Bl k t . h· C t· (14) d . t d h· "th 1ereas ac s one 1n 1S ommen ar1es ep1c e owners 1p as at S0 e
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external
things of the world, in total exclusion of any other individual in the
universe", Vinding Kruse(lS) was to take issue with the unlimitedness and
absoluteness with which inter alia Blackstone had clothed the vision of
dominium plenum, stating that:
"the unconditional inviolable nature of the right of propert~'
remains but one of those magnificent phrases which it is so
easy to shout from the housetops in the enthusiasm of a
revolution and in the dawn of constitutions, but which in the
more sober aftermath, it is impossible to live up to".
(13)Vide Section 3.6 infra.
(14)C . h L fommentar1es on t e aws 0 England 11 2.
(16)
(lS)Vide Kruse The Right of Property (Translation by Federspiel)(1939).
(16)Ibid p 7.
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Against the backdrop of the popular revolutions and their spirit of individialism~
modern Western jurisprudence has developed its view of private property
and expropriation. A state of flux has emerged in the assessment of the
nature of property and its ownership, in consequence of the debates that
attend this enquiry - inter alia, the indefeasibility or otherwise of
private ownership; the capitalist - t1arxian conflict; the individualistic
or social property conception; .the nature in its origin, foundation and
operation, and the extent in its application, of the power of eminent domain;
the positivist -naturalist interplay in regard to the principles of just
compensation upon expropriation that on the one hand do, and on the other
ought to, regulate expropriatee compensability; to name perhaps but a few.
Such diversity cannot however adequately be encompassed in a thesis of this
nature - the focus in this subsection is accordingly confined to the changing
nature of private ownership in modern law in relation to the amplified (or
synthesised) viewof expropriation that has emerged. (17)
(17)A . dId' S .s lS eve ope In ectlon 3.5.2 hereafter.
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3.5.2 THE CHANGING NATURE OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP IN
MODERN LAW AND THE AMPLIFIED (OR SYNTHESISED)
VIEW OF EXPROPRIATION
Private ownership has in modern times surfaced as an evolving and extending
institution, the changes in the understanding of which, have given rise to
an amplified view of expropriation in South Africa and elsewhere, and have
had a concomitant effect upon the relation between Citizens and their Property.
In that the contemporary 'enlargement' of the concept of expropriation
constitutes a sublimation of the opposing forces of public needs and vested
private rights, it is submitted that the Hegelian postulates here again are
finding an expression. Furthermore, in that the natural unfolding of this
proprietary power will ex hypothesi be in accordance with the regulation the
'Idea' of history will bring, it would seem that its ultimate synthesis in the
future will reflect the broad justice (from a liberal perspective) that the
individualistic spirit of its foundation appears to anticipate.
The prevailing vision of property ownership and of man's relation to the
physical thing, influences and even determines the adopted socialJeconomic
and political order, and the very nature of the society itself. (1) Commons,
in The Legal Foundations of Capitalism, (2) notes that the legal concept of
property ownership has evolved from an original view in which property was
equated with tangible objects of wealth, to the broader modern view that
embraces the land itself, the legal rights in the land, and the opportunities
(1) Cf Umeh·. Compulsory A . ·t· f L d d C t·· N· . 1CqU1Sl lon 0 an an ompensa lon ln 1gerla p .
(2) New York 1924 p 50.
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(3)
of income that the land presents.
Whereas the classical description of property ownership contemplated the
right (in respect of a thing) to 'possess, use, enjoy, alter, alienate and
destroy', (4) this interpretation has been criticised inter alia by Paton in
Jurisprudence (5) as failing to identify the real functional basis of
(3) The concept of valuation for expropriation has undergone similar extension.
Whereas property valuation was traditionally constrained by the "notion of
physical dimensions and attributes" (Rams Eminent Domain p 37 50 and 51),
contemporary valuation and appraisal practice reflects the recent develop-
ments that have found expression in financial accounting - there has been
a realisation that assets derive their value not from considerations of
original cost and the past history of the asset, but rather. (and even
exclusively) from their ability to generate future income. Accordingly
value is no longer statically bound down by the past, but is instead
dynamically linked to the asset's realistic future income expectancies.
(Cf: Gordon's growth model in financial accounting). Modern appraisal
practice tends accordingly to quantify in pecuniary terms the worth or
exchange value of the owner's rights in the thing (discounting their
income expectancies), rather than to focus on the substance of the
physical thing itself.
The scope and theory of judicial valuation has been influenced to a
considerable extent by the changing nature of the property ownership
as conceived by the South African courts. The effects in practice of
the modern approach are that new occasions for judicial valuations have
been created; that, with the increased recognition being afforded to
intangible assets as a form of property, problems arise in respect of
their valuation; and that there has been a shift in valuation theory
from tangible to intangible assets as the subject of valuation - business
enterprises for example are now distinguished from the sum of their
physical assets. (Cf: Bonbright, The Concept of Property as Affecting
the Concept of Value 1937 Valuation of Property (USA) 98 - 109).
(4) Van der Linden, Koopmans Handboek 1.7.1.
( 5 )
2 ed Chapter 12. Paton points out further that the ultimate effect of
ownership is that the controller of property has also the ability to
control the people who relate to it - work hours, wage conditions,
nature and circumstances of life - in this regard, the depth of his
insight has considerable relevance for social planning in the future.
LOL
ownership - the broad control that its exercise enables. In modern usage in
the context of expropriation, it has been more expedient to see ownership as
consisting not in the physical thing itself, (6) but in a congeries(7) of
incorporeal or intangible rights that attach to the physical thing.
The modern trend towards an economic view of property and its ownership was
enunciated by Roscoe Pound in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Law:(8)
"In civilised society, men must be able to assume that they
may have control, for purposes beneficial to themselves, of
what they have discovered and appropriated to their own use,
what they have created by their own labour, and what they (9
have acquired under the existing social and economic order". )
This wider conception of property and its ownership found a similar expression
in the jurisprudence of Renner and Kahn-Freud, (10) in terms of which "property
was not confined to the control of 'things', but extended to the whole field
of legitimate economic interests and expectations". (11) Renner's analysis of
(6)This development is evidenced in American jurisprudence in HFH Ltd v
Superior Court (116 California Reporter 436) in which it was held:
"The term 'real property' means only those intangible interests
in land which the owner possesses, and probably the most important
of those is the use to which the property can be put. The owner
cannot hold a parcel of real property in his hands".
Cf also inter alia: Candlestick.Properties Inc v San Francisco Bay
Conservation Commission 11 Cal App 3d 557~89 California Reporter 897;
and People v Associated Oil Company 211 Cal 93>294 P 717.
(7)Vide the 'bundle of sticks' analogy discussed in Section 3.6 infra.
Cf inter alia Matheny Condemnation Appraisal Practice Vol I p 398.
(8)At p 192.
(9)Cf: Locke's view: Section 2.4.4 supra at footnote 10.
(lO)Vide: Kahn-Freud Introduction to Renner : The Institutions of Private
Law and their Social Functions (1949) p 19. (Renner's work was first
publlshed In 1905 and revlsed in 1928). Cf: discussion in this regard
in Friedman, Law in a Changing Society p 88.
(ll)Friedman op cit p 88.
· l' h··· th d' t' t· (12)the nature and function of caplta 1St owners lp hlghllghts e lS lnc lon
between legal ownership and the real control of a thing, and points out that
in these dual aspects of property, the 'Konnexinstitut' or 'complimentary
institution' of control, elucidates and enables a fuller understanding of
private dominium and of the relationship between Citizens and their property.
In short, in its modern conception:(13)
"property is not an exclusive relation of dominance,
exercised by one person, physical or corporate, over
the thing or even a number of 'quasi-things', but ...
is rather a collective description for a complex of
powers, functions, expectations and liabilities,
which may be apportioned between different parties
to a legal transaction".
In the modern age, the 'social idea' of property - as enunciated by inter
alia Rudolph von Ihering(14) - has assumed a growing significance in both
the Western(IS)and the competing Marxian(16) interpretations. The words
of Friedman in Law in a Changing Society(17) afford a perspective:.
"That property and its distribution occupies a central - and
in the view of many, a decisive - position in modern industrial
society is a view shared by legal and political philosophers
from the extreme right to the extreme left. The right to
(12)This division between ownership and control in the case of large corporate
ownership in particular was further developed in depth by Berle and Means
in their locus classicus of business administration The Modern Corporation
and Private Property (1932). Divided shareholdings and the hierarchial
pyramid-structuring of companies has widened the division between owner-
ship and control.
(13)Friedman Ibid p 68.
(14)Vide discussion of Von Ihering's views under Section 3.3 supra.
(15)
Vide People v Byers 153 California Reporter 249, in which the social idea
of property is emphasised:
"... it is clearly established that the property ownership rights
reserved to the individual ... must be subordinated to the rights
of society. It is now a fundamental axiom in the law that one may
not do with his property as he pleases; his use is subject to
reasonable restraints to avoid societal detriment .... "
Cf also: Miller v Board of Public Works (1925) 195 Cal 477 at 488 234 P 381., ..)
(16)V·d S' 11 e ectlon 3. supra at footnote (13).
(17)F . d . 6rle man op Clt p 5 - 66.
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property as an inalienable, 'natural' right of the citizen,
immune from interference by government or other individuals,
becomes a central element in the legal philosophy of Locke,
of the Founding Fathers, of the 'Declaration des Droits de
l'Homme', while it permeates the interpretation of the United
States Constitution, and the Neo-Scholastic political and legal
philosophy of the Catholic Church .
At the other end of the scale, Marxist analysis clearly regards
property as the key to the control of modern industrial society.
The capitalist, by virtue of his ownership of the means of
production, effectively controls society. He exercises the powers
of command which ought to be vested in the community. Hence,
Marxist theory demands a transfer of the ownership and the
means of production to the community This key function
of property and the establishment of a social order remains,
almost without qualification, part of modern Soviet philosophy ...
(W)ith the transfer of ownership in substantially all means of
industrial and agricultural production to the community, the
problem of social justice has been substantially solved in Soviet
society. Ideologically and politically, the property philosophy
of the American Constitution and" the Catholic Church is bitterly
opposed to that of modern Communism, and of all forms of Marxist
interpretation of history. But they share the heritage of modern
Western political philosophy: the controlling significance of
property in the social order. In that, they differ from earlier
phases of occidental civilisation as well as from other civilisations".
\Vhereas traditionally the concept of expropriation was structured by our
legislature within narrow parameters, both the development of jurisprudential
thought in modern South African law in relation to the meaning of property, with
its concomitant effect on legislative enactments, and the more liberal
recent interpretations being accorded to such statutory provisions by the
S th Af ' . d" (18) h h'd h ff f dou rlcan JU lClary, aye ate e ect 0 exten ing compensability
(18)Vide inter alia: Broadway Mansions (Pty) Ltd v Pretoria City Council 1955
(1) SA 517 (A) at 522; Wellworths Bazaars Limited v Chandlers Limited
1947 (2) SA 37 (A) at 43; Krause v SAR & H 1948 (4) SA 554 (0) at 562-3;
Africa v Boothan 1958 (2) SA 459 (A) at 462; Slabbert v Minister van Lande
1963 (3) SA 620(T)at 621 0; Fourie v Minister van Lande en 'n Ander 1970
(4) SA 165 (0) at 170 B; Belinco v Bellville ~1unicipality 1970 (4' SA SA9
(A) at 597 D.
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to previously unprotected holders of rights in respect of property, (19) and
of reducing to an extent the somewhat harsh effects of expropriation on
. . d· ·d I (20)prlvate ln lVl ua s.
Statutory enactments in South Africa have given expression to an abstract
conception of property. In S 12(1) of the Expropriation Act(21) for instance,
the wording 'prpperty other than a right' is used, suggesting that a distinction
exists between rights and property other than a right. This connotes that
rights themselves are merely one form of property but do not, for statutory
purposes, cover all types of property contemplated. The definition of
'property' given in Section 1 of the Act embraces both immovable and movable
property, and 'immovable property' includes a real right in or over immovable
property. Judicial interpretation in the cases Badenhorst v Minister van
Landbou(22) and the unreported judgment in Vinkrivier Klipbrekery v SAS en
Nesenberend, (23) has extended the ordinary meaning of 'property' to include
'intangible property' and rights, both real arid personal. Although a caveat
is voiced by Dr Gildenhuys(24) in respect of the statutory provisions being
(19)Vide inter alia Interland Bemarkings (Edms) Bpk v Suid Afrikaanse Spoorwee
en Hawens 1981 (1) SA 1199 (D) at 1200 H in relation to Section 13 of Act
,J
63 of 1975.
(20)Rams in Eminent Domain (p 52) qomments on the position in the United States:
"The Courts have enlarged the meaning of a 'taking of property' so as
to give a private owner compensation for certain losses for which he
could not formerly have recovered, since they were not obviously
identified with the value of those tangible things to which the
condemner takes title .... "
(21)Act 63 of 1975.
(22)1974 (1) PH K7.
(23)CPD 7 May 1975 which concerned the expropriation of personal rights in
terms of a contract.
(24)Op cit p 56 - 57.
construed too widely, it is submitted that increased recognition of
unregistered rights promotes greaty equity, alleviates the incidence of
harsh localised effects on the particularexpropriatee and provides a basis
for consistency with the natural law.
That private ownership is however subject to certain recognised restrictions
imposed by law is recognised by Spoelstra AJin Gienv Gien 1979 (2):(25)
"Eiendomsreg is die mees volledige saaklike reg wat 'n persoon
ten opsigte van 'n saak kan he ... (maar) ... (d)ie absolute
beskikkingsbevoegdheid van 'n eienaar bestaan binne die perke
wat die reg daarop plaas. Daardie beperkings kan of uit die
objektiewe reg voortvloei of dit kan bestaan in beperkings
wat deur die regte van ander persone daarop geplaas word.
Geen eienaar het dus a-ltyd 'n onbeperkte bevoegdheid om na
vrye welbehae en goeddunke sy eiendomsbevoegdhede -ten aansien
van sy eiendom uit te oefen nie .... Ons reg gaan ook uit van
die sogenaamde absoluutheid van eiendomsreg, maar terselfdertyd
met erkenning van die beperking daarvan".
(26)
n
In final analysis then, on the one hand ownership and on the other expropria-
tion, have in modern times generally, and in South Africa in recent years in
specific, incorporated a recognition of the 'social idea' of property. It
seems accordingly that Hegelian historical synthesis has manifested its
imprint upon the patterns of proprietary evolution, by way of generating an
(25)1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) at 1120 C - H.
(26)Si~ilar views have been expressed in the United States. Cf Cities
Service Oil Company v City of New York 5 NY 2d 110~154 NE 2d 814:
we deem it fundamental that ... what is best for the
body politic in the long run, must prevail over the interests
of particular parties .... n
In Mugler v Kansas 132 US 688 at 689, it was held:
n... individual owners ... (should not be) ... permitted,




extended(27) interpretation and meaning of these two concepts. In the words
of Trollip J in Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board:(28)
"The ordinary meaning of expropriate is 'to dispossess of
ownership, to deprive of property' ... but ... it is (now)
generally used in a wider sense as meaning not only
dispossession or deprivation, but also appropriation by
the expropriator of the particular right, and abatement
or extinction as the case may be, of any other existing
right held by another which is inconsistent with the
appropriated right".
(27)Cf: Stellenbosch Divisional Council v Shapiro 1953 (3) SA 418 (C)
422-3 and 424; SAR & H v Registrar of Deeds 1919 NPD 66; Kent ~~
1946 AD 398 at 405-6; t~inister van Waterwese v Mostert and Others




(28)1964 (4) SA 510 (T) at 515 A-B.
(29)A . ·1 d h k .s~m~ ar tren as ta en place ~n the United States. Cf inter alia
Cooley Constitutional Limitations 254; Gold Hill Mining Company v Ish
5 Ore 104.
3.5.3 THE MODERN VISION OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP -
A CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE AND ORIENTATION
Since the relation between Citizens and their Property is regulated by the
value judgments and the Social Contract that precede the society instituted,
by the notion of the 'thing' in the private law and the conception of
expropriation in the public arena, it_ is appropriate and necessary that
specific attention be directed to that relation within the particular society
in question. It is relevant then to turn to consider the nature of the real
right of private ownership in the context of present South African society. (1)
(1) Vide Section 3.6 infra.
3.6
3.6.1
THE NATURE OF THE REAL RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND ITS APPARENTLY ANTITHETICAL
CORRELATION WITH THE STATE'S POWER OF DOMINIUM EMINENS
INTRODUCTION
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0 (1) th t h t d W t th O k OWhereas t e splrlt 0 ln lVl ua lsm a as permea e. es ern ln lng,
upholds the inviolability of private interests, the sovereignty theory(2) on
the other hand asserts the paramountcy of the public need and draws support
from the 'social idea' of property. (3) This dichotomy generates the impression
that a (perhaps unresolved) conflict exists in our law. It is submitted
however that the tripartite Hegelian pattern suggests that these competing
antecedents have been sublimated in the synthetic culmination that
expropriation (as dominium eminens) constitutes. (4)
It appears further that whereas the real right of private ownership finds a
consistency with the 'thesis' supra (viz: individualism and liberalism), the
(synthesised) instrument of expropriation (5) leans in favour of reflecting
a greater congruence with the 'antithesis' supra (viz: the public need and
(1)
Cf Section 3.5.1 supra.
(2)Cf Section 1.2.3 supra.
(3)Cf Section 3.5.2 supra.
(4)It is stressed however that the 'synthetic culmination' here· envisaged,
approximates to the naturalist and common law conception of dominium
eminens, and not necessarily to the specific (possibly positivist)
interpretation that may from time to time be attached to 'expropriation'
by a particular legislature within history's continuum. Cf Introduction
to Appendix to Section 3.4.
(5)A °t ° t ° ds 1 . eX1S s at present ln most mo ern legal systems, including South Africa
(or perhaps, especially South Africa).
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the 'social idea' of property). The question which arises accordingly is
whether the real right of private ownership is (antithetically) contraposed
against the State's power of expropriation as it exists in our law
alternatively stated, whether the conventionally-alleged indefeasibility and
inviolability of private ownership is ravaged by the inroad thereupon that
expropriation appears to constitute. (6)
It is accordingly necessary to analyse the nature of the real right of private
ownership in South African law, and its apparently antithetical correlation
with the State's power of dominium eminens. Since the conventional view of
real rights in our property law is based upon two fundamental premises
firstly, that rights and duties are correlatives, and
secondl~ that real rights (jura in rem)differ conceptually from personal
rights (jura in personam),
the discussion herein is structured broadly upon this basis. (7)
From the consideration of the conventional definition of real rights in South
African law, it will emerge whether a need for the restatement thereof exists
in view of dominium eminens.
(6)The writer's standpoint in this regard is disclosed in the concluding
paragraph of Section 3.6.3 infra.
(7)The first aspect is considered in Section 3.6.2 infra and the second
aspect is discussed in Section 3.6.3 infra. In the former subsection,
the writings of Dworkin and Hohfeld are mentioned; and in the latter,
the conventional definition of real rights is discussed. The latter
is extended in Section 3.6.4 in relation to the models or images
suggested by various writers as encapsulating the relation between
Citizens and their Property.
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3.6.2 THE FIRST PREMISE :.THAT RIGHTS AND DUTIES ARE CORRELATIVES
3.6.2.1 INTRODUCTION
The first distinction set out in Section 3.6.1 supra (viz: that rights and
duties are correlatives), predicates on one level that the Citizen's
assertion of his private law real right of ownership, has as its correlative
the private law duty upon others that such right of ownership is universally
to be observed. On another level, it voices the possible conceptual conflict
that exists between a Citizen's private law rights to property and his public
law duties to the state, ie since the institution of private ownership (under
contractarian thinking) owes its origin to the prior existence of the State,
the real rights thereby conceived have as their reciprocal accompaniment the
obligations that the pactum subjectionis creates. (1) The interrelationship
between rights and duties is discussed in Section 3.6.2.2 infra.
The first distinction has a furthe~ relevance also - as is discussed in
Section 3.6.2.3 infra. Under Hohfeld's system of jural correlatives, (2)
the concept of a 'right' has a shifting meaning. In the public law forum,
the power of eminent domain has as its correlative the liability of the
Citizen to surrender up his ownership rights when such compete with the
public interest : in the hands of the State, this power (once exercised) is
transformed into a right; in the hands of the Citizen, the liability he suffers
becomes thereby a duty" In the private law forum, once the said power is
exercised, the right the Citizen formerly had, is altered thereby to become a
claim for compensation : in the hands of the State, the existence of the said
(l)Vide Section 2.3 supra.
(2)V"d S t"1 e ec lon 3.6.2.3 infra.
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power connotes the co-existence in the state of its immunity in general
against the claim (or suit) of its Citizen; in the hands of the Citizen
accordingly, the claim is only as sound and as extensive as the legislation
upon which it is grounded.
This structure rationalises accordingly the positivist view in Joyce and
McGregor v Cape Provincial Administration, (3)that unless compensation is
based directly upon statute, the entitlement thereto of the expropriatee,
lacks legal substance. It is submitted however that although Hohfeld's
analysis is a valuable expository device for illustrating the nature of
law in its existing interpretation, his structure is not 'original' law
in itsel~ ie an explanatory model analytically derived from an existing
system, cannot in logic be utilised retroactively to justify the validity
of that system itself. His model accordingly has merit only in so far as
it crystallises the nature of the prevailing legal structure, but it cannot
validly be employed to rationalise the standpoints adopted within that
structure itself. The divergence of law (in South Africa and elsewhere) from
naturalist principles of compensability, remains accordingly a criticism to
be levelled against the underlying law, and is not capable of being directed
against Hohfeld's elucidating encap~ulation thereof.
It is appropriate to turn to consider in greater detail the interrelationship
between rights and duties,(4) and the shifting meaning of rights themselves. (5)
(3)1946 AD 658: discussed in various sections supra.
(4)Vide Section 3.6.2.2 infra.
(5)Vide Section 3.6.2.3 infra.
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3.6.2.2 THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RIGHTS AND DUTIES
By extension from the jurisprudence of the command theorists such as Austin, (1)
who framed duties as "imperatives or notional oughts", (2) and as amplified
and modified by inter alia the Scandinavian realist Olivecrona, (3) the
concept of 'duty' has been seen as being fundamental in jurisprudence
and as being co-existent in thought with, and even prior to, that of 'right'.
Austin, for example, in Lectures in Jurisprudence(4)notes that th~ expression
'in rem' does not denote a right over a thing in as much as a relative duty
between a thing and persons generally and universally.
Dworkin in his definitive treatise Taking Rights Seriously argues that the
rights of Citizens against the State must be recognised and given a practical
efficacy, since:(S)
"(i)f the government does not take rights seriously, then
it does not take law seriously either".
Since in a democracy, a Citizen's general duties to his fellow Citizens are
not absolute, (6) there being certain fundamental duties upon the Citizen
(l)Jurisprudence I pp 89 - 91.
(2)Cf Dias op cit p 211-2.
(3)Law as Fact pp 36 - 37.
(4)Op cit p 382.
(5)0 k O °wor ln op Clt p 205.
(6)Ibid p 186.
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other than his duties to the State, it follows(7) that "this general duty is
almost incoherent in a society that recognises rights". In short:
"Anyone who professes to take rights seriously ... must
accept, at the minimum, one or both of two important
ideas. The first is the vague but powerful idea of
human dignity. This idea ... supposes that there are
ways of treating a man that are inconsistent with
recognising him as a full member of the human community,
and holds that such treatment is profoundly unjust. The
second is the more familiar idea of political equality ...
(which) ... supposes that the weaker members of a political
community are entitled to the same concern and respect of
their government as the more powerful members have
secured for themselves, so that if some men have freedom
of decision whatever the effect on the general good, then(8)
all men must have the same freedom".
In his first proposition, Dworkin's view corresponds with that of Kant, (9)
and in his second proposition, he is close to the views of Rawls;(lO) but in
advocating the need for State restraint and the serious recognition of
private rights, he goes further in submitting that "we must treat violations
of dignity and equality as special moral crimes". (11) To Dworkin, there are
only three grounds(12) that can justifiably and consistently be used to limit
any particular private right - firstly, where the values protected by that
right are not affected; secondly, where some competing (superior) right would
(7)0 k· . 192wor 1n op C1t p .
(8)Ibid P 198 - 199.
(9)Cf Section 2.5.2 supra.
(10)Cf Section 2.6 supra.
(11) .
Dwork1n op cit in a footnote at p 199.
(12)Ibid P 200.
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otherwise be abridged;· and thirdly, where the cost to society of upholding
the particular right would substantially exceed the cost or sacrifice in
violating the dignity and/or equality in question.
Since expropriation (where it appears in an extreme and 'unnatural' form)(13)
may constitute a violation of dignity (in that property under the German
. . f h 1· ) (14) d . 1 t·Social Contract theory is a proJect1on 0 uman persona 1ty, an a V10 a 10n
of equality (in circumstances in which just compensation is not awarded),
this inroad into the sanctity of the private right of ownership is juris-
prudentially acceptable to Dworkin only if one of the three justifications supra
applies. Clearly, the first justification cannot be used, but in the context
of expropriation, both Dworkin's second and third points would appear to have
operation as a rationale for the exercise of the State's dominium eminens.
As regards compensation upon expropriation, Dworkin's principles would
predicate strongly against expropriation without compensation, since the
inroad constituted by the 'taking' of the property would seem perhaps already
to be sufficiently extensive without being compounded by the denial of just
compensation; or at least, if not indicating an entitlement to compensation
as 'of right', Dworkin's principles suggest a strong presumption of 'no
expropriation wi thout compensation',. (15)
This interpretation finds a consistency with the proposition that rights and
duties are correlatives - the right to expropriate (once the power of dominium
eminens has been exercised) connotes under naturalism the correlative duty to
(13)Cf eg Section 1.3.8 supra.
(14)Cf Section 2.5 supra.
(15)Cf Section 1.6 supra.
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compensate - but it emerges in Dworkin's thesis of rights as being fundamental
and requiring serious regard, that some revision of the command theorists'
view of duties as being imperatives, is necessary to reflect the jurisprudential
developments that Dworkin introduced. It emerges again that theoretical
jurisprudence in this regard remains in a state of flux, requiring still the
synthesis that the Hegelian philosophers would anticipate. (16)
(16)Cf Section 2.5.4 supra.
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3.6.2.3 THE NATURE OF 'RIGHTS' IN THE CONTEXT OF EMINENT DOMAIN
UNDER HOHFELD'S SYSTEM OF JURAL CORRELATIVES
The concept of 'rights' finds an elucidation relevant to dominium emine~s
in Hohfeld's Fundamental Legal Conceptions(l) (extending Salmond's theories
in Jurisprudence), (2) in his classification of jural correlatives and
opposites, from which the shifts. in the meaning of 'rights' in the context
of the jural relations created, are apparent. Hohfeld's classification
sets out:(3)
(i) the Jural Correlatives Right Privilege Power Immunity
("You must") ("l may") ("l can") ("You cannot")
Duty No-Right Liability Disability
(ii) the Jural Opposites Right Privilege Power Immunity
No-Right Duty Disability Liability
Although some familiarity on the part of the reader with Hohfeld's theory
must in the interests of brevity be assumed, it is appropriate to consider
here the relevance of his classification to eminent domain and in South
African jurisprudence. By way of a first illustration, itis apparent in terms
of Hohfeld that sovereign immunity (under positivism) creates as its
correlative the disability of the Citizen to require compensation as 'of
right', and that unless a statutory (or constitutional, as in the United
States) authority for compensation exis ts, sovereign power has as its jural




(3)Dias op cit p 249.
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The assessment of Hohfeld's correlatives is perhaps best understood by the
interpretation adapted from Williams in Essays in Legal Philosophy: The
f 1 L Ob t (4)Concept 0 Lega 1 er y:
POWER 4 • IMMUNITY
LIABlLITY~ DIsIBILITY
in which the vertical arrows denote the jural correlatives ( .•. in one
person x, implies the presence of its correlative ... , in another person, y);
the diagonal arrows denote the jural opposites or negations ( ... in one
person x, implies the absence of its opposite •.. , in himself); and the
horizontal arrows denote what Williams terms the jural contradictories
( .•. in one person x, implies the absence of its contradictory ... in
another person y).
Although detailed analysis of this structure falls beyond the.scope of this
exposition, a commendable assessment exists in Dias Jurisprudence. (5) Suffice
it here to consider one illustration : the power of eminent domain which vests
in the State, implies firstly the presence in the Citizen of its correlative,
the liability to render up private property required for public purposes;
secondly, such power in the State implies the absence in the State of its
jural opposite or negation viz: any alleged disability of the State to




Citizen of its jural contradictory, namely immunity from the effect of the
exercise of such power. The first proposition then establishes that by its
very existence, dominium eminens affords the State a power which overrides
all private rights of ownership; the second proposition confirms that this
power (under positivism) is subject to no negation and knows no limitation
in the scope and extent of its potential application; and the third proposition
motivates the realisation that in the absence of the statutory (or constitu-
tional) provision of a compensation formula, the Citizen cannot 'of right'
claim full compensation or immunity, and perhaps even has no claim 'of right'
to compensation at all.
Lloyd in The Idea of Law, (6) although framing his observations in the English
law context, provides a valuable overview regarding the operation of Hohfeld's
system in practice:
" ... an authority, prior to the service of the proper notice,
has a 'power' of compulsory purchase in relation to the
particular piece of land, and the owner is under a 'liability',
as being exposed to the possible exercise of this power. If
then the power is actually exercised and is followed by the
other formalities, ... the authority will then obtain a 'right'
to the transfer of the land and the owner will be under a 'duty' (7)
to proceed with the transfer .... "
(7)The extract supra from Lloyd op cit, continues with the following observation
regarding immunity and disability - it is noted however that by virtue of the
in personam approach under the compulsory purchase postulate in English law
(as discussed in Section 1.2.4 supra), the following observation would in
general not have application in South African law (where immunity and
disability are best viewed, as discussed in the main text supra, from the
sovereign's standpoint):
" ... On the other hand, if the owner can establish that
the authority's legal powers do not extend to this
particular land, then the owner can be said to enjoy
'immunity'from this procedure, and the authority is
under a correlative 'disability' in regard to this
transaction" .
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It emerges then from Hohfeld's analysis that it is the exercise of the power
of dominium eminens which confers upon the State, the right to acquire private
property from its Citizens. Under the naturalist conception, this right
would have as its correlative the duty to pay compensation (or prior to the
exercise of the power, the liability to pay compensation); whereas under the
positivist orientation, such compensation entitlement would arise only where
authorised by, and to the extent determined by, legislative enactment.(8)
(8) As is noted in Section 3.6.2.1: in accordance with Joyce and McGregor v
Cape Provincial Administration 1946 AD 658, it is the positivist
interpretation that regulates our law. The submission of this writer
remains however that greater recognition of the naturalist view ought
to prevail.
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3.6.2.4 RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN OVERVIEW
An elucidating clarity is cast upon dominium eminens by the assessment of
the interrelationship between rights and duties, and of the different
inflexions that are possible within the category of rights - the respective
contributions of Dworkin and Hohfeld are valuable in these regards.
Attention is now directed to the analysis of the second premise(l) in
Section 3.6.1.
(l)Vide Section 3.6.3 infra.
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3.6.3 THE SECOND PREMISE : REAL AND PERSONAL RIGHTS
THE CONVENTIONAL DEFINITION OF REAL RIGHTS IN
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW, AND THE QUESTION AS TO
WHETHER THE RESTATEMENT THEREOF IS NECESSARY
IN VIEW OF DOMINIUM EMINENS
The second premise set out in Section 3.6.1 supra (viz: that real rights
(jura in rem) differ conceptually from personal rights aura in personam)),
is relevant in the understanding of the nature of private ownership in South
African law (and thereby to the relation between Citizens and their Property),
since it is by the method of antithetical contrast with personal rights ~hat
South African jurisprudence has characteristically and traditionally evolved
its definition of a real right. It is appropriate accordingly to turn to a
consideration of the conventional definition of a real right as it exists in
South African law, in order to assess whether there is a need for the restate-
ment thereof in view of dominium eminens.
Under Grotius' interpretation, (1) the transcending power vesting in the State
entitling it to deprive its Citizens of their real right of ownership,
appears to disrupt the conventionally-stated real right definitional
consequences of indefeasibility and inviolability, in that the State would
appear in such circumstances not bound by the 'duty' to observe its Citizen's
property 'right'. In turn, this exposes possibly a somewhat tenuous and
conditional character and substance in the flesh of these definitional
inferences, in that the private real right of ownership yields to the
public power of eminent domain.
(l)Vide Section 1.1 supra.
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If it is, as is often voiced, that real rights are available against the
whole world generally, and that other persons individually and collectively
are bound to forbear in their infringement of these rights, then perhaps,
in terms of this view, it would appear that the State itself, being merely
an aggregation of individuals into a collective under the Social Contract,
would equally be bound to observe such rights. Since Grotius' dicta indicate
to the contrary, is it then to be concluded that the conventional definition
of real rights must know a crucial restatement to reflect the existence of the
State's power of eminent domain1and the according defeasibility and violability
of private interests in the context of a competing property interest of the
public or the State? As is elaborated infra, (2) this would seem not to be
the case.
From its origins in procedural Roman law in the distinction between real
actions (for the recovery of property itself) and personal actions (for
the recovery of the value of the property from the person concerned), the
distinction between real and personal rights was introduced into the sub-
stantive law by the Post-Glossators; in Roman-Dutch law and South African law,
the distinction has remained substantive. From the classical conception of
ownership as a right to "possess, use, enjoy, alter, alienate and destroy", (3)
the conventional view of a real right in South African law has emerged as a
right in property entitling the owner to deal with the property in a particular
(2)Vide footnote (17) infra.
(3)Vide Van der Linden Koopmans Handboek 1.7.1; referred to in Section 3.5.2
supra at footnote (4).
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way, which right is available against all persons generally. Accordingly
under the conventional view, a real right is attached to a thing which
becomes the object of that right, and the rightholder is entitled to
enforce that right against people generally and universally.
The South African case law serves to elucidate the nature of real rights.
In Ex parte Geldenhuys(4) the former view that real rights are conventionally
negative in character (in contrast to personal rights, which usually involve
positive duties), was modified, and the real right registered in Geldenhuys'
case was positive. In Schwedhelm v Hauman~5) the positive-negative distinction
was applied in the assessment that personal rights impose obligations on an
individual and are not closely connected to the land - accordingly they are
not automatically transmissible. Although a contrary view has been adopted
on similar facts in Van der Merwe v Wiese, (6) the latter decision has been
effectively criticised by Hahlo in the 1948 Annual Survey. (7) It appears
that controversy will remain in this regard until the Appellate Division
pronounces upon this point, but it is submitted that until such time,
Schwedhelm's case correctly presents the law.
(4)1926 OPO 155.
(5)1947 (1) SA 127 (E).
(6)1928 (4) SA 8 (c)
(7)Hah10 1948 Annual Survey p 93- 5.
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From these cases inter alia, the conventional view emerged(8) that a
number of definable characteristics of real rights exist : firstly, that
a real right must confer a right in property, or in the American dictum,
that the right must 'touch and concern the land'; secondly, that they must
be available generally (although there was a gradual recognition that this
element was perhaps more a consequence of the existence of the real right
rather than a definitional requirement); thirdly, that real rights are
usually negative in character (although Geldenhuys' case dispensed with this
element as an absolute criterion); fourthly, contrary to the Roman origins, and
although perhaps generally limited in number, there is no numerus clausus
to real rights in our law (Ex parte Pierce);(9) and finally, that a real
right could not arise without an intention to bind the land, although such
intention was not in itself sufficient to give rise to the formation of a
real right.
These five definitional elements and characteristics were subject to further
judicial consideration in the period that followed. Odendaalsrus Gold Mining
Company v Registrar of Deeds(lO) was decided on similar principles to Pierce's
case, and it was held that a half-share in State digging and licensing revenue
constituted a limited real right, and was accordingly capable of registration.
In Nel NO v Commissioner for Inland Revenue, (11) it was held on the facts that
(8) In respect of certain of the interpretations in thIs subsection, the wri ter
acknowledges the guidance received from lectures given by Professor A S
Mathews at the University of Natal in 1981.
(9)1950 (3) SA 628 (0).
(10)1953 (1) SA 600 (0).
(11)1960 (1) SA 227 CA).
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an annuity granting an interest in land was not a real right - since it
did not touch and concern the land; since the intention of the grantor was
to bind someone personally; and since the connection between the right and
the land was accordingly not sufficiently close. It was held further in
Lorentz v Melle(12)that the mere intention to bind land is insufficient if a
real right is to be constituted, and although on the facts an obligation
existed, such obligation 'attached to the civil fruits of the property, to
which civil fruits the ratio of Pierce's case did not extend.
A measure of jurisprudential controversy arises in regard to reconciling
this line of decisions. Von Warmelo in 1959 Acta Juridica, (13)argued that
the real or sole test in the formation of a real right was one of intention,
but it is respectfully submitted that this view conflicts with that of the
Appellate Division in Nel's case. Van der Merwe in Sakereg(14) advances an
exhaustive analysis, but concludes that referral of the matter to the
legislature would be appropriate. It is difficult however to accept this
view in that such a referral could retard the dynamic and cohesive evolution
of the South African law.
It is however noted that although ~he resolution and determination of this
issue in relation to the judicial guidelines is not without its attendant
(12)1978 (3) SA 1044 (T).
(13)Von Warmelo, The Nature of Legal Argument, 1959 Acta Juridica 278 et seq.
(14) Butterworths Durban (1979).
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difficulties, the courts have' evolved certain clear tests - the fundamentals
of the conventional definition of real rights emerge as the first element
supra (viz: that the real right must confer a right in property, ie be in rem),
and the fifth element supra (viz: that a real right cannot arise without an
intention to bind the land). If these elements are present, it appears
conventionally in broad perspective that their effect will be that the real
right will be available and enforceable generally (the second element); and
that in general in the private law forum, the real right constituted may be
said to be inviolable or indefeasible. It appears furthermore that the third
and fourth elements of the conventional definition of real rights (viz:
'negative in character' and 'limited in number') do not necessarily have
operation, nor necessarily are they required or demanded by exponents of
the evolved conventional definition.
Paton in Jurisprudence(15) notes that the analysis of the nature of real
rights on this basis still has attendant theoretical difficulties and
certain key issues remain unresolved. He points out further the criticism
many writers direct against the notion that real rights are available
generally, but it is respectfully submitted as unfortunate that his final
analysis leaves the reconciliation unanswered. It would seem,
without here pronouncing upon the validity of, or reiterating, the two
definitional elements conventionally stipulated (viz: the first and fifth
elements supra), that if the effect they appear to generate (viz: element
two supra) finds a deficiency when viewed in the eminent domain arena, that
the root of this deficiency might not be the inadequacy of its foundation,
(15)4 ed p 298.
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but rather certain departures from logic that attend the nature of the
inductive leap from fact to interpretation. In short, it is conceivable
and probable that the conventional theorists on this point have not erred
in the two foundations upon which they base their assessment, but instead
censure will arise for any interpreter who fails to acknowledge the
limitations they impliedly place upon, and the parameters within which they
impliedly pronounce upon, the effect (element two) of the first and fifth
elements they stipulate. (16)
Although the assessment of real rights in the context of dominium eminens is
not a customary viewpoint, 'it could be argued that the above interpretation,
permitting recognition of the merit in the conventional definition of real
rights, constitutes too liberal (or laissez-faire) an acceptance of the
conventional standpoint and definition. A jurisprudent with such a view
could find cogent motivation and substantiation for his conclusion that
the concept of eminent domain qualifies critically (and even fatally) the
conventional definition of real rights - in his view, a reformulation would
be essential based upon the subordinancy of private property rights under
the transcending public power of eminent domain, and based upon the fact
that whereas private ownership wo~ld appear indefeasible if purportedly
disrupted by any individual or by any individual social sub-group, the
continuity of private ownership cannot withstand, and is unquestionably
subordinate to, the superiority of a competing social or public proprietary
interest, or such an interest of those individuals and individual social
sub-groups in an inclusive aggregate or collective. The more moderate
(l6)Cf description of these five elements supra.
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jurisprudent would however temper such reactionism with the submission that
it is merely the interpretation of the effect of the real right (rather than
its definitional elements) that requires restatement.
What emerges(17) in the submission of this writer is that the solidity and
acceptability of the two foundation definitional elements of the conventional
theorists, are not disrupted or shaken by the eminent domain onslaught of
any radical exponent. Notwithstanding the State's dominium eminens, a real
right must necessarily be a right in rem, and cannot be constituted without
an intention to bind the thing. The conventional legal theorists are
correct in their assessment of the effect of a real right inasfar as the
private law forum is concerned. It is only if that right is to find
analysis in a public law context that a measure of qualification becomes
appropriate, and here only in respect of the effect of that right. The
duty upon 'the world generally' to observe private ownership (and by
correlative, the private real right of ownership) remains rooted exclusively
within the private.law. The liability to surrender up his property is imposed
upon the Citizen in consequence of the State's public law power; inter alia,
Hohfeld's vision of state immunity and paramount authority relative to its
disabled Citizen, and the possible jurisprudential criticisms voiced supra,
do not, it is submitted in final analysis, constitute sufficient basis within
the private law to require an entire restatement of the conventional
definition of real rights. (18)
(17)Cf footnote (2) supra.
(l8)Based then on the underlying premise that the conventional definition of
real rights is satisfactory, an assessment of two models illustrating
this standpoint, is undertaken in Section 3.6.4 infra.
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3.6.4 AN ASSESSMENT OF TWO JURISPRUDENTIAL MODELS
SETTING OUT THE NATURE OF THE RELATION
BETWEEN CITIZENS AND THEIR PROPERTY
3.6.4.1 INTRODUCTION
Attempts have been made by various writers to crystallise into an image or
model, the nature of the real right of private ownership (and in turn, the
nature of the relation between Citizens and their Property). Principal
among these models are:
firstly, the 'bundle of sticks or rights' vision of property ownership; (l)and
secondly, the 'subtraction from dominium' theory. (2)
These aspects are considered infra, with a view to assessing their significance
in relation to expropriation and the proprietary rights of Citizens, and in
order to move the analysis from the level of abstract jurisprudential theory
to the plane of operating reality.
(1) Vide Section 3.6.4.2 infra.
(2) Vide Section 3.6.4.3 infra.
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3.6.4.2 THE 'BUNDLE OF STICKS' (OR 'CONGERIES OF RIGHTS')
VISION OF PROPERTY OWNERSHIP
Seneca in De Beneficiis(l) has by analogy cast light upon the reconciliation
of the apparently diametrically-contraposed claims to private property,
found on the one hand in the State's power of eminent domain, and on the
other hand in the individual's right of private ownership. He suggested
that a thing is capable of a divided ownership vesting in various persons
at the same time although not in the same sense (qualifying his submission
by pointing out that he was not considering co-ownership, which would entail
joint ownership at the same time and in the same sense), and giving by way
of illustration the landlord-tenant example: the right of use conferred upon
the tenant would entitle him during the currency of the lease to exclude even
the dominus, leaving the latter with only a reversionary interest and a right
to receive rent.
Jones in Expropriation in Roman Law, (2) in commenting on Seneca's proposition,
observed that:
"to the Roman lawyers at the time, ... (Seneca's proposition)
... must have sounded like loose talk; their theoretical
difficul ties wi th the emphyteusis show how slow they were to
admit that there might be·divided ownership which was not.
co-ownership. In any case, the State, or the Princeps, as
such, could not be an owner in the private (Roman) law... "
If recalcitrance and reluctance were characteristic of the response of
Roman jurists to Seneca's guideline, the converse is true of the American
(1) 7.5.6.
(2) 1909 LQR 512 at 527.
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jurisprudents. A host of sources expound Seneca's principle in what has
popularly become known as the 'bundle of sticks' theory of property ownership.
In the words of Matheny:(3)
"The one basic principle in Eminent Domain cases is
that a tract of ground is looked upon as a bundle
of rights or sticks, and each interest in the tract
is one of the rights or sticks. Thus the leasehold
interest (for example) ... is one of the rights in
this whole bundle that makes up a piece of real estate".
In the Roman private law forum, Seneca's submission was that the bundle (or
congeries) of rights constituting private ownership was divisible, and that
a divided ownership was accordingly possible (as in the context of lease).
By extension, in the public law forum, the congeries of rights attaching to
a particular thing, is such that ownership is divided between the State and
the private owner, and those rights over the thing that are held by the State
(res publicae), are incapable of private ownership. This then rationalises
and justifies the interpretation supra of Hohfeld, (4) in that the State's
power of eminent domain (being one of the implied or hidden sticks in the
full bundle of rights attaching to any property or thing), remains at all
times vested in the State, and is incapable of transfer to the private sector
- in addition, such power exists (under a broad divided ownership) contem-
poraneously with and notwithstandi~g the real right of private ownership that
vests in the owner.
The 'dominum plenum' that private law knows, is 'plenum' accordingly only to
the boundaries and extents of the private law, and cannot be considered to
(3)Condemnation Appraisal Practice Yol 11 p 398
(4)Yide Section 3.6.2.3 supra.
313
include or subsume the public law power of eminent domain. The conventional
definition of real rights, and by inference the nature of full private owner-
ship, will accordingly generate no paradox or contradiction(5) if assessed
within, and in terms of, the parameters of its necessary forum - the private
law.
Since conceptual difficulty attaches to the postulate of a direct physical
relation between a Citizen and his Property by reason of the abstract nature
of ownership and the (perhaps) separate identity that things bear, the
'bundle of sticks' analogy is a convenient image for encapsulating this
relation. Ownership is seen in South African law (in consequence of
our Roman heritage) not as a direct power over the thing or property, but
as a vesting in the owner thereof of a right to the ownership of that thing,
from which right his power over that thing is axiomatic - it remains however
subject to the constraints or qualifications that its contractarian origin
connotes. Property ownership is accordingly an indirect and abstract
relationship in which the rights of ownership stand mediate between the
owner and the property owned. The right of ownership over the thing is then
the instrument or medium that permits the owner's relation to his property
and the expression and fulfilment of his ownership rights. Since the
exercise of ownership would not be possible in the absence of the existence
of such rights, the connecting right of ownership(6) constitutes the essence
of property ownership in South African law.
(5) Cf Section 3.6.3 supra.
(6) Vide Section 3.6.4.3 infra at footnote (4).
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Although the 'bundle of sticks' analogy finds mention in South African
property jurisprudence, (7) it is not emphasised there as a central core of
the interpretation accorded to the nature of the relation between Citizens
and their Property. Its adoption as a valuable illustrative model in the
context of eminent domain and of property law in general, is here advocated
as being both consistent with the foundations of our legal heritage and as
being appropriately indicative of the relation between the owner and the
object of his ownership right.
(7)
Inter alia in Maasdorp Institutes of South African Law Vol 11 p 25;
Wille Principles of South African Law pp 166, 198; Hahlo and Kahn
South Africa, The Development of its Laws and Constitution p 578;
Silberberg The Law of Property 1975 ed p 37; Friedman Law in a
Changing Society p 66 - 67.
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3.6.4.3 SILBERBERG AND SCHOEMAN'S 'SUBTRACTION FROM DOMINIUM' THEORY
Relevant as a model within the private law in presenting the nature of the
relation between Citizens and their Property, is the 'subtraction from
dominium' theory incorporated by Silberberg and Schoeman in their 1983
edition of The Law of Property. (1) They state:
" ... (the) subtraction from the dominium test ... is based
upon the reasoning that a limited real right diminishes
the owner's dominium over his thing, in the sense that it
either
(a) confers on its holder certain powers inherent
in the universal right of ownership; or
(b) to some extent prevents the owner from exercising
his right of ownership.
This means that a limited real right must amount to a
'diminution' of or a 'subtraction' from the owner's
dominium over the thing to which the limited real ri ght(2)
relates".
Private ownership as dominium plenum would appear accordingly as the
aggregate, composite or conglomerate of all the alienable private rights
in rem and over the particular thing. The divisible or partible nature of
allodial(3) Roman ownership accordingly finds its extension herein into
South African law. Lease would, for instance, illustrate the first cir-
cumstance Silberberg andSchoeman envisage, and servitude would be an
example of the second situation they contemplate. Furthermore, the
interpretation that ownership does not necessarily correspond
(1) This theory was formulated by Silberberg in the first edition thereof
(at p 43 et seq).
(2) Silberberg and Schoeman op cit 1983 ed p 47 et seq.
(3) Cf Section 3.3.2 supra.
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with full control over the physical thing, (4) is reinforced by this model,
in view of the limited real rights (jura in re aliena) that can be formed
by their 'subtraction' from the dominium plenum of the owner.
A fairly extensive authority(5) for the model can be found in the South
African case law - the theory assumes a significance accordingly in our
private law in eludicating the rel~tion between Citizens and their Property.
However it appears that the 'subtraction from dominium' approach, consistently
with the Romanist conception, seems to be framed within the forum of private
rights only, and does not amplify or consider the qualifications upon
unrestricted private ownership that are imposed by the public law. Since
dominium eminens is a public law power of the State, operating over property
and being incapable of inclusion within private ownership, it follows that
its existence in the hands of, or its exercise by, the State, cannot
constitute a subtraction from (private) dominium plenum. For this reason,
although this model has a relevance in general to the relation between
Citizens and their Property, its relevance to that relation from the stand-
point of dominium eminens, is limited.
(4) Vide the writings of Renner and Kahn-Freud (at footnotes 10 and 11)
and Berle and Means op cit (at" footnote 12) in Section 3.5.2 supra.
(5 ) Inter alia in Hollins v Regis trar of Deeds 1904 TS 603 at 605; Ex parte
Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155 at 162 and 164; Schwedhelm v Hauman 1947(1)SA 127
(E) at 135; Ex parte Pierce 1950 (3) SA 628 (0) at 636 0; Fine Wool
Products of South Africa Ltd v Director of Valuations 1950 (4) SA 490 (E)
at 499 A; Odendaalsrus Gold, General Investments and Extensions Ltd v
Registrar of Deeds 1953 (1) SA 600 (0) at 605 0 - E
J
606 C - 0 and 610 G;
Hotel De Aar v Jonordan Investments (Edms) Bpk 1972 (2) SA 400 (A) at
4050; LorentzvMelle 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) at 1050 E.
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It is necessary to consider also the further possible grounds that exist
for avoiding reliance (in the context of eminent domain) upon the
'subtraction from dominium' theory. The model is directed mainly towards
explaining the creation of jura in re aliena, and does not contemplate an
alienation or transfer of dominium itself. (6) It is based upon the stand-
point that if an owner is to part with one of his private ownership rights
in such a way as to divide his ownership or to give rise to a diminution of,
or subtraction from, his dominium, then such partition, equitably viewed, and
consistently with the interpretation of the Social Contract theorists, could
presumably take place only with the consent or participation, or by the
conduct of, the dominus - this stands in contrast to the fact that expropria-
tion takes place "without regard to the wishes of the owner". (7) Furthermore,
the model involves accordingly a division or partition of the rights of
ownership and the acquisition of some of these in a derivative manner by
the proposed holder of the jura in re aliena. Since the exercise of the
power of dominium eminens in its operation in an expropriation, in point of
distinction, is an original mode of acquisition of ownership, and a proceeding
in rem (not requiring necessarily the participation of the expropriatee), (8)
that has the effect of transferring full ownership of the expropriated thing
to the expropriator as at the date of expropriation, (9) it follows that the
'subtraction from dominium' model is inappropriate in an expropriation analysis.
(6) Contra Section 8 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975.
(7) V"d "to 0 f N" h 1 ' d f" "to f 0" 0 01 e crl ~clsms 0 lC 0 5 e 1nl lon 0 exproprlatlon ln Sectlon 1.4supra.
(8) Cf concluding paragraph in Section 1.4 supra.
(9) Cf Section 8 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975.
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3.6.4.4 DOMINIUM EMINENSANDDOMINIUM PLENUM IN OVERVIEW
The fuller understanding of both dominium eminens and dominium plenum
requires that these two concepts be assessed in conjunction in order that
their interrelationship can be determined. From this assessment it becomes
clear that dominium eminens is a public law power that is distinct from but
complimentary to dominium plenum in the private law. For the reason that
the Romanist 'subtraction from dominium' theory(l) does not contemplate
directly (if at all) the public law arena, it becomes apparent further that
in the context of eminent domain and expropriation, the American 'bundle of
sticks' approach(2) is a preferable model for presenting the nature of
the relation between Citizens and their Property, in that it can extend to
include and to rationalise both public and private rights in and over
property.
(1) Vide Section 3.6.4.3 supra.
(2) Vide Section 3.6.4.2 supra.
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3.7 DOMINIUM EMINENS, PRIVATE OWNERSHIP, AND THE
RELATION BETWEEN CITIZENS AND THEIR PROPERTY
A CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE
The synthetic and continuous historical evolution that Hegel postulated,
when viewed in relation inter alia to the institution of private owner-
ship and the instrument of expropriation, indicates that the interpretation
in these regards by a given society at a specified point in time's continuum,
is cohesively connected both to the past movement and to the future to unfold.
The same, it is submitted, is true in South Africa property law at present.
It is accordingly also that the proprietary developments in the modern era
have imbued the concepts of 'ownership' and 'expropriation' with a changing
and an amplified (or synthesised) substance, but that it is in turn from
these present foundations that further evolution and synthesis will take
place.
Dominium eminens emerges in our law as a fundamental feature inherent in, and
not opposed to, the accurate conception of ownership in its broad sense. (1)
Provided that the exercise of this power recognises naturalist principles of
restraint, it is accordingly not the major inroad(2) upon private freedom
and rights to property that some commentaries paint it to be(3) - since its
(1) A similar view is expressed by J WaIter Jones in Expropriation in Roman
Law 1909 LQR 512 at 526. Cf also Van Schalkwyk Onteiening in die Syid
Afrikaanse Reg : 'n Privaatregtelike Ondersoek UOFS (1977).
(2) Vide following paragraph.
(3 ) Cf egReport of the Judicial Council of Michigan on Condemnation Procedure
(1932), quoted in Section 1.3.1 supra at footnote 13; Jacobs op cit p 4;
and sources cited in Gildenhuys op cit p 1 at footnote 2, and p 19 at
footnote 135.
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existence is justified in terms of the Social Contract, and its use is
predicated by both the necessity and the desirability (from time to time)
of adjustments to the balance of State and private lands.
Although the countenance of such an inroad may appear when the otherwise-
apparent sanctity, inviolability and indefeasibility of private ownership
is considered, and although the substance of such an inroad may exist if a
positivist interpretation of dominium eminens is applied and if excesses and
abuses (from a naturalist and liberalist perspective) arise thereby, it is
however emphasised that the view that expropriation constitutes such an
inroad, is based upon two principal factors. The first is the Romanist
vision of ownership, which confines the assessment of this institution
strictly to the private law. The second is the realisation that the
legislative treatment of expropriation in South African law exhibits certain
significant lacunae, which are not capable of the same rationalisation as is
possible in respect of dominium eminens itself - the reform of our existing
legislation (4)is accordingly appropriate and even imperative.
The jurisprudential inquiry into the nature of property ownership as a
determinant of the relation between Citizens and their property, reveals
that the power of dominium eminensoamplifies, rather then detracts from, a
true understanding of this relation. Instead of contradicting the nature
of private ownership as may prima facie appear, the exercise by the State
of its power of expropriation in accordance with naturalist and common law
(4) Vide Appendix to Section 3.7
in South Africa.
Recommendations for Statutory Reform
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principles, supplies a deep rationale for the institution of property itself.
As Rudolph von Ihering notes, "there is no such thing as absolute ownership,
ie ownership which is unaffected by social considerations,,(5) - rather
"only through the existence of expropriation as a legal institution can
property become a practical conception in touch with the needs of life ...
without it, property reveals itself as the bane of society". (6)
The power of dominium eminens in its naturalist and liberalist conception,
is then in overview a necessary social instrument - which finds its origin
in the Social Contract; which permits and promotes collective wellbeing and
the attainment of social goals and objectives; and which regulates the
relation between Citizens and their Property in a way that reconciles,
balances, sublimates and synthesises the opposing natures of the public need
and the private interest.
(5) Geist 1,7.
(6) Cf Der Zweck im Recht I, 411.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION: DOMINIUM EMINENS, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, AND
THE RELATION BETWEEN CITIZENS AND THEIR PROPERTY
4.1 AN OVERVIEW
Dominium eminens, as enunciated first by Grotius in De lure Belli ac Pacis,
emerges in our common law as one of the State's public law proprietary powers,
that, as an offspring of political necessity, is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty created and conferred by the Social Contract. In as far as the
public interest and wellbeing so require, dominium eminens permits the
State's expropriation of private property for public purposes without regard
to the wishes of the owner, and enables through proceedings in rem, the
acquisition in an original mode by the State of the title and interest
therein that was formerly vested in its expropriated Citizen.
Under contractarian thinking, it is the Social Contract that creates the
State; that gives rise to the institution of private ownership and the
instrument of expropriation; and that regulates the derivative relation
between Citizens and their Property. A cohesive connection is thereby
introduced and established between the public law power of dominium eminens
and private law rights to property. If this power is restrained by the
naturalist and common law principles, then dominium eminens will reflect,
rather than repudiate, the liberalist· and contractarian spirit, and will
lead to the translation into practice of just compensation upon expropriation.
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If however the positivist orientation continues to prevail unchecked, then
excesses, abuses, and departures from the just and equitable treatment of
Citizens by the State, can find the soil for their expression in our law.
Where interference with the rights and interests of expropriatees assumes
a proportion which crucially prejudices the foundations of a Citizen's
relation to his Property, or where expropriation legislation fails to
reflect the patterns of Hegelian evolution and synthesis present in our
history, then, although the 'social idea' of property has substance, the
proprietary disturbance that expropriation represents, ought not to be
dismissed out of .hand on this basis as being consistent therewith,- and
accordingly as being a 'necessary' social sacrifice. Rather, the preserving
and the upholding of the sanctity, indefeasibility and inviolability of
private proprietary rights ouqht to be cherished, nurtured and promoted, since
not only is property a cornerstone of Western society and the capitalist
ethic, but also its safeguarding is both a quest, and even a mission, for
social justice that the proponent of such philosophy should espouse and
pursue.
Whereas ultimately, the capacity and the ability to introduce the necessary
reform (as regards inter alia the clarity, the consolidation, and the fairness
(under naturalism) of our statutes), lies with the legislature, academic
research and exposition affords an interim avenue, allows an advocacy of
amendment, and generates in advance certain of the substance and motivation
that fuels the reformist petition. The central significance of private
ownership rights to Western ideology, and in particular to the contractarian
approach, predicates that the sanctity of property ought reverently to be
respected by State and Citizen alike, and that its infringement and the
inroads upon it by the sovereign (where there is an extreme and non-
contractarian exercise of its expropriation powers), must know the





4.2 THE HYPOTHETICAL BASIS OF THE INQUIRY
AND THE CONCLUSIONS THAT EMERGE
In the main text supra, certain hypotheses and submissions are researched
and developed with the objective of investigating their validity - they lead
inter alia to the following principal conclusions. The expository device
of a point-form analysis is adopted herein to facilitate the statement
thereof, and to highlight the individual (yet interdependent) nature of
the observations made and the inferences drawn.
In the analysis of the State's power of dominium eminens in the writings
of Grotius and its place in modern South African jurisprudence, it emerges:
(i) that dominium eminens is the common law foundation of the
State's expropriation power;
(ii) that notwithstanding the decision in Joyce and McGregor v Cape
Provincial Administration (1946 AD 658), a naturalist investigation
of dominium eminens (as undertaken herein) remains relevant and
necessary;
(iii) that the preferable jurisprudential orientation (in matters of
expropriation) is a Social Contract theory as extending the
conventional sovereignty interpretation, rather than the
alternative original proprietary or compulsory purchase standpoints;
(iv) that the nature of dominium eminens is enhanced by its comparative
analytical assessment in relation to the other public law
proprietary powers of the state;
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(v) that significant among these other powers are the following:
taxation, the police power, the war power, destruction by necessity,
forfeiture, dominium over bona vacantia (or escheat), the Group
Areas power (sui generis in South Africa), and the power to construct
public improvements.
(vi) that the meaning of dominium eminens is best understood by prior
reference to these foundations;
(vii) that the conventional positivist and non-contractarian interpretation
of existing expropriation legislation is misguided, and leads to
violations and denials of fundamental naturalist 'oughts'; and
(viii) that reform of the positivist spirit of our present legislation is
accordingly both desirable and necessary.
The consideration of the theory of Social Contract as a foundation for
dominium eminens reveals:
(i) that an awareness of the background and development of the Social
Contract permits an assessment of its effect on dominium eminens;
(ii)
(iii)
that the Social Contract provides a rationale (under the early
views) for the origin of the State, and (under later views) for
its nature, and derivatively by extension, a rationale for the
institution of private ownership;
that the contractarian writings of Locke, Rousseau, Hegel and
Rawls contribute valuably to understanding, and are accorded a
high level of significance by this writer; and
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(iv) that the contractarian philosophy would indicate that South
African society is unjust in both its structure and its
operation.
In the assessment of the changing nature of property ownership, the atten-
dant development of dominium eminens, and the relation between Citizens
and their Property in South African law at present, it appears:
(i) that the changing nature of the property ownership is revealingly
analysed using an adapted Hegelian-inspired model of history -
in essence:
that history is a continuous, rational and synthetic process,
and that the phase at which any instituted society stands, is
at the same time the conclusion of the past movement and the
90mmencement of the movement to come:
(a) that phases of thesis, antithesis and synthesis came
respectively in the formation of societies themselves:
in the sovereignty of men in the natural state, in
their exposure to the depredations of others, and
in the synthesised sublimation of these forces in
the creation of the State;
(b) that these phases came respectively again in regard to
private ownership (inter alia) in the following patterns:
in presocial man, classical civilisations, and in
the Dark Ages;
in Rome, the early mediaeval period, and later
mediaeval times (under Aquinas);
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(c) that the synthetic climax in Aquinas was in turn sublimated
as the commencement of the movement thereafter; respectively
these phases appear
in Aquinas, feudalism, and the liberalism of the French
and American revolutions;
in the writings of Aquinas, of Hume in later times, and
of Finnis in the modern era;
(d) that South African expropriation law reconciles on the one
hand the Roman concept of property ownership and the Lockesian
interpretation thereof, with on the other hand the English
statutory history;
(e) that Western liberalism and Marxian Socialism constitute
a current thesis and antithesis that are presently under-
going, or are yet to be sublimated by, synthesis;
(f) that a similar tripartite pattern is represented in the
competing precursors of private interests and public
need, and in the synthetic culmination thereof that
expropriation constitutes.
(ii) that naturalism affords cogent guidelines as regards the relation-
ship between State and Citizen, and as regards the State's power
to disentitle its members in respect of their property;
(iii) that property ownership derives from a contractarian foundation and
that this ought to be recognised by our legislature;
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(iv) that private ownership in South African law consists principally
not in the ownership of the physical thing itself, but rather in
the holding of the congeries of incorporeal and intangible rights
that attach to the physical thing;
(v) that dominium eminens vests under the Social Contract inalienably
and inseparably in the State, subject however to inter alia the
following conditions:
(a) that:
(1) dominium eminens is legitimately capable of exercise
only by a state that is justly instituted and
constituted (under contractarianism); (if not so
created as historical fact, then as a postulate
of reason, in the sense that its Citizens would
have so consented had they been so consulted);
(2) that South African society complies with neither
the Social Contract theory proper nor the Rawlsian
model, both under its Constitution of 1961 and that
of 1983;
(3) that the White de facto Parliament in South Africa
lacks (under contractarianism) de iure sovereignty
by reason of the fact that its mandate does not
derive from all its Citizens nor from a majority
thereof;
(4) that the Homelands policy and the exclusion of South
African Blacks from the State of their true citizen-
ship, constitutes an indefensible denial of Social
Contract theory in that:
330
from a Lockesian standpoint, such defeats
the 'great ends' for which men aggregated
into communities;
under Rousseau, such would seem to indicate
the suffocation of the 'Volonte Generale';
in Hegelian thought, such is an anti thesis to
liberalism rather than a synthetic climax; and
under Rawls, such is not what men in the Original
Posi tion would have chosen if they had made an
authentic and antecedent judgment from behind a
'veil of ignorance'; and/or that such violates Rawls'
two principles;





the (Lockesian) functions for which
the State has been created;
the (Rawlsian) principles which
regulate the, nature of any just
Western society;
the naturalist tenets which impose
limitations upon State excesses and
abuses; and
and in accordance with the libertari~n
'Rule of Law' ethic;
(c) that the State's powers ought accordingly to know such
restriction;
Cd) that the entitlement to compensation ought to arise Cto
use the Grotian dictum in its broadest sense)
"wherever possible";
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(vi) that, although expropriation (in its just operation) may appear
still to constitute a significant inroad upon the inviolability
and indefeasibility of private ownership, the conventional
definition of real rights in South African law would appear not
thereby to have been ravaged - instead, the analysis of the
instrument of dominium eminens permits a deeper understanding of
the institution of dominium plenum itself; and
(vii) that finally it is only
(a) where the State exercising the expropriation power, is
itself unjust; or
(b) where that power is exercised in an unjust manner;
that the expropriation will itself (notwithstanding the positivist
statutory authorisation) be unjust when viewed from a naturalist,




THE RELEVANCE OF RESEARCH IN EXPROPRIATION LAW
IN SOUTH AFRICA AT PRESENT AND THE RECOMMENDATION
THAT FURTHER RESEARCH BE UNDERTAKEN
The law of expropriation is a field of considerable relevance to South Africa
at present, and will escalate in significance in the future, for a number of
reasons:
(i) In September 1982, the Government announced that during the next five
years, private property valued in the region of one thousand million
ranq would be expropriated for the consolidation of the Homelands. In
addition, it seems that major Group Areas' expropriations will take place.
(ii) There will be substantial further expropriation for state development
projects such as roads, airports and dams.
(iii) 1he Government's economic decentralisation programme, the projected
economic growth of the Republic, and the establishment of border
industries, promote the need for expropriation also.
(iv) The need in South Africa's political future for land stabilisation
and an equitable land distribution, is a political and planning reality
and objective.
(v) In short, whenever a society is in a state of political or economic
flux, adjustment to the balance of State and private lands is under-
taken - in South Africa, it would appear that this is extended to
include adjusting the balance and composition of White and Non-White
lands. Furthermore, whether a society moves in one direction towards
socialism, or reacts in the reverse direction, the expropriation of lands
(and on occasion the nationalisation of industries) is the consequence.
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In order to en.sure that justice and fairness to both expropriator and
expropriatee finds expression in and attends this expropriation, detailed
academic study and research is essential to pave the way in advance and to
promote a clearer understanding of the statutory enactments.
The Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 as amended, has had effect in South African
law since only 1 January 1977, and in spite of elucidating construction by the
judiciary and most valuable (positivist) contributions in legal publications,
many of the major issues that the Act encompasses, have not had the opportunity
yet for full academic analysis and exposition. The uncertainty that the
governmental agencies face in respect of the interpretation and implementation
of the enacted provisions, will be compounded in the future unless further
research is conducted. Such would appear to be the most appropriate in the
forum of compensation upon expropriation, and in respect of recommendations
for statutory reform.
By reason of the pressing relevance expropriation does have and will assume in
South Africa, and in light of the injustice that can flow from an inadequate
awareness of its substance and effect, it is curious that the curricula and
syllabi of the Ll.B courses do not include a more detailed study of
expropriation law. The developments at the University of the Witwatersrand
in this regard are commendable.
In final analysis, expropriation is the instrument which gives effect to the
State's land reforms, and depending on the understanding its implementers have
of its nature and operation, and the equity of its application, the outcome
politically (both domestically and internationally) and economically, will be
either just or harsh. The problem is real and earnest efforts must be made
within the law to generate meaningful solutions. Research cannot guarantee a
blueprint for resolving South Africa's land reform, but it is submitted that it




APPE!'!DIX TO 5E.CT101,1 1.3.6
EXCURSUS
IN ELABORATION OF FOOTNOTE 13 THEREOF
The writer has during 1983 made representations to the Commissioner of Customs
and Excise on behalf of a client on whom penalties and forfeitures in excess
of one hundred thousand rand, were imposed under Sections 88 and 89 of the
Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964, as amended. It was alleged that the
client had underpaid duties and cleared Persian carpets and other goods under
the incorrect tariff headings. Under the provisions of this Act, not only is
the forfeiture of all goods in an affected consignment empowered (regardless
of how small the financial advantage may have been to the person who
(negligently) committed the offence), but also the recovery of duty underpaid
and the imposition of substantial additional penalties is permitted. That
the owner may have been innocent under general principles of criminal law
(in that mens rea was absent), does not remove him from the strict statutory
liability created - in addition he bears a strict vicarious liability for the
acts of his forwarding and clearing agents. Reference to the circumstances
of this case is however relevant in order to outline the motivation submitted
and in that a partial remission of penalties and forfeitures was achieved by
negotiation, since the Commissioner in his discretion was satisfied upon receipt
of representations, that some recognition ought to be accorded to the fact
that the defective goods clearance and declaration for duty purposes, was in
consequence of oversight and was without moral (albeit not without legal)
culpability of the client in question.
Extracts from a memorandum submitted by the writer on behalf' of the client in
this matter (hereinafter referred to as XXX), to the Commissioner of Customs
and Excise, are included infra in elaboration of the nature of the represen-
tations made in this matter.
MEMORANDUM
TO THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
clO CONTROLLER OF CUSTOMS J?,ND EXCISE, DURBAN
PRIVATE BA t5 X54305
DURBAN 4000
FROM: XXX
IN RE: YOUR REFERENCE .
ALLEGED CONTRAVENTION BY XXX OF SECTION 38(1)
READ WITH SECTIONS 40(1), 83 AND/OR 84, OF THE
CUSTOMS AND EXCISE ACT, NO 91 OF 1964, AS AMENDED.
APPLICATION IN TERMS OF SECTION 93 OF ACT 91 of 1964 AS
AMENDED FOR REMISSION OR MITIGATION OF PENALTIES AND
FORFEITURES, AND APPEAL AGAINST THE RULING OF THE
COMMISSIONER IN THIS MATTER IN A LETTER DATED .
ON THE GROUNDS HEREIN CONTAINED.
1.




2.1 As will appear from the above documents, .
2.2
2.3
2.4 XXX applies herein in terms of Section 93 of the Customs and Excise Act
No. 91 of 1964, as amended, for remission or mitigation of penalties
and forfeitures, and appeals against the ruling of the Commissioner in
this matter in the letter dated , on the grounds herein
contained.
3.
The Commissioner is respectfully requested, for the reasons set out under
Sections 4.5 and 6 hereof:
3.1 to set aside his former ruling;
3.2 to find in favour of XXX on the basis set out in paragraph 7.3 infra;
3.3 to mitigate the penalties and forfeitures imposed, and to remit under
Section 93 of the Act, in his discretion, after due consideration of
paragraph 7.3 infra, the whole or any portion he considers appropriate,
of the penalties and forfeitures imposed, subject to any conditions he
may consider appropriate and necessary.
4.
THE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE WAS THAT LENIENCY SHOULD
ATTACH IN CIRCUMSTANCES SUCH AS THOSE OF THE PRESENT CASE:
4.1 It is respectfully submitted that the intention of the legislature in
making provision for the discretionary imposition of customs penalties
and forfeitures, was to permit a distinction to be drawn (where
appropriate) between:
4.1.1 instances where the nonpayment of duty was intentional and
deliberate; and
4.1.2 instances where the nonpayment of duty was in consequence of
some other factor (such as oversight or negligence).
4.2 It is respectfully submitted further that our client's circumstances
and the nature of his contravention (as is elaborated more fully
infra), would appear to fall clearly within the latter category (4.1.2).
4.3 We respectfully note that this principle has imp1ied1y found the approval
of the Supreme Court inter alia in State v Henning 1973(3) SA 108(N) at
109, where the Court in a customs matter cited with approval the maxim
"in poena1ibus causis, benignius interpretandum est" (In (considering)
matters of punishment, (the Court) is required to be more lenient.).
4.4 We accordingly respectfully contend that the imposition of the severest
possible penalty statutorily permitted (as has been ruled) constitutes
an excess hardship and a disproportionately harsh operation of law on
our client, and that leniency should attach in circumstances such as
those of the present case.
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5.
A CONSIDERATION OF BROAD JUDICIAL PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT
5.1 In the determination of what constitutes an appropriate and just
punishment for the contravention of a law, the judicial officer (or
the person or body to whom the judicial task of sentencing is delegated -
in this case the Commissioner) must be guided by certain principles of
sentencing and punishment that have been laid down by the Courts.








Chief Justice Rumpff, in State v Roux 1975(3) SA 190(A) held
that in determining an appropriate sentence, the judge must
consider:
(a) the circumstances of the accused;
(b) the nature of the offence;
(c) the interests of society.
It was held further that, if on considering these elements, a
lenient sentence was appropriate, the judge should accordingly
impose a lenient punishment.
These principles were reaffirmed in State v Dualvani 1978(2)
PH H176(O), where the Court held that the most important
factors in determining sentence are:
(a) the person
(b) the character and circumstances of the crime.
In State v Sparks 1972(3) SA 396 (A) at 4l0H, Justice Holmes held:
"Punishment should fit the criminal as well as the crime,
be fair to the State and to the accused, and be blended
with a measure of mercy. The convicted person should
not be visited with punishment to the point of being
broken.
In State v y 1972(3) SA 611 (A) at 614, Justice Holmes went
further to say:
"The element of mercy, a hallmark of an enlightened
administration, should not be overlooked, lest the
Court be in danger of reducing itself to the plane
of the criminal .... True mercy has nothing in
common with soft weakness, or maudlin sympathy
with the criminal, or permissive tolerance. It
is an el~ment of justice itself."
Professors Rabie and Strauss, in their book Punishment : an
Introduction to Principles 3 ed (1981) state at page 223:
"The determination of an equitable quantum of punishment
must chiefly bear a relationship to the moral blame-
worthiness of the offender."
Reference may also be had to the Viljoen Report (Report of the
Commission of Inquiry into the Penal System of the Republic of
South Africa RP 78/1976 : Sections 5.1.4.6 and 5.1.3.1 - 34),
in which principles of sentencing punishment and forfeiture
are dealt with at some length. Brevitatis causa, extracts are
not included here, but the principles established in the Viljoen
Report stand in broad support of the recommendations herein.
It is respectfully submitted that in the circumstances of the
present case, lenient punishment is appropriate after due
consideration of the submissions herein.
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6.
RELEVANT FACTORS AND CONSIDERATIONS IN MITIGATION (UNDER SECTION 93 OF
ACT 91 OF 1964 AS AMENDED) OF PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES IMPOSED, WITH
REFERENCE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF XXX'S CASE
~n order to establish the broad applicability of principles of mitigation of
sentence and punishment, and the wide extent of their acceptance and imple-
mentation, reference is made infra to decisions of both the South African
Courts and those of a foreign jurisdiction selected (here: Canada). It is
respectfully submitted that these principles are of direct relevance in the
matter of XXX, and necessarily operate to mitigate substantially the appro-
priate punishment (by way of remission or reduction of penalties and for-
feitures imposed).
6.1 THE ACCESSORY ROLE OF XXX IN THE OFFENCE
MITIGATES THE PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES IMPOSED
6.1.1 Although XXX acknowledges that in terms of the Act, it bears
responsibility for the acts of its agents as regards the question
of its guilt, it is respectfully submitted that as regards the
question of sentence, the fact that the contraventions were not.
intentional or deliberate, the reliance placed by XXX on its
agents, and the inexperience of XXX in matters of customs
clearing, operate to mitigate the penalties and forfeitures that
are applicable ....
6.1.2 The following cases, by analogy, extend to mitigate the penalties
and forfeitures imposed on XXX:
(A) SOUTH AFRICA:
In State v Motor 1969 (1) PH H36 (E), it was held that a
person who had merely eaten stolen food was not to be
treated as severely as the person who had physically
stolen it.
(B) CANADA:
In ~ v Southam Press (1976) 31 C.C.C. 2d 205 (Ont. Canada)
the vicarious liability of an editor and publisher led the
Court to hold that their role in the offence was not a
"deliberate" one., and as such although guilty, the Court
set aside their sentence.
6.2 THE CONDUCT OF XXX AFTER THE OFFENCE MITIGATES
THE PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES IMPOSED:
6.2.1 It is respectfully noted that XXX, upon realising that an offence
had been constituted, willingly paid immediately and in full all
amounts required by the Commissioner and co-operated in full with
officials of the Department of Customs and Excise .... It is
respectfully submitted that such conduct of XXX ex post facto
operates to mitigate the penalties and forfeitures imposed.
6.2.2 As authority for the above submission, the Controller is
respectfully referred to the following decisions:
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(A) SOUTH AFRICA:
R v Ndhlovu 1954 (1) SA 455 (A) et al.
(E) CANADA:
In R v Eartlett and Cameron (1961) 131 C.C.C. 119 at 125
(Ma~. Canada) the Court held:
(The accused had surrendered to the police and co-operated
fully).
"This circumstance in no way excused the offences
that preceded their surrender, but it does indicate
a recognition of their wrongdoing and therefore it
is a mitigating circumstance."
also: R v James and Sharman (1913)9CR App R 142 (Can)
R v Green: (1918) 13 CR App R. 200 (Can)
R v Syres : (1908) 1 CR App R. 172 (Can)
R v Hatfie1d : (1937) OWN 559 (CA) (Can)
in which cases it was established that co-operation with
the authorities can mitigate sentence.
6.3 THE GOOD CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED MITIGATES AGAINST
THE IMPOSITION OF SEVERE PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES:
6.3.1 It is respectfully submitted that the good character of the
accused and the high standing of the Directors of XXX in the
community (please refer Sunday Tribune Property Supplement
dated ), stand against the imposition of the severest
possible penalty statutori1y permitted.
6.3. 2 Judicial recogni tion of this principl e may be found in the
following cases:
(A) SOUTH AFRICA:
R v Ndh10vu 1954(1) SA 455 (A) et al.
(E) CANADA
In ~ v Gunne11 (1951) 14 CR 120 (Canada), the Court of
Appeal held:
"It is no exaggerated clemency or abuse of
discretion for the trial judge to give the
prisoner the benefit of his stainless
antecedents and of his good character."
In R v C1arke (1959) 124 CCC 284 at 287 (Man., Canada),
the Court held:
"The personal character of the offender and the
desirability of giving him an opportunity of
redeeming himself ... are matters which require
consideration."
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6.4 SENTENCE AND PUNISHMENT ARE MITIGATED WHERE THE ACCUSED
IS A FIRST OFFENDER:
6.4.1 XXX has on no previous occasion been required to make payment
of any such penalty or been liable to any such forfeiture ....
It is respectfully submitted that the fact that they are a
first offender, must be taken into account in the determination
of an appropriate punishment.
6.4.2 Considerable authority exists for this proposition in South African
law, inter alia:
State v D'Este 1971 (3) SA 107 (B)
State v Fitswana 1974 ( 1) SA 479 (T)
State v F10yd 1975 (1) SA 653 (E)
State v Ma1eka 1976 (1 ) SA 374 (0) at 375
in which cases it was held that where the accused is a first
offender, this is a "rede1ik gewigtige rl mitigating factor.
6.5 THE MOTIVE OF THE OFFENDER MAY OPERATE IN MITIGATION
OF SENTENCE IN AN EXTREMELY FORCEFUL WAY
6.5.1 Although the motive of the offender is inapplicable in law
regarding the question of guilt, it may nevertheless operate
in an extremely forceful way in mitigation of sentence. The
motive of XXX in the importation of the goods in question,
was one of service to the consumer. Quoting from paragraph 2
of the previous Memorandum dated :
"In an effort to control price inflation resulting
from escalations in the supply prices of domestic
manufacturers and thereby to avoid price increases
being passed on to the customers of XXX, and in an
effort to serve the retail sector (and indirectly
the consumer) by providing both a high quality and
a wide range of products at low prices, the Company
resolved in 1981 to enter the international market
and to import certain items to satisfy domestic
consumer demand."
(Please refer also to Memorandum dated paragraph 7,
Schedules Band E, in which it is noted that the profit markup
on the goods in question was very low, and in certain cases,
they were sold at a loss).
It is respectfully submitted that the motive of XXX mitigates
the penalties and forfeitures imposed.
6.5.2 Authority for the above proposition may be found in the
following precedents:
(A) SOUTH AFRICA:
In State v Moyo 1979 (4) SA 61 (RZA), the Court held
that one of the most important considerations in
sentencing an offender is his moral guilt, and thereby
his motive in committing the offence.
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(B) In State v C10ete 1971 (2) PH H74 (A), it was held that
altruistic motives of service. are mitigating circumstances
of "significant effect."
(B) CANADA
In R v Wes1ey (1975) 9 OR (2d) 524 (D.C.)(Can.) in respect
of the violation of gaming laws, the fact that the hunting
was to give food to a needy family was taken into account
in mitigation of sentence.
6.6 THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ALL PENALTIES IS TO BE
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN MITIGATION OF SENTENCE
6.6.1 As is contended under paragraph 4.4 supra, when the additional
duties, the penalties and forfeitures are considered cumulatively,
it is respectfully submitted that they together constitute an
excess hardship and a disproportionately harsh operation of law
on our client. As is submitted in the Memorandum dated ,
paragraph 6B(d), it would be inequitable, contrary to the intention
of the legislature, and contrary to public policy, for XXX to
suffer severe prejudice in circumstances where their contravention
was not intentional or deliberate, and in consequence of bona fide
reliance upon the recommendations of their clearing agents ....
6.6.2 Authority for the above submission exists in the following cases:
(A) SOUTH AFRICA
In State v Whitehead 1970 (4) SA 424 (A), it was held that
the cumulative effect of the other sentences can be taken
into consideration in order that sentence be reduced.
(B) CANADA
In ~ v Poynton (1972) 9 CCC (2d) 32 (Ont., Canada) the
Court refrained from imposing a fine since a penalty of
$4 200 had already been imposed on the accused in
consequence of the same offence under Income Tax laws.
In ~ v Hogan and Tompkins (1960) 44 CR App R255 (Canada)
it was held that. the trial judge, in deciding upon
sentence, would have to take into consideration
administrative penalties already imposed.
In ~ v Smith 1978 2 CR 3d S-35 (Nf1d. Canada) it emerged
from obiter that if an order for the forfeiture of an
accused's motor car was sought, the Court must take into
consideration the sentence already imposed.
6.7 UNDUE HARDSHIP TO THE OFFENDER CAN BE
CONSIDERED IN MITIGATION OF SENTENCE
6.7.1 The submissions under paragraph 6.6.1 supra are brevitatis
causa included here. It is respectfully submitted that in
relation to the circumstances of the contravention by XXX,
the hardship they will experience in the event that the
severest permissible penalty is upheld will be undue
disproportionate and unjust, and that such hardship must be
taken into account in mitigating the penalties and forfeitures
in terms of Section 93 of the Act.
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6.7.2 As authority for the above submission, the Commissioner is
respectfully referred to the following authorities in
South African law:
In Ex Parte Minister van Justisie : in re Berger 1936 AD 334,
which decision was approved by the Rhodesian Appellate Division
in R v Lennox 1973 (1) SA 515 (RA), it was held that undue
further hardship to the accused can be taken into account in
mitigation of sentence. From three Rhodesian cases in 1969,
the principle emerged that forfeiture or confiscation orders
must not be imposed in addition to the punishment, but should
be imposed:
(a) only as part of the punishment; and
(b) only if the circumstances render such an order or
ruling appropriate; and
(c) only if the blameworthiness of the accused justifies
such a forfeiture or confiscation.




1969 (4) SA 194 (R)
1969 (4) SA 195 (RA)
1969 (4) SA 198 (R)
6.8 XXX'S WILLING ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ITS CONTRAVENTION,
AND ITS SUBMITTING TO THE DISCRETION OF THE COMMISSIONER
UNDER SECTION 91, AS REINFORCED BY ITS WILLINGNESS TO
CO-OPERATE AND ITS PENITENCE AND CONTRITION, CONSTITUTE
A BASIS FOR MITIGATION OF PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.
6.8.1 The Commissioner is respectfully referred to the Memorandum
dated , preamble to paragraph 6, paragraph 6C(a),
6C(b), 6C(c) and paragraph 8. It is respectfully submitted,
in relation to the following authorities that such conduct
constitutes a ground for the mitigation of penalties and
forfeitures.
6.8.2 The following precedents inter alia exist in support of the
above submission:
(A) SOUTH AFRICA
In R v Mve1ase 1'958 (3) SA 126(N) and
in R v Mtataung 1959 (1) SA 799(T),
it was held that the guilty plea and evidence of penitence,
have a mitigating effect on sentence.
In State v Muvangua (1975) (2)' SA 83 (SWA), mitigation
of sentence· is justified on grounds of a guilty plea if
there is remorse and if it is likely that the offence
will not be repeated. (The Opp~!tunity shouid- be given




In R v Carriere (1952) 14 CR 391 (Que. Canada) the Court
held that the plea of guilty should be taken into
consideration to mitigate sentence.
In R v Johnstone and Tremayne (1970) 4 C.C.C. 64 at 67
the-Court noted that the plea of guilty saves the community
a great deal of expense and streamlines the administration
of justice considerably. It should accordingly be taken
into account in mitigation.
6.9 THE INEXPERIENCE AND IGNORANCE OF XXX OF THE CUSTOMS
LEGISLATION, ALTHOUGH NOT AFFECTING THEIR GUILT IN
CONSEQUENCE OF CONTRAVENTION, DOES HAVE A SIGNIFICANT
BEARING ON THE APPROPRIATE PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES.
6.9.1 Although the maxim ignoratio legis haud recusat (ignorance of
the law is no excuse) establishes that ignorance or inexperience
is no defence as regards the question of guilt, inexperience and
ignorance of the lawhave a significant effect on the mitigation
of penalties and forfeitures. The Commissioner is respectfully
referred to the Memorandum dated , paragraphs 2,4,
6(i), 6(ii) and 6B(b), from which it is apparent that the brief
period of importing and the lack of expertise of XXX's Directors,
are largely contributory to the negligence and oversight from
which the contravention stems. Under the circumstances, it is
respectfully submitted that mitigation on this ground is
appropriate.
6.9.2 In support of this submission, reference is made to the
following cases:
(A) SOUTH AFRICA
In State v Smith 1974(1) SA 607 (R), the Court held in casu
of a statutory provision which rendered dutiable the
importation of educational books, that ignorance of the law
was a mitigating factor to be considered in determining the
just sentence and punishment.
Vide also: State v Moh1abane 1978(1) SA 404 (0).
(B) CANADA
In ~ v Potter (1978) 3CR (3d) 154 P E I (Canada), in the
context of a trial relating to a customs contravention,
the Court cited with approval a passage from Kenny Outlines
of Criminal Law at page 69:
"... although mistakes of law, unreasonable or even
reasonable, thus leave the offender punishable for the
crime which he has blundered into, they may of course





7.1 As appears from Sections 4 5 and 6 supra, considerable authority
accordingly exists for the view that the imposition in the present
case of the severest possible penalty statutorily permitted,
constitutes an undue hardship and an excessively harsh operation of
law on XXX, and that leniency should attach in circumstances such as
those of the present case.
7.2 For the reasons outlined supra in Sections 4 5 and 6, it is respect-
fully submitted that expression will be given to justice in the event
that the Commissioner sets aside his former ruling and adopts the course
outlined in Section 3 supra.
7.3 If it may be permitted, with due respect, it is respectfully submitted
that a just ruling in the circumstances and in light of the mitigating
and general submissions supra, would be:
7.3.1 that XXX should make payment in an amount
equal to the duty underpaid (plus any
further charges incurred as contemplated
under Section 93 of the Act)
7.3.2 that the Commissioner, in his discretion,
should remit in full in terms of Section
93 of the Act, the forfeitures imposed,
such remission being accompanied however
by a letter of caution to XXX
7.3.3 that the Commissioner, in his discretion,
should suspend the penalties and remit .
the whole or any portion thereof that he
considers appropriate, such remission
being subject to the condition that XXX
shall not commit any similar or related
offence at any time during a period to




TOTAL PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES IMPOSED: R .
7.4 We pray accordingly that the Commissioner of Customs and Excise, in his
discretion, may find in favour of XXX on the basis outlined in paragraph
7.3 or on such further or alternative basis that he, in his discretion,
may consider appropriate.






APPENDIX TO SECTION 2.6 : IN ELABORATION OF FOOTNOTE (16) THEREOF:
JURISPRUDENCE AFTER JOHN RAWLS' 'A THEORY OF JUSTICE' - THE WRITINGS
OF NOZICK, HAYEK, AND NONET AND SELZNICK
(1) INTRODUCTION
In the post-Rawlsian period, perr.apsthe most significant writings in respect
of social justice from a liberalist perspective, have been those of Robert
Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974), of Friedrich Hayek in Law,
Legislation and Liberty (in three volumes: in 1973, 1976 and 1979), and possibly
also of Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick in Law and Society in Transition:
Towards Responsive Law (1978). Since their focus is displaced (to an extent)
away from the largely contractarian theme of Rawls (albeit that their sub-
missions are essential considerations in regard to social justice), their
writings are not incorporated in the main text, and are accordingly merely
mentioned in outline in this Appendix.
The analysis herein does not, nor does it purport to, analyse in depth the
contributions of these philosophers. Since such lies beyond the scope of an
expropriation analysis, the references made infra are intended as an
observation in passing (rather than as an essay) upon these writings. For a
comprehensive insight in these regards, a detailed study of these texts is
necessary - such has not been undertaken by this writer.
(2) ROBERT NOZICK'S 'ANARCHY STATE AND UTOPIA'
Nozick's writings in Anarchy, State and Utopia, in certain ways share features
of similarity with the writings of both Locke(1) and Kant(2) in that they
adopt an individualistic interpretation of the State, the institution of
private ownership, and justice within societies. Nozick's standpoint is
individualistic (both in the conception of society and of rights) and
conservative: he opposes any theory of justice seeking to redistribute social
(1)N "k "t " 1" 1OZlC op Cl at Inter a la 74 - 178.
(2)Ibid 32 and 228.
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goods (on grounds inter alia of his objection to the frequent presumption
that the abilities and capacities of Citizens are common assets, capable
of being utilised for common advantage); and he reasons accordingly that
such a social objective constitutes a suppression of individual liberty.
For this reason, his theory is opposed to the redistributive justic'e
approach of Rawls, (3) although he does concede the relevance and cogency
of Rawls'writings to the extent that he states:
"Political philosophers now must either work
wi thin Rawls' theory or explain why not". (4)
Nozick objects to Rawls' 'difference principle', since when society is
viewed not from the perspective of the least well-off, but from that of
the socially advantaged, the question arises as to what anticipated benefit
would in the minds of the latter, justify their co-operation with the former.
As an alternative, he advances his 'theory of entitlement' in which the
emphasis is not directly upon social justice itself, but upon the justness
of existing accumulations and holdings of wealth. He considers three
principles:
(i) the principle of acquisition, in terms of which the original
acquisition was just if it resulted without denying or infringing
the rights of others;
(ii) the principle of transfer, in terms of which the derivative acquisition
from the original titleholder is just, if it is just in itself and if
the original holding is just; and
(iii) the principle of rectification, in terms of which subsequent holdings
may be regularised (or rectified), in the event that either of the above
two principles is contravened.
The effect of Nozick's formula is that vast accumulations of wealth by
Citizens and unequal distributions among them, are imbued with a legality
under a liberalist and individualist orientation. The State, by contrast,
is seen as being "minimal", in that its powers (consistently with the
(3)Cf: Ibid 183 - 231.
(4)Ibid p 183.
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Lockesian view)" are limited to those necessary for the protection,
preservation and fulfilment of individual rights. Political society is
capable (for Nozick) accordingly of justification only where it contributes
to these purposes.
Scruton in A Dictionary of Political Thought(S) comments pertinently:
"His (Nozick's) views have been criticized:
(a) because they do not take into account
the difficulties posed by the idea of
a 'just original acquisition';
(b) because they are based on an unargued
individualism concerning human nature
and human rights, which attempts to
detach the individual from the history
and social arrangement which has formed
him; and
(c) because Nozick seems not to attend to the
many functions that a state may fulfil
besides that of policing the rights of
its members".
Notwithstanding these objections, and notwithstanding the different inflexion
Nozick adopts (relative toRawls), it emerges in overview that his writings
contribute valuably to the liberalist and individualist view of the relation
between Citizens and their Property. (6)
(3) FRIEDRICH HAYEK'S 'LAW LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY'
Hayek in Law Legislation and Liberty extends the conservative stance of
Nozick to an extreme right-wing degree. His writings have both political
and economic reference; they are liberal in character and capitalist in
orientation; and they advocate the desirability of bringing political democracy
into conformity with the self-regulating nature of a market economy.
Regarding the formation of the state and the operation of the processes of
history, Hayek's vision contemplates a self-centred individual with a wholly-
subjective conception of justice, who acts spontaneously, and whose non-conscious
(5)1983 p 328.
(6)Cf Chapter 3,infra, in particular ~ection 3.5.
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activity characterises the unfolding of his circumstances. Social, political
and economic systems and institutions are accordingly in his view not the
consequence of conscious human creation or preconception, nor are they the
product of the application of objective standards.
Marxian critics (inter alia Kamenka) object to the (right wing) assumptions
of Hayek - that capitalism is morally justified, and that capitalism, with
its 'invisible hand' (Cf Adam Smith), is not preplanned. It seems thdt
some validity exists in their criticism in that the capitalist market appears
to require the underlying support of a patterned and structured legal
system (notwithstanding inter alia Nozick's statement to the contrary).
Ultimately, Hayek's standpoint is anarchist, in that it purports to rationalise
the abolition of all institutions, since in his view, any interference by the
State with the operation of broad market forces, constitutes a violation of
personal freedom. Hayek's liberalism is accordingly not supported by this
writer, since in its extremism, it fails to recognise the meaningful functions
the State can fulfil. Rather than concluding that an interventionist State
is unjust, it seems more appropriate, it is submitted, that such State should
be restrained by requiring its observance of and adherence to naturalist
principles.
(4) PHILIPPE NONET AND PHILIP SELZNICK'S
'LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION
TOWARDS RESPONSIVE LAW'
An innovative standpoint is introduced by Nonet and Selznick in their work
Law and Society in Transition: Towards Responsive Law. An analysis of and
exposition upon their writings in regard to social justice is omitted herein,
brevitatis causa and in an effort to confine this note to the theme at hand.
May it suffice to refer only to their outline of 'repressive law', in order
that the presence of such in South African law (in relation in particular
here to expropriation legislation) might be considered. They state:(7)
(7)Ibid pSI.
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"If we review the various manifestations of repressive law,
two cardinal features emerge. The first is a close integration
of law and politics, in the form of a direct subordination of
legal institutions to public and private governing elites:
law is a pliable tool, readily available to consolidate power,
husband authority, secure privilege, and win conformity. The
second is rampant official discretion, which is at once an
outcome and a chief guarantee of the law's pliability".
Without elaborating these submissions indepth, it seems that South African
expropriation law conforms with this model - in the first regard, vide
Section 1.3.8, and in the latter regard, vide Appendix to Section 3.7.
(5) AN OVERVIEW
The writings of John Rawls have ushered in a new era in political and legal
thinking. If the Hegelian model of history(S) were to be extended to this
context, it would seem that if Rawls' Theory represents a synthetic
culmination of prior contractarian thought, then his treatise has in turn
wi thin the continuum, thetically stimulated a" host of reactions which are
yet to experience a sublimating synthesis.
(8) Vide Section 3.1 infra.
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APPENDIX A.3
APPENDIX TO SECTIO~I 3.4 : IN ELABORATION Of FOOTNOTE (41) THEREOF:
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE UNDER THE EXPROPRIATION ACT 63. OF 1975
AS AMENDED
INTRODUCTION
The Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 as amended, is the statutory expression in
South African law of the state's common law power of dominium eminens. As
is submitted in the main texts supra at various stages in this exposition,
the Act (particularly in respect of the expropriatee's compensation entitle-
ment), falls short however of being an embodiment of the common law heritage
and the contributions of naturalist and contractarian thinking. Although it
is in a sense the consequence of legislative history (as is elaborated in
respect of English law in Section 3.4 supra, and in respect of South African
law in Section 1.3.9 at footnote 15), it could hardly however be said to be
the synthetic (Hegelian)culmination of the diverse strands of broad history
that precede it, since so many themes in legal history are discarded in it or
ignored, either partially or entirely.
The 1975 Act,broadly speaking, (1) is however (from a positivist perspective),
the law that regulates the relation between Citizens and their Property in
circumstances of expropriation. For this reason, an outline of its provisions
is appropriate in the interests of completeness. The complexities (and often
the bewildering nature of administrative practice) can be distilled into the
following model, which sets out in overview in a simplified fashion, the
administrative procedure that exists, in South Africa at present. The words of
Milne J (as he then was) in Durban City Council v Jailani Cafe(2)justify
perhaps the relevance of this analysis:
" ... It (expropriation) appears to me
to be a purely administrative act ... "
(1)T'h' .. 1 d'e varlOUS provlncla or lnances et al having a bearing in matters of
expropriation are not considered herein - vide inter alia Section 1.3.9
supra at footnote (20).
(2)1978 (1) SA 151 (D) at 153 H.
In outline, there are five(3) distinct administrative stages in an
"t" (4)exproprla lon:
A.l the first is the stage of authorisation, in terms of which the
Minister, on behalf of the State, grants approval for the
expropriation;
A.2 the second is the stage of notice, in terms of which the
notice of expropriation is served upon the expropriatee;
A.3 the third is the stage of the passing of ownership and'
possession in the expropriated property 'to the expropriator;
A.4 the fourth is the stage of compensation, at which stage
compensation is negotiated between the expropriatee and
the expropriator;
A.5 the final stage is that of litigation, in the event that
compensation negotiations fail.(5)
(3) The analysis herein was prompted by Wade Administrative Law 1982 ed,
where the three stages in the English system are set out.
(4) The body of this Appendix is adapted from the text of a lecture on
expropriation given by the writer at the University of Natal in 1983.
(5) The writer makes reference herein to the opinions of Or A Gildenhuys,
Advocate M Jacobs, and certain Senior Counsel. These opinions were




A.l THE STAGE OF AUTHORISATION
A.l.l In terms of Section 2(1) of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975, the
power to expropriate private property for public purposes is vested
in the State (as represented by the Minister of Community Development).
This Section reads:
"Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Minister may,
subject to an obligation to pay compensation, expropriate
any property for public purposes, or take the right to use
temporarily any property for public purposes".
A.l.2 In regard to the above extract, it is recorded that it was the Afrikaans
text of the principal Act that was signed. It is important accordingly
to note that where deficiencies in translation arise, or where issues
of interpretation are involved, regard must be had to the wording
employed in that text.
In this regard further, it is noted that the English texts of certain
of the Amending Acts were signed - it would seem here accordingly
that reference in questions of construction should be to the English
text.
A.l.3 The provisions of Sections 2 to 6 of the Expropriation Act set out the
procedure for authorisation. In short, the Minister will receive and
consider the recommendation of the appropriate Government Department,
and in the event that he considers that the public need justifies the
expropriation, he is empowered under Section 2(1) of the Act to authorise
the expropriation, subject to a duty to pay compensation where such is
statutorily provided.
A.l.4 It is noted that ANY property can be expropriated, including both
immovables and movables, and the right to use property temporarily. (Vide
defini tion of "property" in Section 1, read wi th Section 2(1) ) .
A.l.S In terms of Section 3, the Minister is empowered to expropriate immovable
property on behalf of certain juristic persons or bodies, such as
Universities, Colleges, the Atomic Energy Board, the National Monuments
Council, and any other juristic person contemplated in the Act or under
any other law.
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A.l.6 Property can be expropriated also by the Railways (vide Section 4),
by local authorities or municipalities (vide Section 5), or by the
C~mmunity Development Board, subject to the provisions of the Act.
In the last regard1it is necessary to read certain provisions of
other statutes, such as Section 38(1)(a) of the Community Development
Act, 3 of 1966, in conjunction with the Expropriation Act.
A.2 THE STAGE OF NOTICE
A.2.1 In terms of Section 7(1) of the Expropriation Act, the Minister is
obliged to cause a notice of expropriation to be served upon the
owner of the property.
A.?.2 Service can be:
(a) on the owner personally; or
(b) sent or delivered by registered post; or
(c) published in the Government Gazette and in local
newspapers in the event that there are several joint
owners or if the whereabouts of the owner are unknown.
A.2.3 Registered rights must be expropriated separately and a separate
notice sent to each registered rightholder.
A.2.4 The position as regards unregistered rights is different:
(a) In terms of Section 22, all unregistered rights terminate
on the date of expropriation.
(b) In terms of Section 13(1), no compensation is payable by
the State in respect of unregistered rights. (This is
often very harsh for the expropriatee).
353
(c) However, there is an exception to Section 13(1) contained
in Section 9(1)(d), in terms of which unregistered rights
of lessees for business or agricultural purposes, prospective
purchasers who have a personal right through a written contract
of purchase and sale, the holders of builders' liens, and share-
croppers, are permitted to obtain compensation.
(d) It is significant to note that inter alia unregistered residential
lessees cannot claim compensation if their lease right is termi-
nated by expropriation.
A.2.5 Section 7(2) contains certain peremptory provisions regarding the
contents of a valid notice of expropriation - in the event that the
expropriator does not comply therewith, the notice is invalid.
(Vide Cockram "Interpretation of Statutes Chapter VIII).
An as yet unreported matter concerning the Pinetown Municipality has
recently been heard in the Supreme Court regarding the validity of
an expropriation notice.
A.3 THE STAGE AT WHICH OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF THE
EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY PASSES TO THE EXPROPRIATOR
A.3.1 In terms of Section 8(1) of the Expropriation Act, ownership of the
expropriated property passes on the date of expropriation stipulated
in the notice.
A.3.2 Possession of the expropriated property will pass on a date stipulated
in the notice or agreed upon between the parties. This date of posses-
sion will generally not be less than sixty days from the date of
expropriation, unless the property is urgently required by the State.
A.3.3 In terms of Section 8(4), risk in the property passes on the
date of possession, so the owner is responsible for taking
care of and maintaining the property until that date.
A.3.4 In terms of Section 8(6), the owner continues to enjoy the
benefits of and income from the property, and remains liable
for rates and other charges, until the date upon which
possession is handed over.
A.3.5 It is significant to note that the landowner's interest
entitlement under Section 12(3) commences from the date
of possession, and not from the date of expropriation.
This factor can substantially affect the appropriate
quantum of the claim.
A.4 THE STAGE OF COMPENSATION
A.4.1 An entitlement to compensation in South African law arises only
in the event that there is legislative provision in that regard-
(vide Joyce and.MacGregor v Cape Provincial Administration
1946 AD 658 : discussed supra) - a claim for compensation
cannot be grounded upon common law. (Cf Section 1.6 supra).
A.4.2 The provisions of Sections 9 to 13 (in particular Section 12)
regulate the compensation entitlement.
A.4.3 In broad outline, the structure of expropriation claims is
as follows:
(1) In the case of an expropriated landowner
(a) Claim for value of land and improvements, at market
value, under Section 12(1)(a)(i).
(b) Claim for actual financial loss caused by the
expropriation, under Section 12(1)(a)(ii).
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(c) Claim for solatium (equal to 10% of the land value, but
subject to a maximum of RIO 000,00) (being an amount to
compensate for inconvenience attaching to the expropria-
tion), under Section 12(2).
(d) Claim for interest on the compensation award, under Section
12(3).
(e) Claim for costs in the event of litigation, under Section 15.
2. In the case of an expropriated rightholder who is
not disqualified from claiming under the Act
(a) Claim for actual financial loss or inconvenience caused
by the expropriation (including claim for loss of the
right expropriated), under Section l2(l)(b).
(b) Claim for costs in the event of litigation, under
Section 15.




A.4.4 The above submissions,are developed in depth in the earlier work
of this writer, The Expropriation of Leased Business Properties
(1981).
A.4.S The provisions of Section 12,(5) are particularly significant in
the determination of the quantum of compensation to be paid.
A.4.6 It is noted also that claims for compensation should always be
supported by full motivation:
(a) Valuators' reports can be used to motivate land values.
(b) Accountants or actuaries can assist in the preparation of
financial loss claims.
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A.4.7 A section of the Expropriation Act which requires particular mention
is Section 10(5), which provides for the DEEMED ACCEPTANCE of an
expropriation offer in the event that an expropriatee fails to
apply to an appropriate Court for the determination of compensation,
within eight months from the date of the offer of the expropriator,
PROVIDED THAT the expropriator has drawn the attention of the
expropriatee to this section of the Act.
A.5 THE STAGE OF LITIGATION
A.5.1 The provisions of Sections 14 to 18 of the Act have a bearing upon
litigation.
A.5.2 It is suggested that the course of litigation should be adopted only
in the event that negotiations fail. The government departments are
in the experience of the writer very amenable to representations by
the expropriatee, and endeavour to assist in ways that are permitted
by legislation. The importance of detailed negotiation should
accordingly not be overlooked.
A.5.3 A further function of the service of summons can be to interrupt
prescription. The South African law is unsettled on the question
of the date from which prescription operates - whether it is three
years from the date of expropriation or three years from the date
of the first offer of compensation. Whereas Dr A Gildenhuys holds
the latter view, the writer has received contrary opinions from
Senior Counsel. Although the writer supports Dr Gildenhuys' view,
it would seem expedient (until such time that the Court pronounces
on this point) to issue summons prior to the expiry of a three year
period from the date of expropriation, in order that the claim of
a client may not be left open to doubt.
A.5.4 Furthermore, regarding the question of prescription, in the event
that such does operate from the date of the offer of compensation,
the writer records his support for the opinion of Advocate MS Jacobs
(given in the context of Section 10(5)), that such date is the date
of first offer (even if a subsequent increased offer is made).
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A.5.S Regarding the deemed acceptance of an offer under Section 10(S), it
is noted further that although provision is made for the extension
of the eight month period stipulated, it would seem that such
consent cannot (lawfully) be given after the said period has expired.
A.S.G In the event that the parties fail to agree upon compensation, and
provided that litigatiancanbe commenced timeously (vide supra), the
following courses are open to them:
(1) they can either apply to an appropriate Court for the
determination of compensation (to borrow the dictum of the
Act), in which event:
(a) if it is a Supreme Court matter, litigation is
instituted by way of action; or
(b) if it is a Compensation Court matter, litigation
is instituted by motion; or
(2) they can agree to submit the matter to arbitration.
A.S.7 In the event that they elect to litigate, Section 14(1) of the
Act sets out the jurisdiction of the Courts:
(a) In claims less than RlOO 000,00, the matter is heard
in a Compensation Court under Section 16 and under the
Regulations under Section 2S; or
(b) In claims of RlOO 000,00. or more, the matter is heard
in the Supreme Court, unless both parties consent to
the jurisdiction of the Compensation Court.
A.S.8 The costs of litigation are regulated under Section 15 in accordance
with the degree of success achieved by the parties respectively.
A.6 FURTHER ASPECTS
A.6.l Further aspects of the Act (eg: Section 23: withdrawal of Expropriation)
are set out in the remaining Sections thereof. The principal admini-
strative features are however set out supra.
A.6.2 Vide also Appendix to Section 3.7.
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APPENDIX A.4
APPENDIX TO SECTION 3.7 : IN ELABOR~TION OF FOOTNOTE (4) THEREOF:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATUTORY REFORM IN SOUTH AFKICA
APPENDIX TO SECTION 3.7 ( 1 ) INTRODUCTION
The Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 (as amended) has had operation in South
African law since 1 January 1977. Its legislative history(l) is as follows:
TITLE NUMBER DATE OF ASSENT DATE OF COMMENCEMENT
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 20 June 1975 1 January 1977
Expropriation Amendment Act 19 of 1977 8 March 1977 1 January 1977
Expropriation Amendment Act 3 of 1978 3 March 1978 1 January 1977
Expropriation Amendment Act 8 of 1980 18 March 1980 28 March 1980
Expropriation Amendment Act 21 of 1982 16 February 1982 12 March 1982
From the above outline, the principal observations that can be made are that:
(i) South African expropriation law is still in a state of flux, evolution
or synthesis (as evidenced by one new principal Act and four Amending
Acts within the last decade);(2)
(ii) Parliament has indicated a willingness and preparedness to institute
reform or amendment where it is persuaded such is appropriate - it
appears reasonable to conclude that a similar approach will continue,
and that recommendations for further reform will be favourably
entertained;
(l)The development of expropriation legislation prior to 1975 is discussed in
Section 1.3.9 supra at footnote (15), and in the Appendix to Section 3.4
supra. For a comparison between the 1965 and 1975 Expropriation Acts, vide
Van Schalkwyk op cit in particular 1 - 4; 71; 79; 170-1; 283 - 287; and also
pp 60 - 65; 77 at footnote (54); 131 at footnote (88); 225.












The whole of each of these Acts was repealed by Act 63 of 1975 (cf Schedule
to Act 63 of 1975). Vide also preface to Jacobs op cit.
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(iii) Parliament has seen fit on two occasions (1977 and 1978) to pass
retrospective legislation. Although it is noted that the amendments
thereby introduced are perhaps not substantially prejudicial to an
expropriatee, their effect is significant. The sections affected are:
1977 Act
1978 Act
Sections 5(1), 16(4), and 26(2)
Sections 12(2), (3) 16(7), and 25(1).
In his preface to The Law of Expropriation in South Africa, Jacobs comments:
"one would have thought that with so much attention lavished
upon it by the legislature, the expropriation legislation
presently in force in South Africa would at the very least
have been fair to all persons whose rights are affected
thereby and would have been clear in its terms. Unfortunately,
the Act fails to satisfy either of these criteria".
The Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 as amended, is assessed herein in relation
to these two criteria:
(i)
(ii)
Clarity is considered in Section (2) hereof;
Fairness is considered in Section (3) hereof.
and
It is recommended that the observations herein be read in relation to the
sections (of the Act) to which they refer.
(3)Th· d .1S amen ment, regard1ng the solatium entitlement, is perhaps the most
important.
APPENDIX TO SECTION 3.7 (2) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
IMPROVED TRANSLATION AND
EXPRESSION TO PROMOTE CLARITY
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It is submitted that the translation of the Act from ~frikaans (the signed
text) to English and the form of expression adopted, if not being deficient,
is sub-optimal. In order to substantiate this proposition, an analysis is
conducted herein of the translation of Sections 1 to 12 inclusive (the sections
which perhaps have the greatest significance for an expropriatee prior to the
stage of litigation). Although the analysis is not exhaustive, and although
certain of the points infra when viewed in isolation may appear insubstantial,
it is submitted that they in conjunction motivate a proposal for reform (or
at least, closer attention) in the future. Linguistic accuracy and clarity
is vital in statutes by reason of the importance of the statutory wording to
questions of construction and in the ascertainment of the intention of the
legislature.
For ease ef exposition the analysis herein is conducted section by section,






The word "beteken" appears once in the subheading in the Afrikaans
text, while "means" appears thirteen times, and "includes" appears
six times, in the English text.
The words "grond en ander gbed" ("land and other property") are capable
of more precise expression. (Cf: definition of "public purposes" and
heading, and Section 12(1». Vide also definition of "owner").
In the definition of "date of offer of compensation" ("datum van
die vergoedingsaanbod"), the English text is linguistically more
efficient.
The definition of "owner" generates certain contradictions:
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(a) firstly, it suggests that the ownership of land is distinct
from the holding of rights in or over that land (vide discussion
in Section 3.6.4 supra);
(b) secondly, the distinction is curious in that it suggests that
land ownership involves a direct relation between the owner
and the object of his ownership right, and not one in which
the rights of ownership stand mediate in that relation (cf
Section 3.6 supra);
(c) thirdly, the word "any" in the English text, does not appear
in the Afrikaans text.
(v) There appears to be a general looseness in the use of the English
words ("land", "property", "any property") as against the Afrikaans
words ("grond", "goed"). Clarity would be promoted in the event
that the term "property" had been more accurately defined.
(vi) There is vagueness in the words "particular property" in the
definition of "Master".
(vii) In the definition of "public purposes", the words used are capable
of a more accurate restatement to reflect the interpretative efforts
that have been made by the judiciary (vide Section 1.3.8 supra at
footnote 26) and the distinction that has been introduced thereby,
between "governmental purposes" and "public purposes";
(viii) The English text at "this Act", in Section 1, suggests that the
regulations (under Section 25) are subsumed under the Act in one
entity. The Afrikaans text suggests (in the word "ook") that
the Act and the regulations have a separate identity, but are grouped
together in one universal set larger than the Act itself.
SECTION 2:
(i) The Afrikaans text uses "behoudens" and "onderworpe aan", while the
English text uses "subject to" twice.
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(ii) The provisions of Section 2(1) appear capable of more precise
expression - in that the subsection is too broadly phrased, it
contradicts (possibly) Section 22, notwithstanding the first
clause of Section 2(1).
In elaboration: whereas the first "subject to" clause modifies the
power to expropriate, it does not appear to modify the liability to
compensate, which seems regulated by the second "subject to" clause
only. Although the intention of the legislature is perhaps apparent
from the Act as a whole, clarity would be promoted by the restatement
of Section 2(1) to reflect that the liability to compensate is
similarly subject to the other provisions of the Act.
(iii) In that the discretion of the Minister is so widely framed, the rights
of expropriatees (from a naturalist and liberalist perspective) are
crucially qualified. It is noted however that the exercise of such
discretion requires still the element of bona fides.
SECTION 3:
(i) "bepaalde" is translated as "any particular" - this is not in itself
irregular but is perhaps an unwarranted amplification.
(ii) A curious statutory feature exists in Section 3(1) in terms of which
'deemed public purposes' are stipulated.
(iii) "'n" is translated as "any". in Section 3(2) (h) and at several other
points in the Act. In terms of Hiemstra and Gonin Engels-Afrikaanse
Regswoordeboek p 11, this is acceptable, although "enige" would seem
more precise.
(iv) The peremptory or otherwise nature of Section 3(3) is perhaps clouded
by the translation of "word" (Afrikaans) as "shall".
(v) In Section 3(4), a vagueness exists in respect of 'by whom' and 'to
whom' such monies stipulated, are "payable". The Act is silent here
on certain questions (eg Estate Agent's commission).
(vi)
(vii)
In Section 3(5), "vergoed" is translated as "refunded".
Some redundancy and repetition perhaps appears in Sections 3(4)
and 3(5).
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(viii) The Act appears jurisprudentially defective here from a naturalist
perspective in failing to provide that the passing of ownership is
conditional upon the (ultimate or eventual, at least) payment of
compensation, where an entitlement thereto exists.
SECTION 4:
(i) The emergency powers conferred in Section 4(3) appear inappropriately
to have been included in expropriation legislation. (This blurs the
distinction in Section 1.3 supra).
(ii) The reference in Section 4 to "goed" (or "property") appears
inconsistent with the distinction in Section 1 between "grond en
ander goed" ("land and other property").
SECTION 5:
(i) The grammar in Section 5(1) (regarding the positioning of "only")
is incorrect.






"bepaalde goed" is translated as "any particular property".
The words "any person" appear perhaps to violate the principle
that dominium eminens in the hands of the State is inalienable
(vide Section 1.4 supra).
"shall" is translated from both "is" and "moet".· (Contra Hiemstra
and Gonin op cit p 127).
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SECTION 7:
(i) There appears again to be a generally loose usage of "is", "kan" ,
"moet", "word" and "mag".
(ii) "'n" is again translated as "any".
(iii) I n Section 7(2) (c), "shall" appears to lack a counterpart in the
Afrikaans text.
(iv) The words "full particulars" fail to indicate the nature of the
disclosure required.
(v) In Section 7(4), the words "'n kennisgewing dat ••. " have a different
sense to the words "a notice to the effect that.·... ".
(vi) The word "beoog" would perhaps be more appropriate than "bedoel".
(vii) The words "of gebruik" and "moet" are omitted from the English text.
(viii) The words "i f the property to be expropriated is land", suggest that
the word "property" is being inconsistently used, when viewed in
relation to Section 1.
(ix) "verblyfplek" is translated as "whereabouts" in Section 7(5).
(x) There is an addi tional word. "is" in the English text that does
not appear in the Afrikaans text.
(xi) The Active Voice is used in Section 7(5) in English, whereas the
Passive Voice is used in Afrikaans - there would appear to be no
direct justification for this.
(xii) The verbs "bestel" and "publiseer" are used in the Afrikaans text,






The customary co-identity accorded to "Minister" and the "State" ,
finds a divergence in Section 8(2) - the separation of these two
concepts that is thereby posed, is curious.
In Sections 8(3) and 8(4) (also 7(2)(c», "oordeel" is translated
as "opinion"; contra "Section 9(1) proviso, whE:re "discretion" is
suggested by "na goeddunke".
The peremptory suggestion is on occasion lessened or heightened by
the translation eg: in Section 8(3), "wat bestel moet word" becomes
"to be served".
(iv) In Section 8(7), "shall" is supplied in the translation, and "koste"







"die" is translated as "such".
"full particulars" again fails to disclose the nature thereof.
In Section 9(1)(b), the passive and active voices are interchanged.
In Sections 9(1)(c) and 9(1)(d), exactly the same words are translated
in the English text in a different way:"indien die goed wat onteien
word, grond is".
In Section 9(l)(d)(i):
(a) the word "and" is supplied (cf also 9(1)(d)(ii»;
(b) "die kontrak" becomes "it";
(c) "kontrak" then becomes "lease";
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(vi) The reasonableness of the requirement that the contract must be
written, comes into question in Section 9(1)(d)(iii).
(vii) The word "sharecropper" does not appear in the two volume Oxford English
Dictionary, nor does it appear in Bosman Tweetaligewoordeboek in the
English section, al though "deelsaaier" does appear in the Afrikaans
section thereof. It appears however in Hiemstra and Gonin, op cit.
(viii) "be posted" is translated from "gepos kan word".
(ix) The words "na goeddunke" hold less connotation of "opinion" than they
do of 'at his will' or 'at his pleasure'.
(x) In Section 9(2), there are punctuation inconsistencies: commas in the
English text do not appear in the Afrikaans text.
(xi) "nodig ag" is translated as "may consider necessary".
(xii) Section 9(3) is ambiguous in that it is not clear from when the
"sixty days" runs.
(xiii) Sections 9(3), 9(5) and 9(6), would appear to fall short of" the
efficiency of operation they could have created: eg: it seems
that the Minister cannot require or force the expropriatee to
deliver the title deeds, but can merely charge him in the criminal
law for failing to do so; furthermore, frauds appear constituted
only if they appear in a w~itten instrument.
SECTION 10:
(i) The words "en wel" do not appear to have a counterpart in the English
text.
(ii) " reasons exist why ... " in Section 10(1) constitutes a mistake
of syntax - it should be I~ •• reasons exist that ... ", "reason" and






I.n Section 10(3), "shall" corresponds to "is" in the Afrikaans text.
"bepaal" is translated as "may allow".





The wording in Section 11(1) is convoluted and clumsy.
"geag word" is translated as "shall be deemed".






"moet" is translated as "to be" this is an important difference
in view of the effect it has in Section 12 - it perhaps 'lessens' the
degree of the compensation entitlement.
The word "eienaar" ("owner") is curiously limiting in its conventional
sense (however contra Section 1) in regard to the classes of persons
who are compensable.
The English words "make good" are more restrictive than the Afrikaans
word "vergoed".
(iv) "any" here corresponds to "enige", in contra-distinction to the
normal use in the Act of "'n".
(v) The words "all land" in the (signed) English text of Section 12(2)
could be far better phrased to avoid the ambiguity as to whether
solatium is claimable on each property under a combined notice of
expropriation.
368
(vi) "verkoop was" is translated as "if sold".
(vii) "there shall be" is translated as "word daar".
(viii) "neem" in Section 12(3) appears to be positioned in contravention
of principles of Afrikaans sentence structuring.
(ix) The grammar in Section 12(3)(a)(i) is defective by reason of the
'hanging preposition' found in "of".
(x) The ambiguity in the English text in "from", is not contained in
the Afrikaans text in "na".
(xi) The word "resolved" is a malapropism - it should perhaps be
"removed" (as translated from "verdwyn").
(xii) "na daardie datum" does not appear in the English text, nor does
"en wel".
(xiii) "shall" does not appear in the Afrikaans text.




In Section 12(4), "'n" is translated as "any".
Clarity would be promoted in Section 12(5)(h)(iii) if the extent
of the word "any" (or "'n") was more clearly delineated.
In overview, it emerges that the standards of translation and expression are
not of the level that ought to be embodied in statutory law. These deficiencies,
inaccuracies and mistakes lessen the meaning, the clarity and the merit of the
legislature's intention as expressed. The list given is by no means exhaustive,
but it highlights that these defects are accordingly an appropriate forum for
a focus of reform and improvement by our parliamentary draftsmen in the
future. Furthermore, in the interim, in instances of controversy, reliance
should be placed on the signed text.
APPENDIX TO SECTION 3.7 (3) THE CRITERION OF FAIRNESS:
RECQt·1t1ENDATIONS FOR STATUTORY REFORM
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The criterion of fairness as it exists in the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975
as amended, is considered herein from a naturalist liberalist and contractarian
perspective. For ease and consistency of exposition, the analysis infra is structur
wi thin the five administrative staqes set out in the Appendix to Section 3.4 supra.
( 1) THE STAGE OF AUTHORISATION:
Within the confines of the Act itself, no major criticism is raised regarding
the authorisation procedure set out. The vesting of capacity in the Minister
to authorise an expropriation, is an administrative procedure acceptable
under contractarian thinking, since expediency and efficiency in the
executive's operations, militate against a separate legislative authorisation
for each expropriation. (Contra: 1845 Land Clauses Act in England). It is
noted however that since the Minister acts as the authorised agent of
Parliament, he would appear bound in the exercise of his discretion, to
observe the 'Volonte Generale', and to execute this quasi-fiduciary mandate
bona fide.
Where criticism is possible however, is at a stage antecedent to the
provisions of the Act - ie at its inception. Under Social Contract theory
expropriation is permissible or legitimate if authorised by the 'General Will'
and in the furtherance of public purposes. Where an authority is conferred
by the White Parliament upon its appointed Minister to execute functions that
contravene the liberty and equality' of the majority (Cf: Group Areas expropri-
ation - cf Sections 1.3.8 and 2.6 supra), the legitimacy of this authorisation
is questionable. To eliminate this objection, the political restructuring of
South African society would appear to be required. Since such reform is
accordingly no longer legislative in character, it is not explored further
herein.
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(2) : THE STAGE OF NOTICE
(i) In the event that the State was obliged to make an offer of
compensation in the notice in respect of land claims, the potential
prejudice of expropriatees in the absence of such an offer, would be
considerably alleviated. On the one hand, delays in settlement could
be removed thereby (since the expropriatee would have knowledge at the
time of expropriation of the State's assessment of the value of his
property), and on the other hand, the costs he might (unnecessarily)
incur in having his property valued and in consulting his advisers,
would be avoided. Both the background of practice and a consideration
of equity, indicate to the writer the importance of this proposal.
This recommendation could not however extend to financial loss claims,
since the quantum of such would be in the particular knowledge of the
expropriatee only.
(ii) A further recommendation relates to the fact that in its present form,
the Act terminates the rights of unregistered lessees (and others) yet
does not necessarily require that they be given notice thereof. It
appears equitable that an unregistered rightholder ought to receive
formal notice that the property over which his right operates, has
been expropriated. Such notice would appear best given at the time
that the notice of expropriation is served upon the registered owner.
This proposal would require the amendment of Section 7(4). A
convenient procedure would be the obligatory publication of a notice
of expropriation in the Government Gazette.
(iii) The provisions of Section 7(2)(c) do not appear to preclude the
possibility of retrospective expropriations. It is submitted that
such ought to be prohibited statutorily unless cogent circumstances
exist requiring same.
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(iv) It is recommended that legislation should be consolidated to provide
a single uniform procedure. Until such is instituted, it appears
necessary that the Act should permit the expropriatee to contest
the adoption of a procedure prejudicial to his interests, where an
alternative and less harsh procedure exists. By way of examples:
(a) If the expropriator expropriates properties under a combined
notice, then the expropriatee should be entitled to contest
this if such procedure operates detrimentally upon his solatium
entitlement under Section 12(2);
(b) If the expropriator expropriates under (for example) Natal
Ordinance 19 of 1945, the expropriatee ought to be able to
require his re-expropriation under Act 63 of 1975, if the former
prejudices the quantum of his compensation.
(3) : THE STAGE AT WHICH OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION PASS
------------------------------------------------------
(i) The writer raises no objection to ownership and possession passing at
the date(s) stipulated in the notice, and supports the sixty day
provision in Section 8(3). Regarding the proviso to Section 8(3)
however, it is submitted that the expropriatee should be permitted
access to the Courts in the event that he is substantially prejudiced
by the Minister's exercise of his discretion. In general in the Act,
it would seem that the discretion of the Minister should be framed in
a less broad manner.
(ii) The provisions of Section 8 jn general however appear consistent with
equity, save perhaps for the automatic release of the property from
any mortgage bonds to which it is subject. This is a curious feature,
in that the (real) right of the mortgagee could conceivably be
prejudiced thereby - eg where the State's assessment of compensation
payable is less than the amount of the bond granted.
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(4) : THE STAGE OF COMPENSATION
(i) It is in respect of the stage of compensation, that the principal
objections to the Act (on grounds of fairness) arise. In an article
in the Financial Mail of 14 October 1983, at p 34, the recommendation
is made in a headnote:
"Compensation for expropriating property in South
Africa is sometimes grossly unfair. The system
is cumbersome and outmoded. It needs thorough
investigation" .
The article records several examples in which inequity (of a gross
degree) has arisen. In outline, the following situations are
mentioned - this writer appends herein his observations thereto:
(a) an instance is given in which the expropriator acquired property,
and two years later resold it for twenty times the amount paid.
(The writer in his experience has encountered similar inequitable
situations. In one in Ladysmith, Natal, the expropriatee was
offered Rx, he had a bond for R4x, and a sworn appraisal of
market value for R7x. Had he accepted the offer, he would
have had to contribute R3x just to repay the bond).
(b) reference is made to the fact that "there are a daunting forty·
expropriation statutes which deal with expropriation and
compensation in South Africa" - here then again, the need for
consolidation is raised.
(c) the article refers also to the fact that our laws "fall short of
equity because they deal only with tangible losses incurred in
the actual loss of land". In this regard, it is noted that the
market value test in Section 12 is deficient in the valuation of
special purpose or special use properties, (eg churches, mosques,
schools, etc), and in circumstances where comparable sale~ are
lacking. Vide: Minister of Agriculture v Federal Theological
Seminary 1979(4) SA 162 (E); Minister of Agriculture v Estate
Randeree and Others 1979 (1) SA 145 (A); Gray Coach Lines v City
of Hamilton (1971-2) 1 LCR 181.
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(d) our expropriation statute fails to consider losses occasioned by
"injurious affection" - eg: the depressed effect on property
values by virtue of the proximate location of a sewage farm or
airport.
The writer has been advised by Dr Gildenhuys that SAPOA (South
African Property Owners' Association) is currently making
representations to the government that statutory recognition of
such losses is appropriate. In English and American law, com-
pensation is p~yable in this regard. The submission of this
writer is that such inclusion would be equitable.
Vide: Tongaat Group v Minister of Agriculture 1977(2) SA 961 (A);
Richmond Elks Hall Association v Richmond Development Agency
561 F 2d 1327 (USA).
(e) the solatium entitlement under Section 12(2) seems somewhat
arbitrary and inflexible. For example, the same award is made
where a property worth RI00 000,00 is expropriated, as is made
where a property worth several million rand is involved.
(f) the endorsement of the title deeds of land. earmarked for
expropriation is recommended, in order that prospective
purchasers are not misled. (ef Glen Anil developments in Natal).
(g) the article concludes with the observation that
"It is never a good idea to invest any level of
government with powers without their being able
to be called to aqcount in the courts for adequate
compensation. Under expropriation practice in this
country today, the ability of the courts to determine
fair compensation is far too circumscribed in all but
straightforward cases. The whole question needs
legislati ve review".
It appears that the Financial Mail article leans to an extent
perhaps in the direction of Robert Nozick's theory of a minimally
interventionist state, as expressed in Anarchy State and Utopia
(1974); but in any event, it leans in favour of fairness. Although
an extreme stance on this issue is not however herein advocated, since
the public need requires a certain compromise of individual liberty,
the recommendations made in the Financial Mail nevertheless have
considerable substance.
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(ii) Jacobs in The Law of Expropriation in South Africa (at pp 5 - 8)
records certain additional criticisms and suggestions for
amendment, principal among which are the following:
(Those stated supra are not re-included herein. The comments of
Jacobs infra, are modified by the observations of this writer):
(a) the noncompensability of unregistered rights in general, save
for the exclusions in Section 9(1), is inconsistent with equity.
(b) the-residual portion paid to a landowner by virtue of the
provisions of Section 12(S)(h)(iii), can give rise to a
particularly harsh operation of law.
(c) substantial uncertainties exist in respect of the compensation
entitlement of mortgagees and purchasers (with a jus in personam
ad rem acquirendam).
(d) the recognition in appropriate instances of a 'value to the owner'
test, represents an apparently necessary departure from strict
adherence to the market value criterion - eg: modifications to a
house by a paraplegic owner may even detract from its market
value. The inclusion in our Act of provisions similar to those
in the New Brunswick Expropriation Act (Section 38(1)(d», would
be a valuable extension - in terms of that statute, "any special
economic advantage arising out of his occupation" is to be taken
into account in assessing compensation.
(e) the 'home-for-a-home' principle applied in some foreign juris-
dictions, is of value in circumstances where the compensation
paid does not cover the costs of relocation. The opportunity and
scope for the application of this principle exists in our law,
particularly in respect of Group Areas expropriations.
(cf: Section 1Sof Ontario Expropriation Act 1973).
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(iii) In addition to the above, the recommendations of this writer include
the following:
(a) the failure to recognise the claims of expropriated residential
lessees, appears to be without substance (contra: Section
9(1)(d)(i), which recognises leases for business or agricultural
purposes).
(b) solatium (under Section 12(2» and interest (under Section 12(3»
should not be confined only to land claims.
(c) the entitlement to the recognition of losses occasioned by the
expropriation scheme broadly (cf Section 12(5)(f», should extend
to claims under Section 12(1)(b), and should not be limited (as
is the case at present) to those under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act.
(d) the provisions of Section 10(5) should be amended to afford the
expropriatee a protection against the deemed acceptance of
compensation upon expiry of the stipulated eight month period.
(e) the expropriatee should have the right to require the Minister
to advance payment (prior to settlement but after ownership and
possession has passed), in an amount equal to the offer of
compensation made. This would require the amendment of Section
(11)(1) of the Act.
(f) consideration should be given to the introduction of 'betterment
levies' (as exist in English law - vide Davies op cit and Cripps
op cit), in. terms of which the State can require a contribution
from owners whose properties have been considerably enhanced by
a broad expropriation scheme. Of course, recognition would
have to be accorded to the fact that such enhancement was
occasioned without the participation of the owner: a percentage-
based contribution would accordingly perhaps be appropriate.
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(g) it is recommended that the State should establish an independent
organisation in each major centre to advise expropriatees (at a
reduced charge, if any) regarding their preparation and submission
of claims. Alternatively, such could perhaps appropriately be
included within the ambit of the Legal Aid offices, although a
revision of the means test would be necessary in respect of such
matters. This proposal is made partly by reason of the fact that
the expropriatee should not be required to carry the full burden
of financing a claim precipitated unilaterally by the State.
As a further alternative, it is submitted that legislative reform
should be introduced to permit the claimability of legal costs
occasioned by the expropriation, subject to the provision of a
formula regulating on a sliding scale in relation to the quantum
of the settlement, the maximum such costs recoverable.
(h) the list of items herein is not exhaustive. The establishment
of an ongoing commission which would receive and consider
representations by members of the public regarding reform, would
be a valuable contribution to the promotion of social justice,
particularly in view of the extent of amendment that appears
necessary at present.
(5) : THE STAGE OF LITIGATION:
(i) The streamlining and consolidation of procedure between the various
Acts and the Ordinances on the one hand, and that set out within the
Expropriation Act itself (i~ the different nature of the proceedings
instituted in the Compensation Court and the Supreme Court), is
recommended in the interests of uniformity.
(ii) Under Section 14, jurisdiction is conferred upon the said two courts
upon the basis of whether the claim is less than RIOO 000,00 or not.
It is recommended that jurisdiction be conferred upon a 'small
claims court' (in the event that such is established in South Africa),
to hear claims of an appropriate quantum.
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(iii) It is submitted that the costs formula in Section 15 should reflect
recognition of 'vexations negotiations' conducted by either party
prior to the stipulated date (ie "one month prior to the date for
which the proceedings were first placed on the roll"). This amendment
would stand against unfair offers being made by the expropriator; it
would discourage inflated claims by expropriatees; it would facilitate
and expedite settlement; and it would streamline the administrative
process.
(The writer notes in this regard that he has encountered instances in
which the first offer of an expropriator was one-third the final
agreed settlement, and by contrast, expropriatees who have been pleased
to accept substantially less than they initially claimed).
(6) : FURTHER ASPECTS
(i) It is recommended that the discretion of the Minister be extended to
permit the withdrawal (in appropriate circumstances) of an expropria-
tion at any stage prior to settlement. This would require the repeal
of the proviso to Section 23 of the Act.
(ii) It is submitted that equity would be promoted in the event that the
audi alteram partem principle had application in the sense that the
expropriatee (or any other interested party) be entitled to make
representations against the congruence of the proposed (or instituted)
expropriation with considerations of public need.
(iii) The establishment of a Lands Tribunal (as in certain foreign
jurisdictions) dealing in particular with expropriation and related
matters, could promote a specialised focus on this field. In view of
the volume of expropriation activity that is anticipated in South Africa
in the future (cf Section 4.3), such recommendation may contain merit
and substance.
(iv) The introduction of a procedure similar to 'inverse condemnation' in
United States law (vide dis~ussion in Section 1.3.3 supra), is recommended.
(v) In final analysis, statutory reform on a large scale emerges as being
both necessary and desirable in South African expropriation law. Further
detailed research in this regard is accordingly strongly recommended.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION B.l A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ON
EXPROPRIATION TEXTS
Notwithstanding the difficulty outlined in Preface: Section P.4 supra,
(that the availability of research materials in this field in South African
University libraries is limited), the writer was fortunate to be granted
access to certain private libraries. The majority of the non-South African
works cited herein were obtained from these latter sources.
In the field of foreign and comparative expropriation law, in particular
regarding the United States' system, the magnum opus is Nichols' twenty
volume treatise The Law of Eminent Domain. To the knowledge of the writer,
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Eminent Domain and Todd The Law of Expropriation and Compensation in Canada -
the writer is sincerely grateful to Advocate Jacobs for having presented
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are Cripps Compulsory Acquisition of Land and Davies The Law of Compulsory
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Purchase and Compensation (ISBN 421007508).
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